


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THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN
THE WORLD WAR

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY
OF THE WORLD WAR

JAMES T. SHOTWELL, LL.D., *General Editor.*

RUSSIAN SERIES

SIR PAUL VINOGRADOFF, F.B.A., *Editor.*
(Died, December 19, 1925.)

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY, PH.D., *Associate Editor.*

THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR

By

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL NICHOLAS N. GOLOVINE

FORMERLY PROFESSOR IN THE RUSSIAN IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE RUSSIAN ARMIES ON THE RUMANIAN FRONT

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

IN the autumn of 1914, when the scientific study of the effects of war upon modern life passed suddenly from theory to history, the Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace proposed to adjust the program of its researches to the new and altered problems which the War presented. The existing program, which had been prepared as the result of a conference of economists held at Berne in 1911, and which dealt with the facts then at hand, had just begun to show the quality of its contributions; but for many reasons it could no longer be followed out. A plan was therefore drawn up at the request of the Director of the Division, in which it was proposed, by means of an historical survey, to attempt to measure the economic cost of the War and the displacement which it was causing in the processes of civilization. Such an "Economic and Social History of the World War," it was felt, if undertaken by men of judicial temper and adequate training, might ultimately, by reason of its scientific obligations to truth, furnish data for the forming of sound public opinion, and thus contribute fundamentally toward the aims of an institution dedicated to the cause of international peace.

The need for such an analysis, conceived and executed in the spirit of historical research, was increasingly obvious as the War developed, releasing complex forces of national life not only for the vast process of destruction, but also for the stimulation of new capacities for production. This new economic activity, which under normal conditions of peace might have been a gain to society, and the surprising capacity exhibited by the belligerent nations for enduring long and increasing loss—often while presenting the outward semblance of new prosperity—made necessary a reconsideration of the whole field of war economics. A double obligation was therefore placed upon the Division of Economics and History. It was obliged to concentrate its work upon the problem thus presented, and to study it as a whole; in other words, to apply to it the tests and disciplines of history. Just as the War itself was a single event, though penetrating by seemingly unconnected ways to the remotest parts of the world, so the analysis of it must be developed

according to a plan at once all embracing and yet adjustable to the practical limits of the available data.

During the actual progress of the War, however, the execution of this plan for a scientific and objective study of war economics proved impossible in any large and authoritative way. Incidental studies and surveys of portions of the field could be made and were made under the direction of the Division, but it was impossible to undertake a general history for obvious reasons. In the first place, an authoritative statement of the resources of belligerents bore directly on the conduct of armies in the field. The result was to remove as far as possible from scrutiny those data of the economic life of the countries at war which would ordinarily, in time of peace, be readily available for investigation. In addition to this difficulty of consulting documents, collaborators competent to deal with them were for the most part called into national service in the belligerent countries and so were unavailable for research. The plan for a war history was therefore postponed until conditions should arise which would make possible not only access to essential documents, but also the coöperation of economists, historians, and men of affairs in the nations chiefly concerned, whose joint work would not be misunderstood either in purpose or in content.

Upon the termination of the War, the Endowment once more took up the original plan, and it was found with but slight modification to be applicable to the situation. Work was begun in the summer and autumn of 1918. In the first place a final conference of the Advisory Board of Economists of the Division of Economics and History was held in Paris, which limited itself to planning a series of short preliminary surveys of special fields. Since, however, the purely preliminary character of such studies was further emphasized by the fact that they were directed more especially toward those problems which were then fronting Europe as questions of urgency, it was considered best not to treat them as part of the general survey, but rather as of contemporary value in the period of war settlement. It was clear that not only could no general program be laid down *a priori* by this conference as a whole, but that a new and more highly specialized research organization than that already existing would be needed to undertake the "Economic and Social History of the World War," one based more upon national grounds in the first in-

stance, and less upon purely international coöperation. Until the facts of national history could be ascertained, it would be impossible to proceed with comparative analysis; and the different national histories were themselves of almost baffling intricacy and variety. Consequently the former European Committee of Research was dissolved, and in its place it was decided to erect an Editorial Board in each of the larger countries and to nominate special editors in the smaller ones, who should concentrate, for the present at least, upon their own economic and social war history.

The nomination of these boards by the General Editor was the first step taken in every country where the work has begun. And if any justification were needed for the plan of the Endowment, it at once may be found in the lists of those, distinguished in scholarship or in public affairs, who have accepted the responsibility of editorship. This responsibility is by no means light, involving as it does the adaptation of the general editorial plan to the varying demands of national circumstances or methods of work; and the measure of success attained is due to the generous and earnest coöperation of those in charge in each country.

Once the editorial organization was established, there could be little doubt as to the first step which should be taken in each instance toward the actual preparation of the History. Without documents there can be no history. The essential records of the War, local as well as central, have therefore to be preserved and to be made available for research in so far as is compatible with public interest. But this archival task is a very great one, belonging of right to the Governments and other owners of historical sources and not to the historian or economist who proposes to use them. It is an obligation of ownership; for all such documents are public trust. The collaborators on this section of the War History, therefore, working within their own field as researchers, could only survey the situation as they found it and report their findings in the forms of guides or manuals; and perhaps, by stimulating a comparison of methods, help to further the adoption of those found to be most practical. In every country, therefore, this was the point of departure for actual work; although special monographs have not been written in every instance.

The first stage of the work upon the War History, dealing with little more than the externals of archives, seemed for a while to

exhaust the possibilities of research, and had the plan of the History been limited to research based upon official documents, little more could have been done, for once documents have been labeled "secret" few government officials can be found with sufficient courage or initiative to break open the seal. Thus vast masses of source material essential for the historian were effectively placed beyond his reach, although much of it was quite harmless from any point of view. While war conditions thus continued to hamper research, and were likely to do so for many years to come, some alternative had to be found.

Fortunately such an alternative was at hand in the narrative, amply supported by documentary evidence, of those who had played some part in the conduct of affairs during the War, or who, as close observers in privileged positions, were able to record from first- or at least second-hand knowledge the economic history of different phases of the Great War, and of its effect upon society. Thus a series of monographs was planned consisting for the most part of unofficial yet authoritative statements, descriptive or historical, which may best be described as about halfway between memoirs and blue-books. These monographs make up the main body of the work assigned so far. They are not limited to contemporary war-time studies; for the economic history of the War must deal with a longer period than that of the actual fighting. It must cover the years of "deflation" as well, at least sufficiently to secure some fairer measure of the economic displacement than is possible in purely contemporary judgments.

With this phase of the work, the editorial problems assumed a new aspect. The series of monographs had to be planned primarily with regard to the availability of contributors, rather than of source material as in the case of most histories; for the contributors themselves controlled the sources. This in turn involved a new attitude toward those two ideals which historians have sought to emphasize, consistency and objectivity. In order to bring out the chief contribution of each writer it was impossible to keep within narrowly logical outlines; facts would have to be repeated in different settings and seen from different angles, and sections included which do not lie within the strict limits of history; and absolute objectivity could

not be obtained in every part. Under the stress of controversy or apology, partial views would here and there find their expression. But these views are in some instances an intrinsic part of the history itself, contemporary measurements of facts as significant as the facts with which they deal. Moreover, the work as a whole is planned to furnish its own corrective; and where it does not, others will.

In addition to the monographic treatment of source material, a number of studies by specialists are already in preparation, dealing with technical or limited subjects, historical or statistical. These monographs also partake to some extent of the nature of first-hand material, registering as they do the data of history close enough to the source to permit verification in ways impossible later. But they also belong to that constructive process by which history passes from analysis to synthesis. The process is a long and difficult one, however, and work upon it has only just begun. To quote an apt characterization; in the first stages of a history like this, one is only "picking cotton." The tangled threads of events have still to be woven into the pattern of history; and for this creative and constructive work different plans and organizations may be needed.

In a work which is the product of so complex and varied coöperation as this, it is impossible to indicate in any but a most general way the apportionment of responsibility of editors and authors for the contents of the different monographs. For the plan of the History as a whole and its effective execution the General Editor is responsible; but the arrangement of the detailed programs of study has been largely the work of the different Editorial Boards and divisional Editors, who have also read the manuscripts prepared under their direction. The acceptance of a monograph in this series, however, does not commit the editors to the opinions or conclusions of the authors. Like other editors, they are asked to vouch for the scientific merit, the appropriateness, and usefulness of the volumes admitted to the series; but the authors are naturally free to make their individual contributions in their own way. In like manner the publication of the monographs does not commit the Endowment to agreement with any specific conclusions which may be expressed therein. The responsibility of the Endowment is to History itself—an obligation not to avoid but to secure and preserve variant narra-

tives and points of view, in so far as they are essential for the understanding of the War as a whole.

* * * * *

In the case of Russia, civil war and revolution followed so closely upon the World War that it is almost impossible for history to measure with any degree of accuracy the effects of the World War itself upon the economic and social life of the country. Those effects were so distorted by the forces let loose in the post-war years and so confused with the disturbances of the revolutionary era that the attempt to isolate the phenomena of the War from the data of civil war and to analyze the former according to the plan followed in the other national series of this collection has been a task of unparalleled difficulty. Over and above the intricacies of the problem and its illusive character, the authors of the Russian monographs have had to work under the most discouraging circumstances and with inadequate implements of research. For those who know the scarcity of the documentary material available, it will be a matter of no little surprise to find, in the pages of this Russian Series, narratives and substantiating data which measure up so well in comparison with those prepared by the collaborators in other countries. The achievement of the Russian Division of the History is, all things considered, the most remarkable section of the entire collection. This is due, in the first place, to the fact that the authors, all of them exiles who live in foreign lands, have not only brought to this task the scientific disciplines of their own special fields but also an expert knowledge drawn from personal experience which in several instances reached to the highest offices of State.

While these volumes in the Russian History constitute so very considerable an achievement, they cannot in the very nature of the case cover with adequate statistical or other specific data many of the problems with which they deal. No one is more conscious of their shortcomings in this regard than the authors themselves. Nevertheless, with inadequate material and under hampering circumstances they have prepared a body of text and a record which, if admittedly incomplete as history, contains at least one element that would otherwise be lost for the future understanding of this great crisis in human affairs, an element which no other generation working from Russian archives could ever supply. We have here the mature com-

ment upon events by contemporaries capable of passing judgment and appraising values, so that over and above the survey of phenomena there is presented a perspective and an organization of material which will be a contribution to history hardly less important than the substance of the monographs.

The Russian Series was in the first instance planned by one of the most distinguished of Russian scholars who had long been a resident of England, Sir Paul Vinogradoff, Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of Oxford. To the planning of the Series Sir Paul gave much time and thought. His untimely death in December, 1925, prevented him from seeing its fruition or from assuming the editorial responsibility for the texts. Nevertheless, the Series as a whole remains substantially as he had planned it.

The present volume deals with one of the most burning and tragic pages of Russian war history, the effect of the War upon the Russian army. In order to present this story adequately General Golovine has found it necessary to describe the organization of the army and its war-time history as well as the attitude of mind of the soldier. The theme of this volume, as outlined by the editor, Sir Paul Vinogradoff, is therefore a sociological study of that element of the national life of Russia which was most directly affected by the War. To secure an authoritative analysis of so highly specialized a subject, Sir Paul turned to General Golovine, not only because of the part he played in the War itself, but also because, as a former professor in the Russian Imperial General Staff College at St. Petersburg, he had devoted much time and thought to these very problems. This will explain why it is that a volume of this kind, written by a professional soldier, should be included in a series that describes the impact of the War upon the normal course of national life.

The story which General Golovine contributes, moreover, is not so narrowly technical as may appear at first sight. It is the most complete and exhaustive account yet published in any language of the terrible losses suffered by Russia during the War. In the light of the evidence produced by this volume the familiar war-time picture of the Russian "steam roller," which hypnotized the world during the War, appears in an entirely different light. The Russia of war-time is no longer that great colossus which, by the sheer force of man power, was thought capable of ultimately crushing all resistance;

instead of this picture we are confronted with a human problem stated in military terms, of a nation brought face to face with the descriptive capacity of modern military science, as no other nation has been. It is difficult to imagine how the futility, wastefulness and horror of war could be demonstrated with greater force than in the rows of deadly statistics which are so clearly presented in the following pages. By the successful fulfilment of his difficult task General Golovine has rendered a real service to the cause of peace.

J. T. S.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

"THE generation that has endured the World War has at last come to grips with the problem of war itself. The movement to eliminate it from international dealings is not based upon sentiment nor emotion, although they may fortify its purpose; it is gaining rather than losing in strength as the poignant memories of the war grow fainter, because it embodies the major lesson of the whole vast tragic experience, that as between the highly civilized nations war has become a futile instrument incapable of direction and therefore criminal in use." With these words Professor James T. Shotwell begins his book, *War as an Instrument of National Policy and Its Renunciation in the Pact of Paris*.

The volume now offered to the attention of the reader was completed before the book of Professor Shotwell appeared in print. The present author, therefore, is particularly happy to associate himself with the words of Professor Shotwell. His own detailed analysis of the tragedy through which Russia went during the War and which led her to an immense social upheaval may serve as a convincing example of the truth of the conclusion arrived at in the paragraph quoted.

"Surely to no nation," writes Winston Churchill, "has Fate been more malignant than to Russia. Her ship went down in sight of port. She had actually weathered the storm when all was east away." The fate of Russia, indeed, has features hitherto unknown in the history of war. She was defeated though her enemies won no decisive victory on the battlefields. An Empire covering a sixth of the area of the earth, with a population of 167,000,000, began to break up from within. The process of dissolution infected the army, and the breakdown of the latter resulted in the collapse of the Empire.

From the standpoint of social science, this ending of the struggle is of particular interest, for its investigation will aid in making clear what processes are really at work in a nation as a result of the overwhelming strain imposed by a modern war. These processes are subtle and complex, and the study of them involves an analysis of data which hitherto have never been brought within the sphere of scientific investigation in any comprehensive way. The significance of the Series of which this volume forms a part lies in the fact that

it is a pioneer survey in which for the first time the attempt has been made to describe and, if possible, to measure the impact of war upon the normal processes of civilized life. The present work, therefore, should be judged in this setting, as a first attempt to study materials which in the end may throw clarifying light on a most complex sociological problem. It is a work that may be compared to the footpaths traced by first explorers in unknown countries. Those who follow them will widen the paths or use them in the building of new roads in directions which may prove of greater value.

The author fully realizes the difficulties involved in this problem of estimating the elements of the pressure of war and the effect of that pressure upon the life of a nation. Social measurements are difficult at best, but the chief difficulty here consists in the fact that many manifestations of the pressure which war exerts lie in so uncertain and unexplored a field as that of mass psychology. And to the inherent difficulties of the subject itself must be added the fact that the destruction of the military archives of Russia during the Bolshevik Revolution and the civil wars which followed it has prevented the author from having the use of a great mass of documents which would otherwise have been available.

The purpose of the present work determines its structure. War pressure is put upon a country by the demand from the front for man power and equipment, armament, supplies, and means of transportation. While the volume deals with both the human and the material elements, the attention of the student is especially directed to those which grow out of the demand for man power and the loss in human lives. The study of these problems involves some knowledge of the military operations by which the processes of war are carried on; but military operations in themselves are dealt with in this volume only in broadest outline and only in so far as is necessary to explain how the demands of the front arose and had to be met, and how the fortunes of war affected the psychology of that vast aggregate of human beings which make up the conscripted armies of modern war.

In estimating the pressure put upon Russia by the War, the following method has for the most part been employed. It has been held that Russia possessed power of endurance proportionate to the size of her population and the vastness of her area. There was a kind of

“mirage” of immense possibilities based on the immensity of resources. In order to clear up this error, the author has devoted his first three chapters to these conditions which determined how far Russia was in a position to bear the pressure imposed upon her by the World War. These chapters are: I. The Conscription Laws; II. Distribution of the Burden of Conscription; III. Causes of Inadequate Organization and Supplies. The solution of the problem in which we are interested is impossible without a preliminary investigation of the questions dealt with in these three chapters; for in this way alone can we remain in the atmosphere of tangible fact in which Russia was called upon to make her sacrifices during the War.

Beginning with Chapter IV the author undertakes the examination of the war pressure imposed upon Russia. These chapters are: IV. Man Power and the Size of the Army; V. The Losses of the Army; VI. Combatant and Auxiliary Forces; VII. Munitions of War; VIII. Feeding and Equipping the Army; IX. Transport Organization.

In Chapters IV to IX, therefore, the author makes clear the pressure that war put on Russia. In order to bring out the social and psychological effect of this pressure, the author has added two more chapters: X. The Spirit of the Army before the Revolution; and XI. Disintegration of 1917. To avoid the danger of being personal in his attitude and values, the author has given an opportunity, whenever possible, for other participants to speak and has been scrupulously careful that his choice of evidence should guarantee an unbiased presentation of the facts. This will explain the frequent use of quotations in the text.

In concluding, the author may add that the present volume is merely a part of a larger work which he proposes to write under the title of *Sociology of War*. Whether he will succeed in completing that work it is impossible to say, but he believes that the measures taken by modern civilized nations to prevent the occurrence of a new war will greatly gain in efficiency through such a study of the nature of war as a social phenomenon. The treatment of any disease is put on a sound foundation only when the nature of the ailment itself is fully understood. And war is a social disease.

N. N. G.

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CHAPTER I

THE CONSCRIPTION LAWS

Military Service as a "Sacred Duty."

IN the period preceding the abolition of serfdom in Russia, the social structure of the State clearly determined the system of recruiting. There were many exemptions. The full burden of compulsory military service had to be borne by the lower, the "tax paying," classes of the population, as they were called. It was from them that the recruits were taken. The selection of those who were peasants on private estates depended on the decision of their landlords, whereas all other peasants—owned by the State and by the appanages¹ as also non-privileged citizens, were recruited on the strength of the "Regulations for Recruiting" of 1831. Up to 1834 the length of the term of active service was twenty-five years. Later it was reduced to twenty years, the theory being that for the remaining five years the soldier was on unlimited furlough. Serving for so long the recruits were entirely cut off from the mass of the people; and in point of fact the rank and file of the army formed a class by themselves.

Following the emancipation of the peasants in 1861, such an unjust distribution of the burden of military service could no longer be maintained by the Government of Emperor Alexander II when carrying out the reconstruction of the Russian State on new social bases. Moreover, the German victories in the war of 1870–1871 had demonstrated conclusively that the modern armed force must not be founded on a purely professional army, comparatively small and detached from the people; armies to be raised in time of war were taking more and more the character of "nations in arms."

In the Manifesto of Emperor Alexander II of January 1, 1874, by which the establishment of conscription was proclaimed, the Government considered it necessary to lay special stress on the principle of the defense of the State by the whole nation, which constitutes the basic idea of universal military service. The manifesto read:

The strength of the State does not depend exclusively on the num-

¹ Estates owned by the Imperial family.

ber of its troops, but is based chiefly on the moral and intellectual qualities of the army, which can be fully developed only on condition that the defense of the country has become the common task of the people, and when all, without distinction of rank or class, unite in that sacred cause.

The law establishing universal and compulsory military service was promulgated as the "Conscription Law of 1874." In the first paragraph of the Law it was proclaimed that "the defense of the throne and the country is the sacred duty of every Russian subject. . . ." Thus, military service was declared compulsory, alike for all classes and individuals. In accordance with the new principle of army organization, that the army in time of peace should be, in the first place, a school for the building up of a reserve of trained men who, in an emergency, would be called to the colors and become the army in time of war, entirely different terms of service were set up by the Law. The new term of service was five years, but later it was shortened to four and three. By this the wall which formerly separated the army from the people was removed, and the closest contact between them was established. The Conscription Law of 1874 remained in force for forty years, or until the beginning of the World War. Although in 1912 some changes were made, those changes were not of a radical nature. Moreover, they could not have resulted in anything, for the World War began only two years after their publication. For this reason the study of the conditions created by the Russian legislative measures, designed to make use of the country's man power in time of war, must be based, above everything else, on the study of the Conscription Law of 1874.

Territorial Distribution of the Burden of Conscription.

On the strength of it all native—that is, non-Russian—races in the southeast, or the province of Astrakhan, and the extreme north, or the province of Archangel, both in European Russia and in Asiatic,² were completely freed from military service. This exemption also remained in force under the Law of 1912. Up to 1887 all inhabitants of Trans-Caucasia, as well as those of the northern Caucasus, were also exempted from military service. Later on, how-

² The regions of Turgaisk, Ural, Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Semirechensk, and Siberia.

ever, the non-native peoples of all the Caucasus region were gradually made liable to conscription, though certain mountain tribes of the northern Caucasus were drafted for service on easier terms. The people of Turkestan and far eastern Siberia—the Maritime and Amur regions—were exempted from military service. However, as the construction of railways increased, the privilege was withdrawn. For the people of Finland, conscription, based on special regulations, was in force until 1901, but thereafter the Russian Government, fearing for the safety of St. Petersburg in case of a war with Germany, disbanded the Finnish troops, and, pending the working out of new regulations, the Finlanders were unconditionally exempted from military service. Finally, the Cossacks of the eleven Cossack regions in European and Asiatic Russia³ became liable to military service in accordance with “the Cossack Regulations.” The burden imposed on them by these Regulations was, in certain respects, heavier than that imposed by the Conscription Law on the people in general. An explanation of the existence of the special Regulations for the Cossacks lay in the desire of the Government to give them a law which, although based on identical principles, would be adapted to their customs and historical traditions.

Summing up, we may put the distribution of the burden of conscription among the population of the Empire, as it existed in 1914, in this way: Under the Conscription Law, 87.5 per cent of the Russian people were liable for military service, 2.5 per cent were liable under the Cossack Regulations, and 10 per cent were exempt. Hence, it may be seen that in comparison with the old Regulations the new legislative measures had considerably widened the basis on which the recruiting of the armed force was to be established. Although a part of the population was not subject to military service, according to the Law of 1874, exemption was no longer based on the social status of this or that class.

Term of Service.

That the defense of the country is the personal duty of every citizen constitutes the fundamental principle of the law of compulsory military service.

³ Cossacks of the Don, Kuban, Terek, Astrakhan, Ural, Orenburg, Siberia, Semirechie, Trans-Baikal, Amur, and Asuri.

The imbuing of the people of Russia with that principle was a matter of special moral importance. However, in order that such an idea should take root in the conscience of the masses, especially when they have little education, it is necessary that the law should aim at establishing the principle of social justice. This was the reason why all European States, in their laws creating compulsory military service, made age and physical fitness the principal factors governing enlistment in the army. A young and healthy man makes a better soldier, and he can better endure all the hardships of a campaign.⁴

According to the Russian Conscription Law young men who had just completed their twenty-first year were liable to the call for military duty. In time of peace those fit for service were enrolled in the "active forces" which consisted of the army, the navy, and the Cossack troops. After the completion of their "active service" in accordance with the terms established by the Law, all soldiers, sailors, and Cossacks were transferred to the "reserve" (*zapas*). By the time the Law of 1912 was promulgated the term of active service in the infantry and artillery (with the exception of the horse artillery) was three years. In other branches it was four years, and in the navy five years. The periods of service in the reserve were for those who had served in the infantry and artillery (with the exception of the horse artillery) fifteen years, for the other branches thirteen years, and for the navy five years.

The function of the reserve was to fill out, in case of mobilization, the units of the army. In time of peace reservists were liable to be called out for training, but not more than twice and for periods not longer than six weeks. For reasons of economy the period of training was in reality shorter. Those who had served in the army more than three years were called out only once and for two weeks, and those who had served in the army less than three years were called out twice, for three weeks. After the completion of their service in the reserve the men were transferred to the territorial force (*opolchenie*) where they remained until they were forty-three.

⁴ The World War has shown that certain exemptions are necessary in the case of skilled workmen, whose knowledge is needed more in the rear than at the front. These exemptions, however, are not in conflict with the basic idea of the law since they are dictated by the interests of the State, and not by those of individuals.

A Comparison with Germany.

Thus it follows that, under the Russian law, the burden of military service was distributed among three age groups. From the diagram it may be seen that such a simplified solution of the question was not flexible enough to permit in practice the rigid enforcement of the principle of age. The solution of the same question by Germany may serve for comparison. While in Russia those serving under the Conscription Law were divided, by a differing distribution of the burden of military service, into three groups, in Germany they were divided into six. In time of peace this difference was of little consequence, since the burden was felt only by those who were in the active service, whereas the private life of those who were in the reserve or in the territorial force in Russia, or in the *Landwehr* and the *Landsturm* in Germany, was not disturbed. But in time of war the difference between the two systems of age distribution was considerable. In Russia Groups I and II, on the declaration of war, were embodied in the fighting units, in the ranks of which they fought and died, while Group III served in part to make good losses in the ranks, and in part to form special territorial units, to be used in the rear. In Germany, on the outbreak of war, Groups II and III were immediately called into active service. Group IV (*Landwehr*, Class I) was destined for the formation of special units to be used for military tasks of secondary importance. From Group V (*Landwehr*, Class II) special units were formed, which in the beginning were to be used in the rear, but later might be called to carry out auxiliary tasks at the front. Group VI (*Landsturm*, men over thirty-nine years) was destined for the formation of special units to be used exclusively in the rear and for the protection of the frontiers. Finally, Group I (*Landsturm*, men under twenty) might be used in case of emergency for active service.

Foreseeing, in case of a European war, the enormous need of man power, the German law had given to the Ministry of War a certain freedom in the use of these age groups. For instance, the younger groups of the *Landwehr*, in case of emergency, could be used to reënforce the troops of the first and second line, while the younger groups of the *Landsturm*, Class II, could be used to reënforce the *Landwehr*. A comparison of the two systems, as in the diagram, shows, in the first place, that Germany was preparing for

a greater military effort than Russia. Germany had at her disposal for the needs of national defense twenty-eight classes, while the number of classes liable to service in Russia was only twenty-two. In Chapter II the special conditions in Russia which kept her from putting the same strain upon her man power as other western European States will be set forth. But the differing attitudes of the Russian and the German laws toward the younger age groups will here be pointed out.

The conscription age, according to the Russian law, was determined as follows: the annual call for military duty took place in October, and applied to the young men who, by October 1 of that year, had completed their twenty-first year. According to the German law, young men who had completed their nineteenth year were called out. Having adopted high physical standards, the German law granted provisional exemptions to those who were not quite up to standard; for that reason the average conscription age was somewhat higher, viz., twenty years and six months. Thanks to such a system it was possible to avoid overstraining those who were not yet strong enough, and to make the conscription age one year less than that adopted in Russia. The German law also foresaw the necessity, in case of war, of calling out those who had not reached conscription age. Every youth of seventeen was enlisted in the *Landsturm*; in other words, he became liable to military service. The Russian Law of 1874 had not anticipated such a necessity. As for the Law of 1912, although the possibility of calling out young men who had not reached conscription age was foreseen by it, no definite regulations were formulated to that end. A comparison of the data given in the diagram further shows that despite the fact that, in case of war, Germany was entitled to mobilize a greater number of classes of men than Russia, she had chosen a system which enabled her to adapt the use of her man power to changing requirements, and at the same time to act strictly in accordance with the age principle. The system was not only flexible; by paying much attention to the careful selection of age groups, which was of moral importance, it tended to implant a similar principle in the national conscience. The same cannot be said with regard to the Russian law; although it imposed a lighter burden, it was not flexible. Nor did it allow the use of the age groups in the right succession. The law may be described as very crude.

DIAGRAM MILITARY SERVICE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RUSSIAN AND GERMAN LAWS (INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY)

GROUP	RUSSIA	AGE	GERMANY	GROUP
		17		
		18		
		19	Landsturm, 1 class	I
		20		
I	Active service in time of peace	21	Active service in time of peace	II
		22		
		23		
		24	Reserve	III
		25		
		26		
		27		
		28		
II	Reserve	29	Landwehr, 1 class	IV
		30		
		31		
		32		
		33		
		34		
		35	Landwehr, 2 class	V
		36		
		37		
		38		
		39		
III	Territorial Army	40		
		41		
		42	Landsturm, 2 class	VI
		43		
		44		
		45		

*Distribution of the Burden of Military Service
among the Age Groups.*

In every conscription law, no matter how scrupulously it aims to embody the principle that the defense of the country constitutes the duty of every citizen, exceptions have to be made with a view to freeing a certain part of the population from the full measure of military duty. In the following chapters this question will be set forth in detail. Here we shall only take up a question connected with what was said above: To which of the groups shown in the diagram were assigned those men who in time of peace were exempt from military service? This question may seem, at first glance, a mere formality, but in reality it was not so.

In accordance with the Russian Conscription Law of 1874, those who in time of peace were exempt from service in the active army were directly enrolled, when they were called out, in the territorial force, which was divided into two classes, or bans. The first ban was destined not only for the formation of special territorial units, but it could also be used to reinforce the army in the field. The second ban was destined exclusively for special territorial units, which were only used for either the protection of the rear or auxiliary work.

The greater part of the exemptions granted by the law were for family reasons. About 48 per cent of the young men called out were exempted on that ground. Out of that number about one-half (the first category of the exempt) were directly enrolled in the second ban of the territorial army, that is, they were freed by law from service at the front in time of war. The other half were enrolled in the first ban. However, not all the men enrolled in the territorial force—the *ratniki*, as they were called—were kept on the rolls. No record of the men in the second ban was kept at all. As to the men in the first ban, a record was kept only of those who had served in the army and were transferred to the territorial force from the reserve, that is, men between thirty-nine and forty-three, and also of the four younger classes. The number of men in that part of the territorial force was considered sufficient “to meet the probable demand for reinforcements for the active service, and to carry out the formation of territorial units.”⁵ Thus, the intention of the law was

⁵ A. Rediger, *Komplektovanie i Ustroistvo Vooruzhennoi Sili* (*The Recruiting and Organization of an Armed Force*) (3d ed., St. Petersburg, 1900), p. 533.

to free the men of the first ban as well—with the exception of those who had actually served in the army and in the reserve and of the four younger classes—not only from service at the front, but from any kind of military service. As a result, the law, instead of distributing the burden of military service among the various age groups, cut off, as it were, a certain part of the male population, made it liable to military service up to the age of forty-three, and at the same time exempted another part of the male population of the same age from any such service.

This situation constituted a great social injustice. In the course of the World War it became necessary to change the law. Some changes, urgently needed, were hastily made. But the basic defects of the law remained in force. The following example may serve as an illustration of the conditions which existed during the War: A man forty-two years old and the father of a large family, transferred to the first ban of the territorial force after he had completed, in time of peace, his active service and his term in the reserve, might have been called out on the sixth day of mobilization; and, shortly after, he might have been sent to fight at the front. In the meantime his son, twenty-one years old and single, might have been exempted on grounds of family status (if he was the only son) and enrolled in the second ban of the territorial force, which did not call him into active service.

With the object of remuneration, where heads of families had been taken, certain allowances in money were made by the Government. It was a wise and just measure. However, it tended to do only economic and not social justice.

Such a state of things during the War could not have helped to strengthen the conviction in the mass of the people that the defense of the country constitutes the duty of every citizen. For the uneducated mass, the situation actually created by the law meant more than could any words about a "sacred duty." After the Revolution one might often hear such speeches as these at the soldiers' meetings: "We are from Tambov—or Penza. The enemy is far from our province. What is the use of fighting?" And this showed not so much the lack of patriotism in the lower classes, as the complete absence of any understanding by them of the principle of universal military service. The mass of the people had not been taught that by the law.

The attitude of the German law was different. In that country, the question had been given careful consideration, and strict adherence to the age principle in the system of imposing military duty served, in time of peace, as the chief means for obtaining the purpose in view. The German law, like the Russian, had to take into account peace-time exemptions; but a special category for the exempted men, the *Ersatz* reserve, had been set up. All who were physically fit for service in time of war but were granted exemption in time of peace, as well as those who were discharged before completing their term of service in the army, were transferred to this *Ersatz* reserve.⁶ As soon as war was declared the *Ersatz* reservists were called out simultaneously with others of the same age, regardless of what category the latter were enrolled in, whether reserve, *Landwehr*, or *Landsturm*. Thus it may be seen that, following the declaration of war, all exemptions which the German law had to grant in time of peace were no longer valid, and the duty of every German citizen to defend his country became the same.

The Cossacks.

In this connection an interesting fact is worth noticing. It was said above that 2.5 per cent of the population in Russia was subject to military service in accordance with special, or Cossack, Regulations. The system set up by those Regulations had much in common with that adopted by the German law: the burden of military service was distributed among the age groups of the Cossacks very carefully; liability for service began at the age of eighteen; young Cossacks, physically fit but freed from service in time of peace, were called to the colors in time of war along with men of the same age not exempted from service. The striking resemblance between the two systems becomes even more apparent if one considers that they have developed quite independently.

This interesting social phenomenon shows that identical ideas in two different countries, having been put into practice logically and consistently, brought identical results. The difference lay only in this: Germany was carrying out her system on a much greater scale. She had worked it out empirically. The Treaty of Tilsit of 1807,

⁶ Eighty thousand men were transferred annually to the *Ersatz* reserve. Rediger, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

which contained a secret clause to the effect that the strength of the Prussian army, in time of peace, must not exceed 42,000 men, had played an important part. She had also acted scientifically, having made a thorough study of the question under the guidance of such a genius in the matter of organization as Field Marshal von Moltke. The way in which a similar system had been worked out by the Cossacks was exclusively empirical. The centuries of struggle to defend the country against oriental invaders, carried on by the Cossacks, called for the participation of the whole able-bodied male population, and not only did it popularize among the Cossacks the principle of universal military service, but it also helped to work out the very forms needed to put the principle into practice.

Effects of General Social Conditions.

In connection with what was said of the Cossack Regulations, the following question may arise: Why did not the Russian statesmen, when they were drafting the Conscription Law of 1874, learn from the Cossack experiment? The answer should be sought in the general conditions, social and political, which prevailed at that time. The putting into practice of the idea of universal military service is closely bound up with the democratization of the entire social structure. Now, while the traditions and social customs of the Cossacks, formed under the influence of their peculiar historical past, were strongly tinged with the democratic spirit, the remainder of the Russian Empire had made only the first step in that direction when freedom was granted to the peasants. Highly important as was this and other reforms inaugurated in the reign of Alexander II, yet, without reflecting upon the merits of that great Emperor's collaborators, it may be said that, in their position, it was only natural to find it difficult completely to get rid of outworn ideas. So far as military matters were concerned, it is obvious that the authors of the Conscription Law were under the influence of the Regulations for Recruiting of 1831, with which they were more familiar than with the Cossack Regulations. But as the former were based on the idea of a professional army, one apart from the population, no due attention was paid to the age principle in the new law. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that in 1874 the idea of a "nation in arms"

was a new idea, and new not only in Russia, but in all other European States, with the exception of Germany.

After the assassination of Alexander II, in March, 1881, any further development of his progressive reforms came to a stop, and the orientation of the reign of his successor, Alexander III, took a direction opposite to democratization. No improvements, therefore, were made in the Conscription Law. The Revolution of 1905, at the time of the ill-starred war with Japan, forced the Russian Government back into the path indicated by the great reforms of Alexander II. However, when the revolution had been put down, the Government did all in its power to avoid carrying out the reforms promised in the Manifesto of Emperor Nicholas II, of October, 1905. After the revolution the Government no longer had faith in the old political ideas, yet it did not wish to adopt the new ones. Owing to this inconsistent attitude the policy of the Government was characterized by the absence of definite purpose. With the same hesitancy and aimlessness were those measures also marked that related to the reorganization of the armed forces.

Under the immediate influence of the reverses on the battlefields of Manchuria, there were appointed to the highest positions in the army such eminently qualified men as the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich and Generals F. F. Palitsin and A. F. Rediger. To the Grand Duke, in his capacity as President of the Council of National Defense, was entrusted the general guidance of the activities of General Palitsin, who became Chief of the General Staff, and of General Rediger, now Minister of War. An important reform in the organization of the central army administration, the separation of the General Staff from the Ministry of War, was carried through. The importance of that measure lay in making possible concentration on the scientific elaboration of principles of army organization. This work began under the direction of General Palitsin.

General Sukhomlinov.

But as early as 1908 a new star, in the person of General V. A. Sukhomlinov, appeared in the galaxy of the St. Petersburg bureaucracy, the Council of National Defense was abolished, and the control of the Grand Duke over the reorganization of the army came to an end. Palitsin and Rediger were removed, and the General Staff

was again placed under the control of the Minister of War, that position being filled by Sukhomlinov. It was not by chance that Sukhomlinov was appointed to it. As the impression, produced by the defeats in the war with Japan, faded away, and the revolutionary movement was suppressed, the policy of "turning backward" gradually gained ground, and a man without principles like Sukhomlinov was better suited for that policy than his predecessors, who had the courage to point to the unpreparedness of the army and insist on the necessity of strenuous work and study. They were putting an end to the myth of the invincibility of Russia. Inasmuch as Sukhomlinov had graduated from the General Staff College (in 1874) and, in the War of 1877-1878, had been given the Cross of St. George, there was reason to suppose that in his person theoretical training and practical war experience were combined. But graduation from a General Staff College, if it is not followed by continual and unwearying study of the rapidly moving evolution of military art, loses its value: and Sukhomlinov believed that knowledge, acquired by him in the 'seventies of last century and largely of no further practical importance, was permanent truth. His ignorance went hand in hand with an extraordinary light-mindedness. These two personal characteristics enabled him to treat the most complicated military questions with astounding levity. His attitude of easy assurance made the impression on those not familiar with the complicated technique of modern military art, that Sukhomlinov handled such problems well and took the right decisions quickly. This impression, however, was a superficial one. He was like a man walking on the brink of a precipice and unaware of it.

The characteristic traits of General Sukhomlinov, outlined above, have been considered worth noting in view of the fact that his appointment to the position of Minister of War which gave him full power in the demesne of military preparedness was the principal reason for the lack of a definite policy in the organization of national defense. To what extent the Minister of War was unable to realize what was needed may be judged from the following example. The Russian General Staff was, as a rule, entrusted with the work of preparing and formulating all decisions relating to technical questions of national defense. But, for many reasons, the General Staff had not been fitted for this high and responsible task. One of

the main reasons lay in the frequent changes of the chiefs of the General Staff. Within six years, from the time Sukhomlinov was appointed Minister of War up to the beginning of the World War, the position of the chief of the General Staff had four successive occupants—Mishlaevsky, Gerngross, Zhilinsky, and Yanushkevich—whereas in Germany the last four heads of the General Staff—Moltke, Waldersee, Schlieffen, and the younger Moltke—represented an occupancy of fifty-three years. Whenever a new man is appointed chief of the General Staff, the work of preparing the country for war unavoidably suffers. Therefore, it would be idle to expect that General Sukhomlinov could succeed in completely reorganizing all the work of national defense. The decision whether this or that question should be given special attention depended on the ability, amount of training, and even the personal likings of a high military official. Finally a decision would be reached; but in Russia, unlike the custom adopted in France and Germany, it was not infrequently independent from the progress of scientific thought.

The incapacity of Sukhomlinov's military administration clearly manifested itself in the way the much-needed reform of the Conscription Law was carried out. The fact may be easily explained if one takes into account that such a reform called not only for a scientific comprehension of modern warfare, but also for a broader view of the country's political life. Special interest attaches to a criticism of the reform which we find in a volume by General George Danilov,⁷ who as Quartermaster General, a position he occupied from 1908 to 1914, was the immediate assistant of the rapidly succeeding chiefs of the General Staff. He writes:

The Conscription Law, promulgated as far back as the reign of Emperor Alexander II and obviously quite obsolete, formed the basis of our whole military system. The Government, as also the Duma, realized the necessity of a radical reform, but it took time. So the Duma, with a view to making sure that the reform would be advanced more rapidly, decided to oppose the bill to increase the contingent of men liable to military service, yearly submitted to the Government, until the new Conscription Law was passed by the legislative bodies.

⁷ G. N. Danilov, *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine* (*Russia in the World War*) (Berlin, 1924), pp. 34–35.

. . . The complex character of the question, coupled with interdepartmental friction, of which there was never any lack, were the reasons why the law was not passed until 1912. Thus, having been in force for only the two years preceding the World War, it had very little influence on the providing of contingents for the army and on putting it on a war footing. As a matter of fact, the new law did not differ much from the old one, and it was far from making it possible for Russia's peace-time army to become, in time of war, a "nation in arms." Theoretically, the necessity of building up the armed forces of a modern State on such a basis perhaps was admitted, but in practice that principle had not been given life.

CHAPTER II

DISTRIBUTION OF THE BURDEN OF CONSCRIPTION

Importance of "Productive Employment."

WHOEVER has attempted to estimate the military power of Russia has invariably been strongly impressed by the magnitude of her population. The fact that in 1914 the Empire could count its 167,000,000 explains the widely spread conception that Russia was a country with inexhaustible reserves of man power, whose blood might be easily substituted for insufficient armament, and lack of munitions, and technical material. Yet the data of the first and only all-Russian census of 1897 might have opened the eyes of the public and told them many things. Under the influence of such data, D. I. Mendeleev published in 1906 his remarkable volume, *K Poznanyu Rossii* (*Toward the Knowledge of Russia*). As we read that volume now we can only wonder at the many prophecies it contained.

In a table prepared from the census data¹ Mendeleev showed the distribution of the population in accordance with the kind and amount of work done by it. He came to the conclusion that of the population of 128,000,000 in 1897 only 34,000,000 were "producers," that is, men and women productively employed. These 34,000,000 were made up of 27,500,000 men and 6,500,000 women and represented together 26.5 per cent of the whole population. The number of households, according to the same census, was 22,500,000, and the average number of people per household was 5.5. Thus, approximately, in every two households only three persons were engaged in providing the means of life and the remaining eight lived at the expense of their productive work. This may also be put in the following way: every producer, on an average, had to provide food for some 3.75, he himself being included.

With a view to making clear the social significance of these figures, Mendeleev compared them with analogous data for other countries for the same period. In the United States, according to the census of 1900, there were (not including Alaska, the Philip-

¹ Mendeleev, *K Poznanyu Rossii* (6th ed., St. Petersburg, 1907), pp. 86-91.

pires, etc., or armed forces) 76,000,000 inhabitants, of which 29,000,000 or 38 per cent were productively employed. In France, according to the census of 1891, men and women productively employed formed 38 per cent; and in Germany, in 1895, 40 per cent of the population. To make the comparison accurate, it must be pointed out that the following categories in Russia were included by Mendelev among those productively employed: soldiers, persons living on their revenues, domestic servants, and those whose sources of revenue, according to the census of 1897, were unknown. But in the United States, France, and Germany such individuals were not counted as productively employed. When, in our calculation, this is taken into account, and the necessary deductions are made, we obtain for Russia even a smaller percentage, or 24. A detailed study of the causes of such a difference in productive power lies outside the scope of this work. However, it may be pointed out that the great number of children was one explanation. According to the census of 1897, children under ten years of age amounted in Russia to 27.3 per cent, in the United States to 23.8 per cent, in Germany to 24.2 per cent, and in France to only 17.5 per cent. Nevertheless, it goes without saying that the conclusion reached by Mendelev, to the effect that "the population in Russia, at an average, had so far not been doing much work," was quite justified. The meaning of the words "so far" seems to underlie a like opinion, and a very right one, elsewhere expressed by him, that an increase in the amount of productive work done in a country is followed by a higher development of its culture.

The figures quoted above are of great importance from a military standpoint. This is obvious from the fact that the smaller the percentage of the population engaged in the productive work the greater is the economic disruption brought about by a mobilization in time of war. For Russia, the percentage given above remained almost unchanged until the World War, as may be seen in data from the rural census of 1917. Now, if we estimate the highest possibilities of man power in the World War, in the case of Russia, France, and Germany, by comparing the "productive elements" of population in these countries, we obtain ratios differing from those we get by comparing their populations as a whole. Table 1 may serve as an illustration.

TABLE 1

Population and Its Productive Employment.

<i>Country</i>	<i>Total population</i>		<i>Population productively employed</i>	
	<i>Number</i> <i>(in millions)</i>	<i>Index</i> <i>number*</i>	<i>Number</i> <i>(in millions)</i>	<i>Index</i> <i>number*</i>
Germany†	68	100	27	100
Russia‡	150	220	36	133
France†	40	60	15	60

* The reader should note the difference in the two sets of index numbers.

† Excluding the colonies.

‡ Excluding native tribes and localities whose population was exempt from military service.

Further analysis of the capacity of Russia to put forth her greatest possible man power gives results which are even less favorable. No correct estimate of the strain laid upon her man power during the War can be made, unless the disparity in the general economic conditions in Russia and in western Europe be taken into account. The enormous area of Russia, her widely scattered population and little developed urban centers, the insufficient number of railroads and the bad state of highways during part of the year, her long and severe winters with heavy snowfalls—all this made necessary, in Russia, such additional labor as was unknown in western Europe. Finally, one more circumstance, which was of paramount importance, must be taken into consideration: the number of engines in Russia compared with those in other European countries was infinitesimal; to show the difference it will be sufficient merely to mention the fact that in 1908, in France alone, the number of steam horse power in use was fifteen times as great as in Russia. In view of the conditions above, whenever men were taken from their work, their withdrawal was felt infinitely more in Russia than in any western European State.

Exemptions Based on Domestic Conditions.

The sensibility of Russia's national economy to the withdrawal of man power was especially acute in the period immediately following the emancipation of the serfs, when, having just entered the period of industrialization, the country was passing through a transitional stage. This circumstance could not have been ignored

by a statesman like Count Milyutin, the Minister of War under Emperor Alexander II. The Conscription Law enacted by him, therefore, gave special attention to the so-called "exemptions based on domestic conditions." The main purpose of the granting of such exemptions was to provide the army with new contingents in a manner which would cause the least inconveniences to individual families and whole peasant communities. Inasmuch as in Russia, with her primitive rural conditions, the prosperity of every peasant family depended exclusively on the number of its workers, it was provided by the law that recruits should be drafted from families where there were several workers.

Those entitled to exemption on account of domestic conditions under the Conscription Law of 1874, fell into three categories: (1) only sons, and sons or grandsons who were the only workers in their families; (2) sons who were the second workers in their families; (3) sons next in age to brothers serving in the army, and sons whose elder brothers had died while doing their military service. Exemptions under categories 2 and 3 were granted conditionally: men entitled to these exemptions could be enlisted in the army for active service should the number of recruits be insufficient to make up the annual contingent. Those belonging to category 1 were unconditionally exempt from service in the active army.² All those exempted were enlisted in the territorial force, which, as mentioned above, was divided into two classes, or bans: those in category 1 were enlisted in the second ban; and those in categories 2 and 3 were enlisted in the first ban. In time of war they were liable to service in the field. Out of the total number of young men who were annually called for military duty, the following percentages were entitled to exemptions based on their family status: In category 1, about 24 per cent; in category 2, about 20 per cent; and in category 3, about 5 per cent.

Out of these, less than 1 per cent were enlisted in the army. Consequently, some 48 per cent of the yearly contingent of young men called for military service were exempted from active service on account of "domestic conditions"; one half were enlisted in the first ban of the territorial force, and the other half in the second ban. Of the 48 per cent exempted from military service in time of peace,

² Rediger, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

24 per cent were not liable to service in the field army in time of war.

If we turn to other European Powers and look for the solution of the question of exemptions there, we find that the following percentages of young men were exempted on account of their family status: In France, none; in Germany, 2 per cent; in Austria-Hungary, 3 per cent; and in Italy, 37 per cent. From this comparison it can be seen that only in Italy, where the industrialization of economic life, just as in Russia, began late, the number of exemptions based on domestic conditions was almost as great as in Russia.

Evolution of the Conscription Law.

The leading idea of the Conscription Law of 1874 was to put into effect the principles of universal compulsory service by as equitable a distribution of the burden of conscription among the various social classes as was possible. But it took into consideration only times of peace. This was a notable weakness which, however, could at that time hardly have been avoided, for these reasons: first, in the period of great reforms following the emancipation of the serfs, the economic interests of the country were of such paramount importance that the Government of Alexander II had to put them above every other consideration; second, it would have been impossible wholly to eliminate the influence of the old recruiting regulations from this first Conscription Law. The method by which the question was solved in 1874 was therefore inevitable. But the greater the lapse of time since the period of reforms, the more strongly, in a great European war, were the defects of the law to manifest themselves. The Conscription Law not only guaranteed, in peace times, to exempt the number of workers (one worker to every family) needed to perform the country's labor, but even exceeded this. For example, "only sons" were exempted in families where the fathers were able to work. And this was a luxury for which the country was to pay dearly in war time. The number of territorials grew larger and larger, whereas the army, to preserve its full strength, was obliged to have recourse to men of older groups who had passed through active service and reserve.

The changes made in the original law by these new regulations, enacted in 1912, were prompted by a decision to reorganize the armed forces after Russia's unhappy experiences in the war with

Japan. However, in the latter war no general mobilization of the Russian army had taken place; consequently, the obsolete features of the Law of 1874, which were bound to appear in a great war in Europe, did not show themselves. The reforms, therefore, inaugurated under the direct influence of the reverses in the Russo-Japanese War, proved to be very superficial. Not enough attention was paid in Russia at that time to the scientific study of the problems of national defense. A serious effort in that direction, undertaken by General Palitsin and General Rediger, was quickly ended, as we have seen, and the responsible places held by these generals were given to General Sukhomlinov, whose utter inadequacy was pointed out in Chapter I.

Colonel B. A. Engelhardt, Chairman of the Military Commission of the Duma, writes as follows:

Unsatisfactory recruiting for the army and the continuous shortage of men were the underlying reasons for the Law of 1912. The main object of that law, therefore, was to make certain that the army would obtain the number of recruits annually required. To this end certain changes in the regulations for exemption were made, and a new plan for distributing the levy of recruits over the various provinces was adopted. Thanks to these measures the requirements of the army in time of peace could be met, but as regards its requirements in time of war, the solution of the problem remained incomplete.³

In the opinion of the present writer, Colonel Engelhardt's conclusion should have been stressed still more. He would say that requirements in time of war were left entirely out of consideration.

In general, the members of the Duma, which had recently been created and, as a body, was opposed to the Government, were concerned mainly with questions of internal politics, and did not pay the necessary attention to problems of national defense. As a result, when the new conscription bill was submitted to the Duma by the Government, it was subjected to a criticism which was neither thorough nor impartial; overzealous in their efforts to safeguard the individual interests of the people, the members of the Duma disregarded the interests of the nation. No substantial changes were

³ Unpublished monograph by Colonel B. A. Engelhardt, Vol. I, Part II. pp. 8-9. The manuscript of this monograph is deposited with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

introduced by the Law of 1912 in the system of exemptions based on domestic conditions. A half-hearted attempt made in that direction by the Ministry of War—it proposed to exclude only sons in the case of families where the father was also able to work—was unsuccessful. It follows that Russia, when she entered the World War, was in a far more difficult position than that of the other belligerent Powers, first, because her national economic organization required a much greater number of laborers than did the western European States; and second, because her very system of conscription was obsolete and adapted to peace-time, not to war-time, conditions.

It became necessary in the course of the War hastily to enact legislation which fundamentally changed the law. Thus, in 1915 a law was promulgated, on the strength of which the territorials of the second ban became liable to service in the field.⁴ These measures, however, were not the result of a carefully prepared, harmonious system. Moreover, such hasty changes caused a certain confusion in the minds of the masses, whose conception of compulsory universal service, as based on the old law, had rooted itself deeply in them in the long period of peace.

Physical Standards.

The unsatisfactory use which the Conscription Law made of Russia's power—or rather of that limited part of it which was drawn in the army—may most clearly be brought out when we come to the physical fitness of the recruits. The granting of exemptions, based on domestic conditions, to almost 50 per cent of the annual contingent created an extremely difficult situation, inasmuch as physical standards had to be lowered considerably. As a general rule, about 6 per cent were rejected as totally unfit, and about 11 per cent were enlisted in the second ban of the territorial force.

The percentage of men of conscription age exempted from active service for reasons of health in five European armies was: Austria-Hungary, 50 per cent; Germany, 37; Italy, 27; France, 21; and Russia, 17 per cent. We see that Russia's place is at the bottom. This, however, was not because the health of the Russian people was better than that of other nations, but because the granting of a

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

great number of exemptions, based on domestic conditions, made it necessary to lower the standards. The low standards adopted may best be illustrated by the fact that the Russian army in time of peace suffered from a chronic shortage in men. At the same time many men of conscription age, who were in excellent physical condition, were not called out. "The great number of those who were enlisted under protest,"⁵ Colonel Engelhardt writes, "bore testimony to the low standards adopted. Finally, the high percentage of losses in the army from sickness—from 4 to 5 per cent—was further evidence. As a result, there was a serious shortage of men."

One more very important disadvantage resulted from the adoption of low physical standards. In Russia the losses⁶ among the men who had finished their active service and were in the reserve were considerably greater than in Germany. In the German army such losses were about 3 per cent a year; or of 100 men who had passed into the army reserve, there remained after one year 97, after two years 94, and after ten years 73. In the Russian army such losses averaged 4 per cent, that is, after ten years out of every 100 men there remained in the army reserve 64. Now, if we remember that the terms of active service in Russia were much longer than in Germany and that, consequently, the filling up of the army reserve with trained men was a matter of great difficulty, we see that Russia's losses in the reserves were of incomparably more serious effect than Germany's.

Finally, the low physical standards adopted for the enlisted men were certain to be reflected in the fighting powers of the army in the first encounters. When the army's physical fitness was not high, the time needed for it to arrive at its limit of endurance was all the shorter. This consideration is of special importance, for in its first battles the fighting reputation of an army is established. In an army unit that has gained confidence in its initial struggles, a high spirit is long preserved, and its remaining *cadres* instil it in the reënforcements sent to fill up gaps. It may happen that those reënforcements are less fit physically, but, having been embodied in an army unit

⁵ Those who had been passed by the examining boards, but were rejected as unfit after their enlistment in the army units.

⁶ Caused by death, or by loss of physical fitness.

whose morale is high, their own is bettered. The "spirit of the regiment" will not decline; it is only the percentage of those falling ill that will increase. Such was the case with the German army which in 1914, at the beginning of the War, was the youngest and the fittest physically; although the reënforcements of subsequent years belonged to considerably older age groups and were in an inferior physical condition, the morale of these German regiments remained almost the same.

In the Russian army, as was stated above, of the 48 per cent of conscription age exempted on account of domestic conditions, more than one-half were not the only, but the second, workers. Consequently, the possibility existed of rejecting as physically unfit, under a standard as severe as that in the German army, or even more so, not 17 per cent only, but a far greater number. Thanks to the many millions of her population, Russia could have had the youngest and physically the fittest army of all.

Educational Standards.

Another grave reason that kept Russia from making full use of her man power was her low educational standards. According to the census of 1897, the number of persons, both male and female, who had learned to read and write and had been educated in the primary schools, amounted to 25,862,000, or 20 per cent of the total population. The insignificance of that percentage is self-evident. An equally unsatisfactory situation was disclosed by the census of 1897 in the case of those who had received high school and college education. They numbered only 1,441,700, or about 1.1 per cent of the whole population. The thinness of that cultural stratum gave rise to an odd phenomenon. Those who went through high schools and colleges were distinguished from the remaining masses by the name of "intelligentsia." No conception of social class, it must be well understood, was contained in the term; and this is worth noting. The Revolution of 1917, when it destroyed the remnants of the old social structure and when it penetrated more and more into the mass of the people, gradually became a "Bolshevist" revolution; and the hatred of the masses was directed mainly against this intelligentsia. Such nicknames as "landlord," "*burzhui*," etc., served as slogans by which the Bolshevik leaders incited the uneducated to violence

and destruction. It was not so much the fact of owning property as the fact of education—a thing that made the intelligentsia outwardly different from the uneducated—which chiefly marked those possessing it for destruction.

It is quite obvious that in 1874 there was even less education than in 1914, and the number of those who could read and write much smaller. Count Milyutin and his collaborators, as they worked out the Conscription Law, had to take into account such illiteracy. They incorporated in the law a whole system of exemptions based on educational status. A twofold end was to be attained by this. First, it was to safeguard the interests of national education, and to preserve for the various administrative services and social organizations the necessary number of trained men. Second, the requirements of the army had to be met by attracting into its ranks young and educated men who would become officers.

The exemptions on grounds of educational status consisted in: (1) deferments of military service; (2) shortening of the terms of active service and of the period of service in the reserve; and (3) exemption from military service. Deferments of military service were for various periods; the shortest were granted to the students of high schools, entitling them to postpone their service until they reached the age of twenty-two; the longest permitted university students to postpone their service until they were twenty-seven.⁷ Those who had been through the schools were given the choice of entering military service in one of two ways: either as recruits, if they preferred to take part in the annual and general draft; or as "volunteers." Of these two groups volunteers were granted greater privileges than recruits, in view of the fact that the latter, owing to their decision to take part in the draft, had the chance of drawing a number which might wholly free them from active service. The privileges of those enrolled as recruits consisted in shorter terms of active service (two or three years instead of four), the whole period of their military service (active service and reserve) remaining unchanged. As to the volunteers, they could enlist at the age of seventeen and had to serve only one or two years, depending on the education they had received; after the completion of their active

⁷ About .4 per cent of the annual contingent of men of conscription age were so benefiting.

service they were transferred to the reserve for a period of twelve years. Finally, an exemption from active service was granted to physicians, veterinarians, and druggists; to students of the Academy of Arts, who were sent abroad by the Government to finish their education; and to the teachers in government and a number of other schools. All these, numbering .2 per cent of those called to the colors, did not actually serve, and were enlisted in the reserve for a period of eighteen years.

Criticism of Exemptions on Educational Grounds.

When they permitted deferred service for the completion of education, the authors of the Conscription Law were following a sound policy. But a different conclusion will be reached if we carefully consider the significance of the other exemptions on educational grounds, namely, the shortening of the terms of active service and of the period of service in the reserve. We shall see that with regard to these privileges the Conscription Law was guided by the interests of times of peace, and made a considerable sacrifice of the needs of national defense in time of war. A similar tendency has already been pointed out, when exemptions on grounds of domestic conditions were under consideration.

By shortening the terms of active service for all who did not belong in the illiterate mass the Conscription Law was taking up a position which was opposed to the attainment of another objective of that law, namely, the building up in the army of an officers' reserve corps. It was to the interests of national defense that the military training of young men, high school and college graduates, should not be limited to the elementary drill that sufficed for a private, but that it should be carried far enough to include the instruction required by a subaltern officer. This, however, was not the point of view of the law. Having called the category of volunteers into being, with the object of attracting young men who might become officers, the law reduced the term of their active service to one year, in which time it was absolutely impossible to turn a young man into an army officer. The fact has been confirmed by the experience of every country in western Europe. In France a two-year term of active service was established for the training of a reserve officer—one year and a half in the ranks and a half year as officer.

In Italy the term was from twenty and a half months to twenty-seven. In Germany the prospective reserve officer had to serve one year as a private, four months as a non-commissioned officer, and several weeks in the years following as an officer. The World War, even in its first months, showed that Russia was lacking an adequately trained officers' reserve corps.

The shortening of the period of service in the reserve to twelve years, with a view to inducing young men to prepare for an officer's commission, was an even greater loss than the shortening of the term of active service. The point of view of the Law of 1874, that education in itself ought to make the military burden for the educated lighter than for others was unsound not only because it was against interests wholly military, but also because it produced a harmful effect in the broader, or national, sense. The principle proclaimed in the first article of the Law, that the defense of the country was the sacred duty of every citizen, was narrowed down to the selfish conception that the duty was a disagreeable burden. Although, as a rule, neither birth nor wealth, in the spirit of the law, were titles to any special privileges, yet, because of their education, the class of men known as the intelligentsia, in point of fact, were granted new privileges. The mistaken principle adopted by the law was reflected in measures relating to preparedness for war. Under the pretext of preserving trained men for the needs of civil service in its various fields, there were drawn up long lists of offices which exempted those who held them from military service in time of war. A comparison of those lists with analogous lists in France and Germany would have made plain how large a class of "slackers" had on legal grounds been formed in time of peace.

Complete exemption of teachers from active service in time of peace could have contributed only to a strengthening of the tendency to evade the "sacred duty of defending the country." The most direct educators of the young were completely cut off from the army, whereas the creation of a "nation in arms" in time of war called for a situation precisely the contrary, that is, for a most intimate, spiritual, and many-sided contact between the nation and the army. Teachers were not in a position to inspire the young generation with the duty of defending their country. By this it is not meant that the young should have been brought up in chauvinism, as had been

the case in Germany and Japan, but only that every young man should have been educated in the conviction that the interests of his country might require from him not only a disinterested effort, but also the sacrifice of his life, and for that reason military service was not merely a burden, imposed by the State, but also a sacred duty. A teacher, having nothing in common with the army, would often see only its negative sides and, being impressed by its external forms, would be apt to disregard the right of the nation to defend its independence, unity, and freedom.

The Law of 1912.

By the Law of 1912 a few changes were made in the system of exemptions on grounds of educational status. The term of active service for those who had been permitted to serve only one year—the volunteers—was increased to two years, and the period of their service in the reserve was increased to sixteen. Moreover, the privilege was granted on condition that they should pass an examination that would make possible their promotion to the rank of ensign (*praporshchik*), or the lowest grade of officer (the next was that of second lieutenant) established only for war conditions. Furthermore, those who were allowed to serve the three-year term in the active army were not granted any privileges, since the general terms of service had in 1906 been reduced to three years, unless they were enrolled in one of the special arms (cavalry, horse artillery, engineers, etc.), in which the length of the term of service was four years. The decision of the law to make the passing of an officer's test a requisite for the two-year service was an encouragement to the educated young man to prepare for the duties of a subaltern under war conditions, regardless of whether he served as recruit or volunteer. For those who had passed the officer's test the term of service was shortened by six months—to eighteen months instead of two years—and to sixteen and a half years in the reserve.

Another change in the system of exemption consisted in an increase to two years of the term of active service of those teachers not entitled to complete exemption in time of peace. The Law of 1912 lacked the courage radically to change its attitude toward the teacher and see in him one who could imbue the younger generation with a sense of duty to the nation. Therefore, it could not have been

expected that any immediate influence could be brought to bear on popular psychology. Such psychology in the periods of peace changes slowly.

Failures of the Government Policy.

Low educational standards were responsible for the long terms of active service. It is obvious that it requires more time to train an illiterate recruit and make him a modern soldier than it does to train the educated youth. This offers an explanation of why the shortening of the terms of active service in Russia, as compared with France and Germany, proceeded much more slowly. However, even there, granting that conditions in Russia were peculiar, the Russian Ministry of War failed to take the new view, based on the fact that the training of armed forces had become equivalent to the training of the nation. The formation of a large reserve of trained men was indispensable. Elementary military training, therefore, should have been given to the greatest possible number of men. But, owing to the long term of active service, the annual contingent of enrolled men—in other words, the reserve of trained men—was not large enough. Moreover, this led to the necessity of including in the call to the colors during general mobilization the older classes of the reserve. Consequently, war, from the start, had to be waged with an army which was older than it might have been.

Germany, with a view to increasing her reserve of trained men, used to transfer a part of the annual contingent, when they had served in the army one year, to the *Ersatz* reserve. The view of the German General Staff that elementary training did not require much time was well justified. During the World War it became necessary to reduce the period of training of the new contingents in Russia to six months, and experience in the War had shown that, when the training in the depot battalions had been adequate and the cadres of the unit filled from such reënforcements were strong, excellent results were obtained.

The Russian regulations governing compulsory military service and the organization of armed forces could not get away from the antiquated belief that the time when wars were waged with professional armies had not passed. Hence it followed that the Ministry of War had overlooked the great importance of having thoroughly

trained and numerically strong cadres. In time of peace the average number per company of non-commissioned officers on voluntary service, i.e., who remained in the army after the completion of their terms of active service, may serve as an excellent illustration. In Russia there were 2; in Austria-Hungary, 3; in Italy, 3, plus corporals; in France, 6, plus corporals; and in Germany, 12. If to the small number of non-commissioned officers on voluntary service in Russia we add the fact, already pointed out, that the cadres of officers in time of peace were not filled^s and that the training of reserve officers was inferior to their training in other armies, we shall see that the Ministry of War had been training a professional army rather than cadres for an armed nation.

^s On July 25, 1914, the shortage in officers was about 3,000.

CHAPTER III

CAUSES OF INADEQUATE ORGANIZATION AND SUPPLIES

Army Appropriations.

FOLLOWING the emancipation of the serfs, new economic perspectives stood open before Russia. Since each peasant farmer had been allotted a piece of land, no matter if it was not quite equal to his requirements, peasant conditions began to grow and improve. Some landlords, having given up their landed estates, moved to the cities, there to take up activities in other economic fields. There was a marked increase in agricultural production, and simultaneously a demand for industrial enterprises was created, greatly stimulating railway construction. Thanks to the latter, the volume of business in the old economic centers grew larger, and new such centers were called into being in Asiatic Russia. Coal and the metal industries owed their origin to the needs of the railways. A new factor, mass production, widened the prospects of industry, which, in its turn, encouraged the growth of rural productivity. The national income grew steadily.

However, great as was the absolute growth of that income, it was not great enough—considering the area and population of Russia, and the fact that she was late in taking the new social and economic road—to enable her to catch up with other more highly cultured countries. Russia still remained a country of great possibilities for the future, but of scant financial resources in the present. This relative poverty was one of the most serious obstacles that retarded her military preparedness.

General Rediger¹ worked out the relative military expenditure of Russia, France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary for the year 1897–1898, having divided the total military budget of each country by the number of men in its army in time of peace. He obtained the following figures: In gold rubles, Germany spent, per man, 497; Austria-Hungary, 457; France, 375; and Russia, 289. If the ex-

¹ Rediger, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

penditure of Germany be taken as 100, that of Austria-Hungary is 97; that of France, 78; and that of Russia, 60.

But if we compare the military expenditures of these countries for the same year from another standpoint, that is, by learning what part of the respective general budget they formed, we get these figures: In Germany the percentage of the cost of the army to the whole budget was 17.3; in Austria-Hungary it was 17.6; in Russia, 24.3; and in France, 28.6. Taking the German ratio of expenditure as 100, that of Austria-Hungary was 102; that of Russia, 140; and that of France, 165.

By comparing these figures it may be seen that, although the maintenance of the Russian army in time of peace cost less in absolute figures, this represented a much greater part of the general budget than in Germany. Despite the great economic progress with which the period immediately preceding the World War was marked in Russia, there was little change in the general situation, as shown in the figures presented above. The cause lay in the fact that after the war with Japan huge sums had to be spent by Russia for the restoration of her armed force. General Danilov writes:

Following the war of 1904–1905 Russia had to start to create her armed force almost anew. The work progressed slowly, not only because it was so vast, but also because the appropriations for the army in the years following the war were entirely inadequate. . . . To characterize the period from 1905 to 1910, or perhaps even a longer period, I can say only that it was a time when there was a complete lack of money wherewith to meet our military needs. Our so-called “iron reserves,” or reserves to be used in time of war, had been completely used up in the war of 1904–1905. To restore them, several hundred million rubles were needed, and that in accordance with estimates which were far from covering the full supplies required. Such an amount, however, was regarded by our Treasury as very burdensome.²

Thus, the Russian Ministry of War was constantly faced with a dilemma: either to reduce the strength of the army, or to maintain it at a lower cost. The Ministry chose the latter course, and in that respect, as the World War clearly showed, it went beyond any reasonable limit. “Cheapness” of maintenance for the Russian army led, in the first place, to professional cadres of insufficient strength,

² Danilov, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

whereas exactly the opposite, in view of the general lack of education of the mass of the people, was needed by the Russian army more than anything else. Unlike Germany, France, and Austria-Hungary, Russia did not have a strong cadre of non-commissioned officers who remained in service after the completion of their terms. The reserve officers were not sufficiently trained. Even the periods of training of the reservists were shortened with a view to economy, whereas Russian reservists were in need of repeated training more than those in the western European States.

The Artillery.

Armament and technical equipment also suffered from the tendency to maintain the army "at a lower cost." In order to make quite clear what was the effect of a lack of adequate appropriations in that respect, we shall deal with the question of the artillery and its supply of ammunition in the period preceding 1914, for there the deficiencies were felt during the War with especial acuteness.

The Russian artillery, as it entered the War in 1914, consisted of 7 light batteries for every infantry division, including one battery of light howitzers from the corps artillery. For every German infantry division there were 14 batteries, of which 2 belonging to the corps artillery were heavy, that is, there were twice as many batteries as the Russian division possessed. Moreover, the Russian army at the beginning of the War had 60 heavy batteries, when, at the same time, the German army had 381. The Russian military authorities fully realized that the artillery was not strong enough. They sought to improve the situation in two ways: by reorganizing the eight-gun batteries of the field artillery into six-gun batteries—for, since the quick-firing model had been adopted, a battery of six guns had become as strong a combat unit as the former battery of eight—and by forming new batteries armed with heavier guns of longer range.

The way in which so important a question as the reorganization of the eight-gun batteries was solved may serve as a typical example of the sacrifice of combat requirements to financial considerations.³

³ General Manikovsky, *Boevoe Snabzhenie Russkoi Armii v 1914-1918 g.g.* (*The Armament and Ammunition Supply of the Russian Army in 1914-1918*) (Moscow, 1922), Part II, pp. 105-107. General Manikovsky is one of the most authoritative of writers on questions relating to the Russian ar-

The question was raised by the Artillery Department of the Ministry of War simultaneously with the equipment of the army with the 3-inch quick-firing field gun, model 1900. A conference of representatives of the General Staff and Artillery Department, called to pass on this, came to the conclusion that reorganization was necessary. The same view was expressed by most of the generals commanding military districts and army corps. However, General Kuropatkin, then Minister of War, taking into consideration the fact that the reorganization would call for an expenditure of 3,000,000 rubles, voiced the opinion that the eight-gun batteries should be preserved for the time being. According to his opinion, such a heavy additional expenditure would not allow the inclusion of tea in the daily army ration, an improvement which had been decided upon. The final decision, taken in the fall of 1902, was to the effect that, for the time being, there should be no change in the eight-gun batteries. In 1906, following the war with Japan, a special commission, formed on the initiative of Grand Duke Sergius Mikhailovich, Inspector General of Artillery, worked out and recommended a series of measures having as their object the increase of the strength of the field artillery. They included the reorganization of the eight-gun batteries into six-gun batteries and the formation of corps artillery, the latter to consist of twenty-one (instead of twelve) batteries of field guns, and two batteries of howitzers per army corps comprising two divisions. No appropriation, however, for carrying out the project was granted. In 1909 it was submitted again, the Inspector General of Artillery strongly urging its acceptance; but the result was the same. In 1910, with a view to carrying out at least part of the project, an estimate, limited to expenditure necessary for the reorganization only, was submitted to the Assistant Minister of War. But even that measure did not meet with approval, "because of the impossibility of making new appropriations of a permanent nature." Only in 1914, just before the War and under the impending menace of the "big program" of Germany, a big Russian program

tillery. Thanks to his profound knowledge and long experience, he stood out prominently among the artillerists of the Imperial army. In May, 1915, he was placed at the head of the Artillery Department, and remained at that post until he was appointed, shortly before the Bolshevist *coup*, Acting Minister of War.

was also approved, which provided for an increase of all kinds of artillery. But, as the program was to be completed only by April, 1917, the War halted it in the very beginning. It is worth while noting that the most important artillery question did not obtain a satisfactory solution even in this "big program" which was never carried out; the artillery of a Russian division, according to that program, would still be weaker than the artillery of a German division by one battery and a half, or by eight guns.⁴ "Besides," General Manikovsky writes, "the little that was done, was done in an academic way, because there was much talk of *money*, but nothing about the development of existing gun factories and the opening of new ones, yet that was the only right way to solve the problem."⁵

Railroads.

The question of the development of the railways presents the same picture of a continual lack of funds. The enormous distances which had a great effect on the mobilization and concentration of the army, on its supply and reinforcement during the War, and on the strategic transport of troops from one theater of war to another, made strong demands for speedier railway extensions. The following figures showing to what extent the needs of Russia in that respect exceeded those of the western European States may illustrate the situation. The average distance to be covered by rail by a Russian recruit was from 600 to 700 miles, whereas in France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary it was from 130 to 200.⁶ The inadequacy of Russia's railways can be brought out by comparing those of Germany with those even of European Russia. Where, in 1914, Germany possessed 10.6 kilometers for every 100 square kilometers, Russia had only 1. And making all allowances for the difference in density of population, an index number of 100 for Germany's general railways development would give European Russia a coefficient of 4.⁷ The fact that Russian railways were so inadequate created extremely difficult

⁴ Manikovsky, *op. cit.*, Part II, p. 177.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

⁶ Rediger, *op. cit.*, p. 152, n. 2.

⁷ Report of Struve, Chief Engineer, quoted in Zaionchkovsky, *Podgotovka Rossii k Mirovoi Voine (Russia's Preparedness before the World War)* (Moscow, 1926), pp. 123-125.

conditions for the waging of a great modern war, and prevented her from making such use of her resources as did other countries.

The situation shows itself even worse if the uneven distribution of her railways is taken into consideration. The expansion of the railways in the border zone, limited by the line Libau-Dvinsk-Kovno-Grodno-Warsaw-Ivangorod in the north and northwest, and the line Ivangorod-Kobrin-Minsk-Vitebsk-Pskov-Narva in the south and east, might have been expressed by a coefficient of from 10 to 30, or even higher. Equally well equipped with railways was the zone from 200 to 300 kilometers wide, paralleling the trunk line Moscow-Khar'kov-Alexandrovsk. The two zones, pointed out above, constituted those sections of Russia which were best equipped, with the exception of the portion of Finland bordering on the sea. The railway of the vast stretches between the two zones, as also in the east, to the line Petrograd-Vologda-Nizhni-Novgorod-Samara-Tsaritsin-Stavropol-Kutais-Batum, was much poorer, the coefficient here being from 5 to 10. Finally, there were very few railways in the immense areas which remained, their coefficient nowhere exceeding 3.

Such an uneven distribution over the different parts of the country was a result of the fact that Russia, despite her economic backwardness, had to build new railways not so much for economic consideration, as because they were considered indispensable from a strategic point of view. And the underlying purpose of the strategic considerations was narrow enough, for it consisted chiefly in accelerating the concentration of the army, should such necessity arise, on the western frontier. The alliance with France largely made for this. The French General Staff, remembering the defeats of 1870, was afraid to face the German army unaided in the first days of a new war, should it occur. The French General Staff insisted that Russia should concentrate her army on her western frontier in the shortest possible time, and French loans received by Russia were given her strictly on the condition that she build railways leading to the German frontier. There were six double-track trunk lines and two single-track lines leading from the Petrograd meridian to the zones of concentration of the army.

As regards the equipment of the theater of war with lines making possible the movement of troops along the front, conditions were far from being even as favorable as those above. The development of

these lines had been fraught with much greater financial difficulties than the building of the trunk lines leading to the zone of concentration, since the value of the former was less clearly understood by the layman than that of the latter. For this the War made Russia pay dearly. It was during the retreat of the Russian army in 1915 that the shortage of lines paralleling the front was so seriously felt, because the surplus rolling stock could not be moved from the overloaded trunk lines.⁸

The lack of money had an unfavorable effect not only on the planning and developing of the railway lines but on the technical equipment of the railways as well. The low speed of the military trains was one of the weak points of the transportation of troops. The average mileage covered daily by a military train was not over two hundred, whereas in France the figure was twice as large. One of the reasons lay in the non-equipment of Russian freight cars, used for the transportation of troops, with automatic brakes. The question of supplying such brakes was raised on several occasions, but as the improvement called for the expenditure of a score of million rubles it was invariably postponed.

The Geographical Factor.

Along with the difficulties experienced by Russia in the development of her military strength on account of her lack of money, there was another very weak spot growing out of the general geographical conditions. In comparison with the other great Powers, Russia had little access to the sea. If the coast of the Arctic be excluded, we find that she had only the Baltic, the Black, the White Sea, and the Sea of Japan. This was the Achilles' heel of the Russian colossus, not only as concerned its economic life, but also in the matter of its military strength. To blockade Russia, in case of a European war, would be easy. A war with Germany barred the use of the Baltic for transport by sea. The possibility of using the Black Sea depended entirely on whether Turkey became one of Russia's enemies. Communication was really open only through Archangel and Vladivostok. But Arch-

⁸ S. A. Ronzhin, *Zheleznyia Dorogi v Voennoe Vremia* (*Railways in Time of War*). General Ronzhin, of the Russian General Staff, was in charge of military transportation before, and for two years during, the War. His work, a manuscript, is in the possession of the present author.

angel, on account of its climate, remained ice free for not more than six months. Besides, it was connected with the general system of railways only by a narrow-gauge line. As to Vladivostok, it was about 3,500 miles away from the front, and every two trains running to that port and back required one hundred and twenty engines, a shortage of which was felt at the very beginning of the War. During the War, under extremely difficult conditions, the Archangel line was rebuilt by the railroad detachments of the army, and its gauge was made of standard width. Measures were also taken to increase traffic on the Trans-Siberian. Nevertheless, equipment and supplies worth many millions and precious from the military standpoint could not be shipped from Vladivostok and were never received by the army. The Government tried to improve the situation by building the Murmansk railway, leading to an ice-free port on the Arctic, but the technical difficulties were so great that the line could not be completed during the War.

The result of all this was that Russia, when Turkey was added to her enemies, became a sort of barred house, which could be entered only through the chimney. After Turkey's declaration of war, Russia's exports dropped 98 per cent, and her imports 95. Thus, she was "blockaded" far more completely than Germany. The Government could be blamed for having overlooked the possibility of a blockade, and for having neither improved the Archangel and Trans-Siberian lines, nor built the Murmansk railway; but for all this money was needed. And in any case, these measures would have been only a palliative.

Inadequacy of Pre-War Estimates.

How serious was the effect the blockade had on Russia is obvious from the fact that her backward industry was unable to meet her colossal needs for armament, supplies of munitions, and technical equipment. It follows, therefore, that compared with other European States her peace-time accumulation of war reserves, as also the number of her army factories, should have been of the greatest. To what extent were such needs actually met? Table 2 tells a part of the story.⁹

⁹ Manikovsky, *op. cit.*, Part II, p. 58.

TABLE 2

Number of Guns Needed.

	<i>Number of guns needed to equip the army</i>		<i>Number of guns needed annually</i>		
	<i>According to calculations made in 1910</i>	<i>Demanded by G. H. Q. in 1916</i>	<i>War stock according to calculations made in 1910</i>	<i>Demanded by G. H. Q., 1916</i>	<i>Old guns to be repaired</i>
3-inch guns	6,336	11,200	889	6,720	3,780
Light howitzers (4.8- and 4.5-inch)	512	2,160	74	1,476	84
Heavy field guns (4-inch guns and 6-inch howitzers)	240	1,080	24	648	144
Total	7,088	14,440	987	8,844	4,008

As for ammunition, the supply per gun available at the beginning of the War was: for 3-inch guns, 6,400; for light howitzers, 450; and for heavy field guns, 120. The annual war-time requirement, based on General Headquarters' demands in 1916, was, respectively, 42,000, 6,600, and 2,260.¹⁰

No doubt the demands of General Headquarters at the end of 1916, made under the direct impression of the catastrophic conditions which the army was then experiencing in the matter of ammunition supplies, were somewhat exaggerated; but the fact that the estimates of the Ministry of War turned out to be several times less than the actual need is also beyond dispute. It would be unjust, however, to blame the Russian Artillery Department because it had not foreseen the vast needs of a future war. An error, of course, was made, but in that respect there was little difference between Russia and both France and Germany. But the position of the Russian Ministry of War in that respect was exceptionally unfortunate, because every step taken by it had inevitably met with financial difficulties. While the supplies of ammunition in Russia should have been the largest, in reality they were limited to 1,000 rounds per gun.

The question of the necessity of having greater stores of ammunition had been raised by the General Staff, and as a result, in May, 1912, the Chief of the General Staff, after much formality and

¹⁰ Manikovsky, *op. cit.*, Part II, p. 58.

delay, succeeded in getting the Government to consent to an appropriation of 10,000,000 rubles which provided for an increase in the ammunition reserves for the 3-inch guns. With this amount, however, such supplies could be increased only to a very slight degree, namely, 8 per cent. At the same time France decided to increase her supplies of ammunition to 3,000 rounds per gun.¹¹ General Manikovsky writes:

Should we decide to follow this good example, and increase our supplies, at least, to 2,000 rounds . . . this would require an additional appropriation of 130,000,000 rubles. And for the increase of our stock to 3,000 rounds per gun, an amount twice as large would be needed. No Minister of War, even having the full support of the Duma, could at that time expect that such appropriations would be granted.¹²

Irrespective of the cost, another circumstance, complicating the war supplies problem, had to be taken into consideration. "The larger the stock of ammunition," writes General Manikovsky, "the longer it takes to renew it; the greater, therefore, is its deterioration during the time it is kept in storage."¹³ Consequently, there was a certain technical limit, beyond which war stocks could not be increased.

Armament and Munition Works.

An increase of ammunition supplies during the War called for an adequate development of factory production. Well-equipped munitions factories were a necessity for Russia. This, however, meant heavy expenses. The annual output of the State factories amounted only to 600,000 rounds,¹⁴ whereas the annual requirement, as estimated by General Headquarters in 1916, was 42,000,000 rounds, or seventy times as much.

Equally bad was the prospect of being able to equip the existing works for the production of guns. Inasmuch as the artillery, even during the years of peace, had been growing obsolete, because of the rapid progress of modern technique, the establishment of large works, within a short time, had become a question of paramount im-

¹¹ The decision could not be carried out, and in the beginning of the War the French army had only 1,400 rounds per gun.

¹² Manikovsky, *op. cit.*, Part III, p. 9.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

portance. What the actual situation was in that respect may be judged from the fact that the Ministry of War had at its disposal only one gun factory, the Petrograd arsenal. Moreover, "it was only due to some misunderstanding that this technical establishment of the Artillery Department had been given this high-sounding and absolutely erroneous name. In point of fact, it had been and, even since a recent expansion, still was, simply a large workshop, capable of finishing the artillery work supplied by other iron foundries."¹⁵ Requests made by the Artillery Department on many occasions, and urged with special insistence in 1905, to have the establishment moved from the aristocratic section of Petrograd to some other and more suitable place, as also to develop it into a powerful unit, with its own forges, fell through, having met with the refusal of the Ministry of Finance and the State Audit Department to grant the necessary funds.¹⁶

Besides the Petrograd arsenal, controlled by the Ministry of War, there were two other State arsenals: that of Perm, under the control of the Mining Department, and that of Obukhov, controlled by the Admiralty. However, the former, according to a report of the Special Investigation Commission formed in June, 1905, with the object of making a thorough study of the conditions which caused the delay and non-delivery of an adequate supply of munitions to the army, was far from being up to the standard of the great and modern artillery works of Europe, such as those of Schneider, Armstrong, Vickers, Skoda, and Krupp.¹⁷ As to the Obukhov Works, which principally supplied naval guns, it could give to the army only such time as it had left after the needs of the navy had been met.

There were also under the control of the Ministry of War, three other arsenals: in Petrograd, Kiev, and Bryansk. But they manufactured gun carriages, machine guns, caissons, wagons, and harness. During the War these arsenals were overloaded with work, and only under extreme urgency were they called upon to repair guns.

On the strength of the information given above, it may safely be decided that the impossibility of meeting, without delay, the needs of the Russian army during the War was a result of refusals, within a period of many years, to grant funds for the increase of the strength

¹⁵ Manikovsky, *op. cit.*, Part II, p. 93.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

of the field artillery, and for the building of at least one independent and powerful arsenal under the control of the Ministry of War.¹⁸

Work of Reorganization.

Immediately after the war with Japan, which had made it clear that Russia was absolutely unprepared for a war on her western front, the Ministry of War, at the head of which General Rediger had been placed, prepared several memoranda setting forth the called-for army reforms covering training, organization, recruiting, promotion of officers, equipment, and supplies. Three of those memoranda,¹⁹ of a wider scope, were to serve as a basis for the working out of a plan to be followed in preparing the army for a European war. With a view to coördinating them and drafting a final plan of army reorganization, the three memoranda were circulated to every general in command of a military district; and subsequently, with the comments of the latter, they were submitted, by His Majesty's order, to the Council of National Defense, under the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich, for final decision. Much attention was given to the question of army supplies. But the appointment of General Sukhomlinov to the post of Minister of War brought the plan to an end, and nothing came of it. General Lukomsky, one of those closest to General Sukhomlinov, writes:²⁰

This circumstance did not make for systematic progress in the work of preparing for war, in the period from the end of the war with Japan up to the beginning of the war with the Central Powers in 1914. Many measures which had been planned were not carried out; many things, when the sharpest impressions left by the reverses in the Japanese war had passed away, were lost in the pressure of current business; and although all that had been planned was not quite forgotten, it lost, under the influence of the new leaders of the Ministry of War, its urgent character and no longer seemed to call for an immediate change.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

¹⁹ They were prepared under the immediate supervision of Generals Rediger, Palitsin, and Everet.

²⁰ A. S. Lukomsky, in *Sbornik Zapisok Otnosyashchikhsya k Russkomu Snabzhenyu v Veliknyu Voinu* (Collection of Memoranda on the Supplies of the Russian Army during the Great War), published privately in 1925 by the Russian Financial Attaché in the United States, p. 11.

Sukhomlinov and his friends often ascribed the reverses in the war with Japan not to the defects of organization, training and supplies of the army, but chiefly to mistakes made by the commanding officers. . . . To a great extent this fact (that no general system of supplying munitions had been devised) was due to the imperfect and very complicated organization of the administrative machinery of the army, as well as to the irregular inter-relations of the supplies departments of the Ministry of War, on the one hand, and those branches of the Ministry which were responsible for the preparation of the army for war in all respects, on the other.

Leaving out the peculiar political conditions in Russia, resulting from the too tardy emancipation of the serfs, a further circumstance made it difficult to overcome the chaos existing in the army administration. A "scientific organization" of work might have contributed to improve the situation. But "scientific organization" not only calls for the participation, individually, of a country's outstanding scientists, but also demands that they have help and an atmosphere in keeping. When the latter condition does not exist, scientific suggestions are like wheels that are geared to nothing else. They turn, but in vain. The educated classes in Russia, as has been said, were only a thin film over the uncultured mass. Moreover, the culture of the educated was too recent a thing to be rooted deeply. Since its beginnings under Peter the Great, it had existed for only nine generations. Accordingly, even the most educated had little faith in science and the necessity of applying scientific methods to all organization, especially in dealing with social phenomena.

An Illustration.

This may be illustrated by a case taken from the narrow and technical field of gun production. On the occasion of its one hundredth anniversary, the firm of Krupp published a volume,²¹ in which it told of the difficulties it encountered when carrying out the first order for large-caliber guns that it received from the Prussian Government, and the assistance, in questions of theory and practice, given to the firm by Russian artillery experts. The guns were tested at the Okh-

²¹ Krupp, 1812-1912: *Zum 100 jaehrigen Bestehen der Firma Krupp und der Guss-Stahlfabrik zu Essen-Kunk*, 1912.

tenski range in Russia, and the test was executed under the direction of Russia's foremost authorities on ballistics and explosives. The Prussian Government threatened to take the order away from Krupp and turn it over to Armstrong, with whom he had been unable to compete, but Krupp, pointing to the successes achieved, thanks to the help of the Russians, asked the Prussian Government to postpone its decision. In 1867, having delivered the order for Russian coast defense guns, Krupp put himself on a firm footing and passed the test brilliantly. He complied with the demands of the Prussian Ministry of War for working models as good as those of Armstrong. This is one of many examples showing that Russian scientific and technical thought, sterile in its native land, could bear magnificent fruit in more nutritive soil.

In the field of organization as such science is slower to take root than in any other. We find evidence of this in the fact that the Taylor system did not make its appearance until industry in the United States had reached a high level. That scientific methods may be applied freely to the organization of a modern armed force, which is even more complex, a greater number of favorable factors are needed. And to repeat, science in Russian military affairs, which was represented by many eminent men, was often like a driving wheel connected with nothing else. The fate of such a scholar and statesman as Count Milyutin,²² father of the military reforms of Alexander II, may serve as a good example. In the beginning of the reign of Alexander III he had to give up his position, that of Minister of War, and for the rest of his life was kept by the Government from doing any official work. Living in the Crimea he could devote his great intelligence and experience only to the writing of memoirs.

Equally instructive is the fate of another military expert, General Rediger. For his volume, *The Recruiting and Organization of an Armed Force*, he was awarded by the Imperial Academy of Sciences one of its most important prizes. But though, after the war with Japan, he, too, was made Minister of War, very soon an end was put to the important work that he was doing.

When one does not believe in science, one must trust in miracles,

²² A professor in the General Staff College; for his work in history he was honored by one of the Russian universities with the degree of Doctor of History, a rare distinction.

that is, in the timely appearance of a genius. The genius, of course, did not appear, and the difficult conditions under which the Russian army existed remained unchanged. While, as has been said, it should rightly have been the most "costly," it was, in fact, the "cheapest." But its cheapness was achieved by a great lowering of its actual fighting strength.

CHAPTER IV

MAN POWER AND THE SIZE OF THE ARMY

The Army Reserve.

THE strength of the Russian army at the moment of the mobilization was officially estimated at 1,423,000 men.¹ A confirmation of this estimate will be found in a report of General Knox, former Military Attaché of Great Britain to Russia.² The number of reservists called to the colors in 1914 is given in a Soviet publication³ as follows: 2,500,000 on July 17; 100,000 from the Amur and Kazan military districts on September 15; and 43,000 from the navy reserve, between July 18 and August 26.⁴

The article in which these figures appear was written by a certain L. N. Sazonov. It and other articles in the same publication contain much valuable data; but with regard to the question now under discussion M. Sazonov's incompetency may be seen at once. To begin with, the "first day" of the Russian general mobilization was not July 17, as he states, but July 18. The German General Staff had been doing its best for some time to misrepresent that fact with a view to persuading public opinion in Germany and Europe, by a twisting of the truth, that the Government of the Tsar had made itself the aggressor by secretly beginning mobilization on the seventeenth. Furthermore, the total of mobilized reservists, 2,643,000, as given by M. Sazonov, inspires much doubt.

It is of interest that the page in his article, preceding his figures (page 124), contains a quotation from a memorandum of the Minis-

¹ *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine 1914-1918* (*Russia in the World War, 1914-1918*), published by the Central Statistical Department (Moscow, 1925), Table 2. This table is based on the data of the former Ministry of War.

² This document, dated November 1, 1917, is preserved in the archives of the War Office, London. It is based on current data supplied by the Mobilization Division of the Russian General Staff. General Knox had access in his official capacity to important sources and his reports are very reliable and extremely important.

³ *Trudi* (*Proceedings*) of the Commission for the Investigation of the Effects on Public Health of the War of 1914-1920 (Moscow, 1923), pp. 125, 126.

⁴ All dates are given in accordance with the Russian calendar.

ter of the Interior, from which these figures had been taken; and that quotation reads as follows: "The total number of army and navy reservists, taken for military service during the general mobilization and supplementary calls, was 2,630,000, plus 360,000 Cossacks. . . ." Thus we see that M. Sazonov omitted the 360,000 Cossacks. Adding that figure we obtain a total of 2,990,000, or, in round numbers, 3,000,000. But to that total all mobilized reserve officers, army medical officers, etc., must also be added. For this reason one feels justified in holding that 3,115,000,⁵ the figure given in *Russia in the World War*, which also appears in the above-mentioned report of General Knox, is beyond comparison more nearly correct than that of M. Sazonov.

General Dobrorolsky, who was Chief of the Mobilization Division of the General Staff in 1914, states that the strength of the Russian reserve force amounted to 3,500,000 men.⁶ However, this figure like many others adduced by that general may be considered as somewhat exaggerated.

The Territorial Army.

The establishment of the number of territorials mobilized during the War presents more difficulties, inasmuch as they were called on various dates, and from different parts of the Empire.

The territorials of the first class who had passed through the active army and the reserve, that is, men from forty to forty-three (age groups 1895–1892), had been called by the fifth day of general mobilization, or on July 22, 1914. They numbered 400,000. The figure is given in both Soviet publications mentioned above⁷ as well as in the report of General Knox. Territorials of the first class belonging to the four youngest age groups, that is, men from twenty-two to twenty-five (age groups 1913–1910) were called out, in European Russia, at the same time as these advanced-age groups. They also numbered 400,000.

⁵ *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, Table 2.

⁶ Dobrorolsky, *O Mobilizatsii Russkoi Armii v 1914 g.* (*The Mobilization of the Russian Army in 1914*) in *Russki Voenni Sbornik*, No. 2, Belgrad.

⁷ *Trudi* (*Proceedings*) of the Commission for the Investigation of the Effects on Public Health of the War of 1914–1920, p. 152; *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, pp. 17–18.

Subsequently, in the course of the first year of the War, or up to July 19, 1915, according to the statement submitted by the Minister of War to the Duma and the State Council on July 21, 1915, the number of men of the first class of the territorial army mobilized in European Russia was 1,580,000.

On August 15, 1915, 300,000 more territorials of the first class, men from twenty to thirty-eight (age groups 1916-1898), were called in European Russia. On the same day territorials of the same class were called out in Siberia and Turkestan and in the Caucasus, a total of 50,000.

On September 5, 1915, the mobilization of territorials of the second class began: on that day 900,000 men were called in European Russia and Siberia. On September 15, 1915, 25,000 territorials of the first class, from twenty to thirty-eight, and 25,000 territorials of the second class, from twenty to twenty-four, were called in the Amur military district. On October 15, 1915, 30,000 territorials of the first class, from twenty-seven to thirty, were mobilized in the Caucasus, and on October 30, 1915, 400,000 territorials of the second class, aged twenty-five and twenty-six, were called in European Russia and Siberia. In the course of 1916, according to the Annual Report of the Minister of War for that year, there were called to the colors 2,040,000 territorials in all. In January, 1917, 30,000 territorials of the second class, from twenty-nine to thirty-two, were called out in the Caucasus. Then, in February, 1917, the outbreak of the Revolution brought all such movements to an end.

But for the total number of territorials called out during the War, we have the following figures: 400,000 belonging to the first class: those who had been in both the active army and the reserve; 2,705,000 who had not been in the active army; and 3,075,000 of the second class of the reserve who had not been in the active army, making a grand total of 6,180,000.

Early in the War it became clear that it would be necessary to call the young men who had not yet reached conscription age. The Russian laws, as already pointed out, had not wholly foreseen such a necessity, and, during the War, it became necessary to confer on the Ministry of War such additional authority.

Young men in the age groups of 1914, 1915, and 1916, when entitled to the privilege of being enlisted in the territorial army, were

mobilized separately; but for the age group of 1917 and those to follow no such distinction was made; the result of this was immediate increases in recruit contingents. The total number of recruits called during the War was 4,460,000.

Finally, a new medical examination was given those reservists and territorials, in age groups 1916–1910, who had been previously rejected. Of these 200,000 were declared fit for service.⁸

All the data given above are summarized in Table 3.

TABLE 3
Total Number of Men Mobilized.

Date	Strength of army be- fore mobi- lization	Territorials first class				Re- cruits	Reëx- amined men	Total
		Re- serve	Trans- ferred from reserve	Did not serve in regular army	Terri- torials second class			
1914								
Before mobilization	1,423							1,423
July 18		3,115						3,115
July 22			400	400				800
September 22				300				300
October 1						715		715
November 12 and 20				200				200
Total for 1914	1,423	3,115	400	900		715		6,553
1915								
January 2				480				480
January 15						673		673
April 1				600				600
May 15						632		632
August 7						932		932
August 15				350				350
September 5					900			900
September 15				25	25			50
October 15				30				30
October 30					400			400
Total for 1915				1,485	1,325	2,237		5,047

⁸ In 1916, according to the Annual Report of the Minister of War, 100,000 men were enrolled after reëxamination.

Date	Territorials first class							Total
	Strength of army be- fore mobi- lization	Re- serve	Trans- ferred from reserve	Did not serve in regular army	Terri- torials second class	Re- cruits	Reëx- amined men	
(in thousands)								
1916								
January							100	100
February 1				25	300			325
March 25				105	300			405
May 15						908		908
August 25				40	410			450
September 20				150	360			510
October 25					350			350
Total for 1916				320	1,720	908	100	3,048
1917								
January 10					30			30
February 7						600		600
Others							100	100
Total for 1917					30	600	100	730
Grand Totals								
To December 31, 1914	1,423	3,115	400	900		715		6,553
To December 31, 1915	1,423	3,115	400	2,385	1,325	2,952		11,600
To December 31, 1916	1,423	3,115	400	2,705	3,045	3,860	100	14,648
To October 1, 1917	1,423	3,115	400	2,705	3,075	4,460	200	15,378

Thus, about 15,500,000 men were mobilized during the War.

In the *Proceedings* of the Commission for the Investigation of the Effects on Public Health of the War of 1914–1920⁹ the total is set down as approximately 15,000,000. As for *Russia in the World War*,¹⁰ the total is given as 15,123,000.¹¹

In November, 1916, a memorandum signed by twenty-eight members of the Duma and the State Council, who were also members of the Special Council for National Defense, was submitted to the Emperor.¹² In that memorandum the total number of men mobilized up to November, 1916, is given as about 14,500,000. According to

⁹ P. 125.

¹⁰ Pp. 17–18.

¹¹ In the report of General Knox it is given as 15,150,000.

¹² See below, pp. 61 *sqq.*

Table 3, the number up to December 31, 1916, was about 14,648,000, and there were no calls either in November or in December. Thus we see that the two estimates are almost identical.

On September 4, 1917, General Verkhovsky, the last Minister of War in the Provisional Government, in a letter to General Alexeev, stated that the number of mobilized men exceeded 15,000,000. If we take into account that by an order of the Provisional Government, issued on April 1, 1917,¹³ 350,000 men forty-three years old had been discharged, and if we add that number to the 15,000,000 set down by Verkhovsky in his letter, we get 15,350,000. This again shows that the number estimated in the table is almost identical with that arrived at by the last Minister of War.

In October, 1917, when the present author was preparing to go to France, where a conference of the representatives of the Allied Armies was to be held, a calculation of the number of men mobilized was made at the Russian Headquarters at his request. The figure he then set down was 15,800,000. Therefore, the estimate, in round numbers, of 15,500,000 is not exaggerated.

Order of Conscription.

Now let us consider the order in which the age groups were mobilized. We have pointed out that the Conscription Law did not conform to the principle of social justice. A further analysis shows that the sequence of the mobilization orders issued at various dates did not correspond to the principle proclaimed in the first article of the Conscription Law, that "the defense of the throne and the country is the sacred duty of every subject of the Russian Crown."

For example, the territorials forty-three years old (age group 1892) transferred to the territorial army from the reserve were called in July, 1914. In the course of the following three months, from the remaining territorials only those in the first class, not over twenty-six years old, were mobilized. In the next three months, likewise, only territorials of the first class, not over thirty-two, were called. Later on, and all through 1915, territorials of the first class, not older than thirty-eight, were called. And only in September, 1916, that is, after two years of war, came the turn of the territorials

¹³ *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, p. 19.

of the first class, forty-three years old, who had not served in the army in time of peace. As we take up the mobilization of the territorials of the second class, we shall find an even greater difference in the State's treatment of its citizens. That class was called out only in the second year of the War, following the retreat of the army from Galicia, Poland, and Lithuania, and not before almost all of the territorials of the first class had been exhausted. Even men of thirty-eight had been called. Thus, the division by the law of the whole population into three categories becomes clear. Each of these categories—those who had been in the army in time of peace, territorials of the first class, and territorials of the second class—received different treatment, irrespective of the fact that the family status of the men called, the basis for their division into categories, might have changed long ago.

A further discrimination becomes apparent from the fact that all territorials belonging to the same age group, but living in different parts of the country, were not mobilized at one and the same date. Not only were those living in European Russia, the Caucasus, and Asiatic Russia called at differing dates, but even territorials of one and the same age group, living in the provinces of European Russia, were not mobilized simultaneously. Because of the non-registration of territorials in the time of peace (with the exception of the four youngest age groups of the first class and of those who had passed through the active army and reserve) the unsystematic character of the mobilization increased even more.

Age Distribution.

Coming to the question of age, we find that, assuming that the total number of men mobilized totaled approximately 15,500,000, about 2,500,000, or 16 per cent, were under twenty; 7,600,000, or 49 per cent, were between twenty and twenty-nine; 4,600,000, or 30 per cent, were between thirty and thirty-nine; and 800,000, or 5 per cent, were forty and older.

If, further, we estimate that in 1917 the Conscription Law affected a population of 150,000,000, and inquire what proportion of those belonging to each age group were called (that is, of the total number of males falling within it) we find that of those under twenty (two age groups) about 40 per cent were called; of those between

twenty and twenty-nine, about 50 per cent; of those between thirty and thirty-nine, about 40, and those of forty and older (age groups 41-43) about 30 per cent.

Thus we see that no proper use of the age groups was made. Men between twenty and twenty-nine, or those most capable of fighting, constituted only 49 per cent of the total number of men mobilized, and only 50 per cent of the total number of males in their respective age groups. Consequently, there arose the necessity of calling out older age groups.

Geographical Distribution.

Not less unevenly, because not enough attention had been paid to the organization of that important matter, was the burden distributed over the various sections of Russia. Some general idea of this may be formed by examining the data of the rural census of 1917¹⁴ on the strength of which the percentage of able-bodied men mobilized in most of the provinces of European Russia had been estimated. According to the figures there given, the percentage of mobilized men in the province of Ekaterinoslav was 34.2, but in the province of Kursk it was 53.3. The low percentage for the former province may be explained by the large number of miners and workmen it contains. There were also many such workmen in the provinces of Petrograd and Perm, for which the percentages were, respectively, 39.7 and 36.8. But this does not furnish any complete explanation. If we followed the distribution of the burden over all sections of the Empire, the discrepancies would be even greater. For a minimum there would be a zero for Finland, and for a maximum, 60 per cent in the Akmolinsk region.

A further analysis of our data leads to the conclusion that a greater burden was put upon peasantry, not only absolutely, but relatively, than upon any other class. The same conclusion will be reached if we consider the percentage of allowances and subsidies (food, etc.) made under the Law of June 25, 1912, and distributed among the families of the mobilized men.¹⁵ Taking the entire war period, we find that of the total number of allowances made, 91.5 went to the rural districts and 8.5 to the cities. Of the total food sub-

¹⁴ *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, Table 6.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Table 42.

sidies, the rural districts received 91.8 per cent and the cities, 8.2. In 1914–1917 the urban population in Russia amounted to 15 per cent. Even if we take into account the fact that the average rural family was larger than the urban, it still follows that the former paid a heavier toll in lives than the latter.

Chapter II pointed out that every decrease in the number of producers in Russia had a more unfavorable effect than a like decrease would have in the more advanced European States. Figures from the rural census of 1917 are very significant in this respect. According to them, and they deal with the overwhelming mass of the population, there were withdrawn from productive work and enlisted in the army 47.4 per cent of all able-bodied men, or about one-half. Yet the 15,500,000 mobilized men formed only 9.3 per cent of the whole population, if we estimate it at 167,000,000, or 10 per cent if we exclude non-Russians and the inhabitants of sections which were legally exempt from military service.

In France, Great Britain, and Germany, respectively, the number of men withdrawn from productive work did not equal even one-half the producers until the number of men enlisted in the army had risen to between 18 and 20 per cent of the whole population.

The "Russian Steam Roller."

But the fact that Russia's limitations in man power were greater than those of the western European States did not receive due attention either from her Allies or from herself. Public opinion in the Allied countries saw their great hope in Russia's millions. They would be the decisive card for victory over Germany. The "Russian steam roller" was a figure of speech often used by the British press. The idea prevailed that Germany would not be able to hold against the heavy pressure of that imaginary steam roller moving from the east; in other words, the road to victory would be "rolled smooth" by the inexhaustible supply of soldiers. And the point of view of the Ministry of War headed by Sukhomlinov was much the same. General Knox writes as follows, when speaking of the events of the summer of 1915:¹⁶ "The General Staff had no fear for the future as re-

¹⁶ Sir Alfred Knox, *With the Russian Army 1914–1917*, two volumes (New York, 1921), I, 268.

gards the supply of men. General Belaev¹⁷ said that, though the wastage in the present war had exceeded anything previously dreamed of; 'even if we were to continue for two years more at the present rate of wastage we would have no difficulty in finding men.' ” Yet in the middle of June, 1915, as indicated in the beginning of this chapter, almost the whole contingent of territorials of the first class had been used up. This meant the exhaustion of the entire supply of men who, under the Conscription Law, could be called to active service.

General Polivanov, who had just succeeded General Sukhomlinov, was faced at that time with the necessity of calling for active service the territorials of the second class. This, however, as we know, was illegal. The new Minister of War was likewise fully aware that it would have a bad effect on the masses, accustomed to the idea that the second class was exempt from active service.

In his *Memoirs*¹⁸ General Polivanov describes the first steps he took. The Council of Ministers, at its session in Petrograd on June 16, passed the following resolution, offered by the Minister of War:

WHEREAS, in view of the present popular state of mind, the calling of new recruits, which is regarded by the people as a matter of course, should be preferred to the mobilization of territorials of the second class, a measure the people will not look for [a point already made at the session held on June 14 at General Headquarters],¹⁹ be it resolved: that, prior to the taking by the Council of Ministers of a final decision, both the Ministry of War and the Ministry of the Interior shall agree on a course of procedure making it possible to call out the new recruits at earliest, and not after the completion of preliminary work for which almost a year will be needed. For if the call be made thus early, the motive advanced by the Ministry of War, to the effect that the mobilization of territorials of the second class is more desirable because the necessary preparations have already been made, will be no longer valid.

Despite the fact that the Ministry of War was very much against

¹⁷ Later Minister of War; then Chief of the General Staff, and one of General Sukhomlinov's collaborators.

¹⁸ A. A. Polivanov, *Memuari (Memoirs)* (Moscow, 1924), p. 149.

¹⁹ On June 14 a session of the Council of Ministers, presided over by the Emperor, was held at General Headquarters. Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich and his Chief of Staff were present at that session.

this mobilization of the territorials of the second class, this measure could not, of course, be avoided. Such a fundamental change in the law had to be brought into being in an atmosphere of public anxiety created by the catastrophic munitions situation. This public anxiety manifested itself in the Duma's growing lack of confidence in the Government, and it could not be overcome entirely by the removal of General Sukhomlinov as Minister of War and the appointment of General Polivanov, who was popular with the Duma.

Very interesting information as to the attitude of the members of the Government toward the mobilization of the territorials of the second class may be found in the minutes of the secret sessions of the Council of Ministers from June to September, 1915.²⁰ During the session of August 14 there was an exchange of opinions among the Ministers, following a question from M. Goremykin, President of the Council, as to whether the Duma was to keep its promise to pass the bill relating to the territorials of the second class, and, if so, when? Prince Shcherbatov, Minister of the Interior, observed that should the territorials be called without the sanction of the Duma, the Government would not be able, "considering the present feeling of the people, to raise a man." M. Samarin, Procurator of the Holy Synod, was of the opinion that, in order to avoid the mobilization of the territorials of the second class, those who had deserted from the army should be rounded up and sent back to their regiments. This naïve suggestion was supported by M. Krivoshein, Minister of Agriculture, who said that the question might be solved "if that mob of loafers, who only made for greater demoralization in the rear, were put in the trenches."

Shingarev's Speech.

On August 19 the bill was taken up by the Duma. On that occasion a speech of exceptional interest was delivered by M. Shingarev, one of its most prominent members and chairman of the Military and Naval Commission. In that speech he not only set forth the attitude of the Duma toward the projected change of the legal status of the territorials of the second class, but also dealt with the whole ques-

²⁰ A. N. Yakhontov, *Tyazhelie dni (Fateful Days)* in *Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii (Archives of the Russian Revolution)* Vol. XVIII (Berlin, 1926). Yakhontov was assistant secretary of the Council of Ministers.

tion so comprehensively that his speech is worth quoting, and we quote at length.²¹

Gentlemen of the Duma, the question of mobilizing the territorials of the second class, which in its turn has come up for our consideration, is the most serious phase of the problem of our national defense. Prior to taking up that question, the members of the Military and Naval Commission held it to be their duty to learn in detail how we stood as to munitions. To feel justified in granting the increased demands of the Ministry of War for more hundreds of thousands of men, we had to put the following question to the Ministry: what is the situation in the matter of armament, shells, rifles, cartridges; will not the men, whose calling to the colors we are to sanction, find their position a bad one? Will not they be unarmed? We had further to ask, how do the men you are calling out stand as to training? And tell us what our losses have been so that we may know why you are asking for so great a number of men. All these questions, as the members of the Military and Naval Commission—and also those members of the Duma who do not belong to the Commission but were present at our sessions—are aware, were for many days considered by the Commission in great detail. Gentlemen, the picture which was presented to us during those deliberations was a sad one. We must say that the responsibility for the immense shortage of munitions and equipment rests upon the former heads of the Ministry of War²² and partly on those now in charge . . .

Even in worse case, up to recently, was the training of our men for service at the front. The army complained with good reason that the reinforcements it was receiving lacked training, that often they were sent unarmed, that they were not sufficiently familiar with the use of arms. . . . Furthermore, some members of the Commission insisted that, as a preliminary measure, it would be absolutely necessary to reënforce the army in the field with those elements which had had sufficient training. By those elements was meant our police force, its rank and file, and its officers. For among the police were to be found a considerable number of men who had been specially trained to arms, and were ready for immediate service. Unfortunately, this desire, already twice voiced by the Duma, is meeting with insurmountable resistance on the part of the Ministry of the Interior. But, gentlemen, this measure would not give a sufficient number of men to reënforce the army and to drive the enemy out of the country. The losses which the army suffered and is suffering

²¹ Stenographic Report of the Duma, Session 12, August 19, 1915.

²² General Sukhomlinov.

are great. We were told that from 300,000 to 400,000 men a month are needed merely to make good our losses. If such reënforcements do not come in time, if the combat units are not immediately brought to strength, our army may almost melt away, and then we shall no longer have our living wall to hold back the pressure of the enemy. It appears, according to the explanations of the representatives of the Ministry of War, that sometimes the need of reënforcements is so great and so acute that, in circumstances of dire necessity, under the pressure of the urgent demands of the army command, it becomes indispensable to send into the front trenches units which have not had training enough.

Inasmuch as the reënforcement of the army has been carried out neither systematically nor quickly enough, while training in the interior of the Empire has not been well organized, a situation has been created in which men have been sent to the combat units too soon. First the training lasted two months, later its duration was one month. After four weeks of training men little prepared have been sent to the front.

At the present time the Ministry of War wishes to take another measure which, so far as we can judge, is in the right direction and, as it seems, was taken by our enemy long ago. The Ministry wishes to call out at one and the same time men to a number exceeding by far our monthly losses, to recruit men in enormous numbers. The recruits of 1917 have just been called out; this will give us from 700,000 to 800,000. Subsequently, territorials of the first class of the older age groups will be called; they will do guard duty on roads and railways, act as garrison troops, etc., while their younger comrades, who have been in the army, may be sent to the front. Next come the territorials of the second class, who may be called out on the authority of the bill we are considering now, and who complete the category liable to such a call. It is intended, according to the explanation of a representative of the Ministry of War, in the beginning of September to call out from four to six of the younger age groups of the said territorials of the second class. Each age group numbers from 200,000 to 250,000 men, which means a total of over 1,000,000, plus the recruits of 1917, who number more than 700,000. Thus, the Ministry of War will perhaps obtain about 2,000,000 men in all. A certain part of these will have to be used at once, which is to be regretted, to make good army losses; but the remainder will be trained in the interior of the Empire for a longer period, for four, five, or perhaps six months, so that a formidable force may be created for the moment when a sufficient number of guns, shells, rifles, and cartridges will be at our disposal. These are the hopes of the Ministry, they are also our hopes: we expect that, after several months,

from that mass of men undergoing training a force will be formed formidable enough to repulse the enemy.

To be sure, it is not enough to have munitions, equipment, arms; nor is it enough to have a great supply of men; it is requisite that they be provided with leaders and commanders. We have also noted that there is no satisfactory plan whereby the campaign may be conducted systematically. . . . There is not enough coördination between the management of military affairs in the interior of the country and the activities of the authorities at the front. The Commission, on several occasions, voiced a wish that there should be more systematic coöperation between General Headquarters and the Ministry of War; that the former should be fully informed as to the resources in the interior while the latter should be fully informed as to the needs of General Headquarters; that there should be one plan, and a complete coördination of the common work of national defense . . .

Our reserve of men who have not yet been called is not large enough: the number of territorials of the second class amounts approximately to a little more than 4,000,000. Moreover, the oldest age group in that reserve does not constitute material well fitted for active service. Experience with the older age groups of the territorials of the first class who have been called up has shown that they are also not well suited for the strain of modern war. Thus, our reserve consists of a number slightly exceeding 4,000,000, but the older age groups must be regarded with reservations. Next we have a limited contingent, made up of older age groups only, of the territorials of the first class. Finally, there is a project for the calling out next year of those born in 1897, or stripplings of eighteen. But whoever observed the 1917 recruiting, who saw those half-grown boys, must have decided that such material was to be used with care, that it was to be preserved as long as possible and called upon only in a great emergency.

It goes without saying that even it will have to be drawn upon in case of urgent need, but the Commission, as it considered the question of the supply of men, remembered that there still remained a considerable part of the population which, up to this time, has not been liable to conscription. It amounts to about 20,000,000 men, and it consists of the so-called "non-Russian peoples," including the Mohammedans of Trans-Caucasia, the inhabitants of Turkestan, the natives of Siberia, the Kirghiz, etc. Those elements, although exempt from military service, have not reconciled themselves to exemption: they have considered it to be an offensive reflection upon them. Statements to that effect, we know, have been made by the Kirghiz, and by the Mohammedans of Trans-Caucasia;

they were at a loss to understand why they should not, why they could not do their military duty. There are approximately 10,000,000 males in those groups; consequently, if we assume that only 5 per cent are fit for military service, we shall then obtain a contingent of 500,000 men.

You see, gentlemen, that as regards the question of supplies of men, although our position is, by much, more favorable than that of our enemy, although we can struggle on for many, many months, while using that supply of men, we are obliged, nevertheless, to say to our Ministry of War: Remember that that supply is the last; remember that you have to use it with the greatest care; remember that, unlike your predecessors, you must not do the work in such a way that men will be used at random and lost in vain. Precious, priceless is the blood they shed for their country; treat them with thoughtful judgment, spare every single life; do your best to give them the most thorough training; do your best—and this constitutes your main duty—to give them, disregarding all obstacles, and paying no attention to the influential, better instructors, better commanders, and better leaders.

In the speech of M. Shingarev the question of the supply of men, as it presented itself in Russia in the autumn of 1915, has been set forth with great completeness. But those words in which he requests that the Government should take the police and send them to the front, sound a somewhat shrill and discordant note in that weighty speech, full of serious arguments.

Colonel Engelhardt's Criticism.

In this connection the criticisms made by Colonel Engelhardt,²³ a former member of the Duma, and of its Military and Naval Commission in which he played an important part, are worth noting. The debates during the consideration of the bill to call out the territorials of the second class

proved that even the members of the Duma little understood how many men were needed both for the front and for services in the rear. On the initiative of the right wing of the Duma, a wish was expressed that the police should be sent to the front. The suggestion was eagerly supported by the extreme left represented by M. Kerensky. This measure would inevitably have ruined our police forces. As a result of substituting men inexperienced and physically second rate for trained policemen, unquestionably one of the foundations on which are based the maintenance

²³ Engelhardt, *op. cit.*, Part II, pp. 33–36.

of order in the interior would have been weakened—a situation which might have formed part of the program of the party bent on revolution; but the tactics of the right wing in that question were beyond understanding. Complete ignorance of the actual state of things could be the only explanation. In vain did the member, who reported the bill to the Commission, strive to explain that a replacement of experienced policemen by retired men, while undermining the efficiency of the police force in the troublous times of war, would not contribute much to the army. In point of fact, the number of policemen, in both city and country, did not amount to even 45,000,²⁴ of whom only two-thirds could be called for service in the army, being still within the age limit. Inasmuch as reinforcements of more than 300,000 a month were needed, the 30,000 policemen, even if sent to the front, would form only one-tenth of one monthly contingent; moreover, such an insignificant reinforcement would be obtained at the cost of our police themselves. Despite the obvious absurdity of the measure, against which the representative of the Ministry of the Interior strongly protested, a resolution that the measure be adopted was carried by the votes of the right and left wings of the Duma.

Thus, M. Shingarev's request that the police be sent to the front was a concession made by him to a primitive kind of reasoning, on the one hand, and to politics, on the other. His indignation against Sukhomlinov's activities at the Ministry of War is an expression of the general indignation felt everywhere. His warning against the popular belief that Russia had an inexhaustible supply of men shows profound foresight. But the most remarkable part of Shingarev's speech is its final words. In those words he touched upon an outstanding but evil feature, which, from of old, had been characteristic of Russian tactics, that is, the heedless shedding of the blood of Russia's soldiers. Does that heedlessness result from influences of oriental collectivism which attaches little value to individual life? Was it the consequence of insufficient preparedness on the part of the higher command, incapable of methodical procedure and preferring, during the conduct of military operations, to take a chance? We think that it was the result of the whole intricate complex of causes underlying the general retardation of the development of Russia in comparison with other civilized nations. It is of special interest that that fundamental criticism of Russian military leadership, which had been no-

²⁴ Information received from the Police Department in 1915.

ticed by Peter the Great who demanded that victories should be won with "little blood," was formulated, for the first time since then, not from the chair of the General Staff College, but from the Duma.

Memorandum of the Special Council for National Defense.

By the end of 1916, as has been said, the supply of men in the category of the territorials of the second class was nearly exhausted. Russia was faced with a difficulty with regard to recruiting her armed force, a situation which seemed incredible to the average observer. The first alarm was again sounded by the members of the legislative bodies. Twenty-eight members of the Duma and of the State Council, who were also members of the Special Council for National Defense, considered it their duty to submit, in that connection, a memorandum to the Emperor through M. Rodzianko, President of the Duma. The author of this memorandum was Vladimir I. Gurko, a member of the State Council. Its complete text, which has never been published, was as follows:

Your Imperial Majesty: Having taken part for more than a year in the work of the Special Council for National Defense, established in accordance with Your Majesty's command, we have considered it our duty to scrutinize all questions relating to the organization of our army, including those whose examination lay beyond the limits of the set task of the Council, inasmuch as we have assumed that an acquaintance with all measures tending to prepare victory was an indispensable condition for the correct solution of all questions referring to defense. So long as the questions outside the competency of the Special Council did not seem to us as having an exceptional significance and State importance, we confined our activities within the limits set down in the Regulations of that Council, and did not consider it our duty to express our opinion with regard to those questions. But at the present time, Your Majesty, we are confronted with a question which, in our judgment, is of such importance for the fate of our country, and, furthermore, is so alarming and even formidable, that, not having been authorized to consider it at the Council, we, as your subjects, have held it to be our duty to submit this question to you directly. So much the more do we consider it our duty since the danger with which our country is threatened can be put aside only by measures emanating from Your Majesty. This question relates to the further recruiting of the army, for which a monthly contingent of 300,000 men is needed. From a table

herewith it may be seen that, not counting the 14,500,000 men called up to this time, there remain, out of the total of 26,000,000 men liable to military service, aged from eighteen to forty-three, 11,500,000. This number, at first glance, seems enormous and sufficient to reinforce the army for a long time. But after a closer examination of the various categories of which this number is made up, a different conclusion is reached. It consists (1) of 2,000,000 men who remain in the territory occupied by the enemy, of emigrants and of those who, in violation of the law, evade military service; (2) of 5,000,000 men absolutely unfit, on account of physical defects, for military service (this figure is, of course, approximate; it has been calculated on the basis of the results obtained after a partial reëxamination of those who had been rejected as not coming quite up to the required physical standards); and (3) of 3,000,000 men who cannot be taken from the country because they constitute the minimum of able-bodied males indispensable for war industry, railroads, and the various branches of State administration.

Thus, if the three categories mentioned above are excluded, the remainder available as reinforcements will amount, approximately, only to 1,500,000; and this remainder consists first of youths of eighteen, the 750,000 recruits of 1919 who unquestionably, after sufficient training, will be excellent material; and second, of men either over forty, territorials of the second class, age groups 1894 and 1895 (about 150,000), or those who, after a reëxamination, may be found fit for service (about 600,000). These two categories, of far from equal value, a total of 1,500,000, represent our whole supply of men as yet unused. Consequently, if a monthly contingent of 300,000 men will be needed as reinforcements, in five months, to go on with the war, we shall be using our depot battalions, that is, the last resources of the fighting strength of any army, and we shall not be able to replace them.

But, perhaps, by certain changes in the present law, it will be possible to find men who, up to now, have not been called upon. There, however, only two measures can be suggested: the enlisting of non-Russian peoples, now exempt from military service, and of men from forty-three to fifty, as is being done in enemy countries.

Of these measures only the former can be considered desirable or even necessary, especially in the case of certain warlike tribes, now reluctantly giving service in the labor detachments, into which some of them have been drafted, but likely to become excellent war material. But it cannot be expected that that source can furnish a considerable contingent, not only because the number of such non-Russians, exempt from military service, is small, but also because not all who are of military

value could be drawn upon at once. As regards older men, those past forty-three, to call them out is, so far as we can judge, absolutely out of the question, even regardless of the fact that they, for the most part, would be able neither to fight nor to work efficiently in the rear, and they would constitute only additional mouths that would have to be fed by those who are doing the work of the country at large.

Here, too, Your Majesty, arises another question, not less alarming than that of future recruiting and closely connected with the latter—we mean the ever-increasing shortage of labor in all the important branches of national economy, including those enterprises at work to meet the numerous and enormous needs of the army. No matter what measure, tending to develop this or that branch of industry, has lately been under deliberation in the Special Council, invariably we have been confronted with one and the same obstacle: there are no men. Even the production of heavy shells, so needed by us, and urged so energetically by the Artillery Department, meets with the same difficulty. The Chief of that Department has reported to the Special Council that, if he could not obtain 30,000 workmen, wherever available, he would not be able to put production on the proper basis, and that he himself had been unsuccessful in his efforts to find these needed men. The same holds true with regard to private industry, on which army work is based. There are not enough men in the coal mines, not enough smelting metal, yet the demand for coal and metal has increased. Factories are systematically luring workmen in other factories to come to them, so that a special law has been suggested to meet that evil. This shortage of men is likewise felt in the countryside. One of the greatest handicaps in the supply of food lies in the lack of men to cart our grain to the railways. The beet-sugar factories have been unable, for like reasons, to dig and harvest the whole crop of beets. Farming work, threshing and fall ploughing, was finished late, and it put an extreme strain on the whole rural population.

Briefly, the entire mechanism of the State and the life of the country are suffering, it is clear, from a shortage of men. To that, it seems, a reply might be made that the percentage of men called to service is considerably smaller in Russia, compared with the whole population, than in enemy countries, and especially in that of our ally, France. In Russia about 10 per cent, and in France about 16 per cent, have been called to the colors. But our national economy cannot be compared to that of France. Our enormous tracts of land, with a widely scattered population, our little developed urban centers, our insufficient railroads and bad ordinary roads during a certain part of the year, along with the

fact that our mines and coal fields, so indispensable for the production of ammunition, are situated in the part of the Empire lying far away from most of our smelting works and mills, finally, our climate, compelling, as it does, our people to make great efforts to protect themselves from the bitter cold of winter and to cope with the snow—all this makes necessary in our country so much additional work and consequently calls for so many extra working hands, that in western Europe there is nothing comparable. Moreover, the insignificant number of mechanical motors in Russia, in comparison, for instance, with France (in 1908, steam engine horse power in France was fifteen times what it was in Russia), and the low productivity of the Russian workman, in comparison with the workman of western Europe, which is caused by many factors, means that the withdrawal of 10 per cent of our population from productive work seems to have a more unfavorable effect on the general course of our national economy than the effect produced by the withdrawal of 16 per cent in France.

In particular, it may be pointed out that the enlistment of skilled workers, in number insignificant in Russia, coupled with the substitution for them of labor not accustomed to specialized and complex work, has resulted in an increase of the total number of factory workers, which, however, was not followed by an increase in output. Coal-mining, in that respect, has suffered most: inasmuch as inexperienced miners were substituted for experienced ones, the increase in number from 170,000 to 250,000 has resulted only in a slight increase in coal production. Furthermore, the shortage not only of mechanics, but of blacksmiths and locksmiths is so great that even farming has been affected, since the simplest repairs of agricultural implements cannot be made. Yet the area under cultivation merely in European Russia, without the territories occupied by the enemy, exceeds 72,000,000 deciatines,²⁵ and the hay-producing area, 20,000,000 deciatines, which is almost equal to the areas of France and Germany, taken together. To till and reap that gigantic area by sheer man power, without the assistance of proper implements, is something which the people still at work in the interior are not in a position to do. The recalling of the skilled workmen from the ranks, with a view to using them in the rear in accordance with their special qualifications, is dictated by the necessity of getting from every man that maximum of productive work of which he is capable. Beyond question, an experienced smith, for instance, may be incomparably more useful doing the work of national defense in a factory than in the trenches.

²⁵ One deciatine = 2.7 acres.

From all that has been said, Your Majesty will see that further to re-enforce the army from the supply of men still in Russia at the rate of 300,000 men a month, is not only absolutely impracticable, but that even the enlistment of a more or less considerable part of the grown-up male population still remaining, and engaged in work connected with national defense, is impossible without seriously impairing the whole organism of the State. Moreover, those still at work, with the exception of the contingent of 1919, are, neither in age nor in physical qualifications, material fitted for the army. Does this mean, however, that any further increase in the number of soldiers, that the preservation unimpaired of the fighting strength of our army is impossible? We are strongly of the belief that it is not so. Firmly convinced of the absolute necessity of bringing the War to a victorious end and having full confidence in the final triumph of Russia's arms, we have found a way of keeping our army at the present strength. It lies in these, the following, two measures: the first consists in reënforcing the fighting element of the army by using men now serving in the rear; the second in reducing our monthly losses at the front.

No army now waging the War has so enormous a percentage in the rear as has our army. For instance, in the French, the ratio, in numbers, of the rear—not counting the depot battalions—as compared with the front is 1:2, whereas in our army it is $2\frac{1}{4}$:1, that is, it is more than four times as large. Of course, our peculiar conditions, those conditions which make it necessary for us to leave behind for the regular work of the country a greater number of able-bodied men than that in the west, are one cause of the difference in the above ratio; but the difference, as it stands now, is out of all proportion. This state of things calls for attention so much the more since it has an obvious tendency to grow: our rear units are steadily increasing, and they grow at the expense of the front, at the expense of the fighting men, as has been made especially plain during the present summer.

We know that you, Your Majesty, have given your attention to that—we take the liberty of saying it outright—formidable phenomenon, and that an army order to that effect has been issued by you. But we are convinced that to suppress the evil an order does not suffice. That good results may be obtained it seems necessary to send representatives specially authorized to all rear units, including the depot battalions, whose staffs in charge of supplies have also grown out of proportion, and to reduce the strength of those units to a minimum. The cleaning up of the surplus men in the rear is necessary not only to reënforce the army with new elements, but also to restore the morale of the rear units which in-

evitably is affected by the presence of idle men. To reduce the number of men in the rear by one-quarter at least would give a new contingent of more than 1,000,000 fighting men, or considerably more than could be raised in the country, without impairing its normal life, and of a far better quality from the physical point of view. The filling of gaps in the army might also be made considerably easier by increasing the number of men, rated as lightly wounded, who return to the ranks after their wounds have healed. In that respect it would be necessary to discontinue the evacuation of lightly wounded men into the interior and to open hospitals for that category of wounded in the immediate rear. This measure has been carried out in part in the army of General Lechitsky, and good results have been obtained. Should it be put into play on a larger scale, that would save the necessity of transporting large numbers of men over long distances, often under conditions which do not contribute to their quick recovery, and would make it possible to keep the lightly wounded in closer contact with the front and military discipline as well as to send them back, after recovery, to their units, which is of no small importance. But as all wounded, under the present system, are evacuated into the interior, the comfortable conditions in which they live when they are treated at the hospitals in the central part of the Empire, are so different from the hard conditions of life in the trenches that a tendency, natural and inevitable, to evade the return to the front grows up among evacuated men. This frame of mind cannot be disregarded because the spirit of the troops, after all, depends on it. However, irrespective of the number of men which may be taken from the rear units, and whatever contingent of wounded men may be counted on to return, after their recovery, to the front, in a war of long duration to furnish men at the rate of 300,000 a month will exhaust such supplies. Therefore, under the pressure of circumstances, the efforts of the commanders at the front must be directed to lessening the need of reinforcements, in other words, to making the losses smaller.

Your Majesty, in the initial period of the War you were graciously pleased to express an idea which made a deep impression on many of your subjects. On October 1, 1914, addressing the cadets promoted to be officers, you spoke as follows: "Remember what I am going to say to you: I have not the slightest doubt of your courage and bravery, but I need your lives; because useless losses in the officers' corps may lead to serious consequences. I am sure that every one of you will give his life willingly when it becomes necessary, but do it only in case of exceptional urgency. In other words, I am asking you to care for yourselves."

The wisdom expressed in these words of our Emperor has not been

appreciated, we regret to say, as it should have been, by the army and its subordinate leaders. The principle of sparing human life has not properly been observed. Young officers, despite Your Majesty's instruction, have not had regard for themselves; nor have they, or the army, been spared by their leaders. A different feeling has taken root among the men, that the road to victory, owing to the shortage of technical equipment, ought most largely to be opened at the price of human blood. As a result, while the monthly losses of our Allies gradually and steadily decrease—in France they are equal at present to one-half of their number in the initial months of the War—on our front they remain without change, and even have a tendency to increase. It is of pressing importance to instil it in all leaders of our army that waste of human life, regardless of humanitarian considerations, cannot be tolerated—because our supply of men is far from being inexhaustible. This is necessary not only for the preservation intact of the fighting strength of our troops until the victorious end of the War, but also for the continuance of the work which is done in the rear, inasmuch as a disorganized rear would not be able to meet the needs of the army.

We must have recourse to a well developed and widely applied system of protective measures, the use of helmets, shoulder-pieces, improved fortifications, etc. But most important of all, to substitute lead, steel and explosives for the power whose source is human blood.

Your Majesty, as your subjects and as members of the Special Council for National Defense, duty imperatively urges us to say that the material resources of the Russian army are growing every day and that the production of heavy shells, if a sufficient number of workmen be kept in the country, will be put on a proper basis, that the extraordinary measures now being taken with the object of developing armament and aviation will bring good results, and that it would be calamitous if, at the moment when Russia found herself equipped with guns, shells and aircraft, she would lack men—in other words, that one force which up to now we had considered inexhaustible.

On the strength of everything said above, we take the liberty of submitting to Your Imperial Majesty for consideration the following measures which, we are firmly convinced, are absolutely necessary: (1) A refusal further to reënforce the army at the expense of the population still remaining in the country, with the exception of the next contingent of recruits of 1919, and of subsequent contingents which will have completed their eighteenth year; (2) the gradual drafting into military service of non-Russian peoples who are exempted by law; (3) the return to the factories of skilled men and the substitution for them at the front of an

equal number of those who, once rejected, have, after reëxamination, been found fit for military service, and also of the remaining territorials of the second class; (4) the reënforcing of the front, that is, of combatants at the expense of rear units, and also the opening of hospitals for the slightly wounded adjacent to the front so that they will not be evacuated into the interior of the country; (5) careful regard for the lives of our men in battle, coupled with a patience to await the increase of technical equipment, essential for dealing the enemy the final blow.

General Shuvaev's Letter.

The profound comprehension of the true state of things shown by the authors of the memorandum is so much the more striking since there was no such comprehension in the highest quarters of the army. This lack of understanding of the actual situation comes out plainly in the reply to the memorandum, written at General Headquarters. However, it should be noted that the reply was written during the absence, through sickness, of General Alexeev, Chief of Staff, who, beyond doubt, would have taken a different attitude toward the question raised by these twenty-eight members of the Duma and the State Council. But, in point of fact, among the personnel of the High Command there were very few who would reason as a statesman should. General Basil T. Gurko, a brother of the writer of the memorandum, who was temporarily replacing General Alexeev, was no exception.

After the removal of General Sukhomlinov the new Ministry of War began to understand the actual situation better than did the Headquarters. This may also be explained by the fact that, being directly in charge of the distribution of man power, the Ministry was above all forced to realize that the sources of such man power were nearing exhaustion.

In his letter of December 8, 1916, General Shuvaev, who succeeded General Polivanov, wrote to General Gurko as follows:

On many occasions I have called the attention of General Alexeev . . . to the fact that in the near future the remaining contingents of men liable to military service will be exhausted; therefore, in order that the army may be kept at its present strength, it is necessary as soon as possible to take the most decisive steps with a view both to making the most careful use of reënforcements and to finding within the army

sources of further reënforcement of the combat troops by a most drastic reduction of non-combatant elements, the percentage of which is at least twice as great. A commission formed according to my instructions of the representatives of the General Staff and the various departments, the Adjutant General of General Headquarters being a member, has, after careful deliberation, worked out a whole series of measures which it is imperative to carry out energetically and immediately if we are to make a certainty of the further reënforcement of the army. If those measures are not carried out energetically and on the broadest scale, further replacement of losses will become soon absolutely impossible . . .

General Shuvaev's letter was accompanied by a statement in which recruiting sources were listed and the measures to be taken were set down; and it also informed General Gurko that, in view of the memorandum submitted to His Majesty by the members of the Duma and the State Council, on November 29 the contents of the letter had been reported to the Emperor at Tsarskoe Selo.

In the statement attached to the letter of the Minister of War, attention was drawn to the defects of the Conscription Law. The exemptions which the law was granting constituted openings, as it were, through which many capable of service escaped it. All such exemptions were to be scrutinized, and their granting carefully checked up.

Effects of the Revolution.

The Revolution, which broke out in February-March, 1917, brought this work to an end. In the state of chaos which developed in the country, any regular recruiting was out of the question. Under the pretext that they were "defending the Revolution" the depot battalions, making up the garrison of Petrograd, had obtained a promise that they would not be sent to the front, and the Provisional Government did not dare to use them as army reënforcements. Reënforcements from other depot battalions were very unwilling to serve; desertions from the trains, on their way to the front, increased enormously. The Provisional Government, persisting in its decision to continue the War until "the final victory," was in a tragic position, which was made even worse by the fact that, regardless of the unwillingness of the masses to go on with the War, the supply of men was coming to an end.

The situation of the Provisional Government has been clearly outlined in a letter of its last Minister of War, General Verkhovsky. On September 4, 1917, he wrote to General Alexeev:

Despite all the measures taken by the Ministry of War to reënforce the army, it has become obvious that the lack of men has not only not been made good, but has increased. According to a statement of the Adjutant General at the latest conference held at Headquarters on August 25, the shortage on all fronts then amounted to 674,000. This situation shows with the greatest clearness that we are not strong enough to continue the War on the scale on which it has so far been conducted. We must remember, in the first place, that the country has entered upon the fourth year of war—a war whose hardships are without precedent. More than 15,000,000 workers have been taken for service. The economic life of the country, in every branch, has been utterly disorganized. To put any further strain upon the country's strength is out of the question. The need has arisen of at once taking the most decisive steps; and to do it we must have a clear idea of what sources of man power still remain in the country.

There are at present in the interior somewhere between 450,000 and 500,000 men, who form the depot regiment which may be sent to reënforce the infantry. . . . This number may be increased, if we deprive the army of men assigned for special work, by from 200,000 to 300,000. Thus we may possibly have 700,000 or 800,000 men; and this is the last resource on which we can depend for the continuance and ending of the War . . .

It is true that, in addition to the sources for recruiting pointed out above, other contingents in the interior and not yet called out, may serve the same end . . . but the number of men in such categories²⁶ is insignificant and uncertain. It cannot, therefore, be relied upon as a basis for our calculations. Thus it follows that, should we succeed in making good the present shortage of men, it would still be absolutely impossible to maintain the present strength of the army, because there would be no further recruiting fields. Consequently, it is necessary to take an energetic decision—to decrease the size of the army and maintain it from the material which the army possesses in itself.

Fate decreed that measures proposed by General Verkhovsky should not be carried out. In seven weeks the Bolshevik *coup* took place, and Russia left the Allied ranks.

²⁶ Those possibly found fit after reëxamination, evacuated men, deserters, etc.

Skilled Labor.

According to the data of the Central Statistical Department²⁷ the number of men liable to military service but granted deferment amounted on October 1, 1916, to 2,176,362. By the end of the War this number was at least 2,500,000, or more than 16 per cent of the total called to the colors, as computed above. If we considered the absolute figures only, it might be thought that the question of exempting skilled workmen²⁸ had been easily solved. However, a different impression will be obtained if we go more deeply into the question.

Any successful solution of the problem of exempting the skilled workers from army service during war must be a very complex one. As it constitutes freeing the exempted man from the duty of offering his life to his country, it may easily depart from the direction indicated by actual State necessity and become a path by which, under a fictitious sanction of law, risk to life may be evaded. Only nations possessing a high degree of development, nations deeply imbued with the sense of social duty and social justice, are in a position correctly to solve that complicated question. Russia, as she entered the War in 1914, was far from having reached such a point. Moreover, the idea that modern war is waged not only by armies, but by the whole nation, existed in theory but not in actual fact. The Conscription Law foresaw only the exempting from service of those doing the work of the State, laboring in State factories, on the railroads, etc. General Sukhomlinov and his collaborators thought that they could wage a war, relying only on these little-developed State industries. Thus, from the first day of general mobilization, the collaboration of all the forces of the country in the work of supplying the army with modern material was made difficult.

During the mobilization of July, 1914 [writes Colonel Engelhardt],²⁹ numbers of skilled factory workers were enlisted. . . . The representatives of industry, whose interests were affected directly by the calling out of skilled men, were the first to raise their voices and tell of the

²⁷ *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, Table 70, p. 88, and note to Table 70, p. 16.

²⁸ By "skilled workmen" we mean men engaged in any work requiring special knowledge and skill, and not merely skilled factory workers.

²⁹ Engelhardt, *op. cit.*, Part II, pp. 18-22.

necessity of a more prudent attitude. But the military authorities, guided by the principle—narrowly interpreted by them—which says that “the rear must sacrifice everything to the front,” at first remained deaf. However, when the withdrawal of skilled factory workers and miners resulted in a decreased output, this dangerous condition little by little began to be realized by the central military administration and the country at large. Yet the military bureaucracy, hypnotized by the immediate needs of the front, did not realize, up to the end of the War, that in the interests of the front the withdrawal of productive elements from the interior should not have been carried beyond a certain limit. Our Ministry of War was, in that respect, in a very difficult position. While it could well understand what great need of men there was both at the front and in our industries, which were working feverishly, it was not in a position, owing to its peculiar organization, to take the rôle of arbiter in the division of man power between front and rear. The line of least resistance and the path of compromise had to be followed. With regard to the fixing of dates for calls and the size of the contingents to be called out, the Ministry of War was guided exclusively by the instructions received from the General Headquarters. Occasionally, too, it would even show a weakness and submissiveness which did harm, especially in the matter of granting deferments and releases to those who had a certain educational status and were capable of becoming officers. In that respect the widely developed activities of the war industries committees and of the All-Russian Unions of Zemstvos and of Towns, which absorbed a large number of educated men, attracted attention. That much good was done by those bodies cannot be denied: without their help the Army Supply Department would hardly have been equal to the huge task it had been called upon to perform. . . . Yet it must be admitted that the demands by those bodies for workers, both intellectually and physically capable, was too great . . .

The fact that educated circles were little conscious that the defense of the country by arms was the duty of every citizen resulted in intellectuals “finding it easy” to obtain work in the rear, or in safe places in the army. In such circumstances the Ministry of War, despite its good intentions, was powerless. Whenever it took measures against “slackers,” those measures chiefly affected workmen and peasants. But whenever it consented to the setting aside of skilled workers for labor in the rear, great numbers of “slackers,” as well as the men really needed for the work, would intrench themselves in the country.

At the beginning of the War skilled factory workers and miners had been called to the ranks, and most of them had been killed in the first campaigns. But when, in 1915, the development of national industry was under way, and an increased number of men were needed, that increase could be carried out only with unskilled workers. This meant decreased production, which, in its turn, called for a greater number of men.

Although a certain tendency to evade service at the front has here been pointed out, this, however, did not argue any lack of patriotism in any particular class. It grew out of an insufficient development of a sense of national duty. Good as well as bad patriots could be found in every nation. Society itself should have watched its members and urged those who were inclined to stay behind, to go to the front.

In any case, the effect was that a well-marked division grew up within our intellectual classes. Elements, whose patriotic feeling was little developed, were eager to settle themselves in the rear, inasmuch as in that respect they were in a far better position than non-intellectuals, whereas the patriots were anxious to go to the front, often in spite of the fact that their presence in the rear was more to the interest of the nation than their service in the ranks.

The appearance of the patriotic intelligentsia at the front undoubtedly produced an extremely beneficial effect, because this section of the educated classes gave the country those "war-time officers," who filled up the great gaps in the officers' corps of the regular army, now melting away. But these educated elements, in their turn, also began to suffer heavy losses on the field. Just as the withdrawal of the skilled factory worker, during the first campaigns, resulted in a lower factory production, the loss, within a short time, of the quintessence of Russia's patriots must have contributed to the weakening of the national feeling in the masses. For the people could not see the heroic sacrifices of the intellectuals, who were fighting in the ranks as officers, while every day they could see how service at the front was evaded by those who preferred to stay behind. This condition, of course, did not help to develop the idea that the defense of the country was the sacred duty of every citizen, nor did it contribute to strengthening, in the people, the consciousness of the necessity of continuing the War.

If the number of those who were granted deferment because their

work, for one reason or another, was considered necessary for national defense, that is, some 2,500,000, be added to the number of men called out for active service, or about 15,500,000, we get the stupendous total of 18,000,000.

Prisoners Taken.

In Table 4³⁰ will be found the number of prisoners taken from 1914 to 1917 inclusive. Inasmuch as their number was one that amounted to seven figures, these prisoners might have constituted a very considerable additional force to Russia's reserve of man power. But to take full advantage of it a well-planned system was needed; and no such system had been worked out in detail, therefore any profit to be derived from such numbers of prisoners was much less than it might have been.

TABLE 4
*Number and Distribution of Prisoners Taken from the
Beginning of the War until September 1, 1917.*

	<i>German</i>	<i>Austrian</i>	<i>Turkish</i>	<i>Bul- garian</i>	<i>Total</i>
In camps, hospitals, and working	143,602	1,605,828	63,363	665	1,813,458
Sent to Allied countries and used in troop formations	2,639	36,639			39,278
Invalids, sent home	2,996	16,526	258		19,780
Sent to neutral countries, there to be interned	366	1,118			1,484
Died	4,575	46,448	582	3	51,608
Escaped	5,212	30,205	306	2	35,725
Total	159,390	1,736,764	64,509	670	1,961,333

It may thus be seen that the total number of prisoners taken by the Russian army was about 2,000,000.

³⁰ *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, pp. 15, 41.

CHAPTER V

THE LOSSES OF THE ARMY

Difficulty of the Problem.

TWELVE years have passed since the tragic month of October, 1917, when Russia left the ranks of the Allies. To the present, however, the question of the war losses suffered by Russia remains unsettled, and it is unlikely, one must confess, that the actual total of those losses will ever be established with the needed accuracy.

M. Sazonov, one of the principal Soviet investigators of the problem of casualties during the War, at whose disposal was all the available material in Russia, has reached the following conclusion:¹ "To establish the exact number of aggregate casualties and to classify them as dead, or wounded, shell shocked, prisoners, or missing, presents difficulties; for complete and trustworthy material, even in a rough state, is lacking." All records needed to estimate casualties were, during the War, preserved in Petrograd. After much shifting about and careless handling during the Revolution, part of this precious data, dealing with the work of the Army Medical Service, was carelessly shipped to Moscow, now the capital.

However, leaving all this aside, any study of Russia's losses would be difficult: the unprecedented number of combatants, the occupation of whole regions by the enemy, the length of the War—all this greatly complicated the collection of the needed information. If we add that the recording of casualties was done by many organizations, in addition to army agencies—that is, by the Red Cross, the Unions of Zemstvos and of Towns, and by other institutions—and that no uniform and scientific system had been adopted for the recording of data, our doubts of the possibility ever of learning the exact number of Russia's war losses will easily be understood.²

Before we attempt to reach conclusions, although we shall study the question from the first-hand material preserved in Russia, the following details seem worth submitting.

¹ L. N. Sazonov, in *Trudi (Proceedings)* of the Commission for the Investigation of the Effects on Public Health of the War of 1914–1920, p. 161.

² V. T. Binshtok, in *ibid.*, p. 142.

After the civil war the Bolshevik authorities made the Statistical Division of the Staff of the Red Army responsible for the recording of the casualties suffered by the army in the World War, the civil war, and the war with Poland. The First Section of the Statistical Division, formerly located in Moscow but later moved to Petrograd, was given the task of furnishing information relating to the losses of the Red Army. The Second Section was given the same work for the former Imperial army. And it was enormous—one of checking up all remaining reports from commanders and headquarters, and some 18,000,000 individual cards. Of the above, 9,000,000 cards had been filled in during the War by the army agencies which had had immediate charge of the evacuation and recording of losses. The remaining 9,000,000 cards, containing information as to those who had been treated in the hospitals of the Red Cross, and the Unions of *Zemstvos* and of *Towns*, came from these organizations. Among these millions of cards many were valueless from the statistical standpoint, inasmuch as they contained only the name of the man under treatment, but no information as to his army unit, and no date or address. The classification of such cards called for a large staff, but the actual staff was limited to a minimum.

Of the entire work assigned to the Second Section, a small part has by now been completed. Returns on casualties, based on the original reports of the various army commanders and staffs, and including totals of the dead, wounded, shell-shocked, and missing have been submitted. But, according to the Statistical Division itself, after a preliminary summing up, totals so arrived at must be regarded as both inaccurate in general and less than the actual losses in particular. The main reason for their inaccuracy comes from the fact that a great many reports of the commanders were lost during the chaos of the Revolution and especially after the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks.

Another great obstacle to the division of total losses into categories lies in the impossibility of a correct interpretation of the data under the head of "missing." That category includes many killed and wounded left behind by their units, and, no doubt, many who had been taken prisoners. The Statistical Division rightly thinks that it is necessary to check up the data received from the front not only as compared with the data of the Central Board of Evacuation,

in the case of prisoners, but also along with the data relating to the evacuated who were under treatment in the medical establishments of the various organizations—the source of the second 9,000,000 cards above mentioned. But even after this work is performed, the totals for losses will still be incomplete. Although the information upon those evacuated will considerably increase the figures for the wounded, sick, and shell-shocked, the number of those left on the battlefield may still remain unknown. It was just here that the staff reports were most incomplete, not on account of any unwillingness to communicate such information, but because the hours of crisis through which at such times the combat units were passing made it, in point of fact, impossible to draw up accurate reports. To see this clearly one has only to picture such circumstances as those in which the gallant troops in the center of Samsonov's army found themselves during the catastrophe in eastern Prussia, or to recall the campaign of 1915, when the army, without ammunition, retreated from Galicia, Poland, and Lithuania, and made bloody sacrifices on every inch of ground. Thus, it is obvious that a large number of killed and wounded must have gone unreported, and the casualty returns were less than the actual number.

Soviet Statistics.

In the preliminary summary made by the Statistical Division in 1920, the following totals were arrived at:³ Killed in battle, 511,068; died of wounds, 35,185; other wounded, 2,830,262; missing, 1,936,278; total, 5,312,793. That these totals are incomplete becomes obvious when we compare the number of those killed in battle plus the number of wounded with the total given for those who later died of their wounds. Inasmuch as there were about 3,000,000 wounded, the number of those who afterward died would run into hundreds of thousands.

In 1925 the Central Statistical Department published the following figures for battle casualties: Killed in battle, 626,440; died of wounds, 17,174; other wounded, including those shell-shocked and victims of gas, 2,754,202; missing and prisoners, 3,618,271; total, 7,036,087.⁴ A comparison of the two sets of figures above shows (1)

³ Sazonov, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

⁴ *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, p. 30.

that the number of killed in the second is 115,000 greater than in the first; (2) that the number of those who died of wounds, compared with those killed in battle, is, in the second estimate, as much out of proportion as it is in the first; (3) that the number of wounded, in the second, is 76,000 less than in the first; and (4) as the number of prisoners has been added to the number of missing in the second, there the total losses are greater by nearly 2,000,000 than in the first. Thus, the comparison leads to the conclusion that in the returns from Soviet sources, the tables are less than they should be and that many losses are concealed under the head of "missing."

Commenting upon its casualty figures given above, the Central Statistical Department states⁵ that it has arrived at these totals

by scrutinizing the lists of killed, wounded, shell-shocked and gas-poisoned, on the basis of information received from the theater of war, which lists were drawn up periodically by the General Staff. As for prisoners of war and those missing, the lists in these cases were communicated by the Red Cross Committee on Prisoners of War and Missing Persons, a committee located in Copenhagen. All such data, in chaotic condition, were received by the Central Statistical Department from the Statistical Division of the Staff of the Red Army.

Better to understand the above statement of the Central Statistical Department, let us compare its figures with those gathered during the War by the General Staff. According to the Soviet computations the yearly losses were as follows: 1914 and 1915: Killed, 312,607; died of wounds, 4,967; wounded,⁶ 1,537,849; prisoners and missing, 1,547,590; total, 3,403,013. For 1916 the corresponding figures were: 261,096, 8,687, 995,106, 1,172,448, the total being 2,437,337. The figures for 1917 were 52,737, 3,520, 221,247, 918,233, total, 1,195,737. The corresponding grand totals were: 626,440, 17,174, 2,754,202, 3,638,271, and 7,036,087.

The confidential annual report of the Minister of War for 1916 contains the following figures, covering the losses from January 1, 1916, to January 1, 1917: Killed on the field, or died of wounds: officers, 4,100; men, 265,684; total, 269,784—wounded, officers, 10,-

⁵ *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, p. 15.

⁶ With the "wounded" in the present text there will also be found those who were shell-shocked and poisoned by gas.

851; men, 984,267; total, 995,118—missing, officers, 730; men, unknown; total, as given, 730—prisoners, officers, 3,750; men, 1,499,154; total, 1,502,904; grand total, 2,768,536.

From a comparison of those figures with the respective figures (for 1916) of the Central Statistical Department, it may be seen that they are almost identical. Furthermore, according to the data received by General Headquarters from the General Staff, battle casualties up to January 1, 1916, have been estimated to be: Killed, officers, 6,146; men, 306,640—died of wounds, officers, 1,486; men, 3,481—wounded, officers, 24,695; men, 1,513,149—missing, officers, 3,560; men, 500,039—prisoners, officers, 9,222; men, 1,034,077; total, 3,402,495.

Those figures are also virtually identical with the respective figures of the Central Statistical Department. The grand total given by the latter is 3,403,013, that by General Headquarters, 3,402,495.

The above comparison is important not only because it confirms the quoted statement of the Central Statistical Department to the effect that the totals have been arrived at "by examining the lists . . . drawn up periodically by the former General Staff," but also because it proves that, as a matter of fact, no scientific examination and classification of such data have been attempted. The Central Statistical Department simply made use of the lists of the former General Staff which had been prepared in a "bureaucratic" way. The word "bureaucratic" is used because the character of the work done by the former General Staff was such that it could satisfy only definite bureaucratic needs. For instance, the lists of the killed were drawn up with the purpose of informing their relatives; consequently only those were listed whose deaths could be established at once, and beyond doubt. All cases admitting of the slightest doubt were listed as "missing." The less possible it was to make full records of the "killed," the smaller the number of "killed," and the larger the lists of the "missing." If the Central Department of Statistics had worked scientifically on the data of "battle casualties," it would have made the reservation that under the heading "killed" there appeared only those whose names had been mentioned in the lists published by the General Staff during the War.

A mistake of equal importance has been made by the Central Statistical Department in the case of the wounded. Had that Depart-

ment carefully examined the material which the former General Staff had used when drawing up the lists of casualties, it would not have failed to see that the totals of wounded recorded in the lists included only a certain class of wounded; yet an examination of the tables of the Central Statistical Department leads one to believe that it includes them all. To learn what class of wounded was recorded by the General Staff is by no means difficult.

On June 1, 1917, General Janin, the Chief of the French Military Mission with the Russian army, addressed this letter to General Headquarters:

I have received from France a letter requesting me for the following information: (1) the actual strength of the Russian army before mobilization, (2) the number mobilized, (3) the actual strength of the army after mobilization and the number of men in the depot units during every successive period of six months, (4) the losses: killed and missing, prisoners, discharged after the completion of their full term of service, transferred to the reserve, seriously wounded, discharged before the completion of their term of service, exemption granted, and returned for factory work.

The office of the Adjutant General at Headquarters turned this letter over to the General Staff in Petrograd for reply. It took four months to get the necessary information. The reply of the office of the Adjutant General to the request of General Janin was dated October 10, 1917, and in it the delay was attributed to the fact that the information had been sent in by the General Staff only on October 3, a circumstance clearly showing that no exact record was kept there. The following are the figures given: Killed and missing, 775,369; seriously wounded and discharged, 348,508; taken prisoner, 2,043,548; released after completion of full term of service, 48,889; released before completion of full service, 170,210; exempted, 1,200,000; returned for factory work, 50,000; evacuated into the interior, as sick, 1,425,000, and as wounded, 2,875,000.⁷

Thus, it may be seen that on the basis of the above information General Headquarters stated that the number of wounded "evacuated into the interior of the country" alone amounted to 2,875,000.

⁷ *Trudi (Proceedings)* of the Commission for the Investigation of the Effects on Public Health of the War of 1914-1920, pp. 158-159.

But according to the computations of the Central Statistical Department, the total number of wounded, that is, of wounded, shell-shocked, and gas-poisoned, amounted only to 2,754,202. Consequently, there can be no doubt whatever that the latter total represents the wounded evacuated into the interior, in other words, those whose wounds were of a serious nature. The discrepancy in the two totals may be due to the fact that sections of the lists of the General Staff were lost.

The Number of Wounded.

A scientific analysis of losses, based on a thorough examination of material collected at the French front, has shown that of the total number of wounded from 18.5 to 23 per cent were so slightly injured that it was not necessary to evacuate them.⁸ Thus it follows, according to the French calculation, that for every man slightly wounded, who was treated in the hospitals of the war area, there were from 3.35 to 4.40 who had to be evacuated. If the same ratio be applied to Russian losses we find that to the 2,875,000 wounded, evacuated into the interior of the country, there should be added from 655,000 to 860,000 slightly wounded. This would increase the number of wounded to a total of from 3,530,000 to 3,735,000. However, even these figures would not give the final total. As a matter of fact the area of the zone which had been designated in Russia as the theater of war exceeded by many times the corresponding area in France. Consequently, in Russia the meaning of the term "evacuation into the interior of the country" had not the same meaning as in France. In Russia it was not merely the slightly wounded who were detained in the hospitals established in the rear of the army, but the seriously wounded as well. Those who were evacuated into the interior belonged mostly to the category of those requiring prolonged care.⁹

That measure had been adopted not only with a view to a more speedy return of men to the ranks, but also for transport reasons,

⁸ J. Toubert, *Études statistiques des pertes subies par les Français pendant la guerre 1914-1918* (Paris, 1922), p. 16.

⁹ In that respect the statement made in the memorandum of twenty-eight members of the Special Council (see Chapter IV) had no foundation in fact. From the beginning of the War those who did not have to undergo long and complicated treatment were sent to the hospitals opened in the theater of war.

inasmuch as the railways were overburdened with work. Accordingly, too, it follows that even the larger estimate given above (3,735,000) is below the actual total.

In order to get closer to it, for the entire war period, we must use, not the data of the General Staff, but that filed with the Army Medical Service.

The returns of that Department were based on the reports of the hospitals and other establishments as also on those of medical officers. Its totals, therefore, included not only those who were evacuated into the interior, but also wounded who were treated in the medical establishments of every army and front, and in the rear as well. The returns of the Army Medical Service were nearer the truth than the reports sent by army units directly, because certain wounded received in the hospitals and there treated might have been reported by the latter, owing to the lack of necessary information, as missing; besides, the recording of losses by the Department complied with the requirements of scientific statistics to a far greater degree than that of the army units.

Dr. Avramov's Computations.

An attempt to systematize the material of the Army Medical Service has been made by Dr. Avramov.¹⁰ His publication contains information covering only the forces which were engaged on the Russian western front (that is, the northern, northwestern, southwestern, and Rumanian fronts), from August, 1914, to September, 1917. Thus Dr. Avramov's work does not include the totals for the Caucasus front, the Russian forces which fought in France and Macedonia, nor losses after September, 1917. Moreover, his article cannot be considered as exhaustive, both because in the periods of heavy fighting, reports were sent in inaccurately, and also because parts of the records were lost during the retreat and demobilization of the army. If the latter point were taken into consideration, Dr. Avramov thinks, the totals would have to be increased by approximately 10 per cent.¹¹ However, despite the fact that Dr. Avramov's computa-

¹⁰ A. G. Avramov, *Zhertvi Imperialisticheskoi Voiny v Rossii* (*Victims of the Imperialistic War in Russia*) in *Izvestia* (*Bulletin*) of the People's Commissariat of Public Health, Nos. 1-2 (1920).

¹¹ Sazonov, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

tions are incomplete, as a source for the study of Russia's losses, in sick and wounded, it outranks all others.

Dr. Avramov has arrived at the following totals: Killed, officers, 12,813; men, 652,077; total, 664,890—wounded, shell-shocked and gas-poisoned, officers, 73,768; men, 3,740,059; total, 3,813,827—missing, officers, 13,382; men, 2,319,993; total, 2,333,375.

Let us, for the time being, pass over the question of the number of killed and missing, and take up the total of wounded, put by Dr. Avramov at 3,813,827. Adding to that total the 10 per cent suggested by him, we get, in round numbers, 4,200,000. If we deduct the 2,875,000 evacuated into the interior we get 1,325,000, which number should correspond to the total of wounded treated in the medical establishments of the theater of war. It also forms 32 per cent of the total number of wounded, a percentage which, under the circumstances that existed in Russia, may not be considered unduly high. Therefore, the total number of wounded, based on the study by Dr. Avramov, may be put at 4,200,000; this estimate seems nearer the truth than any other published so far.¹²

Dr. Avramov's work also allows us to learn how the casualties were divided among the various branches of service; but here we shall limit ourselves, as before, to quoting his data relating to the wounded. The total number, according to Dr. Avramov, was divided as follows: Infantry, 94.1 per cent; cavalry, 1.7; artillery, 1.1; engineers, 0.3; frontier guards, 2.6; other arms, 0.2. Inasmuch as the infantry constituted the largest part of the army, in Russia even to a greater extent than anywhere else, it was natural that the greatest share of the losses should have fallen to it. But that overwhelming share is also due to the very nature of the service performed by the infantry.

Furthermore, Dr. Avramov's work contains information with regard to the losses in every arm of service. For example, in the infantry the percentage of wounded was, officers, 56.5; men, 36.9. The corresponding figures for the cavalry were 41.2 and 18.3; for the

¹² The *Trudi (Proceedings)* of the Commission for the Investigation of the Effects on Public Health of the War of 1914–1920, p. 176, contain the following reference to the work of Dr. Avramov: "The figures given by the author prove that the data used by him are more complete than the information at the disposal of the Headquarters."

artillery, 26.3 and 7.4; for the engineers, 10.6 and 5.5; for the frontier guards, 54.1 and 45.9; for other branches, 2.9 and 0.7; general average, 47.8 and 32.9. From the above data it may be seen to what extent the percentage of losses of officers exceeded that of men.

To give an idea of how much greater were the losses in the Russian army than those in other armies, the French losses in the rank and file were, for the infantry, 21.8; cavalry, 7.1; artillery, 6.1; and engineers, 6.3.

Another Method.

It has been said that the preliminary summing up, made by the Statistical Division of the Red Army in 1920¹³ gave the following totals: Killed in battle, or died of wounds, 546,253; wounded, 2,830,262. In 1925 the Central Statistical Department published figures which differed from the above: 643,614 killed in battle or died of wounds, and 2,754,202 wounded.¹⁴

These figures give the following ratios of deaths to the total number of casualties: in the former case, 1:5.18; in the latter, 1:4.28. Neither of these ratios deserves confidence. A careful study of the losses suffered by the French army has shown that in it the ratio was 1:2.39;¹⁵ and in the German army, according to German sources, it was 1:2.35.¹⁶ Thus it may be seen that the French and German ratios are almost identical. This may be explained by the fact that the deadliness of weapons, when the number of cases is great, is almost a fixed quantity. There is no reason to suppose that the ratio of killed to the total number of wounded in the Russian army was smaller than that in the French or German army. As for the number of deaths by wounds it must have been, beyond doubt, greater in Russia where the lack of communications, not to mention other circumstances, created conditions incomparably more difficult for the medical service, especially in the moving of the wounded from the war zone.

We may, therefore, be quite certain that, taking as a basis the knowledge obtained from the statistical analysis of losses in the

¹³ See above, p. 77.

¹⁴ *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, p. 30.

¹⁵ Toubert, *op. cit.*, pp. 3, 36.

¹⁶ M. Schwarte, ed., *Der Grosse Krieg 1914-1918* (Berlin, Leipzig, 1923), X, Part 3, 553.

French army, we shall get figures which are smaller than the actual numbers. However, this method will enable us to come much closer to the actual figures than those given in Soviet studies. On the strength of Dr. Toubert's work¹⁷ it can be shown that of every seventy-two wounded, three died in the course of the next twelve hours, two in the hospitals of the theater of war, and one in some hospital in the interior. Everyone familiar with the conditions found in the dressing stations and advanced medical detachments of the Russian army, knows well that an overwhelming proportion of the wounded who died during the first twelve hours must have belonged to the category of those who died while still with their units. Yet Dr. Avramov estimates that category only at 24,713. If we take for the Russian army the same ratio which has been set down for France, we shall find that the number of wounded who died in the course of the first twelve hours must have amounted, putting the total of wounded at 4,200,000, to at least 175,000. Hence it is clear that Dr. Avramov overlooked 150,000 deaths, or put them down in the category of the "missing." This statement confirms the conclusion, reached before, that the total of wounded, as arrived at by Dr. Avramov, with 10 per cent added to it, would by no means be an exaggeration: taking 4,200,000 wounded as our point of departure, we may be sure that all the estimates we shall arrive at will be below the actual figures.

According to French records, as was said above, of the sixty-nine wounded who lived through the first twelve hours, three died later. Assuming that those three died in hospitals, we get a percentage of deaths in hospitals amounting to 4.4. The following figures show the rate of hospital mortality for the wounded in the case of certain previous Russian wars. In the Crimean War (1854-1855) it was 19.5 per cent; in the war with Turkey (1877-1878) it was 12; in the war with Japan it was 4.2. It will be seen that the inferred ratio in the World War, as estimated above, is very close to that established during the war with Japan. But it should be borne in mind that one would expect the ratio in the World War to be somewhat higher; for, in the war with Japan, the percentage of those wounded by bullets was larger and the Japanese bullets were also remarkably "humane."

A study of the 103,194 registration cards of wounded cared for in the hospitals of the Petrograd Committee of the All-Russian

¹⁷ Toubert, *op. cit.*

Union of Towns has shown¹⁸ that the mortality here amounted only to 1.4 per cent. But, according to the opinion of M. Binshtok,¹⁹ in which it is impossible not to concur, that figure means little, inasmuch as the only wounded who got as far as Petrograd were those who could stand a long journey, and were on their way to recovery. This significant fact should also be noted: According to French observations, of the wounded who had lived two weeks, an average of 1.9 per cent died later. This offers additional proof that our reasoning is correct.

To sum up, the lack of reliable data covering the total number of deaths from wounds makes it necessary, if we are to obtain at least an approximate figure, to take as our point of departure the ratios between the respective categories of losses in the French army. With the total number of wounded amounting to 4,200,000 the number of deaths from wounds should be approximately 350,000, a figure assuredly less than the true one.

Number of Men Killed.

In the French army the ratio of killed to wounded was 1:3.3.²⁰ Consequently, the number of killed in the Russian army, with its 4,200,000 wounded, could not have been less than 1,260,000, or in round numbers, 1,300,000. This is twice as large as that set down in Soviet publications. The reason for such a discrepancy may be thus explained: In the French army, after the checking up of men taken prisoner, no trace was found of another 252,900. With regard to them M. Toubert writes: "Most of these 252,900 given as missing must be added to the number of the killed. . . ." ²¹ This was done, making the total number of killed roughly 900,000. It may be seen, then, that the French, having studied in detail the losses of their army, came to the conclusion that in order to obtain the actual number of killed it was necessary to add to the established number of

¹⁸ S. A. Novoselsky, in *Trudi (Proceedings)* of the Commission for the Investigation of the Effects on Public Health of the War of 1914–1920, pp. 185, 195.

¹⁹ Binshtok, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

²⁰ Toubert, *op. cit.* This ratio is different from the one given above, because the latter referred both to the killed and to those who died from wounds, whereas here only the killed are considered.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

killed 36 per cent more. We may hold it for certain that, under the conditions of the Russian front, the number of "unknown" killed must have formed a vastly greater percentage. The "unknown" killed on the French front were made up, according to M. Toubert, of those who "had been undoubtedly torn to pieces, crushed, or buried."²² But in the case of the Russian front there should be added a great number who, killed, or dying of wounds, had been left on the battlefield, and subsequently were buried in common graves either by Russian troops belonging to other units, or by the enemy. "Their names, O Lord, Thou knowest."

The total French losses in prisoners and missing were estimated, according to the statement of M. Tardieu at the Versailles Peace Conference, at 800,000. Consequently, the number of "unknown" killed amounted to 32 per cent of the total number of "prisoners and missing." The Central Statistical Department²³ puts the number of Russian "prisoners and missing" at 3,638,271, of which number 32 per cent would amount to 1,164,250. But the number of "unknown" killed has been put by us at only 674,000 (1,300,000 minus the 626,000 recorded by the Central Statistical Department). We are, therefore, far from exaggerating the real number.

However, it seems desirable to learn how large was the "missing" category. Was it large enough to include the 674,000 killed, estimated above? Inasmuch as the huge total, 3,638,271, given by the Central Statistical Department includes both "missing" and "prisoners" taken together, the number of "missing" may be obtained by using the following method: By establishing the number of prisoners, and then deducting that number from the total arrived at by the Central Statistical Department. Let us, therefore, take up the question of Russian losses in prisoners.

Prisoners.

General Headquarters, as we already know, in its reply to General Janin, on October 10, 1917, estimated the number of prisoners at 2,043,548.²⁴ Yet the Central Statistical Department gives for the same date a very different figure, 3,343,900. It is supposed to be based on the data of the Headquarters.²⁵ Moreover, another estimate

²² *Ibid.*

²⁴ See above, p. 88.

²³ *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, Table 22, p. 30.

²⁵ *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, Table 5, p. 20.

was drawn up in 1919 by a department known as the Central Board on Evacuation; the total number of Russian prisoners of war was at that time estimated to be, in Germany, 2,385,441; in Austria, 1,503,412; in Turkey, 19,795; and in Bulgaria 2,453, a total of 3,911,100. M. Sazonov,²⁶ when quoting these figures, writes as follows:

In the course of 1919 and 1920 lists of prisoners of war were still being sent to the Central Board on Evacuation. According to these lists, the total number of prisoners taken by the Central Powers was estimated, in October 1, 1920, at as many as 4,260,775. To get a more reliable figure it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that a certain percentage of prisoners' cards were made out in duplicate—twelve per cent, according to the statement of the commission which revised the cards. On the other hand, account should also be taken of the circumstance that portions of the lists, mailed in the countries where the prisoners were interned, might have gone astray and failed to reach Russia, either in the course of the War or after it, especially when relations between Russia and western Europe had been broken off. . . . Following the revision of the card index, during which the necessary changes called for by the filing of duplicates had been made, the Central Board on Evacuation estimated the total number of Russian prisoners, recorded up to October, 1920, and taken by the Central European powers, at 3,750,000, among them 23,329 officers, physicians, priests and nurses.

The Soviet figures quoted above contradict the data in the German source material.

In the statements received in Russia during the War through the Hamburg Red Cross, the total number of prisoners interned in Germany was estimated, by September 10, 1915, as follows: Russian, officers and military officials, 7,833; men, 905,339; total, 913,172—French, officers and military officials, 4,536; men, 269,978; total, 274,514—British; officers and military officials, 661; men, 24,313; total, 24,974—Belgian, officers, etc., 666; men, 40,475; total, 41,141. At the end of 1915, for the purposes of propaganda, a volume was issued in Germany, in five languages, including Russian, entitled *Prisoners of War in Germany* (H. M. Siegen, Leipzig). There we read (p. 1), "There were about 1,500,000 prisoners in Germany

²⁶ Sazonov, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

when this book was nearing completion." Inasmuch as publication took place two or three months after the estimate of the Hamburg Red Cross had been made, allowing for the difference in time, the two estimates might, in detail, have confirmed each other. Almost immediately after the end of the War, or in 1919, there appeared an important work by Wilhelm Doegen, devoted to the question of prisoners of war in Germany. The first volume²⁷ gives, for September 10, 1915, the same figures as those issued by the Hamburg Red Cross. The volume, *Trudi (Proceedings)* of the Commission for the Investigation of the Effects on Public Health of the War of 1914-1920, was published in 1923. Consequently, the Soviet authors were in a position to use the above work by Doegen. This, however, they did not do. The Hamburg Red Cross figures are used in the Soviet publication by Sazonov (p. 170) but they were not taken into consideration. Yet it would seem that these figures might have suggested to Sazonov and his collaborators the idea of using other German sources.

A section of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, established during the War, was given the task of recording Russian prisoners of war. That section obtained information from the General Staff, the Central Bureau of Information, and the Allied Governments. According to the information received, the total number of Russian prisoners, on December, 1916, amounted to 2,501,250, 1,400,000 being in Germany, 1,095,000 in Austria-Hungary, 6,200 in Turkey, and 50 in Bulgaria.²⁸ Finally, according to the information of the Austro-Hungarian Bureau, the total number of Russian prisoners interned in the concentration camps of the Central Powers on February 1, 1917, was estimated at 2,080,694.²⁹

From the above, then, it may be seen that the difference in the various estimates of the number of Russian prisoners of war is very considerable. There seems to be only one way to arrive at the exact

²⁷ W. Doegen, *Kriegsgefangene Voelker*, Bd. I, *Der Kriegsgefangenen Haltung und Schicksal in Deutschland*, published by Amtlichen Auftrage des Reichswehr Ministeriums (Berlin, 1919).

²⁸ Memorandum dated April 23, 1917, preserved among the papers of S. D. Botkin, formerly in charge of this section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

²⁹ Quoted in *Vremya*, May 18, 1917.

number: to study the question on the basis of the data preserved in the military archives of the former enemies of Russia. With that object in view the present author wrote to Major Gunther Frantz, one of the members of the Reichsarchiv in Germany, asking him to undertake the necessary research work in the German archives. Major Frantz kindly consented, and did the work, as requested, using the material filed in the State archives in Potsdam, in the Berlin branch of it, and also in the Restverwaltung für Reichsaufgaben, likewise in Berlin. His work confirms the Doegen figures, and it also contains some new data. Working from the data in these two reports, it is possible clearly to establish the number of Russian prisoners in Germany at any period of the War. Much information is given in Table 5. But since, as a result of the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia left the ranks of her allies and her army practically ceased to exist, the figures have been given only up to the end of 1917.

TABLE 5

*Russian Prisoners of War in Germany, January 1, 1915, to
January 10, 1918.*

(Based on figures by W. Doegen and Major Frantz.)

	<i>Officers and military officials</i>	<i>Privates</i>	<i>Total</i>
1915, January 1	3,577	306,653	310,230
March 10	3,897	355,380	359,277
June 10	5,391	520,709	526,100
August 10	6,081	720,613	726,694
September 10	7,833	905,339	913,172
October 10	8,324	969,855	978,179
1916, January 10	8,734	1,017,046	1,025,780
July 10	8,858	1,117,220	1,126,078
October 10	9,288	1,215,154	1,224,442
1917, January 10	9,322	1,222,084	1,231,406
April 10	9,715	1,241,831	1,251,546
June 10	9,920	1,244,815	1,254,735
1918, January 10		(estimated)	1,400,000

The totals of Table 5 represent the number of prisoners interned in the concentration camps. According to the statement of Major

Frantz, they also include those who died in captivity, sick men exchanged for German sick, and those who escaped. On the other hand, those who died on their way from the front to the internment camps have not been included in the totals. Inasmuch as these were all men fatally wounded and picked up on the battlefield, they, as Major Frantz rightly states, cannot be included among prisoners and must be listed among those who died of wounds.

To learn the number of Russian prisoners in Austria-Hungary a request was sent to Colonel Egon von Waldstaetten, of the Austrian army, for detailed information from the Vienna archives. On the basis of the report furnished by him, we compiled Table 6.

TABLE 6

*Number of Russian Prisoners in Austria-Hungary
September 25, 1914, to December 31, 1917.*

	<i>Officers and military officials</i>	<i>Privates</i>	<i>Total</i>
1914, September 25	443	44,573	45,016
1915, January 1	1,120	173,518	174,638
March 1	1,320	233,205	234,525
March 31	1,720	253,122	254,842
April 21	1,804	287,265	289,069
May 21	1,860	342,785	344,645
June 10	2,503	476,690	479,193
September 1	3,741	695,513	699,254
October 1	3,960	720,914	724,874
1916, August 1	4,354	801,796	806,150
December 31	4,682	840,293	844,975
1917, February 1	4,755	848,998	853,753
March 1	4,723	852,195	856,918
April 1	4,719	861,942	866,661
May 1	4,654	866,465	871,119
June 1	4,559	866,403	870,962
July 1	4,647	866,102	870,749
August 1	4,530	866,012	870,542
September 1	4,521	869,512	874,033
October 1	4,370	882,834	887,204
November 1	4,370	906,612	910,982
December 1	4,370	909,257	913,627
December 31	4,320	912,426	916,746

Again, too, the above totals do not include such fatally wounded as died either on the battlefield or on their way to the concentration camps. Those who died in captivity, sick men sent back to Russia, and those who escaped are, likewise, omitted. Therefore, the figures for prisoners in December, 1917, as set down by Colonel von Waldstaetten, do not represent, as do the figures of Major Frantz, the grand total of officers and men taken prisoner. Consequently, to the total on December 31, 1917, the following figures must be added: 27,738 prisoners who died in captivity, about 27,000 sick, and all who escaped from the camps. Their number is not given. But the corresponding data in Major Frantz's work may be given as a basis. According to him, the Russian prisoners who successfully escaped from Germany, as set down in the latest official statement, that of June 10, 1918, numbered 24 officers and 60,295 men, whereas the number who escaped and were caught totaled 418 officers and 199,530 men. These stupendous figures, whose psychological significance will be taken up further on, may serve to refute the rather general opinion that in the mass of the Russian people love of country is little developed. At present, however, let us merely note that in 1918, according to Major Frantz, a total of 4.2 per cent succeeded in escaping from Germany. There is no reason to suppose that the percentage of Russian prisoners who escaped from Austria-Hungary was any less. The latter, therefore, may be put at 40,000. This, plus the number of those who died in captivity, must be added to the total given by Colonel von Waldstaetten for December 31, 1917—917,000. Thus, we obtain a grand total of about 1,000,000.

To the number of Russian prisoners in Germany and Austria-Hungary must be added those in Turkey and Bulgaria. In Turkey, according to Colonel von Waldstaetten, there were, on January 1, 1917, 115 officers and military officials and 5,283 men. This figure is confirmed by the data of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,³⁰ who estimated the number of Russian prisoners in Turkey in December, 1916, at 6,200. Add to that about 2,500 for the number of prisoners in Bulgaria.³¹ The total for all four countries is, then, about 2,410,000, or, as given by Colonel von Waldstaetten, 2,417,000. We shall take the latter total as our basis for further calculations.

³⁰ See above, p. 89, n. 28.

³¹ Sazonov, *op. cit.*, p. 169. The number of Russian prisoners in Turkey given by Sazonov (19,795) is greatly exaggerated.

The Missing Men.

By subtracting the above number from 3,638,271, which is the number of "prisoners and missing" established by the Central Statistical Department, we get, in round numbers, a difference of 1,200,000, which represents, according to the Department, the number of "missing." This number is almost twice as large as the probable number of "unknown dead," 674,000, as estimated above. There cannot, therefore, be the slightest doubt that such a great number of dead could remain "unknown." The balance of 526,000 "missing" (1,200,000 less 674,000) might consist of the following: (1) those who had been fatally wounded and died before reaching the internment camps; (2) those who had been fatally wounded and died after having been picked up either by "neighboring" troops, or by the local population; (3) a certain number who found their way into hospitals without the knowledge of their units, and as to whose fate neither commanders nor headquarters possessed any information.

In view of the fact that the total number of wounded has been estimated by us on the basis of Dr. Avramov's data, that is, we put it at 4,200,000, which is by 1,425,000 greater than the total of wounded and those who died of wounds, as set down by the Central Statistical Department (2,754,202 plus 17,174), we shall in the future disregard the balance of 526,000, considering it as already included in our total.

It is worth while noting that the missing have been put by Dr. Avramov at 2,333,375. No explanation, however, of that stupendous figure is given by him. Undoubtedly it includes prisoners. If such is the case it coincides with our estimate of the number of prisoners, and also confirms the correctness of our decision to consider the "unknown" wounded, and those dead of wounds as already included in our final total of wounded.

A Summary.

Summing up all losses then, we find that about 1,300,000 were killed in battle; about 4,200,000 were wounded, of whom some 350,000 died; 2,417,000 were taken prisoner; the total loss being, then, about 7,917,000.

According to the data of the Central Department of Statistics, the final figure was 7,036,087. A much greater total is given by Sazo-

nov.³² "It is very probable," he says, "that the actual losses were close to 8,428,717." The figure we had arrived at, 7,917,000, lies between the final figures given by the two official Soviet publications.

A Comparison with France and Germany.

Now let us compare the figures we have reached for all battle casualties, other than prisoners and missing (that is, killed, died of wounds, wounded, shell-shocked, and poisoned by gas), with the corresponding figures for the French and German armies.

TABLE 7
Comparative Losses, Russian, French, and German.

Army	Mobilized	Died of Killed wounds (in thousands)	Wounded	Total losses	Percentages		
					Percent- age of casual- ties	in preceding column divided by number of months of war*	
Russia (according to the totals estimated above)	15,500	1,300	350	3,850	5,500	35.5	0.91
Russia (according to the totals given by Central Statistical Department)†	15,500	626	17	2,754	2,397	16.0	0.41
France‡	8,300	900	250	2,750	3,900	47.0	0.92
Germany	11,000	1,808		4,247	6,055	55.0	1.04

* In the case of Russia, 39 months; in the case of France and Germany, 51.

† *Rossya v Mirovoi Poine*, p. 30.

‡ J. Reval, *L'effort militaire des Allies sur le front de France* (Paris), p. 84.

A mere glance at Table 7 makes obvious the absurdity of the casualty totals published by the Central Statistical Department. The losses of the Russian army, lacking as it did sufficient armament, munitions, helmets, and other such necessities, could not have been less than those of the French and Germans. The memorandum submitted to the Emperor in November, 1916, by the twenty-eight members of the Duma and the State Council may serve as confirmation.³³

The Commanding Officers' Point of View.

The memorandum of the members of the Special Council, upon its receipt at General Headquarters, had been communicated to the commanders of the several fronts, and the characteristic replies it

³² Sazonov, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

³³ See above, pp. 61 *sqq.*

called forth showed that the charge that the high command was little sparing in the blood of either officers or men was well founded.

General Brusilov, commanding the armies of the southwestern front, wrote as follows:³⁴

The desire expressed for a greater husbanding of the human element in battle, coupled with the demand that we wait patiently for the increase of the technical equipment needed for dealing the enemy a final blow, can least of all be understood by me. An offensive without casualties may be staged only during manoeuvres; no action, at the present time, is taken at random, and the enemy suffer as heavy losses as we do. . . . As regards technical equipment, we use such as we have; the more of it we have, the greater is the guaranty of success; but to defeat the enemy, or to beat him off, we must suffer losses, and they may be considerable.

General Ruzsky, commanding the armies of the northern front, pointed out in his reply that war meant victims and that pressure on leaders to reduce losses might result in deadening their initiative and dash; moreover, to be sparing in that regard might have very disadvantageous consequences, inasmuch as there was no certainty that, with the continuance of the War, the technical equipment of the army would become better than that of the enemy. Those replies prove that both Brusilov and Ruzsky had forgotten the dictum of Peter the Great that his generals should win victories in which little blood was shed. Finally, the casualty figures, as estimated by us, though twice as great as those given by the Soviet Central Statistical Department, may well be held to be well within the mark.

Distribution of Losses in Time.

Let us now try to learn how the casualties were distributed over the various periods of the War and on what factors they depended. We shall be wise to bear in mind, however, that owing to the lack of exact information our analysis will be conditional. Nevertheless, it will enable us to offer some roughly statistical outline, in a large way.

Prisoners.

In the first nine months of the War, or up to May 1, 1915, the Russian army lost 764,000 in prisoners, an average of about 85,000

³⁴ December 8, 1916.

men a month. The northwestern front, facing the German army and made up of five Russian armies, the First, the Second, the Tenth, and—later—the Fourth and Fifth, lost more than 450,000. Merely during the catastrophe suffered at the end of August by the Second Army, the Germans took 92,000. On the same front the First Army, during its advance in eastern Prussia, which began with the Russian victory at Gumbinnen and ended with the unsuccessful battle at the Mazurian Lakes, lost 45,000.³⁵

On the southwestern front in the course of the great battles in Galicia which ended with the Russians occupying the larger part of it, the latter lost, as prisoners, 443 officers and 44,573 men.³⁶

From May 1 to November 1, 1915, there was an average loss of 160,000 prisoners a month, and for five months, from May 1 to September 1, the average was 200,000. These stupendous figures clearly show how great were the calamities which the armies were then experiencing. In the winter campaign, from November 1, 1915, to May 1, 1916, the fighting on the Russian front assumed the character of trench warfare, the troops having settled down behind barbed wire along the whole line. The number of prisoners at once dropped to 156,000, an average of 26,000 per month. In the summer campaign of 1916, from May 1 to November 1, the armies of the southwestern front broke the Austro-Hungarian line, and were victoriously engaged in the second series of Galician battles. But, the attempts of other Russian armies, at the same time, to break the German front to the north of Polesia did not meet with success. The number of prisoners increased somewhat. It reached 212,000, the average per month being 35,000. In the winter campaign of 1916–1917, November 1, 1916, to May 1, 1917, there were no important operations on the Russian front; trench warfare set in again. The number of prisoners fell to 96,000, or an average of 16,000 a month. In the beginning of March, 1917, the Revolution broke out. The collapse of the army was reflected in the increased number of prisoners. They doubled, as compared with the preceding campaign, and amounted to 213,000, an average of 35,000 a month.

For the whole War the average was 62,000 a month, the total, as already given, being 2,417,000. We can now make an outline, a

³⁵ *Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg, 1914–1918* (Berlin, 1925), II, 230, 317.

³⁶ Data of von Waldstaetten.

chronological comparison with the losses in killed, wounded, etc., which again, we shall here group together as casualties in general.

Casualties and Prisoners.

Good troops may lose many prisoners, but the sacrifice in blood will also be great; in this they differ from poor troops, which surrender even in actions that put little strain on them. To obtain the casualty figures for every period of the War, we may take the total of killed and wounded established above, 5,500,000, as a basis and then make use of one of the tables drawn up by the Central Statistical Department.³⁷ It contains the casualty figures for various periods of the War, but they include only those killed, or so recorded, and wounded who had been evacuated into the interior. The total, therefore, amounted only to 3,371,826. But there is no reason to suppose that the ratio of casualties as given above would not hold for all casualties for every period of the War. And using such a ratio we have compiled Table 8.

TABLE 8
*Estimate of Total Casualties (Prisoners Excepted) for the
Various Campaigns of the War, 1914-1917.*

<i>Campaigns</i>	<i>Casualties*</i>	<i>Average per month</i>
Summer campaign, 1914, and winter campaign, 1914-1915 (from beginning of War to May 1, 1915)	1,210,000	135,000
Summer campaign, 1915 (May 1 to November 1)	1,410,000	235,000
Winter campaign, 1915-1916 (November 1, 1915, to May 1, 1916)	850,000	140,000
Summer campaign, 1916 (May 1 to November 1)	1,200,000	200,000
Winter campaign, 1916-1917 (November 1, 1916, to May 1, 1917)	660,000	110,000
Summer campaign, 1917 (May 1 to November 1)	170,000	21,000
For the entire war	5,500,000	140,000

* Throughout this section, of course, "casualties" do not include either prisoners or missing.

Now, by comparing the data above, we can arrive at the ratio between casualties and prisoners for every period of the War (Table 9).

³⁷ *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, p. 30.

TABLE 9

Estimate of Casualties and Prisoners throughout the War.

	Number		Percentage	
	Casualties	Prisoners	Casualties	Prisoners
Summer campaign, 1914, and winter campaign, 1914- 1915	1,210,000	764,000	61	39
Summer campaign, 1915	1,410,000	976,000	59	41
Winter campaign, 1915-1916	850,000	156,000	84	16
Summer campaign, 1916	1,200,000	212,000	85	15
Winter campaign, 1916-1917	660,000	96,000	87	13
Summer campaign, 1917	170,000	213,000	45	55
For the entire war	5,500,000	2,417,000	69	31

Two well-marked turning points stand out clearly. During the summer campaign of 1914 and the winter campaign of 1914-1915 there were from six to seven prisoners for every ten killed or wounded. The same ratio existed in the summer campaign of 1915. But in the winter campaign of 1915-1916 the ratio greatly improved; there were only from one to two prisoners to every ten killed or wounded. In the summer campaign of 1916 and the winter campaign of 1916-1917 the ratio remained as favorable as before. The fact that each ratio, that for the first three campaigns, and that for the following three, remained without change, indicates that the cause of the change should be looked for in the interval between the third and fourth campaigns, in other words, the autumn of 1915. It cannot be explained by any bettering of the quality of the army, inasmuch as, having lost in the course of the first three campaigns the greater part of its cadres, it became not better but worse. The cause, in our judgment, should be sought in the change in the nature of the War: up to the autumn of 1915 the war of maneuvers predominated on the Russian front; such battles are always of a more decisive character than those in the case of trench warfare; consequently the former offer greater opportunities for the victor to take prisoners. After the autumn of 1915 the front had become stabilized; and the opportunities to take prisoners, by encirclement, pursuit, etc., were few. Another cause may have lain in the change in command; in September, 1915, General Alexeev succeeded General Yauushkevich as Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief. Gen-

eral Alexeev's profound knowledge of military art and his thorough understanding of the conduct of modern war accounted for the fact that, after his appointment, the tasks assigned to the armies were commensurate with their strength and means.

Another sharp change in the ratio between casualties and losses in prisoners, this time for the worse, occurred between the winter campaign of 1916–1917 and the summer campaign of 1917. There can be no doubt whatever that in that case the demoralizing influence of the Revolution played its part. The mass of the soldiery did not want to fight, and as a result from twelve to thirteen threw down their arms to every ten still willing to shed their blood for their country.

Officers and Men.

To continue our analysis, a second table drawn up by the Central Statistical Department³⁸ gives us—if we allow for the defects noted above—the casualty figures for both officers and men. And, when we have again made the required corrections and additions, we can embody the data thus obtained, in Table 10.

TABLE 10

Comparative Estimate of Losses (Both as Prisoners and Casualties) in Officers and Men, Respectively.

		Number			Percentage (approximately)	
		Casualties	Prisoners	Total	Casualties	Prisoners
1914 and	Officers	53,000	13,000	66,000	80	20
	Men	2,975,000	1,779,000	4,754,000	63	37
1915	Total	3,028,000	1,792,000	4,820,000
1916	Officers	24,500	2,000	26,500	92	8
	Men	2,035,500	342,000	2,377,500	86	14
	Total	2,060,000	344,000	2,404,000
1917	Officers	12,500	2,000	14,500	87	13
	Men	399,500	279,000	678,500	59	41
	Total	412,000	281,000	693,000
Entire Period of War	Officers	90,000	17,000	107,000	84	16
	Men	5,410,000	2,400,000	7,810,000	69	31
	Total	5,500,000	2,417,000	7,917,000

³⁸ *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, Table 24, p. 32.

This table shows that the officers were better fighters than the rank and file. If we take the figures for the whole War we see that whereas for every ten officers killed or wounded fewer than two were taken prisoner, for every ten men killed and wounded there were from four to five prisoners. An analysis of the same ratios for the War year by year shows that in 1914 and 1915 (taken together) they were, officers, 2.5, men, 5.9; in 1916 they were, officers, 0.9, men, 1.6; and in 1917, officers, 1.5 to 6.9. The averages for the whole War are 1.9 and 4.4. From these figures it may be seen that between the third and fourth campaigns, when trench warfare began, the difference in the ratio of "surrenders" between officers and men grows smaller. But even more interesting are the effects of the Revolution. We find that the latter had an unfavorable effect both on the officers and the rank and file. Yet, while the figures, in the case of the men, were almost seven times the respective figures for 1916, the figures for the officers did not quite double.

It might seem that the demoralization produced by the Revolution would have been greater among the officers than in the rank and file. In the campaigns of 1914 and 1915 the major part of the army's regular officers had been killed. By the spring of 1915, in the infantry only from one-third to two-fifths of those remaining were regular officers; the commanders of the battalions and the greater part of the company commanders were drawn from that class, but all the subaltern officers were holding commissions only in time of war. By the autumn of 1915, in the infantry regiments only from 10 to 20 per cent were regular officers: some of the commanders of the battalions and a considerable part of the company commanders were now holding temporary commissions.³⁹ Their training was very much inferior. But there was an important circumstance which tended to diminish the effects resulting from lack of professional training. The "war-time officers" of 1916 and 1917 were patriotic intellectuals. It has already been said that for an educated Russian to avoid being sent to the trenches was not a matter of great difficulty; therefore, only those served at the front who not only professed the idea that the defense of the country was their duty, but also carried it into

³⁹ General Chernavin, *K Voprosu Ofiterskogo Sostava Russkoi Armii k Kontzu Eya Sushchestvovaniya* (*The Russian Officers' Corps at the End of the War*), in *Russki Voenni Sbornik* (1924), No. 5, p. 227.

practice. A certain social selection was taking place, in which the lukewarm "patriots" settled down in the rear, while men of high character filled the officers' posts. The Revolution, as it demoralized the rank and file, at the same time strengthened the determination of the officers' corps, and caused a sharp split between the soldiery and their leaders.

The Sick.

The total of the sick, according to Dr. Avramov, amounted to 5,069,920, 88,386 being officers and 4,981,084 men. From the beginning of the War to January 1, 1917, the figures were, respectively, 61,551 and 2,946,728; from January 1, 1917, to October 1, 1917, they were 27,285 and 2,034,356.

Dr. Avramov is of the opinion that in relation to the actual strength of the army, the percentage of sick among officers was 10.5, and among the men 13.1.

If we compare the average monthly sick list from the beginning of the War up to January 1, 1917, with the average during 1917, the year of the Revolution, we find that in the first case there were 2,122 officers and 101,612 men; in the second 3,032 and 226,039. That is, the average number in 1917 was $2\frac{1}{5}$ times as large as in the preceding period. Yet there were no epidemics in 1917. An analysis of the increased incidence of sickness in 1917 discloses the fact that it began to grow after the beginning of the Revolution. Consequently, the cause of that increase was wholly psycho-sociological, and was not the result of changed health conditions. Immediately after the Revolution, the soldiery began to move homeward, but inasmuch as in the beginning they were afraid of deserting openly, they took advantage of every slight illness, or even feigned sickness, in order to be sent to the rear. The medical officers, terrorized by the mass, had to comply with such requests. The present author knows of cases where, in July, 1917, certificates of evacuation were signed under the threat of bayonet or mob. The officers, with a sense of duty more developed than that of the men, were much less affected. The incidence of sickness among the officers increased by 43 per cent, and among the men by 121.

In the case of previous wars the mortality rate from sickness in the Russian army was: in the Crimean War, 22.9 per cent; in the

war with Turkey (1877–1878), 6.6; and in the war with Japan, 2.5. Health conditions in the army during the war with Japan were considered very favorable. The same may be said with regard to the World War. Despite the long duration of the War the cases of epidemics were not many. Therefore, the estimate of Dr. Binshtok,⁴⁰ who put the number of deaths at 2.5 per cent, may be a correct one. Inasmuch as the total of sick, as was said above, is estimated at 5,069,920, 2.5 per cent of this amounts to 126,776, or, in round numbers, 130,000. This does not call into question, according to Dr. Binshtok, the total of deaths from infectious diseases (42,670) which in the Russian army constituted, as a rule, one-third of the total deaths from sickness.

To the above deaths from sickness are to be added those who died suddenly and those who died as prisoners. According to Dr. Avramov the number of the former was 7,196, bringing the above total to approximately 140,000. That figure, however, does not represent the final total. It should be borne in mind that Dr. Avramov's figures do not include data from the Caucasus front, nor do they contain any information as to the Russian troops who fought abroad; the number, therefore, of deaths from sickness, set down above, is below the true one. But, on the other hand, the number of deaths has been estimated from the number of cases of sickness, not on the basis of the number of men who at any time were ill. It is obvious that the latter figure would be greater than the former, inasmuch as the same man might have been ill several times. Thus the impression might be given that the number of deaths has been exaggerated. But that impression would pass away after comparing our figures with those of such losses in the French army. According to Dr. Toubert,⁴¹ the sickness mortality in the French army was 175,000. That is, the average of deaths per month in the French army was 3,400. Taking 140,000 as the total corresponding figure for the Russian army, we get an average of about 3,600 per month. But the numerical strength of the Russian army was far greater than that of the French, and 140,000 can by no means be an estimate that is exaggerated.

The Russian prisoners of war who died in Germany numbered 210

⁴⁰ Binshtok, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

⁴¹ Toubert, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

officers and 47,934 men, and those who died in Austria-Hungary numbered, respectively, 241 officers and 27,497 men. The total of deaths in Turkey and Bulgaria is not known. However, in view of the insignificant number of prisoners in both cases, the number of the dead would not greatly change our figures. The total of deaths among prisoners, leaving out the fatally wounded who died before reaching the interior of the enemy country, may be put, roughly, at 70,000.

The totals of killed, of those who died of wounds, and of those who died from sickness up to the Bolshevik *coup d'état* were approximately as follows: Killed, and recorded as such, 626,000; killed, but not so recorded, 674,000; died of wounds, 350,000; deaths from sickness, 140,000; died as prisoners, 70,000; total, 1,860,000.

Disabled Men.

To complete our study of losses in the Russian army it is necessary also to try to estimate the number of those who were disabled, and, in consequence, were discharged.

An examination of the registration cards for 103,194 wounded and 70,755 sick, cared for in the hospitals of the Petrograd Committee of the All-Russian Union of Towns, shows that among the wounded 25.2 per cent, and among the sick 14.9 per cent were discharged unconditionally. If we apply that scale to the total number of evacuated wounded (2,425,000) and of the sick (1,875,000) we find that, in the course of the War, there were discharged as unfit for further service, 611,000 wounded and 279,375 sick, or a total of 890,375. These figures are, no doubt, exaggerated. It has already been pointed out that Petrograd was a center where such wounded and sick as required complicated treatment were evacuated; and among such wounded and sick the percentage of permanently disabled must have been high.

We have also said that General Headquarters, in its reply to General Janin, estimated the number of severely wounded and discharged up to October, 1917, at 348,508. In the same document it was stated that, in addition, 70,210 men had been discharged before the completion of their term of service. Unquestionably it may merely have been the effects of some serious disease that led to such discharge. Therefore, the number of invalids by October, 1917, ac-

according to the estimate of General Headquarters, was 418,718. To that figure there would be added 37,295 permanently disabled, and prisoners exchanged for disabled prisoners in Russia, during the War. This increases the total to 456,013.

But even that figure cannot be considered the final total. In September, 1917, in which the figures of the General Headquarters were gathered, a great number of disabled could not have been included in the total communicated to General Janin; some were still under treatment in the hospitals, some were absent on leave, and the question of their eventual discharge was to be decided later. An estimate, therefore, by Sazonov,⁴² based on the data of the Army Medical Service, that the number of those discharged from service and disabled by wounds, shell shock, or disease, should be put, in round numbers, at 700,000, is, in our judgment, well founded.

⁴² Sazonov, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

CHAPTER VI

COMBATANT AND AUXILIARY FORCES

The Army in the Field.

IN Russia, in what is known technically as the "army in the field" are included the country's armed forces both on land and sea, and the military establishments under the control of the Commander-in-Chief. The areas indicated for the necessary deployment and movements of the army in the field were called "the theater of war." In addition to the forces making up the army in the field, there were, in the interior of the country, numerous establishments working for the army in the field, and also depot troops, or army units in which recruits and territorials were receiving their training; moreover, certain territorial units had been kept in the interior on garrison duty. All troops and military establishments in the interior took their orders from the Minister of War.

The army in the field was divided into "fronts" made up of groups of armies, and into separate armies. At the beginning of the War there were, first, two fronts and two distinct armies, namely, the northwestern front made up of the forces acting against Germany; and the southwestern front made up of those acting against Austria-Hungary. But there were also two other armies, the Sixth, or Petrograd Army, for the protection of the Baltic coast, and that of Odessa, for the protection of the Black Sea littoral. After the declaration of war by Turkey there was formed an army of the Caucasus; and, later, it saw service on the "Caucasus front." In the autumn of 1915, following the retreat from Poland and Lithuania, the northwestern front was divided into two fronts, the northern front, made up of the armies covering the roads leading to Petrograd, plus the Sixth Army; and the western front, made up of the armies covering the roads leading to Moscow. Finally, when it became necessary to send numerous Russian troops to the assistance of Rumania, the "Rumanian front" was formed.

Its Strength.

Thus, in 1917, Russia's forces were divided into five fronts: the northern, the western, the southwestern, the Rumanian, and the Cau-

casus. To ascertain the numerical strength of these forces during the World War is not an easy thing. The difficulty lies not so much in the loss of many documents, as in the fact that enumeration was not done in the right way. There was much red tape and making of reports, even as in the case of army losses, but such reports were drawn up in so haphazard a fashion that the figures submitted by the army commanders turned out to be very different from those of the Army Supply Department. The difference was so great that it led to correspondence between General Headquarters and the Ministry of War. In October, 1916, the Chief of the General Staff wrote to the Adjutant General at General Headquarters as follows:

During his latest visit to General Headquarters the Minister of War obtained from the Chief of the Army Supply Department figures giving the number of men drawing rations both in the army in the field and on the theatre of war. The totals were, for the northern front 2,127,000 men; for the western, 1,651,000; for the southwestern, 3,640,000, and for the Caucasus front, 851,000; the total being 8,269,000. But, according to information received from the officers commanding separate fronts, the total numerical strength was, on September 1, 1916: northern front, 1,553,000, western front, 1,808,000; southwestern front, 2,439,000; army of the Caucasus, 391,000, or a total of 6,191,000. The Minister of War, therefore, asks for an explanation of the above difference, one of 2,078,000 men, as he desires to know what classes of men are included in it.¹

Soon after the February Revolution, at a conference held on March 30, 1917, at Headquarters, the question of the difference between the figures of the army commanders and those of the Army Supply Department again arose. The conference reached the conclusion that the latter figures "were the result, to a great extent, of theoretical calculations."

In order to check up the figures of the Army Supply Department, on April 20, 1917, by order of General Alexeev, a one-day census was taken. According to it, the total number of men in the army in the field—as fed that day—was 9,050,924. This was 2,200,000 greater than the numerical strength according to the figures of the commanding officers.² Thus it became clear that the difference lay

¹ *Trudi (Proceedings)* of the Commission for the Investigation of the Effects on Public Health of the War of 1914–1920, p. 136.

² *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, Table 11.

in the fact that army commanders did not include in their totals a whole group of establishments, the auxiliary organizations which were working for the army. We shall come to that later on. For the present, let us try to arrive at the total strength of the army in the field on the basis of the calculations of the army commanders. Two documents will be of help, the *Summary of Reports Submitted by the Various Fronts to General Headquarters*,³ and *Data Relating to the Numerical Strength of the Troops and Establishments of the Army in the Field, as Based on the Documents of General Headquarters*.⁴

The peace strength of the Russian army amounted, as we have said, to 1,423,000. Mobilization made this 4,700,000.⁵ But of this total not more than 3,500,000 were included in the army in the field. In view of the fact that the concentration of the entire forces required two and a half months, it would have been impossible to survey their total strength before October, 1914. But by then a number of bloody battles, accompanied by heavy losses, had taken place. On October 1, that is, when the concentration of the army in the field was complete, its strength was estimated at only 2,700,000; and by December 1, it had decreased to 2,000,000. This decrease is explained by the continuously heavy losses suffered during this first part of the War, when Russia was called on to save the French from a defeat. But, to add to this, the Russian army, owing to the inadequate organization of the depot troops, was not getting its reinforcements on time. Instead of 15,000 combatants, its divisions had only an average of 7,000 or 8,000.

By January 1, 1915, following the arrival of the necessary reinforcements, the army had grown to 3,500,000. But the heavy fighting in January reduced its number, by February 1, to 3,200,000. Two months later, on April 1, 1915, thanks to more reinforcements and to new formations, it numbered 4,200,000. However, in May the Germans broke the front in Galicia. The Russians, then in a critical position owing to lack of munitions, suffered severely. In numbers, the army had fallen by May 15 to 3,900,000. "All the late advances have been pure murder, as we attacked against a large quantity of field and heavy artillery without adequate artillery preparation,"

³ *Trudi (Proceedings)* of the Commission for the Investigation of the Effects on Public Health of the War of 1914-1920, Table 2, p. 209.

⁴ *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, Table 9, p. 23.

⁵ Sazonov, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

wrote Captain Neilson,⁶ an officer attached to the British Military Mission, who had witnessed the heavy fighting of the Third Army on the southwestern front, against which the first blow of von Mackensen's forces was directed. And to illustrate the tragic "melting away" of the Russian forces at that time, we can give other instances of what was suffered by the troops of this Third Army.

On May 19 Captain Neilson wrote:⁷ "Their losses have been colossal. They confessed to over 100,000 on the 16th, but I think they have lost more. Here are a few details which I know to be correct: Tenth Corps—in one division 1,000 men remain; in the other only 900; Twelfth Siberian Division—only 2,000 remain."

On June 6 Captain Neilson wrote:⁸

This army is now a harmless mob. . . . Here are some of the strengths even after reinforcements have arrived since May 14 at the rate of 2,000 to 4,000 a day: Twelfth Siberian Division, 18 officers and 3,000 men; Tenth Corps, all three divisions together—14,000 men; the Twenty-ninth Corps, which is the strongest in the army, has 20,000 men. The Twenty-third Corps lost more than half its strength in an attack. The Ninth Corps lost 3,500 men in three days. . . . We are very short of ammunition and guns. All realize the futility of sending men against the enemy, they with their artillery and we with ours.

On July 9, despite the arrival of new reënforcements, the strength of the infantry of the Third Army, although the number of battalions had increased, amounted only to 97,000 bayonets, instead of 232,000.⁹

General Zuev, commander of the Twenty-ninth Corps, reported to the Minister of War in August, 1915, that there were regiments which had only 200 men and divisions with only 3,000 or 4,000. The total strength of the corps, which had consisted of four infantry divisions, had been reduced to 11,000 bayonets.¹⁰

General Knox, referring to a greater section of the front, wrote:¹¹

The Russians had therefore twenty-three army corps on a front, from Lomja to Vlodava, of under 200 miles, but corps did not average more than 12,000 bayonets, with a total average of shell in battery, park and reserve of 150 to 200 rounds per gun. . . . In the First Army the

⁶ Knox, *op. cit.*, I, 288.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 284.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 287.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 300.

¹⁰ Polivanov, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

¹¹ Knox, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

Twenty-seventh Corps had 27,000 men, but the Chief of Staff told me that the other corps averaged only 5,000 bayonets each.

In consequence of such "melting away," the strength of the army in the field by August 15, 1915, despite the arrival of numerous reinforcements, had fallen to 3,800,000. But in September, and especially in October, when the heavy fighting was over, it had again increased, and, on November 1, 1915, it amounted to 4,900,000.

Following the appointment of General Alexeev as Chief of Staff, there began an energetic and well-planned campaign to restore the army's strength. Gaps in the existing units were filled in, new units were formed, the organization of the depot troops was improved. As a consequence there was a gradual growth in numbers until, by June 1, 1916, they had reached 6,800,000. By September 1, owing to the bloody battles fought by the Russians in Galicia to assist France, attacked at Verdun, and to save Italy from defeat, the strength of the army in the field had again dropped to 6,500,000. But it grew by November 1, 1916, to 6,900,000. And its strength was the same on January 1, 1917, according to the confidential report of the Minister of War.

TABLE 11

Strength of the Army in the Field.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Number of Men</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Number of Men</i>
1914		1916	
October 1	2,700,000	February 1	6,200,000
December 1	2,000,000	April 1	6,300,000
		June 1	6,800,000
1915		September 1	6,500,000
January 1	3,500,000	October 1	6,500,000
February 1	3,200,000	November 1	6,900,000
April 1	4,200,000		
May 15	3,900,000	1917	
August 15	3,800,000	January 1	6,900,000
September 15	3,900,000	May 1	6,800,000
November 1	4,900,000	September 1	6,000,000

The beginning of the Revolution was also the beginning of the collapse of the army. Desertion, taking place openly as well as under various pretexts—men pretended to be sick, to be delegates to soldiers' soviets, etc.,—became a serious menace. To establish the actual strength of the army in the field after the Revolution is therefore

impossible. We can only assert that it must have been below the strength given in the reports. The figures for two dates in that period may be cited: On May 1, 1917, we find a total of 6,800,000,¹² and on September 1, 1917, 6,000,000.¹³

Auxiliary Troops.

A memorandum written by General Alexeev at the end of 1915, read in part:

It is absolutely necessary that the following work, complicated but compulsory, should be done. The Chief of the Army Supply Department says that he is feeding from 5,500,000 to 6,000,000 men at the front, in addition to those on the military districts of the interior. But the number of combatants we have been able to gather is about 2,000,000. If such is really the ratio we arrive at a conclusion which cannot be admitted, namely, that for every man at the front there are two men in the rear. Yet with our organization in the rear, unwieldy though it is, there should be one man there to every three or four at the front. . . . We are told that we have obtained 14,000,000 men, that 6,000,000 out of that number are losses, and therefore we have still 8,000,000 men; but we keep on asking for more in view of the shortage of men in the infantry. It is necessary that the headquarters of the fronts check up their data against those of the Army Supply Department, and that they submit information as to the number receiving army rations (*a*) in the combat units—though their headquarters and hospitals should be shown separately—(*b*) in the headquarters of the armies and fronts, (*c*) in the establishments and groups of troops in the rear, (*d*) in the organizations which are fed by the Army Supply Department . . .

The fact that the rear had grown out of proportion likewise attracted the attention of the members of the Special Council, and was mentioned in their memorandum referred to above.¹⁴ In his reply to that memorandum General Basil Gurko, Acting Chief of Staff in the absence of General Alexeev, then ill, wrote with regard to the growth of the rear as follows:

The insufficient number of railways, macadamized roads and even common roads makes it necessary for us to maintain, besides the armies at the front, extensive rear units which work for the combat units and carry out their tasks—with great difficulty, too, especially during the

¹² *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, Table 11, p. 24.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Tables 10 and 13.

¹⁴ See above, p. 65.

season of bad roads, and when the fighting is intense. However, the ratio of the troops in the rear to the combat units, pointed out in the memorandum,¹⁵ does not quite conform to the actual situation: according to the information of Headquarters the fighting men at the front, including the territorials, but not including the depot units, numbered on December 1, last, 65 per cent of the total of troops, including auxiliary units, and no further increase in the number of fighting men at the expense of the rear, without a considerable improvement in technical services and transportation, is possible; otherwise, the welfare of the troops will suffer.

Thus it may be seen that General Gurko's reply as to the proportion of the fighting element was in sharp contradiction to the opinion of General Alexeev and to the data in the memorandum of the members of the Special Council. The divergence between General Alexeev and General Gurko is especially striking. Both generals, when they expressed their opinions, were successively holding the highest position in the General Staff, that of the Chief of Staff of the Army. It would seem that their points of view should have been identical. Yet General Alexeev thought that the fighting element of the army in 1916 formed only 35 per cent and the auxiliary element 65 per cent, whereas General Gurko asserted the opposite, that the fighting elements formed 65 per cent and the auxiliary elements 35. The cause of such divergence of opinion should be looked for in the fact that methods of estimating the fighting strength, as was pointed out before, were not uniform. That General Alexeev realized this, the first line of his memorandum offers proof.

In accordance with a rule adopted in the Russian army in time of peace, it was divided into "men of the line" and "men of the auxiliary services." Although this division was of some importance from the standpoint of promotions and privileges granted for service, it was obsolete and of no value in calculating the army's fighting strength. Consequently a new catchword, "bayonets," appeared in the course of the War. But this innovation, for which no authority can be found, muddled the matter even more, inasmuch as the artillery and the machine guns personnel could not be considered "bayonets" and were not included, therefore, in the number of fighting men. The question not having been authoritatively decided, a great

¹⁵ $2\frac{1}{4}:1$.

variety of methods of recording the man power developed. For instance, certain armies did not include in the number of "bayonets" the non-commissioned officers. Moreover, many units took advantage of the absence of a uniform system of keeping records to impress the higher command with their small number of combat troops. We are therefore of the opinion that the percentage of the fighting element mentioned in the memorandum of General Alexeev was too low. On the other hand, General Gurko's estimate, based on the obsolete division of the rank and file into "men of the line" and "men of the auxiliary services," was too high. To solve the question at the present time is impossible. We may only express an opinion, based on wide experience and a personal checking of facts, that at the end of 1914 the fighting elements formed 75 per cent of the army, and at the end of 1916 the percentage dropped to 50. If we apply that scale to the figures giving the numerical strength of the army, we find that the number of actual combatants during the War fluctuated between 1,500,000 on December 1, 1914, and 3,500,000, on November 1, 1916.

From the beginning of the War the medical establishments of the Red Cross and various unofficial or auxiliary organizations, among which the Union of Zemstvos and the Union of Towns should be given the first place, made a part of the forces in the rear. In proportion as deficiencies in supplies began to appear, these unofficial organizations extended their activities and no longer limited themselves to relief work. Distrust of the Government considerably increased the tendency to form all kinds of autonomous organizations for the supply of the army. It goes without saying that this untiring activity of unofficial organizations was extremely helpful. We shall speak of it later. But it is necessary to point out here that the rapid growth of such groups, official and unofficial, was crowding the rear. The number of men thus employed on April 1, 1917, was estimated at 1,844,000.¹⁶ Another estimate, relating to June 1, 1917, puts it at 3,053,000.¹⁷

The data of the Army Supply Service gave figures which are found in Table 12.

¹⁶ *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, Table 14, p. 25.

¹⁷ *Trudi (Proceedings)* of the Commission for the Investigation of the Effects on Public Health of the War of 1914-1920, p. 137.

TABLE 12
*Numbers of Men in Each of the Five Fronts Receiving Army Rations on September 1, 1917.**

	<i>Northern front</i>	<i>Western front</i>	<i>Southwestern front</i>	<i>Rumanian front</i>	<i>Caucasus front</i>	<i>Total</i>
Fighting units	825,371	819,633	1,464,614	1,258,097	366,152	4,733,897
Depot troops	53,767	64,505	165,352	56,929	59,900	400,453
Troops attached to headquarters	89,358	175,379	210,358	194,234	120,002	789,331
Total	968,496	1,059,517	1,840,354	1,509,260	546,054	5,923,681
Auxiliary organizations	325,000	600,000	701,000	467,000	585,000	2,678,000
Grand total	1,293,496	1,659,517	2,541,354	1,976,260	1,131,054	8,601,681

* *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, p. 24.

This table clearly shows that the number of men in the auxiliary organizations was, at the end of the War, about 2,700,000. These unofficial organizations did not form part of the army, and they consisted chiefly of men not liable for military service. All such individuals, as they had not been called out for service, were omitted by the army commanders from their calculations of numerical strength. But the Army Supply Department, for which the important thing was the number of rations, regardless of the legal status of those drawing them, included in its estimates all such organizations. In this lay the main cause of the difference of 2,000,000 between the estimate of the High Command and that of the Army Supply Department, the difference which puzzled both the Ministry of War and the General Headquarters.

The Machine Age.

Table 12 is also of interest from another point of view. It enables us to establish the true ratio between the fighting and the auxiliary elements in the army in the field. The total strength of the army on September 1, 1917, as stated above, may be put at 6,000,000; its fighting elements, therefore, which formed 50 per cent, numbered about 3,000,000. But the numerical strength of the army, according to the data of the Army Supply Department, when including auxiliary organizations (see table), was 8,601,681. Consequently the combatants, as so estimated, formed 35 per cent of the total strength. Thus we arrive at the conclusion that the ratio between the fighting and auxiliary elements was accurately estimated by both General Alexeev and the twenty-eight members of the Special Council, at two auxiliary service workers to every combatant.

A protest against such a ratio was voiced in both memorandums, that of General Alexeev and that of the members of the Special Council. But the question was much more complicated than the authors of these memorandums thought; and here we are approaching one of the most important changes in the organization of a military force which result from the development of mechanical appliances. To characterize this phenomenon we quote from a lecture given in 1922 by General Debeney, formerly head of the French *École de Guerre*, and then Chief of the French General Staff:¹⁸

¹⁸ *La Guerre Moderne et les Machines*, in *Revue de la Semaine*, February 10, 1922, p. 145.

In point of fact the influence of the machine by no means leads to a decrease in the number of troops, but calls for a different distribution of man power. In proportion as the material of war improves, the army strips its firing line in order to spread out more and more towards the rear; the number of troops remains the same; but, divided into echelons, they are scattered so far back that finally they cover the whole of the national territory.

The necessity of a distribution of man power differing from that in previous wars became evident from the beginning. In the course of the War, with the gradual increase of the use of mechanical appliances, the new tendencies became strongly manifested, so that finally a situation in the army of the field was created, in which for every combatant there were, in round numbers, two men in the rear. It goes without saying that such a distribution of men, from the standpoint of the use of men in battle, was cumbersome and disadvantageous. But aside from stating the ratio, it is important to learn to what extent the great number of men in the rear was in keeping with the actual requirements.

The Remote Rear.

The ratio of one combatant to two men in the rear established above refers only to the army in the field. But in the vast area lying behind the theaters of war and divided into military districts there were quartered the main masses of the depot troops as well as the numerous establishments of the rear. All those elements, as was said in the beginning of this chapter, were under the orders of the Minister of War and constituted the remote rear. Consequently, in order to get a correct idea of the distribution of man power the numerical strength of that remote rear must also be taken into account. Yet, precisely to estimate that strength is even more difficult than to arrive at that of the army in the field.

Simultaneously with the declaration of general mobilization the formation of 500 depot battalions was started; soon after, the formation of 500 more depot battalions, of the second line, was begun. But the losses of the army in the initial campaigns were so great that the organization and numerical strength of the depot troops, as planned by the Ministry of War, turned out to be wholly disproportionate to the need of reinforcements. The 1,500,000 men, sent as re-

enforcements by the end of 1914, were not enough to make good the losses. Therefore, in 1915, men whose training was absolutely inadequate were sent to the front.¹⁹ Unquestionably the poor training of the depot battalions resulted in an increased number of prisoners. In the course of 1915 the army in the field received reinforcements totaling 3,286,041 in all.²⁰ In June, 1915, General Polivanov, having succeeded General Sukhomlinov as Minister of War, used his efforts to improve the system of reinforcing the army. In this respect he was given warm support by the members of the Duma. By the end of the year he succeeded in building up a large reserve, one of 2,000,000 men in the depot battalions in the interior, whose training could continue for four, five, and even six months. During 1916, according to the Annual Report, for 1916, of the Minister of War, reinforcements numbering 2,533,010 were sent to the army, while, on December 31, more than 2,170,000 in training remained in the interior.

In the course of 1917, 1,899,591 men were sent to the army. With regard to that year a very significant fact should be noted: from June on not only reinforcements, trained in the depot units, but also those units themselves, including their permanent training cadres, were sent to the front. This clearly was a symptom pointing to the exhaustion of the supply of men, as was set forth in Chapter IV. Another proof of such exhaustion is offered by noting the numbers of men in the depot troops in the interior. Such forces amounted to 2,089,350 on December 1, 1916, but on September 15, 1917, only to 1,100,000, in other words to about one-half of their former strength.²¹

There is no way of learning the precise number of men serving in the establishments of the Ministry of War. Of the data so far published, only one document is of help. It is stated by the Central Statistical Department²² that on June 1, 1917, "there were in the establishments of the rear, convoy troops and institutions under the orders of the Ministry of War 200,000 men liable to military service." According to the same source there were at the same time 200,000 men in the territorial units quartered in the interior. Thus the total number of men in the establishments and troops under the direct control of the Minister of War amounted, by the end of the War, to 400,000. Inasmuch as the number, in preceding years, was smaller,

¹⁹ See above, p. 56.

²⁰ *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, Table 4, p. 20.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Tables 5, 19, 21.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

we shall not make a great mistake if we put it at 300,000 for 1915, and at 350,000 for 1916. Consequently the total number of men in the remote rear under the control of the Minister of War (that is, including the depot troops in the interior) may be estimated as follows: December 31, 1915, 2,300,000; December 31, 1916, 2,550,000; and November 1, 1917, 1,500,000, or approximately an average of 2,000,000.

It should be remembered, however, that this refers only to men who were called for military service. In addition to them millions of men worked for the army in the remote rear. The number of men employed in the State and private factories working for the army was estimated by the Special Council in 1916 at 2,000,000.²³ Even more were employed in other branches of supply and transport. There is no way of learning that number inasmuch as the entire country worked for the War. In this connection it is of interest to note that Russia spent for the War about one-third of her national capital, which in time of peace had been put at 120,000,000,000 gold rubles.²⁴

The ratio of the combatants to the auxiliary troops in the army in the field, as estimated above, was 1:2. But if we take into consideration the men liable to military service, who worked for the army in the remote rear,²⁵ we may assume that the total number of men in the rear (in the immediate as well as in the remote rear) was 7,000,000 by the end of 1915, and 8,000,000 by the end of 1916. Thus, of the total of men liable to military service there were three men in the rear to every one at the front. Such proportion does not indicate a careful use of man power.

Men Returning to the Ranks.

In reading the numerous memoirs written by authors who were closely connected with the governing circles, one often comes across complaints that the number of men who had been wounded or sick and who, after their recovery, had returned to the ranks, was very

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

²⁵ Including those who were temporarily exempted, their work having been considered necessary for the War. The number of such, according to the Central Statistical Department, amounted on October 1, 1916, to 2,176,362. See *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, Table 70.

small. An attempt to throw more light on that question has been made by Sazonov.²⁶ On the basis of a report submitted in June, 1917, by the Chief Medical Inspector to the Chief of Staff, he reached the conclusion that on an average, during the entire period of the War, there returned to the ranks about 50 per cent of those who had been evacuated. Sazonov writes:

Although the percentage of officers who returned to the front was considerably higher, this would not change, substantially, the general percentage of the total evacuated, inasmuch as the number of officers, compared with that of the rank and file, was insignificant. Consequently, we shall not make a mistake if we accept the estimate of 50 per cent. Hence it follows that the number of losses through those who were evacuated on account of wounds and sickness, estimated at 4,300,000,²⁷ must be reduced by 50 per cent and put at 2,150,000. . . . A confirmation of the correctness of the above calculation may be found in a memorandum drawn up by the Adjutant General at Headquarters for the conference which was held at Headquarters after the Revolution of February-March, and in which M. Guchkov, then Minister of War, took part. In that memorandum we find that the following number of wounded and sick returned to the front: From the beginning of the War to January 1, 1916, 1,160,182; and in 1916, 549,756; or a total of 1,709,938. It is obvious that by the end of the War this number must have increased.

Now, taking Sazonov's rule as our point of departure, we shall try to ascertain the percentage of those who returned to the front as compared with all wounded, and not merely with those who had been evacuated into the interior, as was done by the author above mentioned. Let us begin with the situation on January 1, 1917. The number of sick and wounded who did not return to the front must have been, on that date, 1,710,000. This figure includes all who did not return, inasmuch as all who were seriously wounded, or gravely ill, were subject to evacuation, and were later granted long leaves of absence.

On the basis of Dr. Avramov's work it may be established that by

²⁶ *Trudi (Proceedings)* of the Commission for the Investigation of the Effects on Public Health of the War of 1914-1920, pp. 159-160.

²⁷ See the reply of General Headquarters to General Janin; see above, p. 80.

January 1, 1917, of the sick about 725,000 did not return. Consequently, the number of wounded who did not return must have been about 985,000. But the number of killed and wounded amounted, by then, to 5,100,000, of whom the killed numbered 1,170,000, and the wounded 3,930,000. Hence it follows that from the beginning of the War to January 1, 1917, the percentage of wounded who returned was about 75.

In order to see whether complaints that only a small number of Russian wounded returned to the front are well founded let us compare the percentage figured out above with the corresponding percentage in the French army. The latter was high because the military authorities in France, on account of France's shortage of men, were very strict as to the discharging of men from military service. From the work of M. Toubert²⁸ we learn that the number of wounded who returned to the front in 1916, 1917, and 1918, formed 79 per cent of the total. Therefore, the percentage of wounded who returned to the front in the Russian army was only 4 per cent smaller than the corresponding percentage in the French army. But it should be taken into consideration that the treatment of the wounded in Russia was much less favorable than in France: let us only mention the conditions of evacuation from the battlefields in Russia, which could not be compared with those in France, and the poor technical equipment of the Russian hospitals. That the percentage in the Russian army was slightly below the percentage in the French army may, therefore, be easily understood.

In considering the question of the number of sick who, after their recovery, returned to the front, the anomaly, of which we spoke in the preceding chapter, should be borne in mind. After the beginning of the Revolution, along with the evacuation into the interior of those who were seriously ill, a "personal-evacuation" was taking place, in other words, an abandonment of the front under the pretext of sickness. This accounts for the fact that, according to the data of Dr. Avramov, the number of sick who did not return, from the beginning of the War to October 1, 1917, amounted to 1,910,188, whereas, according to the figures of General Headquarters for the same period the number of sick who were evacuated into the in-

²⁸ Toubert, *op. cit.*, pp. 20, 36.

terior was put at 1,425,000 only. Furthermore, if we estimate, on the basis of the data of Dr. Avramov, the number of sick who did not return in 1914, 1915, and 1916, we shall get a total of only 726,200 for the first twenty-nine months of the War, but if we estimate the number of sick who did not return in 1917, we get a total of 1,183,988 for the remaining nine months.

A comparison of these totals offers a full confirmation of what was said above, and even makes it possible to find out how many of those evacuated on account of sickness were nothing but deserters in disguise. This may be done by establishing the monthly average of sick who did not return to the front in the course of the first twenty-nine months of the War; this average was 24,972. There is no reason to suppose that in the course of 1917 any difference may have arisen as a result of changed health conditions; yet the average for every month of 1917 was 131,554. We are, therefore, justified in asserting that the difference of 106,572 represents those whom we have called disguised deserters. The total of such deserters amounted for the ten first months of 1917 to 1,000,000.

According to the data of Dr. Avramov the percentage of sick who returned to the front from the beginning of the War to January 1, 1917, was, for the whole Russian army, 75.9. We are not in a position to compare that ratio with similar ratios in France, since corresponding data for the French army are not available, but it seems certain that during the first thirty-one months of the War the number of wounded and sick in the Russian army who after their recovery evaded military service and did not return to the front, was not considerably greater than the respective numbers in Allied countries.

Military Bureaucracy.

When we pointed out that any tendency to interpret the social processes which were developing during the War by applying statistical methods was unknown in military circles in Russia, we did not mean that no work of a statistical nature was done. On the contrary, we feel sure that in no army and in no country were the subordinate agencies of the executive machinery so busy preparing reports, tables, summaries, etc., as in Russia. But, it must be admitted, all this stupendous amount of work did not represent the result of any

complete and well-planned system. It was haphazard. The various requests, addressed by the higher officers to the subordinate departments and bureaus, were numerous, but they lacked a general guiding idea, they were not uniform, and they even disclosed at times the lack of any comprehension of real conditions.

The following may serve as an illustration. The headquarters of General Brusilov on the southwestern front ordered the combat units daily to report the precise losses suffered by every unit. It was obvious that the carrying out of such an order in the case of regiments engaged in actual fighting was impossible. Yet every night, during many months, reports, often fictitious, flowed into Headquarters, on the basis of which summaries were drawn up. But even more interesting is the fact that when the present author in 1917, before leaving for the Inter-Allied Conference in France, requested information upon the losses on the southwestern front in 1916 and 1917, Headquarters, on that front, replied that no such information was available. The enormous work of the subordinate headquarters had been drowned in one general morass of paper.

We deem it necessary to make such an introduction before turning the light on the question of deserters. Without that introduction it would be difficult to understand the ignorance which the Government showed in the case of a question so cardinal and pressingly important.

Desertions.

At the conference of the Council of Ministers on August 4, 1915, Prince Shcherbatov, Minister of the Interior, made a statement that "the police were unable to apprehend the bulk of the deserters; they were hiding in the forests and in the fields." It would seem, too, that the Minister of the Interior should have been better qualified than anyone else to judge correctly. And the statements of other ministers sounded the same note. M. Samarin, Procurator of the Synod, said that "crowds of men in uniform were roaming in the rear." M. Krivoshein, Minister of Agriculture, remarked that "the great number of soldiers wandering about in the cities, villages, on the railroads and all over Russia strikes me, even as a private citizen." The members of the Special Council in their memorandum referred to above, stated that there were 2,000,000 men who remained in the territory

occupied by the enemy, or were emigrants, or, in violation of the law, evaded military service.

Colonel Engelhardt wrote on this subject:

Until the autumn of 1915 the people in the villages were able to do their work, in part because women and children took the place of the men who had left for the War, but chiefly because some 4,500,000 territorials of the second class, not yet called, remained in the country. But, although up to that time the villages were resignedly sending reinforcements to the front, one might suspect, judging from the ever-increasing number of deserters, that a new discontent was developing among the peasants, a discontent caused by the War. Even in the beginning I did not think that a certain access of patriotism, which at the moment of the declaration of war developed among the people of the capital, was any measure of the actual attitude of the nation. On the contrary, on the grounds of my personal observations I felt from the beginning that the Russian peasant served unwillingly. However, in the first period of the War there was so little trouble in the country, and the popular readiness to obey orders was so deeply rooted, that evasions of military service in great numbers did not occur, if surrenders at the front, which, of course, might have arisen from other causes, be not considered as such. It is possible that the frequent surrenders resulted from pernicious propaganda, upon which General Yanushkevich dwelt in his letter to General Polivanov.²⁹ According to his information the recruits leaving to join the colors were being advised "not to fight until blood was shed, and to surrender to save their lives."

At any rate [Colonel Engelhardt wrote] it is significant that as early as the beginning of the second year of the War desertions at the front and especially in the depot echelons, while on their way to the front, became a commonplace, and the average number of deserters in such echelons reached 25 per cent. I happen to know of three cases when the train was stopped because there were no passengers on it. All, with the exception of the officer in command of the echelon, had run away. I heard this from the Mobilization Division of the General Staff.

We shall not here pass upon Engelhardt's statement that no patriotic zeal for the War was manifested by the peasant masses; the final chapters of the present volume deal with that. However, the data published by the Central Statistical Department³⁰ give us the fol-

²⁹ Polivanov, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

³⁰ *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, Table 16, p. 26.

lowing figures: Total desertions from the beginning of the War up to the Revolution of February–March, 195,130, average per month, 6,846. For 1917 the detailed figures are: March 1 to May 15: total, 85,921, average per month, 34,270. From May 15 to June 1 there were 16,342 desertions; from June 1 to June 15, 11,213; from June 15 to July 1, 19,294; from July 1 to July 15, 23,432; from July 15 to August 1, 13,805, the total being 365,137. As we study these figures, the increase of desertions that followed the outbreak of the Revolution is particularly striking. Before the Revolution the monthly average of deserters was 6,300, after the Revolution it was 30,900, that is, five times as large. Furthermore, no confirmation of the colossal number of deserters mentioned by the ministers and Colonel Engelhardt can be found in the above. General Gurko wrote:

I must say there were insistent rumors both in the country at large and in Council circles that the numbers of deserters hidden in the villages reached the enormous figure of one or two millions. A comparison between the number of men called out and those actually serving showed that this figure was in any case exaggerated. Of course, the number of soldiers arriving from the armies, and living in the interior or travelling by railway, was temporarily enormous; from 1915 on, leave was granted to a number running between two and five per cent of the membership of their units. Consequently there were times when 500,000 men were on leave. Adding these to the wounded who had received permission to go to their villages before rejoining, and men sent on business to the interior, you have such colossal numbers temporarily on leave and travelling by railway, that it is not astonishing that veritable fairy tales were told as to the number of desertions.

Now let us, as suggested by General Gurko, compare the number of men withdrawn from civil life with those actually serving. The figures as of December 31, 1916, were these: Total number called out, 14,700,000; killed, 1,200,000; sick and wounded, 1,710,000; prisoners, 2,150,000; recorded desertions, 180,000; army in the field, 6,900,000; depot troops in the interior, 2,200,000; other establishments under the orders of the Minister of War, 350,000; giving a total of 14,690,000.

The above comparison clearly shows that the rumors circulating at the end of 1916, to the effect that the number of desertions amounted to two millions, arose from the pessimism that prevailed

before the Revolution. Nor was Colonel Engelhardt free from that pessimism, as may be seen from the above quotation. As to the two millions mentioned in the memorandum of the members of the Special Council, that figure did not represent the number of deserters, inasmuch as it also included those who remained in the territory occupied by the enemy and those who evaded military service. Moreover, it was merely a guess.

If we take December 31, 1915, instead of 1916, we get a similar result: the difference between the number of men mobilized and those actually serving (plus losses and deserters) amounted only to 34,000. This figure, like the difference of 10,000 in 1916 (14,700,000 less 14,690,000) is so insignificant that it can be disregarded. But the result is very different when we take November 1, 1917; we find that the difference then was 1,500,000. This figure represents the number of desertions that had not been recorded. Adding to these the 365,000 that had been on record, we get a total, by the end of the War, of 1,900,000. But even that colossal figure is not complete. The Revolution opened the way to a special form of desertion which was carried on under the cover of revolutionary slogans. We mean the election of delegates to all kinds of soldiers' committees and soviets. This style of desertion, beginning in June, 1917, gradually opened a broad road by which tens of thousands left the front. It is impossible to learn how many so deserted. However, to give some idea of their number, we quote from the volume of General Knox,³¹ and his figures relate only to one of the five Russian fronts, namely, the southwestern:

The following is reported to be the detail of the numbers of elected organizations on the southwestern front, that is, of fighting men engaged in talk: Active army: men, 63,690; officers, 7,055; others, 1,162. Depot units: men, 1,769; officers, 228; others, 19. Rear units: men, 9,568; officers, 911; others, 546. Grand total, 84,948.

The numerous garrison troops in Petrograd, consisting of depot units of the Guards, refused to fight under the pretext that they were "defending the revolution."

We shall not be far from truth if we assume that by November 1, 1917, the number of desertions, recorded and disguised, must have

³¹ Knox, *op. cit.*, II, 699, 700.

exceeded 2,000,000. Thus, by the end of the War, there was, for every three men in the army in the field, not less than one deserter. This epidemic desertion took place after the Revolution. In point of fact it was a spontaneous demobilization. The mass of the people had wearied of the War and declined to go on with it. The fact was well understood by the Bolsheviks; they used it as their trump card in their struggle with Kerensky.

CHAPTER VII

MUNITIONS OF WAR

The Crisis.

THE munitions crisis which Russia experienced is common knowledge. Its causes were twofold. They lay in the general conditions of Russian life, as set forth in Chapter III; and in the inability of governing circles to foresee and to organize. It is out of the question fully to list all the supplies needed by the army; neither the limited scope of this work, nor the available data make this possible. But a general and fairly comprehensive picture may be drawn.

As early as the fifth month of the War the army was facing a catastrophe.

The immensity of the requirements [writes General Danilov]¹ surpassed the wildest expectations, and, therefore, the difficulty of meeting them constantly increased. The rear could not catch up with the front, and, accordingly, both the strength of the army and our supplies of munitions daily decreased. We were confronted with the absolute necessity of a fundamental reorganization of our armed forces. . . . Our mobilization Division had done much to improve methods of putting the army on a war footing . . . but the question of how to maintain it at the same level throughout the war, not to speak of continuously developing that strength, had been hardly touched upon. Yet it was by this that the conception of a nation in arms might have been realized, a conception that must form the basis of military preparedness in every modern State.

Small Arms.

Chronologically, the small-arms crisis developed first. In the plan of mobilization the following quantity need had been foreseen: 4,500,000 rifles on hand and available, including a supply in reserve, and 700,000 more to be added yearly by manufacture in the army factories, which were to increase production accordingly during hostilities. But in reality this was the number of rifles that was needed: 5,000,000 upon the completion of mobilization, 5,500,000 to arm the men later called out, and about 7,200,000 to make good

¹ Danilov, *op. cit.*, pp. 246, 249.

the wastage and losses during the three years of war, or about 200,000 a month. The total number of rifles at the end of three years, as foreseen by the mobilization schedule, was 6,600,000 (4,500,000, plus 700,000 multiplied by 3) while the number actually needed was 17,700,000.² It follows that the actual need surpassed the estimate by more than 150 per cent. There was a shortage of 11,000,000, and it was imperative that from somewhere it should be made good.

To 4,652,000, initially available, Russian factories added, in 1914, 278,000; in 1915, 860,000; in 1916, 1,321,000; in 1917, 1,120,000. Another 2,434,000 were purchased abroad. About 700,000 were taken from the enemy, and the total was, then, 11,365,000. Thus we see that 35 per cent of the requisite number were not supplied. It was a shortage, too, which delayed recruiting. General Danilov writes:³

Owing to the shortage of rifles the army units, although they had been greatly reduced, were unable to fill up their gaps, and the reënforcements sent from the rear had to be kept behind in the depot battalions, swelling their number and hindering the training of new contingents. For instance, by the end of November, 1914, there were 800,000 men, mostly trained, in the depot troops, whereas the army in the field suffered from an appalling shortage of men. There were cases when men, sent to the front, had to remain with the army supplies, inasmuch as the absence of rifles made it impossible to put them into the ranks.

In 1915 the situation became catastrophic. How grave it was one may judge from a report sent by the British Military Attaché to his Government. According to that report in the whole Russian army, which occupied a front from Reval to Chernovitsy (in Bukovina) there were only 650,000 rifles. It is not an easy thing to give an adequate description of the situation in which the army found itself during the campaign of 1915. Only a part of the men at the front were armed, the remainder waited for the deaths of comrades, to take their rifles. To find a way out, the High Command resorted to various devices, some of them simply absurd. For instance, in August, 1915, when the present author was Quartermaster General of the Ninth Army, a telegram was received from the headquarters of the southwestern front to the effect that some of the infantry companies were

² Manikovsky, *op. cit.*, Part I, pp. 84, 85.

³ Danilov, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

to be armed with very long-handled axes; such companies, it was thought, might be used for the protection of artillery. The fantastic character of the order, sent from the remote rear, was so obvious that General Lechitsky, commanding the Ninth Army, who knew his men, disregarded an order which in his opinion might only destroy the prestige of the authorities. This project to revive "halberdiers," which reads like fiction, has been mentioned here as an illustration of the atmosphere, almost that of despair, in which the army was living during the campaign of 1915.

The tragic consequences of the shortage of rifles were rendered even more marked by the fact that the Ministry of War, headed by Sukhomlinov, for a long time paid no heed to what was being said at the front. Having acquired, in time of peace, the habit of solving questions in the bureaucratic way, the Ministry did not have the courage to face the threatening catastrophe. For instance, no workshops equipped for fundamental repair work on rifles had been foreseen in the mobilization plan. When that important need arose the Ministry of War could do nothing better than turn over the repair of arms, which the troops and local workshops were unable to handle with the means at their disposal, to the rifle factories. Such factories—those of Tula, Izhevsk, and Sestroretsk—then found themselves in an extremely difficult position, having been already called upon to increase the production of rifles.

The factories, of course [writes Manikovsky],⁴ protested against such added work . . . but they were forced to do it, although it would have been possible to organize, promptly and on a large scale, the repair of small arms in the workshops of the depots in the interior, and, more than that, to set up special workshops in the zones of military operations. All this was done later, but unfortunately it was done after a long delay, during which the proper work of the factories, burdened with such repairs, was held up.

The failure of the Ministry of War to foresee the threatening catastrophe had evil consequences in another way. Purchases of rifles abroad could not be made in time. As early as September, 1914, the Artillery Department, seeing the impossibility of satisfying the demand through its own government factories, began to look for rifles, not necessarily of the latest model, nor even of the same

⁴ Manikovsky, *op. cit.*, Part I, p. 39.

caliber—provided they could be purchased with the accompanying ammunition—in Allied and neutral countries. But negotiations, begun with that object, were discontinued by order of General Sukhomlinov, who gave as his reason the impossibility of using rifles of differing calibers. It was only after a telegram had been sent on December 15 by the Chief of Staff to say that rifles should be purchased abroad irrespective of the caliber, that such purchases were authorized. Thus three most precious months were lost, inasmuch as, by January, 1915, foreign markets had already been invaded by Russia's Allies and enemies.

"Carelessness" of the Soldiers.

It is of interest to note that some representatives of Headquarters, and above all the Ministry of War, have pictured in dark colors the careless handling of war supplies by the soldiers. "In time of peace," General Danilov writes,⁵ "we did our best to teach the men to take good care of their rifles. . . . Unfortunately, when the War began, these good instructions were completely forgotten. . . . And for the loss, abuse, or abandonment of rifles the offenders either were not punished, or were punished insufficiently."

It goes without saying that the Russian soldier, having less education than the French, British, American, or German, handled his arms less carefully. The fact that the mass of the people in Russia were badly educated was reflected in the fighting strength of the army. But this unfavorable condition should have been taken into account by the higher authorities. They did not do it. The present author, having closely observed the Russian army at the front, feels justified in asserting that the commanders of the regiments were doing all they could, but they were not getting the necessary assistance from the higher officers, who limited themselves to giving out orders and criticisms. In 1914 and 1915, on the author's initiative (and after being Quartermaster General of the Ninth Army he became Chief of Staff of the Seventh) in those armies special detachments were organized for the purpose of collecting arms, and also special workshops, mobile as well as permanently located, for the purpose of giving immediate assistance to the units at the front and relieving them of the work of repairing rifles. Thanks to the activi-

⁵ Danilov, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

ties of these workshops, unforeseen by any regulations, an end was put to the disorder which had prevailed before, and the Seventh and Ninth Armies were cited as examples of troops taking good care of arms and war equipment. This may serve to show that the solution of the problem lay in actually organizing work from above, not in reprimanding and issuing orders which sometimes it was impossible to carry out.

Machine Guns.

The number of machine guns required, as fixed by the mobilization plan, was 4,990. But in July, 1914, there was a shortage of 883. In view of this the Artillery Department sent an order to the Director of the Tula works—the only rifle factory in Russia which also manufactured machine guns—calling on it to increase the production of machine guns so that by January 1, 1915, the requisite number might be completed and delivered. That order was carried out.

The great importance of machine-gun fire became obvious to every man in the ranks in the first engagements. The 4,990, of which about 10 per cent (454) were kept in reserve, were clearly not enough for an army 3,000,000 men strong. Yet an annual output of 10 per cent of the machine-gun total was the quantity scheduled by the mobilization plan. Although the manufacture of machine guns was a most complicated process, and to establish such factories required from one and a half to two years, the Ministry of War gave the Artillery Department, during the first year of the War, neither instructions as to the number required, nor details concerning the monthly supply. Not until September, 1915, after the appointment of General Polivanov as Minister of War, was an order for 12,039 such weapons given to the Artillery Department. But three weeks later the number was increased to 31,170. The guns ordered were to be delivered in fifteen months, or, precisely, at the rate of 2,078 a month. Such monthly production was thirty-six times greater than the capacity of the Tula works, as included in the mobilization plan. Fortunately, the Artillery Department, acting on its own initiative, at the beginning of the War took decisive steps to develop machine-gun production. In 1915 it was manufacturing 350 a month and was preparing to increase that monthly output in 1916 to 1,000.

However, even that increase in production was not enough. It became necessary to place orders abroad. But, by that time all fac-

tories abroad were busy filling orders for the Allied and enemy countries. In the meantime the demand for machine guns was growing always greater.

How great were the requirements of the army may be judged from a calculation made by General Headquarters for the Inter-Allied Conference held in Petrograd in the beginning of 1917. The figures for the needed machine guns then were 133,000. To this there should be added 600 machine guns a month, or 7,200 for the year, as replacements.

To the number of machine guns, 4,152, which the army actually possessed at the beginning of the War, Russian factories added, in 1914, 833; in 1915, 4,251; in 1916, 11,072; and in 1917, 11,320. There were purchased abroad, in 1915, 1,057; in 1916, 9,428; in 1917, 31,833. Some 2,000 were taken from the enemy. This gives us a total of 75,946.

The above total, however, does not take account of wastage and loss. If they are taken into consideration we find that the number of machine guns available on January 1, 1917, amounted to about 16,300, and constituted only 12 per cent of the requisite 133,000 as estimated by General Headquarters.

Small-Arms Ammunition.

The supply of small-arms ammunition, in accordance with the mobilization plan, should have been 3,346,000,000 rounds for rifles and machine guns. But the Ministry of War had cut down that supply to 2,745,000,000 rounds. Thus, at the beginning of the War there was a shortage of nearly 600,000,000 rounds.⁶

Unfortunately, the shortage of small-arms ammunition was not disclosed by General Headquarters in the first months of the War. The available supply, General Danilov states, "lasted only until the beginning of 1915; then the situation changed sharply for the worse."⁷

There were many instances in 1915 when successful military operations could not be developed on account of the shortage of ammunition. Thus in September the Ninth Army opened an offensive between the rivers Sereth and Strypa against advancing Austro-Hungarian forces. The offensive was very successful. In the

⁶ Manikovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

⁷ Danilov, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

course of five days more than 35,000 prisoners were taken, and the Austrian line was broken on a front of sixty kilometers. The enemy had not a single new division in the vicinity to fill the gap, whereas in front of it two infantry and two cavalry divisions of the Ninth Army stood concentrated, ready to move forward. But their ammunition was gone. General Lechitsky, Commander of the Ninth Army, implored General Ivanov, commanding the southwestern front, at once to send a million cartridges by truck. This was refused, and no further advance of the Ninth Army could be made. It was enough to live through one such episode to understand how the revolutionary poison was taking hold of the men at the front.

To add to the fact that the supply of small-arms ammunition held in reserve before the War was entirely inadequate, the production of cartridges in the course of the War, as foreseen by the mobilization schedule, was far from what was needed to satisfy the actual requirements. An annual production of 550,000,000 rounds by the three cartridge factories in Russia—the Petrograd, the Lugva, and the Tula—had been held to be sufficient to meet all demands. But the average number of rounds actually needed amounted to 250,000,000 a month. That is, it was six times what had been expected. As a result of extreme efforts the production of the three factories was increased threefold. The question of building a new cartridge factory was raised, but a decision was reached only in April, 1916. The obtaining of supplies abroad, as they had been sought too late, was meeting with great difficulty. The supplies of small-arms ammunition may be set down as: Number of rounds available at the beginning of the War (all figures being in millions of rounds), 2,745. Delivered by Russian factories in 1914, 345; in 1915, 1,022; in 1916, 1,482; in 1917, 1,008. Purchased abroad, about 2,500. Taken from the enemy, about 400. Total 9,500.

From these figures we can see that the demand for cartridges was after all satisfied. The requirements for the three years of War amounted to 9,000,000,000, and the number of rounds actually delivered was 9,500,000,000. But two very important reservations should be made with regard to a situation apparently so favorable. In the first place, it was only in 1916 that the delivery of small-arms ammunition in quantities corresponding to the actual needs began. In 1915, owing to a shortage of ammunition, the army had to pass

through a severe crisis. Secondly, the quantity needed was estimated on the basis of the quantity used. But there was a permanent shortage of rifles. Even in 1917, 35 per cent of the rifles needed had not been supplied. As to the number of machine guns, it was only 12 per cent of the number estimated by General Headquarters at the end of 1916. It follows that the demands for small-arms ammunition were met only because the necessary number of rifles and machine guns could not be supplied.

The Artillery.

In the early chapters of this volume we pointed out how inadequate was the Russian army's artillery equipment. The fact became quite obvious after the first encounters with the Germans. The Russian reverses in East Prussia—the catastrophe suffered by the army of General Samsonov, and the defeat of that of General Rennenkampf—were entirely due to the overwhelming preponderance of the German batteries.⁸ Table 13, in which are shown the number of batteries possessed by both sides in the initial engagements and the tactical results, may serve to illustrate the statement above.

Unfortunately, the great importance of equipping the army with powerful artillery was not sufficiently realized by the responsible officers at General Headquarters. The volume written by General Danilov, Quartermaster General, who inspired the Russian strategy in the first year of the War, may serve as a proof. Despite the fact that the War clearly showed that in modern warfare the predominant factor lies in strength of artillery fire, he asserts that during the operations in East Prussia the Russians possessed a double superiority over the Germans.⁹ Such a conclusion results from comparing the number of battalions on both sides; yet the infantry division, coupled with a certain coefficient, based on the strength of its artillery, should serve as the basic unit in estimating the fighting strength of an army. Such a calculation would have led to an entirely different conclusion. History had already reached it.

Only at the beginning of 1917, when the Inter-Allied Conference convened in Petrograd, were Russia's artillery needs set down fully

⁸ A detailed study of the military operations in East Prussia forms the subject of a special monograph by the present author: *Iz Istorii Kampanii 1914 goda* (*The Campaign of 1914 on the Russian Front*) (Prague, 1926).

⁹ Danilov, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

TABLE 13

*Russian and German Artillery in East Prussia, August, 1914.**

<i>Battles, major and minor</i>	<i>Russians</i>		<i>Germans</i>		<i>Tactical results</i>
	<i>Battalions</i>	<i>Batteries</i>	<i>Battalions</i>	<i>Batteries</i>	
<i>Battle of Stallupönen, August 4</i>	40	20	17	19	Undecisive
<i>Battle of Gumbinnen, August 7</i>					
1. On the front of the Russian Twenty-eighth Division	12	6	25	28	Swift and decisive success for the Germans
2. On the front of the Russian Twentieth Division	12	8	11	7	Undecisive
3. On the front of the Russian Third Army Corps	42	22	25	28-30	Attack of the Germans repulsed, their losses heavy
4. On the sector to the south of the Rominten forest	22	9	26	16	Undecisive
<i>Battle of Hohenstein-Soldau,</i>					
(a) August 13					
1. In the region of Hohenstein	30	14	20-26	15-18	Undecisive
2. Between Muhlen and Usdau	15½	8	24	28	Swift and decisive success for the Germans
3. Between Usdau and Soldau	32	14	24	17	Undecisive
(b) August 14					
1. In the region of Hohenstein	30	14	24	14	Undecisive
2. Between Muhlen and Usdau	12	8	11	12	Undecisive
3. In the region of Usdau	24	11	29-35	40	Swift and decisive success for the Germans
4. Near Heinrichshofen (west of Soldau)	16	6	6	5	Undecisive
(c) August 15					
1. In the region of Hohenstein	30-40	11-19	50	30	Success for the Germans
2. In the region of Waplitz	16	10	11	12	Success for the Russians
3. In the region of Soldau	20	6	20	39	Swift and decisive success for the Germans

* The Russian artillery was made up 85 per cent of field guns and 15 per cent of light howitzers. The German artillery was 55 per cent field guns, 20 per cent light howitzers, and 25 per cent heavy artillery.

and systematized. Thus, almost two and a half years of serious war had passed before the truth was really learned. The work by General Manikovsky, head of the department charged with the supply of munitions, may be regarded as testimony from the most competent witness, and it disclosed the lack of system and the haphazard nature of the demands made by the highest military authorities. The detailed picture drawn by him¹⁰ clearly shows chaotic conditions. We shall indicate the main counts.

Field guns: In May, 1915, the requirement in guns was fixed by General Headquarters at 293 a month; but in the second part of that year it was increased to 560. Finally, according to the program submitted to the Inter-Allied Conference in 1917, the estimate was 1,200 a month. Inasmuch as the mobilization plan provided only for the production of 75 guns a month, the actual output, in order to keep up with the demands, had to be sixteen times greater than was originally scheduled.

Light howitzers: The requirement in these guns, estimated at the beginning of the War at 35 a month, gradually increased until it reached, in 1917, 200 guns. But the mobilization plan provided only for a production of 6 a month. The actual production, therefore, had to be thirty-three times greater.

Heavy field artillery: The need in artillery of this class, 4.2-inch long-range guns, and 6-inch field howitzers, was formulated only at the time of the Inter-Allied Conference. It was put at 95 a month. The mobilization schedule provided only for an output of 2 pieces a month. The planned production had to be increased forty-seven times.

Heavy artillery: Here the actual requirement was so little understood that, up to the middle of 1915, even a special commission, headed by the Inspector General of Artillery, did not by any word indicate that big guns were needed. Only when the fighting took on the character of trench warfare and the fortifications were made so strong that the army could not advance a step, did it become clear that guns of large caliber were a necessity in modern war.

On October 22, 1916, the Inspector General of Artillery submitted to the Chief of Staff a report suggesting the creation of an artillery reserve under the direct control of the Commander-in-

¹⁰ Manikovsky, *op. cit.*, Part II.

Chief. This reserve was to be made up of guns of large caliber, such as would be used in siege operations, and they were to be assigned to that front from which the main attack would be launched. The report was immediately approved by General Alexeev. The requirement in such guns was finally decided upon before the meeting of the Inter-Allied Conference in Petrograd. For the twelve months of 1917 it was estimated as follows: Six-inch guns, 512; 8-inch howitzers, 211; 9.2's, 168; 11-inch howitzers, 156; 12-inch howitzers, 67; total, 1,414. In view of the fact that the mobilization plan had not foreseen the need of heavy artillery of the above calibers, these belated demands for such guns came to the Russian factories as a complete surprise.

To complete the picture of the demands for ordnance equipment during the War we have still to mention two other types of artillery entirely unforeseen by the Russian arsenals, anti-aircraft guns and trench artillery.

The demand for anti-aircraft guns came as a surprise to every country in the War, so in this respect the Russian mobilization plan was not worse than that of the other Governments. However, when the need of the new weapons became clear the Russian authorities were slow in reaching a decision. It was not before the beginning of 1917 that the requirement in anti-aircraft guns was formulated in accordance with a definite plan. It was estimated at 1,052 guns for the twelve months of 1917.

Trench artillery fell into two classes, cannon of small caliber, and trench mortars (bomb-throwers and mine-throwers). Prior to the War nothing was said of trench ordnance. The first demand was made only in July, 1915, in a telegram from General Headquarters to the Artillery Department. According to the program worked out before the meeting of the Inter-Allied Conference, one battery of four 37-millimeter guns was to be assigned to every infantry regiment. Requirements in such guns (including a 5 per cent reserve) were put, for the twelve months of 1917, at 4,476.

Although the siege of Port Arthur in 1904 had shown the great importance of bomb-throwers and mine-throwers, they were not considered, before the World War, as an indispensable weapon. But it became obvious, in the course of the War, that the production of trench guns was a necessity. The Germans were the first to use them.

In Russia the first trench mortars were made after the German pattern—some guns had been taken by the Russians after an attack—but in the beginning they were manufactured in small numbers, as nobody thought they would be needed in thousands. However, the initial demand of General Headquarters, made after a year of war (in August, 1915), was for 10,000 hand-throwers. The energetic measures of the Artillery Department, coupled with the fact that the production of trench mortars was comparatively easy, resulted in the demands for bomb-throwers and mine-throwers being met to a large extent. Before the meeting of the Inter-Allied Conference the requirements in these guns were forecast, for the twelve months of 1917, as follows: 7,000 bomb-throwers, a demand that was met, 4,500 mine-throwers, and 2,400 mine-throwers of a heavier type.

A Summary.

Summing up what has been said above we have drawn up Table 14 showing the requirements in guns in the beginning of 1917, that is, when General Headquarters had made a final calculation and had systematized its needs:

TABLE 14

Requirements in Guns at the Beginning of 1917.

	<i>Guns for new formations</i>	<i>Guns to make good losses By reconditioning</i>	<i>New</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Field artillery</i>				
3-inch guns	4,120	3,780	6,720	14,620
Light howitzers	740	84	1,476	2,300
<i>Heavy field artillery</i>				
4.2-inch guns	108	60	216	384
6-inch howitzers	244	84	432	760
<i>Heavy artillery</i>				
6-inch guns	512	..	300	812
8-inch howitzers	163	..	48	211
9-inch guns	132	..	36	168
11-inch howitzers	120	..	36	156
12-inch howitzers	54	..	13	67
<i>Anti-aircraft artillery</i>				
3-inch guns	620	..	432	1,052
<i>Trench artillery</i>				
37-millimeter guns	2,748	..	1,728	4,476
Bomb-throwers and mine-throwers	13,900

The solution of the artillery problem lay not only in an increase of the number of infantry divisions, but chiefly in the completion of the armament of the army, which at the beginning of the War was insufficiently equipped with guns. In Table 15 a comparison is drawn between the ordnance equipment, as it existed in the army, and what, at the end of 1916, was considered necessary by the General Headquarters.

TABLE 15

Proposed Reorganization of the Artillery.

<i>Ordnance equipment of an infantry division</i>	<i>Number of Batteries</i>	
<i>Regimental artillery:</i>	<i>Existing</i>	<i>As planned</i>
37-millimeter guns	none	4 (one battery to every regiment)
<i>Field artillery:</i>		
3-inch guns	6	9
Light howitzers (4-inch, 5-inch)	none	3
<i>Army corps artillery</i>		
<i>Field artillery:</i>		
Light howitzers (4-inch, 5-inch)	3	none
<i>Heavy field artillery:</i>		
4.2-inch long-range guns	none	1
6-inch howitzers	none	2
Anti-aircraft guns	none	3
<i>Army artillery</i>		
<i>Heavy field artillery:</i>		
4.2-inch long-range guns	19	none
6-inch howitzers	41	none
<i>Heavy artillery:</i>		
6-inch long-range guns	none	129
8-inch howitzers	none	42
9.2-inch long-range guns	none	33
11-inch howitzers	none	60
12-inch howitzers	none	27
Anti-aircraft guns	none	Three batteries to each army and four batteries to each "front."

From this table we can see that the question raised by General Headquarters in the end of 1916 was, in point of fact, a question of carrying through a very extensive change in the artillery of the

army. In this connection it is of interest to note that the proportion and types of ordnance equipment, fixed in 1916 by General Headquarters, were identical with what existed in the German Army at the beginning of the War. It is, therefore, out of the question to say that the demands of General Headquarters were exaggerated. On the contrary, it should be borne in mind that the Germans, as a result of their experience during two and a half years of war, had increased the strength of their artillery. Consequently, there is good reason to maintain that the program of armament, worked out at the end of 1916 by the Russian General Headquarters, was far from being up to the latest requirements demanded by actual experience. But even these comparatively moderate demands from General Headquarters turned out to be impossible of fulfilment. It was pointed out above how inadequate was the production of guns in Russia before the War. The necessity arose of placing orders overseas. This realization, however, came very late, and after the foreign market had been filled with orders from the other warring countries. The number of guns received during the War from the Russian factories as also from factories abroad may be seen from Table 16.¹¹

This table enables us to see in what proportion the army was supplied with guns manufactured in Russia, and with guns purchased abroad. The opinion has taken root that Russian industry failed and that the supplies received from the Allies were very large and helped enormously. This legend is in direct contradiction with the facts. More than three-quarters of the ordnance equipment of the army were manufactured by Russian hands. Such production called for no less a strain than was imposed on the industry of other countries in the War.

To give a picture of the army's inadequate equipment in heavy guns, when, in October, 1917, the present author was preparing to go, as Military Representative of Russia to the Inter-Allied Conference at Versailles, in November, he obtained the necessary data from General Headquarters. According to them the numbers of heavy guns on the various Russian fronts and on the respective enemy fronts were (on October 1, 1917) as stated in Table 17.

¹¹ Manikovsky, *op. cit.*, Part II, Tables 1, 3, 6, 7, 12, 28.

TABLE 16
Guns Received during the War.

	<i>1914</i>		<i>1915</i>		<i>1916</i>		<i>1917</i>		<i>Totals</i>	
	<i>From Russian factories abroad</i>	<i>From Russian factories</i>	<i>From Russian factories abroad</i>	<i>From Russian factories</i>	<i>From Russian factories abroad</i>	<i>From Russian factories</i>	<i>From Russian factories abroad</i>	<i>From Russian factories</i>	<i>From Russian factories abroad</i>	<i>Grand Totals</i>
<i>Field artillery:</i>										
3-inch guns	285	..	1,654	366	7,238	220	3,538	..	12,715	13,301
Light howitzers	70	..	361	..	818	400	445	..	1,694	2,094
<i>Heavy field artillery:</i>										
4.2-inch guns	12	69	206	155	181	224	623
6-inch howitzers	28	..	83	8	120	104	231	343
<i>Heavy artillery:</i>										
5-inch and 6-inch guns	22	..	48	188	32	84	102	374
8-inch howitzers	5	..	29	..	51	..	85
9-inch howitzers	4
9-inch and 10-inch guns	10	10
11-inch howitzers	12	..	8	..	6	..	26
12-inch howitzers	2	33	7	12	..	45	54
<i>Anti-aircraft artillery:</i>										
<i>Trench artillery:</i>	20	56
37 mm. and 40 mm. guns	?	30	?	200	100	330
Bomb-throwers and mine-throwers	3,002	456	12,443	753	1,854	143	17,299	18,651

TABLE 17

Artillery on the Russian Front on October 1, 1917.

<i>Fronts</i>	<i>Length of front, in versts*</i>	<i>Number of guns to every verst of the front</i>			
		<i>Howitzers</i>		<i>Heavy guns</i>	
		<i>Russian</i>	<i>Enemy</i>	<i>Russian</i>	<i>Enemy</i>
<i>Northern front</i>	265	0.7	1.4	1.1	2.4
Twelfth Russian army	70	1.4	1.6	1.9	5.1
Fifth Russian army	195	0.5	1.3	0.8	1.4
<i>Western front</i>	415	0.4	0.6	0.5	1.5
Third Russian army	110	0.4	0.8	0.4	1.8
Tenth Russian army	105	0.6	0.5	0.9	1.4
Second Russian army	200	0.2	0.5	0.4	1.3
<i>Southwestern front</i>	480	0.5	1.2	0.4	0.7
"Special" Russian army	250	0.3	0.8	0.2	0.6
Eleventh Russian army	120	0.7	1.9	0.7	0.8
Seventh Russian army	110	0.8	1.4	0.7	0.7
<i>Rumanian front</i>	600	0.9	0.8	0.5	1.1
Eighth Russian army	65	1.2	1.7	0.8	1.8
Ninth Russian army	65	1.6	1.5	1.0	1.5
Second Rumanian army	55	2.6	0.9	0.7	1.6
Fourth Russian army	158	0.5	0.8	0.1	0.7
First Rumanian army	52	1.5	1.3	1.4	2.5
Sixth Russian army	205	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.5
<i>Caucasus front</i>	1,000	0.07	0.04	0.1	0.1

* One verst = 0.7 mile.

From this table it may be seen that in October, 1917, the army was sufficiently equipped with howitzers and heavy guns only on the Caucasus front, that is, for the war with Turkey. In such equipment it was only half as strong as the Germans and Austro-Hungarians. The superiority of the enemy was especially great on the northern and western fronts, where the Russian armies were facing German troops exclusively. It is also of interest that the Rumanian army was much better supplied with howitzers than the Russians.

But we shall get an even clearer idea of Russia's shortage in guns if we compare the number demanded by General Headquarters in 1917 with the number which were actually delivered in that year. This is done in Table 18.

TABLE 18
Number of Guns Demanded and Delivered.

	<i>Guns demanded by General Headquarters</i>	<i>Actually delivered</i>	<i>Shortage</i>
<i>Field artillery</i>			
3-inch guns	14,620	3,538	11,082
Light howitzers	2,300	445	1,855
<i>Heavy field artillery</i>			
4.2-inch guns	384	336	48
6-inch howitzers	516	224	292
<i>Heavy artillery</i>			
6-inch guns	812	116	696
5-inch howitzers	211	51	160
9-inch guns	168	..	168
11-inch howitzers	156	6	150
12-inch howitzers	67	12	55
<i>Anti-aircraft artillery</i>	1,052	less than 50	more than 1,000
<i>Trench artillery</i>			
37 mm. guns	4,476	less than 300	more than 4,176
Bomb-throwers and mine-throwers	13,900	1,997	11,903

From the above table it is clear that in 1917 the army received only a small part of the artillery equipment necessary to bring it, in that respect, to the level of the German army in 1914. Thus the armament of the Russian army in 1917 was at least as inadequate as it had been in 1914. But, inasmuch as the standards of armament in 1917 were higher, it follows that, in comparison with enemy armies and those of Russia's Allies, she was, in 1917, more poorly armed than in 1914.

Artillery Ammunition.

No sooner had military operations begun than the Ministry of War was flooded with requests for artillery ammunition, each more pressing and alarming than the one before. To give some idea of how rapidly a crisis in the question of ammunition supply developed, we shall quote a few telegrams, picking them from hundreds of like dispatches wired to Petrograd in the first two months of the War.

The first battles on the northwestern front took place at Gumbinnen on August 7, 1914. Here six and a half infantry divisions of General Rennenkampf's army—the First Army—met eight and a half infantry divisions of the German army commanded by General Pritvitz. And even by the fourth day of the conflict (August 10) the general in charge of supplies on the northwestern front wired the Minister of War:

Most stubborn fighting on the part of the First Army has called for an enormous expenditure of 3-inch ammunition. General Rennenkampf asks for 108,000 shrapnel shells and 17,100 ordinary, also 56,000,000 rifle cartridges. I can send and am sending my last reserves: 2,000 ordinary shells, 9,000 shrapnel shells, and 7,000,000 rifle cartridges. Orders of Commander of the front are that I ask your assistance in expediting at earliest, supplies of ammunition to make up what has been used.

On August 28, 1914, the general in charge of supplies on the southwestern front telegraphed the Minister of War to point out the great need of artillery ammunition in the armies engaged in battle with the Austro-Hungarian armies in Galicia:

Heavy fighting is taking place along the whole front; the expenditure of ammunition is enormous; soon the stock will be completely exhausted. Immediate supply is necessary; the situation is critical. If whole parks cannot be sent, my urgent request is at least to ship shrapnel shells in special cars and by special train to Brest-Zdolbunovo.

On the following day, August 29, the critical situation of the armies of the southwestern front was confirmed in the following telegram from the Chief of Staff to the Minister of War:

The situation in the matter of artillery ammunition is critical. The whole burden of modern warfare falls on the artillery. . . . Continuous fighting for fifteen days and more has upset theoretical estimates. The supplying of the southwestern front with ammunition is already being done at the expense of the northern and Odessa districts. Immediate help is necessary. Without ammunition there can be no success. With a view to ascertaining the true situation and checking up the enormous demands of the troops General Kondzerovsky and Ronzhin were sent to the front. Both of them, having gone over all the data and after conferring with the authorities in the rear, have been convinced that there are good grounds to believe in the possibility of immanent catastrophe,

perhaps at the last hour before the defeat of the enemy. Immediate help is here absolutely necessary. I am convinced that on this depends our final success over the Austrians.

On September 8 the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich considered it necessary to apply to the Emperor directly. His telegram read as follows:

For more than two weeks there has been a shortage of artillery ammunition. This I have pointed out, asking for speedier deliveries. Now General Ivanov reports that he is forced to hold up the operations against Przemyśl, as also on the entire front, until the stock of shells in the local depots reaches at least 100 to every gun. At present there are only twenty-five per gun. I find it necessary to request Your Majesty to order that the shipment of shells be hastened.

Such was the situation at the beginning of the War.

In the initial period, so long as the reserves of ammunition manufactured in time of peace were available, the difficulty of satisfying the demands for shells consisted only in making the necessary deliveries on time. Thanks to the energetic measures of the Artillery Department, in the course of the first four months (by the end of November, 1914) the 112 "light" parks foreseen by the mobilization plan, each containing a full supply of ammunition, were moved to the theater of war. By that time experience had also shown what the monthly supply of shells, provided they were delivered regularly, should be. For every 3-inch gun 300 shells were needed per month, which necessitated the assigning of a local park to every army corps, or of 50 parks a month to the whole army in the field.¹²

The carrying out of such a task was beyond the power of the Artillery Department. We have already pointed out how little developed and how unprepared for eventual developments in time of war was the manufacturing of munitions of war in Russia. For the development of that particular industry time was needed; and meanwhile stocks of ammunition were doomed to a catastrophic decrease. It suffices to say that during December, 1914, and the first months of 1915, only twelve parks, that is, less than 25 per cent of the supply needed, could be relied upon to contain a month's supply of 3-inch shells. The question of ammunition for the heavy field artil-

¹² Danilov, *op. cit.*, pp. 256-257.

lery was even worse. And if it did not reach such an acute phase as that of ammunition for the field guns, it was only for the reason that the number of heavy field batteries was insignificant. As for heavy artillery, it did not exist.

The Spring of 1915.

In the spring of 1915 the situation became tragic in the full meaning of this word. It was then, too, that Germany turned her main attack from the French front to the Russian. The ordeal endured by the Russian army in the summer months of 1915 was one impossible to describe. The "drum fire" of the enemy's powerful artillery could be answered only by the shots, fired at long intervals, of an artillery which was many times weaker. There were periods during which, in certain regiments, ten rounds a day was made the limit.

The following passage from the reminiscences of a commander of one of the most gallant Russian infantry divisions may serve to illustrate the situation:¹³

The spring of 1915 I shall remember all my life. The retreat from Galicia was one vast tragedy for the Russian army. No cartridges, no shells. Bloody fighting and difficult marches day after day. No end to weariness, physical as well as moral. Faint hopes followed by sinister dread. I recall the battle at Przemyśl in the middle of May. For eleven days the Fourth Rifle Division fought stubbornly . . . eleven days during which, with increasing roar, the German heavy artillery swept away whole lines of our trenches, and their defenders with them. We hardly replied—there was nothing with which we could reply. Our regiments, although completely exhausted, were beating off one attack after another by bayonet or by short-range fire. Blood flowed unendingly, the ranks became thinner and thinner, the number of graves constantly multiplied. . . . Two regiments were almost annihilated merely by gun fire. Gentlemen of France and England, you, whose methods have reached such an incredible degree of technical development, will be interested in learning the following fact, absurd to read, but all too real for us. When, after a silence of three days, our only 6-inch battery received fifty shells the fact was immediately communicated by telephone

¹³ A. I. Denikin, *Ocherki russkoi smuti* (*The Russian Turmoil*), Vol. I, Part II, pp. 29–30. Also published in English under the title *The Russian Turmoil*, London, 1922; references in the present volume are made to the Russian edition.

to every regiment and company, and the men heard it with delighted relief.

On March 21, 1915, General Yanushkevich, then still Chief of Staff, wrote to General Sukhomlinov, on the further retreat of the army:¹⁴ "The evacuation of Przemyśl has become a fact. Brusilov refers to the shortage of ammunition—that *bête noire*, yours and mine. . . . All our armies are crying with one voice, 'Give us ammunition!' . . ." In the winter of 1915–1916 the ammunition crisis began to grow less, and in the summer campaign of 1916 the field artillery was adequately supplied. This, however, was not true of the light howitzers and heavy artillery.

Growth of Requirements.

We can now give detailed figures for the growth of shell requirements in the various periods of the War.

In November the need was estimated by General Headquarters, as we saw above, at 50 parks a month, or about 1,500,000 rounds. General Polivanov, after he had been appointed Minister of War (June, 1915) estimated the need at 100 parks a month,¹⁵ or 3,000,000 rounds. In the autumn of 1916 General Headquarters put the monthly requirements for 3-inch guns at 4,400,000, and for light howitzers and heavy guns at 800,000, that is, a total of 5,200,000 rounds a month. In December, 1916, before the meeting of the Petrograd Inter-Allied Conference, the monthly need was estimated by General Headquarters to be 3,500,000 rounds for 3-inch guns, and 915,000 rounds for howitzers and heavy guns, a total of 4,415,000 rounds.

The growth of shell deliveries during the successive periods of the War is shown in Table 19.¹⁶

The stupendous effort put forth by the Russian munitions industry to attain the above results may be best judged from a comparison of those results with the output which in peace-time the Russian factories were equipped to deliver. When the War began there were only two factories—the Zlatoustov and the Izhevsk—capable of

¹⁴ *Krasni Arkhiv (Red Archives)*, Vol. III.

¹⁵ Polivanov, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

¹⁶ Manikovskiy, *op. cit.*, Part III, p. 234.

TABLE 19

*Shell Deliveries,***1914-1917*

	<i>Supply available at the beginning of War</i>	<i>Supply received</i>			<i>Total</i>	<i>Grand total</i>
		<i>1914</i>	<i>1915</i>	<i>1916</i>	<i>1917</i>	
3-inch guns	6,433,000	516,000	10,062,000	19,420,000	11,739,000	48,170,000
	0	0	1,188,000	8,104,000	2,668,000	11,960,000
4-inch to 6-inch guns	572,000	140,000	1,176,000	3,797,000	3,329,000	9,014,000
	0	0	129,000	1,692,000	868,000	2,689,000
Guns over 6-inch caliber	0	0	0	10,000	15,000	25,000
	0	0	0	46,000	38,000	84,000
Total	7,005,000	656,000	11,238,000	23,227,000	15,083,000	57,209,000
	0	0	1,317,000	9,842,000	3,574,000	14,733,000
Grand total	7,005,000	656,000	12,555,000	33,069,000	18,657,000	71,942,000

* The figures above the line show the number of rounds of Russian make; the figures below the line show the number of rounds received from abroad.

With regard to the shells from abroad the figures show the number delivered in Russia; as to what quantity actually got to the front no information is available.

turning out 3-inch shells, and each could manufacture 25,000 rounds a month.¹⁷ But in the last months of the War the monthly output of such shells amounted to 2,000,000. That is, it increased forty times. The increase in the output of shells of larger calibers was no less.

Technical Equipment.

As regards the supply of technical equipment it would be impossible to give an account as detailed as that of the armament and ammunition supply, first, because not all the necessary data for such an account are available, and also because it would go far beyond the limits set for the present work. A general picture, however, may be drawn, and the situation in the case of a few of the most important classes of technical equipment may be described.

The actual need of every kind of such equipment many times exceeded the demand as standardized in time of peace. In 1915, especially in the summer campaign, the army lived through a crisis in the matter of technical supplies of every sort, similar to that which developed in the field of ammunition supply. In 1916 an improvement set in, and it then reached its highest point. In 1917, after the outbreak of the Revolution, the production of the Russian factories decreased, and the supplies shipped from abroad also grew smaller, inasmuch as, following the entry of Rumania into the War (at the end of 1916), a certain tonnage on the trains running from Archangel had to be assigned to the Rumanian army.

Let us now turn to the situation in 1916, the most favorable year, in the matter of three articles of technical equipment, telephones, motor cars, and aircraft. On January 1, 1916, there were in the army in the field 4,000 telephone outfits, 27,000 versts of telephone- and telegraph-wire, and 240 signaling stations. The need for the next eighteen months (from January 1, 1916 to July 1, 1917) was estimated as follows: 298,000 telephone and telegraph outfits, 680,000 versts of wire and 2,000 signaling stations. In the course of 1916 there were delivered 105,000 telephones, 3,000 telegraph instruments, 236,000 versts of wire, and 802 wireless stations. Thus the need was not met. In the meantime it became clear that requirements in liaison equipment had increased in such proportion as to make it

¹⁷ Manikovsky, *op. cit.*, Part III, p. 26.

necessary for every infantry regiment to have recourse to from 40 to 50 telephones and 90 to 100 versts of wire. This called for an additional delivery of 340,000 telephones, 3,000 telegraph instruments and 450,000 versts of wire. Deliveries, of course, were never made.¹⁸

On January 1, 1916, there were in the army 5,300 motor cars for various purposes,¹⁹ 1,350 motor cycles, and 3,500 bicycles. For the next eighteen months the need was estimated as follows: 19,300 motor cars, 13,600 motor cycles, and 9,300 bicycles. In the course of 1916 there were received: 6,800 motor cars, 1,700 motor cycles, and 8,800 bicycles. These deliveries, if compared with the material available on January 1, 1916, were large; but they were far from satisfying the army's needs, which had increased during 1916. In order to see how insignificant was the number of motor vehicles we have only to recall that the French army, a little more than half the size of the Russian army, had, in 1918, 90,000 motor cars, whereas Russian General Headquarters expected to have in that year only 14,000.

The supply of aviation equipment was in even worse case. Except for the branch of the "Gnom" factory in Moscow, which manufactured not more than five motors a month, the production of motors for aviation in time of peace was non-existent. The supply of motors for the flying corps depended, therefore, chiefly on purchases abroad. But the Allies, anxious to develop their own air forces to the limit, would part with few of their engines.

When war was declared Russia's aircraft consisted²⁰ chiefly of Newports (70 h.p.) and a few Farmans, model XVI and XXII, for training purposes. Almost everything was completely worn out, the airplanes having had two years' service. Even the Newports manu-

¹⁸ All data bearing on technical equipment available on January 1, 1916, as also on the estimated needs for the period from January 1, 1916 to July 1, 1917, have been taken from the documents of the Special Council on Defense. Data relating to the deliveries of technical equipment in 1916 have been taken from the Annual Report of the Minister of War for 1916.

¹⁹ It is of interest to note that the Russian army, when the War started, had only 679 motor cars, among them 418 trucks and 2 ambulances; to these 475 motor cars requisitioned from private owners should be added.

²⁰ Information taken from a memorandum submitted by M. V. Rodzianko, President of the Duma, to the Emperor in the autumn of 1916, in which he described the critical situation of the aviation.

factured at the Shchetinin plant, the wing construction of which was found to be defective, were sent to the front and were used there, irrespective of the fact that the defect caused a number of accidents with resulting loss of life.

The composition of the air forces at the beginning of the War was: air squadrons, 39; airplanes, 263; balloon companies, 12; pilots, 129; and observers, 100.

In a few months (in the winter of 1914-1915) many squadrons, their equipment completely used up, had to be sent to the rear. Some squadrons, those which were equipped with Newports, were given Moran-Parasols, in other squadrons for the worn-out equipment there was substituted repaired machines that had been taken from the Germans and Austrians; later the Voisin airplane with a 130 h.p. engine made its appearance. Although all this reorganization was of a chaotic character, most of the squadrons were able to return to the front, reëquipped. However, the question of supply was unsatisfactory; France was sending to Russia only those models which for the French army were considered obsolete.

In the autumn of 1915, after the German offensive in Serbia, the shortest route from France having been blocked, airplanes and motors shipped from France remained at Salonika. From there they were sent to Archangel. This port, however, became ice-bound earlier than usual. Consequently such equipment had to be unloaded at Alexandrovsk, on the Murmansk coast, and stored there for the whole winter. In the spring of 1916, therefore, the Russian air forces were again in a critical situation. Such planes as had been purchased abroad were in part on the Murmansk coast, and in part in France; those constructed in Russia, being without engines, had to be put aside. When at last, in June, 1916, the French airplanes were received they proved to be completely out of date, and the Russians were in no position to meet the enemy in the air on an equal basis. Fighting between the German Fokkers and the Russian airplanes ended, for the greater part, unfavorably for the latter, and the list of Russian aviators who perished in battle was growing longer every day.

By September, 1916, the Russian air forces numbered 75 air squadrons, 36 balloon companies, 502 pilots, 357 observers; and they possessed 716 planes.

A comparison of the above figures with those for the beginning of the War makes plain the growth of Russia's air forces. But mere comparisons do not convey any true conception of the situation. It should be borne in mind that in the same period the numerical strength of the army had increased. By September, 1916, the number of infantry divisions had doubled, the air forces, consequently, should have been twice as strong. If this be taken into consideration we must see that in the end of 1916 Russia's aviation force was only a little stronger than it had been in the beginning of the War. However, during the same two and a half years the development of the German air forces (as also those of France and Great Britain) had made such enormous progress that the Russian army was, at the end of 1916, even more defenseless in the air than it had been in 1914.

Exemption of Skilled Men.

At the beginning of this chapter it was said that the causes of the crisis which the Russian army experienced during the War were of two kinds. Some were the result of general conditions, others must be attributed to the inability of governing circles to foresee and to organize. The latter we shall examine more carefully, inasmuch as they not only had certain results in the field of material events, but affected the morale of the troops and the country as well. In the army and among the people distrust was growing; and discontent, which beyond doubt tended to hasten the revolutionary explosion, was gaining strength.

It has already been pointed out that no steps had been taken either by the legislature or by the Ministry of War that would exempt the skilled workman from military service. This had an extremely unfavorable effect on industry. "All protests made by the Artillery Department," General Manikovsky writes, "remained without effect."²¹ After most of such workmen had, without due forethought, been enlisted, a crisis developed which the factories found it difficult to cope with. The Ministry of War was firmly resolved not to allow the return of these workmen to the factories, and gave as its reason, "the depressing moral effect which such a return would produce on the men remaining in the ranks."

²¹ Manikovsky, *op. cit.*, Part I, pp. 36-38.

Another class of workmen whose exemption from military service caused complications were the recruits. The Ministry of War was opposed to granting exemption to them for the reason that the youngest age groups constituted the best material for reinforcements. More than a year had elapsed before this question was decided, and decided favorably to the Artillery Department which, protesting against the Ministry's attitude, pleaded that many young men had gone to work in the factories long before they had reached conscription age; and that by then they had become skilled workmen.

Moreover, aside from the lack of experienced workmen, there was also a shortage of unskilled labor. This was especially felt in summer, when a certain number of artisans would leave the factories for farm work, and factory production would fall accordingly. To change this the Artillery Department, early in the War, submitted to the Council of Ministers a project according to which the factories would be placed on a special basis and would themselves be held to be mobilized. This project rightly regarded the manufacturing of things needed for national defense as a special form of military service. It was a project, however, that was not approved by the Council of Ministers. In December, 1914, and in February, 1915, the project again was placed before the Council, but was again rejected. When the final decision was made known, it was explained that the Council "fears to give cause for undesirable comment, and unrest."

Thus there was no guaranty that the factories would at all times possess the necessary personnel for mobilization work. They were powerless in the face, for instance, of such a fact as this: Simultaneously, and in summer, 3,000 men had left the Izhevsk factory, the only factory in Russia manufacturing rifle barrels and rifle sears. And there had been other like cases. A thousand men had, all together, left the Sormovo factory; 700 had left that of Pospel.

Lack of Organization.

The principal error made in Russia in the case of war labor [writes Colonel Reboul, of the French army]²² consisted in the failure to foresee

²² Reboul, *La mobilisation industrielle en Russie pendant la guerre*, in *Le Temps*, March 4, 1924.

an ensemble of organization, to work out a plan of production. There was never in Petrograd a centralizing authority entrusted with the working out of a general program that would satisfy all the needs of the army. . . . Every branch of service always worked alone, without regard to its neighbors.

And it must be admitted that in substance he was right.

In order that war labor might attain the maximum of productivity it was not enough to put one man in charge of the whole work. Such a measure might have as its result only a nominal, or, if such expression may be used, only a mechanical unity. A matter of great importance for modern war work lay not in the establishing of any fixed system, but in adopting the best system under the circumstances. The following is an illustration:

When in 1915 mass production of shells was begun, a special organization, headed by General Vankov, was set up for the purpose of manufacturing one-piece shells of the French model. The simplicity of the operation made it possible to assign the work to factories of minor importance. This had been done in France. But in Russia General Vankov gave such work to the biggest and most efficient factories, such as the Kolomka, and many others,²³ thus keeping them from work not less important, and more complex. Many like examples may be cited. At one critical moment the rifle factories, despite their small number and output, were given repair work. The barbed wire we ordered from abroad may serve as another example. Instead of using the limited cargo space assigned to Russia for the shipments of machine tools, urgently needed by the factories, it was used to bring in millions of tons of wire, which could be easily manufactured in Russia.

In proportion as the ammunition shortage increased, in the army there was a constant growth of feeling against the rear. This discontent spread rapidly to the people in general. When the shortage of munitions assumed catastrophic proportions, many rumors, often without any foundation in fact, got abroad. People began to talk of colossal grafting, of bribes, and even of high treason. These rumors created a certain mental atmosphere which was not without influence even on men in high positions, such as Rodzianko, the President of the Duma,—a fact clearly evident in his Memoirs.

²³ Manikovsky, *op. cit.*, Part I, p. 18.

The Special Council.

The incapacity of the Ministry of War to satisfy the needs of the army gave rise, both among the unofficial organizations and among the members of the Duma, to a tendency to take the matter of supplying the troops under their own control. On the initiative of the President of the Duma and despite some objections raised in bureaucratic circles, on June 7, 1915, the Special Council came into being as an extraordinary measure. The Minister of War was appointed President of that Council. Its members were made up as follows: The President of the Duma, four members both of the Duma and the State Council, four representatives of commerce and industry, representatives of the Ministry of the Navy, of the Treasury, of Communications, of War, and of the State Controller. The Council was responsible directly to the Emperor.²⁴

The creation of this Special Council was not favorably received by General Sukhomlinov. But on June 12, 1915, he was dismissed, and General Polivanov succeeded him. The latter showed great willingness to coöperate with the new institution, as he saw in it the only means of restoring popular confidence in his Ministry, and of enlisting the support of the nation. On June 18, in accordance with a bill submitted by General Polivanov, the name of the Special Council was changed to "The Special Council to Coördinate Measures for National Defense," and the number of its members was increased. The new composition of the Council was as follows: The President of the Duma and nine members, the President of the State Council and nine members, the Ministers of the Navy, of Finance, of Commerce and Industry, of the Interior, of Agriculture, of Transport, the State Controller, the heads of the various Departments of the Ministry of War, representatives of industry, of the All-Russian Unions of Zemstvos and of Towns, and of the newly formed Central War Industries Committee. The Minister of War remained the President of the Council.

In addition to the Special Council to Coördinate Measures for National Defense, there were called into being, by the same Act, several other Special Councils; a Special Council to bring together

²⁴ See P. Gronskey, *The Central Government* in the volume, *The War and the Russian Government* (Yale University Press, 1929) in this Series of the "Economic and Social History of the World War"; also Polivanov, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

under the control of the Minister of Transport all measures relating to transportation, a Special Council, headed by the Minister of Commerce and Industry, to bring under his control all measures relating to fuel; and a Special Council, presided over by the Minister of Agriculture, to coördinate all measures relating to food. To coördinate the activities of the several Councils in case of necessity, conferences were called at which the Minister of War presided.

It goes without saying that the system of Special Councils, adopted for the purpose of coördinating war work, was extremely unwieldy. These meetings of many members were incapable of rapidly accomplishing creative work. There was only one way of solving the problem radically: It was necessary to form a Ministry of Munitions which would unify all efforts to provide supplies, both for the army and the country at large. But though this was suggested by some members of the Duma, it did not meet with approval on the part of the majority. At this time relations between Government and Duma were becoming strained. The Government no longer enjoyed the confidence of the people. They, and their spokesman, the Duma, feared that a new Ministry of Munitions might soon become another bureaucratic institution, as much out of touch with actuality as was the Ministry of War.

But, despite the above unfavorable side, inherent in such organizations, the Special Councils played a very important and positive rôle. They were like fresh water pouring into the stagnant pond of the bureaucracy. They enabled public opinion to break through the barriers of antiquated institutions, incapable of keeping abreast with life. They meant control, they turned light on the "dark spots," and they called for work that would anticipate events. Their creation, therefore, especially the calling into being of the Special Council for National Defense, meant a first step toward saving Russia from catastrophe. From our previous description of the methods in which the various needs of the army had been met, it will be plain that beginning about the autumn of 1915 an improvement set in everywhere; and in 1916 not only was the agony of the troops at an end, but the army was even able to win a great victory in Galicia.

The War Industries Committee.

The Special Council for Defense made it possible for unofficial organizations to take an active part in providing supplies. This

alone was of the greatest importance, inasmuch as the mobilization of industry was undertaken on the initiative of the community itself. That mobilization, as a public movement, had its origin at the Ninth Congress of the Representatives of Industry and Commerce, held in Petrograd on May 26–29, 1915. At this Congress, following deliberations on a report, "Industry and War," and a courageous address by P. P. Ryabushinsky, a resolution was passed which called on industry to unite its efforts in the service of the nation. A Central War Industries Committee in Petrograd and local committees all over the country were set up in order to adapt industrial production to the needs of the War.²⁵

The Central War Industries Committee began its activities by drawing up a list of things needed by the army and the navy. However, since no general plan for supplying the army existed, the Committee had to prepare its own partial programs upon the receipt of each order from the Ministry of War. The main difficulty experienced by the Committee, in proportion as it developed its activities, lay in the lack of machine tools. Many machines were needed, for increased production in the existing factories, as well as for the equipment of new ones, but they had to be imported from abroad. Simultaneously with the mobilization of the big industrial establishments there began a mobilization of the smaller ones. This work was carried on by the war industries committees in coöperation with the All-Russian Unions of Zemstvos and of Towns.²⁶

That the services rendered by the war industries committees were great even the enemies of public initiative must admit.

With the formation of the Central War Industries Committee [says General Lukomsky]²⁷ there was good reason to expect that national industry would be developed to the utmost, and that the army and the

²⁵ For a detailed treatment of the organization of the war industries committees see S. A. Zagorsky *State Control of Industry in Russia during the War* (Yale University Press, 1928) in this Series of the "Economic and Social History of the World War."

²⁶ Polivanov, *op. cit.*, pp. 204–206. See also N. Y. Astrov, *The Municipal Government and the All-Russian Union of Towns* in the volume *The War and the Russian Government* (Yale University Press, 1929), and T. J. Polner, Prince V. A. Obolensky and S. P. Turin, *Russian Local Government during the War* (Yale University Press, 1930) in this Series of the "Economic and Social History of the World War."

²⁷ Lukomsky, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

country would bring to the home market everything which Russia was in a position to supply. In that respect it is only justice to the Committee if we say that, by a gradual development of its activities, by bringing together manufacturing undertakings and peasant-workmen's associations, and by opening new factories, the Committee was of immense assistance to the Ministry of War in the matter of supplying the army. Of course, the activities of the Committee may be criticized on the score that very large sums were spent on the organization of its machinery, also that though not encouraging the enormous greed of many manufacturers, it combated them very feebly. There were many such charges against the Committee, but I am of the opinion that, under the circumstances then existing, and if one takes into consideration the absence of a central and efficient Munitions Department, it was often necessary to pay high prices in order to obtain needed supplies more speedily. It should also be borne in mind that the Committee was not the only institution placing orders in the home market: orders were also placed by the All-Russian Unions of Zemstvos and of Towns, and by the Ministry of War. Consequently the Committee had to pay prices which were already established.

The reproach made by General Lukomsky that the Committee did not fight the greed shown by many manufacturers is a very serious one. The sources of the evil, however, were not in the attitude of the Committees; they had to be sought more deeply. It would be possible to carry out an adequate organization for war labor only under such conditions as would be brought about by a law of universal industrial liability, based on principles identical with those of the Conscription Law. Since the State considered it had a right to demand from its citizens the sacrifice of their lives, much more had it the right to demand from those not in the ranks, a free offering of their work and property. But this idea was a new one in every country. It called for advanced development, scientific as well as social. Only a strong government could have handled it. But the supreme authority in Russia, although it was struggling continually to attain a real autocracy, was in point of fact very weak; for it had little real support. As we have indicated above, the Council of Ministers three times rejected a project of the Artillery Department to militarize the factories doing war work. The Council of Ministers, no doubt, feared the workmen. Likewise it did not dare to fight, as it should have fought, the evil practices of the manufacturers.

The Policy of the Government.

We shall not consider in detail the sources of the Government's weakness. There were many, and many of them grew out of the War. The subject will be taken up later on. Here we shall only point out the chief cause which was clearly formulated by the Ministers themselves at their conferences. "The Government," said M. Sazonov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the meeting of the Council of September 8, 1915, "cannot live in a vacuum and rely solely on the police."²⁸ Two days later at another meeting the same idea was developed by M. Krivoshein, Minister of Agriculture.

No matter what we say [he remarked], what we promise and how we try to win the confidence of the progressive parties and the people of Russia, they will not believe in us. In point of fact, the demands of the Duma and of the whole country have narrowed down not to any question of a program, but to that of the men who are entrusted with power. I, therefore, am of the opinion that at the center of our deliberations should be placed the fundamental question of the attitude of His Majesty toward the present Government, as well as toward the demand of the country for the setting up of an administration enjoying the confidence of the people. Let His Majesty decide whether he would prefer to shape future internal policy in the direction of a refusal to meet desires, or in the direction of reconciliation. In the latter case he would have to choose a man who enjoys public confidence, and entrust him with the formation of a Government. Until that cardinal question be settled we shall make no forward movement, no matter what we do. I believe in the latter policy, that is, that the Emperor should choose some one who could be entrusted with the forming of a Cabinet that will answer the expectations of the country.²⁹

The opinion of Krivoshein was shared by the majority of the Council of Ministers. However, the Emperor preferred the other policy, and the Council of Ministers, the chief executive body of the country, became even more powerless.

The incapacity of the Government was rendered even more noticeable by the poor ministers it chose. And this was no result of accident. It was an outgrowth in the social process which was going on. The choice of men was most limited. The better elements were held in suspicion, for they were looked upon as opponents of the

²⁸ Yakhontov. *op. cit.*, pp. 107, 123.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

Government. General Polivanov was relieved on March 15, and General Shuvaev was appointed Minister of War—"an honest and a good man," in the words of Rodzianko, "but he had not enough training for such a post in time of war; and the meetings of the Special Council, when he presided, were confused and wearying."³⁰

In January, 1917, General Belaev succeeded General Shuvaev. The appointment of Belaev, who was wholly devoted to an autocratic policy, was due to the influence of the Empress Alexandra Feodorovna. He was a typical military bureaucrat. But no harmful results for the munitions problem could have been produced by his appointment, for at the end of February, 1917, the Revolution broke out.

The Revolution.

Under the influence of the raging storm of revolution, discipline among the workmen at once began to pass away. The technical and the executive personnel of the factories, even if they had not been ejected by the workmen, would have been in no position to control things. As a result, extremely careless production and an ever-decreasing output ensued. As early as April the output of the Moscow metals industry dropped 32 per cent, the production of the Petrograd factories from 20 to 40 per cent; by July 1 the output of the Donets coal basin decreased 30 per cent, and so on. The oil industry in the Baku and Grozny fields was also dislocated. The Provisional Government had no power to fight the growing anarchy. Industrial enterprises were falling to pieces. By June, 20 per cent of the Petrograd factories had been closed down. For the first months of the Revolution the mortality list—as yet incomplete, of course—of the Russian industry could be written very briefly. In March 74 factories closed and 6,644 workers were discharged. The corresponding figures for April were 55 factories and 2,816 workers. In May the figures were 108 and 8,701; in June, 125 and 38,755; and in July, 206 and 47,754. For the five months the totals were 568 and 104,670.

³⁰ Rodzianko, *Krushenie Imperii* (*The Downfall of the Empire*) in *Arkhiv Russkoi Revolutsii*, Vol. XVII (Berlin, 1926), p. 123. Published in English under the title: *The Reign of Rasputin: an Empire's Collapse* (London, 1927). References in the present volume are made to the Russian edition.

The effects of the shocks received by industry were not felt by the army during the summer campaign of 1917 in so far as its supply of munitions was concerned. Simply because, with troops which did not want to fight, it became impossible to undertake military operations on the same scale, and calling for the same effort, as in previous campaigns, the expenditure of ammunition became considerably less. The reserve, built up by the strenuous endeavors of the country during the patriotic movement at the end of 1915 and in 1916, remained sufficient. The seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in the end of October, 1917, completed the collapse of Russia.

Conclusion.

An opinion has become general among Russians that by the autumn of 1917 the army was better armed and equipped than ever. One proof is seen in the fact that the subsequent Civil War, which lasted for three years, was able to feed on the supply accumulated for the conduct of the World War. This argument contains an elementary mistake. Technical equipment required for a great war in the European theater differs so much from that used in a civil war, that no comparison is possible. Consequently a supply which would be insufficient for a war on the grand scale might meet many times the needs that would arise during a struggle in the interior. Furthermore, an evaluation of the ammunition supply in the autumn of 1917 cannot be based on the standards applied in 1914, when the armament of the army was worse than inadequate. Let us recall our conclusion reached above. In the autumn of 1917 the Russian army, in comparison with its Allies and enemies, was more poorly armed than in 1914. The War was in its fourth year. The enemies of Russia, as well as her Allies, were not content with an increase in the number of their weapons, despite the fact that in that respect their quantity standards were many times greater than those adopted by Russia. They went further. They invented new weapons and new methods of warfare. They had entered upon mass production in the case of tanks. They were building an aircraft, really capable of fighting in the air. They were getting ready to use poison gas on a large scale.

Those who assert that by the fall of 1917 the Russian army was well armed and equipped have forgotten an old truth which had

been formulated clearly by John W. Draper. "War," Draper wrote,³¹ "makes a people run through its phases of existence fast. It would have taken the Arabs many thousand years to have advanced intellectually as far as they did in a single century, had they, as a nation, enjoyed undisturbed peace." The law that makes for an extreme acceleration of the evolution tempo in time of war found its expression during the World War in a rapid development of armament. It will not be an exaggeration if we say that the difference between the campaigns of 1918 and of 1914 was greater than the difference between the latter campaign and the war of 1870-1871. Those who persist in applying the scale of 1914 to the situation in 1917 may be likened to a passenger who, riding on an express train, would expect to see from his window the same landscape which he saw a few hours ago.

³¹ J. W. Draper, *History of the Intellectual Development of Europe* (London, 1899).

CHAPTER VIII

FEEDING AND EQUIPPING THE ARMY¹

Russia's Resources of Grain.

"BEFORE 1914 the belief that it was not necessary to prepare plans to feed the army and the civilian population in time of war, had taken firm root in Russia. The natural resources of the country were held to be so great that no difficulties were anticipated in getting the army everything that it could need." So wrote in 1925 General Bogatko, formerly Assistant Chief of the Supply Department.²

In July, 1914, the army was fully provided with food supplies in accordance with the mobilization plan. During the concentration of the army and in the first days after the arrival of the troops at the theater of war, they were fed on supplies specially stored for that purpose. But those favorable conditions did not last for long. The requirements of the army proved to be so great that the naïve idea of meeting them "as they had been met in time of peace" failed to stand the test from the very beginning. "Speaking generally," General Bogatko concludes, "the whole machinery of provisioning the army, including the fundamental principles that underlay that machinery, was not adapted to the huge task with which we were confronted in the War."

Difficulties in finding supplies were experienced in the first year of the War. And that task was not limited to the feeding of the army at the front, several million strong; it was closely connected with providing food for the vast interior. The Ministry of Agriculture was charged with the task of supplying the army. The decision was an innovation, the above Ministry, in pre-war times, having taken no part in such work. It had no technical equipment and was absolutely unprepared for such a function. In time of peace the question of food supply was in the hands of the Ministry of War, or its Supply Department, and of the Ministry of the Interior.

¹ For a detailed discussion see P. B. Struve, *Food Supply in Russia During the World War* (Yale University Press, 1930) in this Series of the "Economic and Social History of the World War."

² N. O. Bogatko, in *Sbornik Zapisok* (*Collection of Memoranda*), pp. 74, 78, 79.

I am not going to go into the reasons [writes M. Naumov, former Minister of Agriculture]³ which made it seem necessary not to improve and adjust the existing machinery of food supply, but to create a system, new, complex, and as yet untested. . . . I only wish to state that in November, 1915, when finally I had to submit to the orders of the Emperor, take over the Ministry of Agriculture from M. Krivoshein, and consequently become the chief of food supply for the army and the country, I found myself facing a complete chaos of decisions, opinions and proposals. . . . As a result, instead of at once carrying out a definite plan, as previously planned, I had, at a time of great military pressure . . . and under extremely unfavorable conditions, to work out such a plan of supply. . . . Hence the haste and unevenness of the central machinery.

The difficulty of a systematic utilization of Russia's food supplies increased in view of the fact

that no data existed relating to the stores of products, even those of first necessity, and that no accurate statistics enabling one to compute the output of bread, meat, etc., were anywhere to be had.⁴ The annual cereal crop—of rye, wheat, barley, maize, and oats—averaged, for 1910–1916, 4,500,000,000 puds.⁵ In 1914, and especially from 1915 on, the smaller number of men and live stock, and the reduced area under cultivation, resulted in decreasing harvests. But at the same time the exporting of grain almost ceased. An average of 680,000,000 puds, or about 15 per cent of the harvest, had been exported yearly. In 1914 the figure was 348,000,000, and in 1915 it was only 31,000,000. . . . In the matter of bread stuffs, the army was better off than in any other respect.⁶

It was quite possible, indeed, to meet the requirements of the army from the stocks remaining from the harvests of 1914, 1915, and 1916. The quantity of breadstuffs, in millions of puds, required by the army, was as follows: 1914, flour, 23.6; grits, 3.4; oats and barley, 52.6. 1915, flour, 118.3; grits, 15.4; oats and barley, 153.6. 1916, flour, 212; grits, 35; oats and barley, 295. 1917, flour, 225; grits, 30; oats and barley, 175.⁷

³ A. N. Naumov, in *Sbornik Zapisok* (Collection of Memoranda).

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

⁵ One ton = 62 puds.

⁶ Naumov, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

⁷ *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, p. 60.

But, according to General Bogatko, little of the cereal stock of 1916 had gone to the army, and a decrease in supplies ensued.⁸ The cause lay in the confusion which resulted from inadequate organization.

With reference to baked bread and army biscuits stress must be laid on the fact that here organization, so far as the army was concerned, was excellent, and thanks to this, it did not experience any shortage. Mass production, however, could not be organized. The Supply Department owned certain biscuit factories, but their output was small. It tried to enlist the help of private undertakings, but without much success.

Meat.

The situation in the matter of meat supplies was very different.

Before the War [Naumov writes],⁹ in comparison with other countries, Russia was poorly provided with live stock. In 1913 there were only 52,000,000 head of cattle in the whole empire. 9,000,000 constituted the annual increase. This approximately equalled the annual consumption. When the War began a larger supply of meat was needed for the army, and the general consumption of meat also increased, chiefly as a result of the prohibition of intoxicating liquors.

In the first year of the War 5,000,000 head of cattle were taken for the army, which, together with the number killed for home consumption, made an imposing total of 14,000,000. Moreover, as a result of the evacuation of western provinces, not less than 4,000,000 head in the region invaded were lost. A total of 18,000,000 were slaughtered, a number equal to twice the annual increase. The remaining 44,000,000, including those in Siberia, could give an increase of only 7,000,000, whereas for the army and people together 14,000,000 were needed. Again the necessity arose either of depleting the herds by 7,000,000 more than their natural increase, or of reducing the meat ration, first at home and then at the front. The latter course was taken.

The conditions described above made obvious the great importance of government measures for a systematic utilization of meat

⁸ Bogatko, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

⁹ Naumov, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

products by means of their proper preparation, storage, and distribution.

To my great regret [says Naumov],¹⁰ there, too, after I had assumed control over food supplies I found an atmosphere of uncertainty as to what should be done; good intentions and reassuring hopes abounded, but there was a complete absence of any practical plans worked out in advance. . . . As a result appalling losses of live stock occurred, and enormous supplies of stored meat spoiled in transportation and at the stations. There were no refrigerators; no census of live stock was taken; the question of purchase and distribution was in a chaotic condition. . . . It will not be out of place here to mention the great rôle which canned foods might have played in the matter of supplies for the country and especially for the army, if the canning of food had been organized, adequately and soon enough. The huge abundance of fish, fruits, and vegetables, and finally the actual supplies of meat, including mutton and pork, all this constituted inexhaustible resources.

Such was the gloomy situation, as pictured by the head of the Ministry charged with the supply of food. The conditions under which beef on the hoof was being shipped to the army may be seen from the following description by General Bogatko:¹¹

The delivery of live stock, although it was possible at any time of year, was fraught with many disadvantages, so far as transport was concerned. Only 120 puds could be shipped per car. During transportation cattle lost weight, they died of starvation and thirst, for the irregularity of the shipments sometimes made feeding and watering impossible. Large rail shipments of frozen meat could be made in winter, but in continuously mild weather there would be losses by spoiling. Summer shipments called for extensive refrigeration—refrigerator cars and supplies of ice at the stations, for re-filling. But the Ministry did not succeed in building up any real system of refrigerating because of the lack of equipment. Deliveries of frozen meat could not be made on a large scale. . . . The preparation of canned meat for daily consumption in the army would have required a great many factories and a vast supply of tin plate, whereas there was not enough tin plate even for the small quantities of food already being canned.¹² Taken as a whole, the delivery of meat was not regulated until the end of the War.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Bogatko, *op. cit.*, pp. 80, 81.

¹² There were fifteen canned-food factories, including one owned by the State.

When the War began the army meat ration, which in time of peace was three-quarters of a pound, was increased, without weighing the country's meat resources, to a pound and a half; that is, it was doubled.¹³ In the first period of the War—in 1914 and the beginning of 1915—when, in the zone bordering on the front much live stock was available, and when the army invaded East Prussia and Galicia, where live stock was also abundant, no difficulties were experienced in supplying the troops with meat. But when the supply in the immediate rear was exhausted, when the territory occupied in Germany and Austria-Hungary had been evacuated, and numerous herds of cattle, unwisely gathered in the rear, had perished, mostly from hunger, during the retreat in the summer of 1915, the question of meat supplies entered upon an acute phase. Besides the difficulty of bringing large numbers of cattle from the interior, serious doubts arose lest the people of the cities might be left without meat. It became necessary to reduce the army ration and return to the peacetime standard. Measures taken in the summer of 1915 for improving and organizing the meat supply brought effective results only at the end of 1916; before then there were times when it was often impossible to meet the army's needs. Taking the numerical strength of the army from year to year, those needs were: 1914, 13,500,000 puds; 1915, 51,100,000; 1916, 82,000,000; 1917, 78,100,000, or a total of 224,700,000.¹⁴

Other Foodstuffs.

As regards other articles of food, the Memorandum of General Bogatko contains the following data:

Fats: "In the first days of the War, in accordance with the request of the Chief Medical Inspector, it was decided that 25 zolotniks¹⁵ of fats should constitute a part of a one-pound meat ration; and to that was added 2½ of bread, an increased portion of sugar, and tea and vegetables. But such a quantity of fat could not be consumed by the men; and the remainder was either sent back by them to their families, or it was sold. In the meantime the actual situation in the case of fats was far from being as favorable as it was thought to be." In the beginning of the War fats were received from western

¹³ Lukomsky, in *Sbornik Zapisok* (*Collection of Memoranda*), p. 38.

¹⁴ *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, p. 60.

¹⁵ One zolotnik = 0.15 ounce.

Siberia, where much butter was produced by peasant associations, and a large stock was available. After it had been exhausted and production had decreased, the supply of fats became very difficult, inasmuch as the supplies of butter in other parts of the country were insufficient. No thought had been given to the fattening of hogs, and not enough lard could be obtained. It became impossible to supply the army even with a reduced ration of fats.¹⁶ The requirements to keep up the standard ration, called, in 1914, for 1,600,000 puds; in 1915 for 6,510,000; in 1916 for 11,500,000; and in 1917 for 11,200,000.

Vegetables: In the first year of the War vegetable-drying was mostly practiced by the market gardeners of Rostov. Subsequently it was taken up by other supply men, and no shortage was experienced. Shipments of fresh vegetables—cabbage, beets, and potatoes—and of sauerkraut and beets in barrels, were also made.

Fish: When Naumov was quoted above, it was pointed out that, on account of the poor development of the canning business no adequate use could be made of her vast supplies of fish. As a result, according to General Bogatko, "salt herrings were bought abroad."¹⁷ Thus, instead of using every unit of foreign tonnage for shipments of machine tools, Russia imported fish.

Fodder.

In the beginning of the War fodder was plentiful. In the winter of 1914–1915 some difficulties were experienced. In the following winters the situation became worse. To keep the horses alive on several occasions many cavalry units had to be withdrawn to the rear. There were times—especially in the winter of 1916–1917—when the loss of horses, owing to lack of feed, increased to such an extent that the situation became threatening. When the difficulties of rail transportation made it impossible to bring fodder from the interior, it became clear that the using of substitutes was indispensable. But the question of mass production of fodder substitutes was not solved by the Army Supply Department until 1917.¹⁸ For an adequate supply the army would have had to have, in 1914, 52,600,000 puds of oats and barley, and 125,200,000 puds of hay. For the years following,

¹⁶ Bogatko, *op. cit.*, pp. 81, 87–88.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

¹⁸ Lukomsky, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

the corresponding figures would have been: 1915, 153,600,000 and 212,800,000; 1916, 295,000,000 and 338,000,000; and 1917, 175,000,000 and 500,000,000.¹⁹

The Special Council for Supply.

To sum up, the keynote of the first year of the War might have been the country's resources recklessly thrown away. It was only in the autumn of 1915 that the army's huge requirements were realized. This was coincident with the establishment of the Special Councils mentioned above. The Minister of Agriculture was appointed chairman of the Special Council for Supply; and the institutions under his control were charged with full responsibility for the food supply of the Empire. What must be said of this attempt to establish some sort of order in this department has been said by the Minister himself:²⁰

The very idea of creating the above Council [he writes] . . . predetermined its membership, one exceptionally large, and of the greatest variety. . . . Members of the two legislative houses, representatives of the Unions of Zemstvos and of Towns, as well as others from towns and zemstvos individually, representatives of the war industries and stock exchange committees and of trades unions . . . governors, chairmen of municipal councils, officials of the Ministry of Agriculture, officials of other departments, etc.,—almost daily all sat in conference until a late hour, deliberated, argued, voted, raised protests. Certain questions, for instance, that of fixed prices, were a source of endless and impassioned debates. To this it must be added that, as a matter of course, frequent changes occurred in the personnel of the Council. . . . To sum up, the conditions were complex and delayed the work; at any rate, they did not contribute to any rapid elaboration of a plan of food supply, without which it was neither possible for the chairman of the Council and of his assistants in the capital and the provinces, to do their work, or for such work to be successful.

We have said the chief defect of the Special Councils lay in their having so many members—a condition that made constructive labor difficult. Naumov confirms this in his statement above. But when we spoke of the Special Council for National Defense, we also emphasized the fact that, despite its defects, it played a salutary rôle inas-

¹⁹ *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, p. 60.

²⁰ Naumov, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

much as the establishment of the Council had contributed to a participation of the public in the task of supplying the army. The same should be said with regard to the Special Council for Supply. For all its defects, it brought together the central authorities and the unofficial forces of the country. Had this not been done, the work of the Ministry of Agriculture would have been that of one more revolving fly wheel, geared to nothing. It would seem that the main difficulty encountered by the Ministry was of another sort, the unpreparedness of the governing circles to adjust themselves to the complexities of the present age. As a result they sought to find primitive solutions for every question. Whenever the nature of things permitted them to stick to the simplest kinds of organization good results were achieved. Such was the case with the army's bread; flour was delivered to the troops, and they themselves baked the bread in their field bakeries. Equally easy was the supplying of dried vegetables; the question could be solved by a simple arithmetical increase of the number of home producers engaged in such work. But whenever the requirement called for mass production and the complex forms of modern industry, the situation was different, and the troubles that developed were in proportion to the complexity of the organization. Such was the case in the production of army biscuits, in the matter of meats and canned food. The organization of food supply remained primitive. In no instance was it put on a scientific basis, which is indispensable for modern mass production.

The fact that only the simplest solutions were sought had, as its result, a lack of coördination between the activities of the civilian food organizations and those of the supply agencies of the army. "The absence of such coördination of food supply," writes Nau-mov,²¹ "was felt so acutely that the slightest delay in taking measures to change that situation threatened both the army and the country with catastrophe." Moreover, the adherence of Russian governing circles to primitive methods was a very serious obstacle to their co-operation with the public. That, without the assistance of the latter, the conduct of a great modern war was impossible many persons could clearly see; but among them only few could realize that the participation of the people called for much more complex forms of State administration. General Polivanov, Sukhomlinov's successor

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

as Minister of War, understood it well; but in the spring of 1916 he was dismissed, and the confusion in the demesne of food supply greatly increased.

On March 15, the Minister for War, General Polivanov, was dismissed . . . [writes Rodzianko, the President of the Duma].²² The news of Polivanov's downfall was received with profound consternation. The press was lavish in its praises of the late Minister, and enumerated the beneficent effects of his work during his comparatively short term of office. In the Duma and in society people spoke everywhere of irresponsible influences, of the Ministry having become a game of leap frog. . . . The chaos in the country was becoming appalling. A meat shortage was beginning to make itself felt in Petrograd; yet cartloads of carcasses on their way to the soap factories could be met in the streets. They were seen in broad daylight, and the sight aroused general indignation. At a time when no meat was to be found on the market, rotting carcasses were virtually being carried to the dumps. Members of the Special Council inspected the municipal cold-storage warehouses, beyond the Baltic railway station. The refrigerators were in order and the meat in good condition, but mounds of rotting meat were piled up in every direction. This was the meat intended for the use of the army. There was no place to store it. When the contractors asked permission to build new refrigerators, they obtained neither permission nor the necessary funds. As usual, the different Ministers were unable to agree: the Army Department placed the orders for the meat, and the railway carried it, but there was no place to store it, and no permission was granted to put it on the market. All this was as stupid as many other things. Everyone seemed to be in a conspiracy to bring about Russia's ruin.

The members of the Special Council reported on all they had seen. I wrote to Alexeev. And then only did the meat question receive attention. Hundreds of tons had, of course, already gone. It was the same with meats from Siberia: but here thousands instead of hundreds were lost, owing to the inadequacy and disorganization of the transport arrangements. Those responsible for this were, of course, never discovered: each laid the blame on someone else; and all blamed the general chaos.

Lack of Firm Policy.

To find a way out, General Alexeev, on June 15, submitted a memorandum to the Emperor, in which he suggested that the Gov-

²² Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-123.

ernment be put under someone possessing the authority of a dictator.

The fate of this proposal is well known [writes Naumov].²³ Seeing that this would not meet with the approval of his social and bureaucratic entourage, the Emperor hesitated to do it unaided; and at the meeting of the Council of Ministers on June 28, 1915, over which he presided, he limited himself to expressing a desire that all the heads of government departments . . . do their utmost in the interests of the country and serve unitedly in the national cause, equally dear to all.

The above is of special significance for the reason that it occurred precisely at the time when, judging from the correspondence between the Emperor and the Empress Alexandra Feodorovna, the idea of complete absolutism was taking more and more hold upon them. It was for that that all the latest ministerial changes had been made. And yet, at the same time, the Emperor hesitated to take a decisive measure on which there depended order and coördinated labor throughout the country.

The tragic inconsistency of the policy pursued by the Government has been well brought out by M. Thomas, the French Minister of Munitions, who visited Russia in May, 1916. He was speaking with Rodzianko of the defects of the supplies system; and when Rodzianko asked: "Tell me, please, frankly, as you see it, what does Russia need?" Thomas replied: "What does Russia need? She needs authority in her Government. For, if I may say so, Russia must be very strong morally to withstand in the grave times we are living through the state of mild anarchy which reigns in your country and which strikes a foreigner."²⁴

Effects of the Revolution.

At the end of 1916 the food-supply situation entered an extremely difficult phase. On December 17-18, 1916, at a meeting held at General Headquarters, General Evert, commanding the western front, made the following statement:²⁵

The troops must be provided with food, no matter where the main

²³ Naumov, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

²⁴ Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

²⁵ In the volume *Razlozhenie Armii v 1917 Godu (The Break-up of the Army in 1917)* (Moscow-Petrograd, 1925), p. 7.

attack is planned for. The stocks of supplies in the base and food depots, which are now exhausted, must be made good again. Instead of having a monthly reserve we are depending on daily deliveries. We are not getting what we should get, and we are living on short rations. This affects the spirit and the morale. The local resources are also exhausted. Measures to replenish the base depots should be taken at once. The army ration has been so reduced that no further steps in that direction are desirable.

An equally gloomy picture was drawn by General Ruzsky, commanding the northern front: "Not even meat is delivered to the northern front," he said; "the general opinion is that we have everything, but can get nothing. In Petrograd, for instance, those who are poor suffer, those who are rich can have all they want. There is no organization in the interior . . ." The disorders which occurred in Petrograd in February, 1917, and were the beginning of the Revolution, had been preceded by difficulties in obtaining food.

In the course of the first month of the Revolution General Alexeev, who had become Commander-in-Chief, had to reduce rations in the rear. A telegram to that end was sent by him on March 20. It is a very significant document, in which it may be seen, too, that the support of the Provisional Government was not considered a sufficient guaranty that the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the army would be carried out; the order had to be endorsed by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

The state of things created by the Revolution from its beginning could only make worse the chaos of the food situation. The shortage in the amount of grain collected during the food campaigns amounted in March-June, 1917, to 40 per cent; in July, to 70 per cent; and in August, to 90 per cent.

A fairly complete picture of the food problem since the Revolution was drawn by General Knox, British Military Attaché, in his report of August 10, 1917.²⁶

I have the honour [he says] to send some notes on the situation as regards supply and transport. At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Soviet on the first of August, the Minister of Supply, Peshekhonov, spoke of the economic state of the country. He said that in May

²⁶ Dispatch D. 3; British Embassy, Petrograd; Brigadier General Knox; Archives of the War Office, London.

the position was very bad. The army had only supplies for a few days. In Moscow there was at one time grain for one day only and in Petrograd the position was little better. The situation has improved. The army has from 20 days' to 1½ months' supply. Petrograd has 20 days' and Moscow 14.

The future is threatening. The chief difficulty arises from the disorganization of the railways, which may cause a disaster in the autumn. It is impossible to depend on railways only, for the feeding of northern Russia. Food must be carried by the waterways. The idea, however, of carrying grain to the Volga by railway, transferring to lighters for conveyance to the north, and transferring later to railway cars is largely checkmated by the exorbitant wages demanded by dock laborers, wages which make it possible for them to work, not 8 hours a day, but far less.

The Government depended formerly for army supply on the landlords' crops, which were easily collected. Landlords' sowing has decreased on account of interference by the peasants. The peasants try, too, to prevent the use of harvest machinery. They demand that they should reap the harvest at a wage of one-fourth to one-third of the crop in kind. This means that a large part of the landlords' crops will be scattered through peasants' cottages, and its collection by the Government will be impossible.

The peasant population of several Governments refuse to give their grain except in return for manufactured goods. The villages in southwest Russia lack cloth and metal ware. The Minister of Supply is making heroic efforts to find material to barter, but manufactured material is almost unobtainable in Russia; and limitations of tonnage prevent its import. Even when some material has been collected, its distribution in the prevailing disorder is not a simple matter. Six hundred wagons of stuff were lately despatched for bartering in the Caucasus, but 400 have been "arrested" at Taganrog, and the local committees demand the distribution of the contents on the spot. The sugar output will be reduced, as the peasants have taken over by force part of the beetroot estates.

The peasants do all they can to hold back their grain in the hope that the prices, which are at present low, may be raised. There are no Government store houses along the railways, and supplies have to be railed on immediately they are brought in. The delivery to railhead is a problem in itself. Horse requisition has been overdone. There is no mechanical transport. There are practically no metalled roads in the grain-bearing districts, and the tracts are often impassable in spring

and autumn. Just now such means of transport as the peasant possesses are engaged in the actual harvesting and no grain is being delivered to railhead. Horse-drawn transport is so limited that grain cannot be conveyed from long distances. In fact, it amounts to this that the army and the town population of Russia have to depend for their existence on a narrow strip some fifteen miles wide on either side of the railways.

A good harvest is of vital importance, for though there is always grain enough to feed the population, we require a surplus within transportable distance. The harvest of 1917 is barely fair. The yield of rye is average. Wheat is good in the northern Caucasus and in western Siberia, but unfortunately only middling in the Volga governments whence it can be easily carried. Oats and barley are not good. The problem the Ministry of Supply has now to solve is the conveyance of as much grain as possible of the northern Caucasus crop by water to the upper Volga before river transport stops. The Volga tonnage—4,500,000—is sufficient, but the last barge must leave the lower river by September 23, so time is short, and the selfish laziness of the dock laborers referred to above is likely to prove a decisive factor. At the end of next month it will be possible to estimate the effort demanded from the Russian railways in the winter.

The position now is of course worse than it was at this time last year. The Chief Intendent told me that he always tried to keep a reserve of two months on the front and that he had succeeded up to November, 1916, when the reserve began to fall gradually till at one time in February there were only a very few days' supply left.

The Assistant Minister of Supply told me that the reserve of food at the front is now 20 to 30 days as compared with 60 days at this time last year. In Moscow and Petrograd there are 20 days as compared with 45 in August last year. These figures differ from those given publicly by the Minister of Supply on the same day. The Department of Military Communication shows that the precedence is always given to food supplies for the army and everything obtained from the Ministry of Supply is sent on without delay.

For purposes of army supply Russia is divided into an "eastern" and a "western" region. The dividing line is rather east of the general line Petrograd-Odessa, the handing-over stations being Petrograd, Bologoe, Rzhev, Smolensk, Bryansk, Gomel, Kiev, Znamenka, Nikolaev, and Odessa.

Every few months a conference at General Headquarters settles the number of carloads of each article that the "eastern region" is required

to supply to each front. The southern fronts are of course more self-supporting than the others. The daily food supply—in earloads—was fixed for July as follows: northern front, 561, western, 589, southwestern, 355, and Rumanian, 102. The problem is more difficult in winter when on an average 800 earloads are required daily for hay and 400 for oats and barley. In February the number of earloads was: northern front, 660, western, 893, southwestern and Rumanian, 687. General Headquarters asked the “eastern region” for 51,612 earloads in March, but owing to the non-delivery of supplies at entraining stations, only 32,448 ears were loaded—a shortage of 37.1 per cent. Things were worse in April. Out of 45,900 earloads asked for only 12,821 ears were loaded—a deficit of 72 per cent. In the first half of May and June the deficit amounted to 21 per cent.

In October, 1917, as the present author was preparing to go to the Inter-Allied Conference, he obtained from the Chief of the Army Supply Department the data of Table 20 on the supplies possessed by the army on October 10 of that year.

TABLE 20

Number of Days' Supplies in Hand, October 10, 1917.

<i>Front</i>	<i>Flour</i>	<i>Grits</i>	<i>Biscuits</i>	<i>Fats</i>	<i>Meats and fish</i>	<i>Beef on the hoof</i>	<i>Canned food</i>	<i>Oats</i>
Northern	15	37	6	62	3½	10	12	1¾
Western	10½	12	10	50	6	12	15½	5
Southwestern	9	4	2½	2	⅕	4½	7	⅔
Rumanian	8½	5	2½	5	1	2	6	4
Caucasus	25½	66	34	61	4	3½	25	9

When giving out the above data, the Chief of the Army Supply Department added that in the future he could not count upon any regular replenishing of supplies, many items of which were nearing exhaustion. When asked what would come next, he lifted his hands and answered, “Hunger riots.”

Ten days later, the author attended a meeting of the Provisional Government. In the course of it, M. Prokopovich, the Minister of Supply, stated categorically that he could provide food for 6,000,000 men only. Yet the number of men needing food was 12,000,000. To this the Minister of Transport answered in equally categorical fashion that, should the 1,200,000 railway employees and their families be deprived of food rations, the railways would immediately

cease working. Thus the step to be taken at once was the reduction of the strength of the army—which at that time numbered over 10,000,000, including the depot troops in the interior—by more than 5,000,000.

Such a measure, in point of fact, was a demobilization. But there was no opportunity to carry it out, for in a few days came the Bolshevik *coup d'état*.

Equipment.

A picture similar to that of the food problem might be drawn in the case of clothing supplies.

From the beginning of the War [writes General Lukomsky]²⁷ the Army Supply Department foresaw that its actual requirements would be greater than was anticipated in time of peace. And it took steps to secure large supplies of clothing so that the eventual demands of the front might be duly met. But it also made a mistake in its calculations, and had to resort to the placing of orders for equipment abroad. Among other things large orders for boots were made abroad, chiefly in England and the United States, as early as 1915. These orders proved very expensive. In certain cases they were badly executed. Moreover, a considerable amount of cargo space, so precious for the shipment of munitions, had to be diverted to other purposes.

The impossibility of satisfying the requirements of the army from the resources of the country alone very quickly became evident. It was a surprise to all in the Army Supply Department. There was a shortage of leather, of tannin, of workshops, of makers. And at the bottom of all was the absence of an adequate organization. While there was no leather on the market, hundreds of thousands of hides, taken from slaughtered cattle, were rotting at the front. . . . The production of tannin, had it been planned beforehand, would have been easy; at any rate, it would not have been difficult to get it, soon enough, from abroad. There were also men enough to do the work. But here again no adequate organization and no extensions of existing workshops and associations of peasant makers had been prepared, in due time. In this respect, there was even great discontent in certain parts of the Empire, which occasionally took the form of disorders. The situation was this: an order had been issued by the governors of the provinces to the effect that all makers not working for the army should be called out for serv-

²⁷ Lukomsky, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

ice in the workshops of the zemstvos and the Army Supply Department. And the order was carried out by the police in certain districts in a very peculiar way: the makers, in villages and in adjacent places, were gathered together and sent to the district towns under police escort, as if they had been arrested.

The above may serve as proof of how complete was the incapacity of the Ministry of War to organize supplies. The Ministry could foresee that there would be requirements; but it was unable to learn in advance how great those requirements would be. It placed orders for boots abroad, using "precious cargo space," but it did not develop home production owing to "the absence of an adequate organization," etc. Very characteristic are the words, "the impossibility of satisfying the requirements of the army . . . very quickly became evident."

To this incapacity of the Ministry of War must be added the general inability of the Government to organize the nation for war. Strange as it may seem, politics found their way even into the question of the supply of boots. As it offers so characteristic an illustration of the character the problem assumed, we cite it from Rodzianko's remarkable reminiscences. He tells of his visit, at the end of 1914, to General Headquarters, when he had a talk with Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich. The Grand Duke, writes Rodzianko,²⁸

spoke of Sukhomlinov, in whom he had no confidence and who was trying to gain an influence over the Emperor. He said that he had been compelled temporarily to suspend military operations owing to the lack of munitions and the shortage of boots. "You have influence," the Grand Duke added, "and you are trusted. Do organize the supply of footwear for the army as soon as possible." I replied that this could be done by asking for the coöperation of the zemstvos and other public bodies, particularly the former. Plenty of material could be found in Russia. Labor, too, was plentiful. But one province produced the leather, others the shoe-nails, the soles and so forth, while the cheap labor (the shoemakers who worked at home) was also scattered. The best way to bring all of them together was to call a conference of chairmen of the provincial zemstvos boards and organize the business with their assistance. The Grand Duke entirely approved of my plan.

On my return to Petrograd I went to the Duma and asked the advice

²⁸ Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-120.

of the members as to the best way of obtaining supplies of footwear. We decided to send a questionnaire to all chairmen of zemstvos boards and mayors of towns. This was soon done, and favorable answers came pouring in. As there was reason to expect that this plan would be opposed by the Government, I decided to call on some of the Ministers individually and talk it over with them. Krivoshein, Sukhomlinov, and Goremykin approved of the idea of a conference and promised to support my proposal before the Cabinet. The interview with the Minister Maklakov, however, took rather a peculiar turn. On my stating that I was entrusted by the Commander-in-Chief with the urgent task of organizing the supply of boots for the army and of summoning a conference of chairmen of the zemstvos and municipal boards in Petrograd, Maklakov said: "Yes. Yes. What you say tallies exactly with the information we have received through our agents." "What information?" "According to my secret information, this conference, under cover of the needs of the army, will discuss the political situation and demand a parliamentary government."

The result was that in 1915, in addition to all its other difficulties, the army began to suffer from a "boots" crisis. From personal experience the author can bear testimony to the tragic period through which, in December, 1915, the infantry of the Seventh Army lived. That army was intended for a descent operation against Bulgaria, with a view to assisting Serbia. But, owing to the highly suspicious attitude of Rumania, the descent could not take place, and the Seventh Army was, at the end of November, transported to Galicia to become a part of the southwestern front. Having detrained, the troops were forced to march from four to five days to take up the positions assigned them at the front. This had to be done during the season of bad roads in the autumn, and the boots of the infantry gave out. It was then that our sufferings began. In reply to our most desperate requests we received boots in such small quantities that the men had to march barefoot. That catastrophic situation lasted nearly two months. In the early part of 1916 it began to improve, footwear needs having been met in part. In the course of 1916, some 29,000,000 pairs of boots, of which over 50 per cent had been made in Russia, were delivered.²⁹

We shall omit details as to how army needs in the case of other

²⁹ Bogatko, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

articles of equipment were met. None meant any such acute crisis as was the boots situation. But the general picture was everywhere the same. The Ministry of War was absolutely unable to decide what quantities were needed, or to ascertain what articles could be supplied—and how. In 1916 the supplies situation improved in every field. The active participation of all classes brought good results; but no adequate organization, which would have made it possible to obtain maximum results with the least possible effort, existed anywhere. The beginning of the collapse of the country, which followed the Revolution, was reflected on every department of supply.

The Attitude of the Soldiers.

The picture of the supplies situation, as given above, would be incomplete if we omitted one phase growing out of the attitude of the mass of our soldiers. The fact that popular education was still on a low level did not contribute toward giving them any proper view of State property. They firmly believed that the resources of the State were inexhaustible. Such an attitude on the part of the rank and file served to give the authorities responsible for supplies a cover for their own faults—for their inability to foresee and to organize. But, as for arms and ammunition, the attitude above mentioned could not have counted for as much as was claimed by the authorities concerned. In point of fact, a very strict control over munitions was exercised by the officers, though in the case of things not a part of the fighting equipment, especially clothing, the situation was very different. There no such control existed; besides, in most of the men there was a rooted belief that articles of clothing became their property from the day they were handed to them, and that the Treasury was rich enough to renew their outfits at short intervals. It should be noted that, under the influence of a military education, that harmful belief had been, to a great extent, eradicated among the soldiers who had completed their terms of service in time of peace. But with the arrival of reinforcements, made up of men inadequately trained, the situation changed for the worse. Later, when the national enthusiasm of the first days had passed away and the army entered upon the period of grave reverses in the summer of 1915, careless handling of military outfits was made one method of sabotaging the War. This reservation, however, should be made: the re-

enforcements, which were sent to fill up the gaps, were soon cured of this by the influence of the cadres. Accordingly, at the front, the attitude of the soldier toward State property did not differ greatly from that in time of peace. But the way in which State property was being handled in the rear was going from bad to worse. Here is a case occurring when the author was Chief of Staff of the Seventh Army.

In December, 1915, this army, as we have said, passed through a "boots" crisis. When the crisis was at an end a strange fact came out. The regiments kept on sending demands for footwear, whereas, according to the information of the headquarters, their needs had been met. After a tour of inspection was made, it developed that the men in the reënforcement companies, a great number of whom had then arrived, were equipped with old and worn-out boots. Yet it was known that, in accordance with the existing regulations, they had been provided with brand new footwear before leaving for the front. In a few days it was learned that nearly every man in these reënforcement companies had sold his new boots when passing through villages en route, and had received worn-out boots in exchange. Simultaneously an investigation, made by the local police, disclosed the fact that in such villages small workshops had been opened for the making of skirts for peasant women from the tents which formed a part of the soldiers' outfits. And to put an end to the evil was not an easy thing. The reënforcements, while on their way to the front, were under the control of junior officers, promoted in time of war and having little experience, while the police officials in the villages were few. To change this state of things it became necessary to increase the permanent personnel of the depot battalions by taking experienced officers from combat units, although such officers were badly needed at the front. When the Revolution broke out, careless handling of State property increased until it became a saturnalia of waste.

If expressed in graph form, the attitude of the rank and file here showed a curve which was dropping steadily. But throughout the War, in spite of the fluctuations of that curve, the following unalterable phenomenon might be noticed: neglect and wastefulness were seen most often among the detachments of reënforcements and the rear units. The nearer the troops were to the front, the more careful

were they and the greater was the order among them. Thus it happened that because clothing was wasted in the rear, a shortage of it was often experienced by the troops then fighting. But the neglect and wastefulness, wherever it was found, had this result that the demands for equipment and especially for clothing were in excess of the demands which would be made under normal conditions. This, in its turn, called for extra and non-productive effort on the part of the country.

Only an approximate estimate of the quantity of clothing supplied during the War can be made. But, according to the Central Statistical Department,³⁰ there were provided, in all, about 429,000,000 arshines³¹ of various textiles, 65,000,000 pairs of leather boots, 15,000,000 pairs of felt boots, 450,000 puds of sole leather, 12,000,000 warm short coats, 21,000,000 heavy undershirts, 30,000,000 pairs of heavy drawers and wadded trousers, 30,000,000 pairs of warm socks and woolen stockings, and 51,000,000 ordinary undershirts. To these may be added 782,000 saddles and 217,000,000 horseshoes. And on the whole we are inclined to believe that the above figures are too low.

Conclusion.

We can end the chapter by quoting the conclusions arrived at by General Bogatko.³²

Although the resources of Russia were abundant and of many kinds, it was necessary to use them with care. When the War began the country was prepared neither to develop her industries nor to adapt them to the needs of the army. As for those needs, no one had any clear idea of their immensity, their nature, nor how long they would endure. A firm and active master was lacking, and therefore, from the beginning, there had been no systematic and economic use of resources. Until the end of the War no general scheme for the development of industry and the utilization of its resources was worked out. . . . And the result of this lack of orderly economy was that certain resources were not used at all. The army at times received more than it needed. Prices went up. People were deprived of articles of food and of everyday household necessities. The country itself was without the staples that were indis-

³⁰ *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, p. 61.

³¹ One arshine = 0.8 yard.

³² Bogatko, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-88.

pensable for the production of supplies; for instance, metal for agricultural implements, and the like. The railroads became congested, and a greater number of cars had to be assigned to the transportation of supplies than were necessary. For this reason supplies of meat, grain, and other things that were abundant in Siberia, could not be shipped westward.

In view of the dislocation of transport, fuel and raw materials could not be delivered on time, and stored supplies could not be shipped. . . . All this caused a shortage of necessities and an increase of prices, and tended to upset the normal course of the country's economic life. Discontent with the War, with the existing order of things, and with the Government was spreading among the people, and preparing a favorable ground for the Revolution. . . . The abundant resources of Russia were not exhausted during the War, but to its end, nobody knew how to use them.

CHAPTER IX

TRANSPORT ORGANIZATION

The Mobilization.

Good transport service is the chief factor on which depends a smooth functioning of the system of supplies. Waterways in Russia, as pointed out above, could not be of much service to the communications of the army. Nor was it possible, owing to the scarcity of macadamized roads, especially east of the line Kovno-Baranovichy-Rovno, to expect motor transport to give much real assistance to the railways. Thus the railways were, in point of fact, called upon to move all supplies for the army.¹ Such being the case, we shall limit this chapter to a survey of the work of the railways in the War.

The work which fell to them during mobilization and concentration at the theater of war was brilliantly performed. Not only were thousands of trains with troops carried to their destination as planned, but some units, during the period of concentration, were moved, on orders growing out of the advance of the enemy, far beyond the points of detrainment previously settled upon. Still other units were brought to the front more speedily than was scheduled. For the Siberian troops from three to four days were saved. Movements not foreseen by any plan were carried out without confusion, and, in some instances, were of great effect on the course of military operations. All together 3,500 trains with troops were transported by the railways, merely in the preliminary concentration.

The Next Task.

When the mobilization and strategical deployment of the army was over, work not less important and complex, made necessary by the fighting at the front, began. That work was of three sorts: (1) the transportation of supplies and reinforcements; (2) the strategical movement of troops; and (3) evacuation to the rear.

¹ The description of the work of the railways in this chapter is based on the report of General S. A. Ronzhin, formerly Chief of Communications of the army. This report is published in *Sbornik Zapisk* (*Collection of Memoranda*), repeatedly quoted above.

In the case of the first, the shipments of food, of fodder, and of clothing for the army required the greatest amount of rolling stock. The poor development of technical equipment here added much to the natural difficulties of the work. The army train was moved wholly by horses. This called for the transportation of fodder for horses that numbered hundreds of thousands. No less than five supply columns, each consisting of about 200 carts, were added to the horse-drawn equipment of every army corps; their transportation by rail called for an extra number of trains, ten for every army corps. Furthermore, owing to the absence of a refrigerating service, and to the necessity of transporting live stock instead of frozen meat, only 10 per cent of the theoretical capacity of the rolling stock could be utilized for general purposes. As a result of these two examples of the technical unpreparedness of Russia, hundreds of railway cars were moved to the front for no adequate reason.

The difficulties experienced by the railways in handling of ammunition and also technical and medical equipment were less, inasmuch as the Russian army, as compared with the armies of her Allies and the enemy, was very inadequately provided with things of this kind. Moreover, the compactness of such shipments, coupled with the fact that they were not assigned to definite units, facilitated their movement.

In the autumn of 1914, when the actual strength of the army corresponded with plans made in time of peace, the trunk lines, which were doing the main work, could master it easily. Difficulties arose in Galicia alone, where the retreating enemy had destroyed the railways and carried their rolling stock away. But these difficulties were soon ended. Traffic was restored thanks to the energetic efforts of the military engineers; and a simple means of adapting the Russian rolling stock of the standard—five-foot—gauge to the Galician lines of a narrower gauge was soon discovered.

In the winter campaign of 1914–1915 the great Russian offensive came to a halt. The directions in which supplies must be moved became stabilized, and the work of the railways went on smoothly. The only movements of trains not foreseen were those now and then made necessary by urgent shipments of ammunition, of which there had begun to be a great shortage. Nevertheless, the situation did

not seem to be alarming, and the depots near the front were filled with all manner of supplies.

The strategical transportation of troops began, as a matter of fact, as early as the period of concentration. In the autumn of 1914 and in the winter campaign of 1914–1915 these movements of troops were, relatively speaking, insignificant. Military operations were confined to Russian Poland and Galicia. Their conduct was characterized by that great strategical advantage which Russia continued to possess up to the spring of 1915—freedom of initiative. The High Command was free to make its own decisions, and the railways were assigned tasks commensurate with their powers. Whenever a hitch occurred at some terminal point, or junction, it was soon straightened out, without delay or injury to the general traffic.

Evacuation.

Evacuation in the first period of the War—up to the spring of 1915—began simultaneously with mobilization, and had for its object the removal from the frontier zone of everything which it was felt must be kept from getting into the hands of the enemy. Inasmuch as mobilization was a lengthy process, the concentration of the armed forces had to take place in a zone some distance from the frontier. It was in the section between the frontier and the zone of concentration that the evacuation of valuable State property, of documents, and of all things useful from a military standpoint, was started immediately. The personnel of government institutions and individuals desirous of leaving were also moved away. Under cover of the Russian cavalry such an evacuation was carried out successfully; it called for no extra effort on the part of the railways.

But the evacuation of the wounded in this first period of the War turned out to be work that was much more complicated than had been expected. That, from the very beginning of the War, the fighting would be on such a scale of magnitude nobody had anticipated; in consequence there were cases of great disorder during these first months. One is described by M. Rodzianko.

Soon after my arrival in Warsaw [he writes]² in the autumn of 1914, the commissioner of the Zemstvo Union, Vyrubov, called on me and

² Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

proposed that I should visit the Warsaw-Vienna railway terminus, at which 17,000 wounded from the battles of Lodz and Brzezany had been collected. There we found a heartrending scene: the platforms were covered with wounded in countless numbers. They lay in the cold rain and mud without even a litter of straw beneath them. The air was filled with their cries: "For God's sake, have our wounds dressed. We've been without dressing for five days." It should be noted that after fierce fighting they had been taken from the front in freight cars, in complete disorder, and helplessly abandoned at this Warsaw-Vienna terminus.

After the beginning of 1915 such horrifying sights were no longer to be seen, for by then the evacuation of the wounded was being carried on according to orderly and established methods.

In the summer campaign of 1915 Germany turned the full force of her military operations from the French theater of war to the Russian. In May, 1915, the combined forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary broke Russia's Galician front on the Dunaets. Under such pressure, the Russians, greatly outnumbered, were forced to retreat into the interior. This stupendous retreat lasted four months. It started in Galicia and, spreading to the north, gradually included the whole front. In the beginning of September it halted on the line Dvinsk-Luninets-Kivertsy-Radzivilov-Novoselitsy. Thus, all Russian Poland, Lithuania, a considerable section of White Russia, and nearly all that part of Galicia occupied by the Russian army in the beginning of the War, were left in the hands of the enemy.

During this retreat the railways played a most active part in the military operations. Troops were often and hastily moved by rail to sections of the front threatened by the enemy, and were sometimes detrained on the battlefield. At that time the fact that Russia no longer possessed the advantage of the initiative affected the regularity of the work of the railways; and the amount of transport work to be done and the direction it had to take were governed by the movements of the advancing enemy. But no railway work was fraught with such enormous difficulties as that called for by the evacuation. Inasmuch as the latter was closely connected with the retreat of the army, no plan could be worked out before the troops fell back. Galicia had first to be cleared. The task was not an easy one, its railways being, as said, of a narrower gauge than that of the lines in the Em-

pire. Under the circumstances to move trains to the Russian lines at the frontier stations was impracticable. It became necessary to build side-tracks, running along certain sections of the railways in the frontier zone, and thus to remove the rolling stock from Galicia. Twelve thousand cars were handled so.

But the conditions of evacuation in Russian Poland, Lithuania, and White Russia were even more difficult. Galicia was an invaded territory from which only military establishments and stores had to be moved, whereas the evacuation of the abandoned provinces of the Empire had to include, besides war materials and supplies, various property and many thousands of refugees as well. The evacuation of a single city like Warsaw with its hospitals, factories, railway shops, and administrative establishments, presented a most serious problem. This, however, constituted only a small part of the total which had to be transferred from Russian Poland and the adjoining provinces. Evacuation was begun almost simultaneously with the retreat of the troops, and alarms in the rear spread quickly. In that atmosphere the work of the railways, which had to carry out orders that were improvised, was not easy. As the signal for retreat went forth, State and private property was hastily loaded at the stations in the rear, and trains were dispatched to points further in the interior. This was often done without paying much heed to existing traffic. Owing to frequent changes in the situation, coupled with occasional interferences by army commanders, to exercise control over traffic was extremely difficult. Trains which, because of military necessity, had been dispatched from stations near the front, made it necessary to turn back other trains which were on their way, and caused a congestion of traffic. The number of trains dispatched considerably exceeded the actual capacity of the lines, and a tie-up ensued. Trains coming from the front often had to stop between stations, forming unbroken chains of cars, sometimes many miles long. The insufficient number of railway lines in the theater of war, running north and south, became painfully apparent; such lines might have diverted traffic from the main channels and relieved the pressure on the lines leading to the interior. Especially unfavorable was the situation in the northern theater of war.

The evacuation greatly impeded the transport of supplies and reinforcements. Even after the retreat had come to an end the work of

the railways remained for a considerable length of time very complex. Conditions did not become normal until the troops had settled into their new positions, the rear had been organized, and evacuation was really over.

After the Retreat of 1915.

After the summer campaign of 1915 the railways of Russian Poland, Lithuania, and the greater part of White Russia remained in the hands of the enemy. The loss of the northern section of the line Vilna-Rovno, the only railway here running north and south, was especially felt. All this made transport conditions vastly more difficult. At the same time, beginning with the autumn of 1915, the military tasks with which the railways were confronted underwent a considerable change.

The numerical strength of the army greatly increased. Up to the end of September, 1915, it fluctuated, as we know from Chapter VI. It had varied between 3,000,000 and 4,000,000. In January, 1916, it had risen to above 6,000,000; and by the end of that year it was almost 7,000,000. The length of front had also become much greater. Following the entry of Rumania into the War it was almost twice what it had been in 1914. The organization of the rear grew more complex. The depots of the bases in the north were not always provided with a sufficient stock of provisions, which necessitated shipments of supplies from the depots in the south. This called for a different make-up for the mixed supply trains at the junctions; and the latter were not sufficiently developed and equipped to enable them to do work which no one expected they would be called upon to do.

It was after the army had grown in strength that the defects of the supply system began to be most keenly felt. In the rear such defects manifested themselves in an unequal replenishing of the base depots in the south and north. Inasmuch as the former were abundantly supplied, from them provisions were sent to the north, which meant extra work for the railways. Another serious organization weakness lay in the fact that the shipments were directed not only to definite depots but sometimes even to definite army units, that is to say, they were not sufficiently "impersonal." It followed that a supply train, having reached a depot station, had to maneuver and un-

load similar supplies at various points where supplies "belonging" to this or that army unit were being stored. Even when moving from one section of the front to another units would persist in taking with them the stocks of food and fodder which "belonged" to them.

As a result, when the evacuation had been completed, the tasks imposed on the railways by the transportation of supplies were still beyond their strength. Difficulties increased in proportion as the munitions crisis came to an end, and shipments, always larger and larger, were sent to the front. From his own experience in the eighteen months during which the author was Chief of Staff of the Seventh Army (October, 1915 to April, 1917) he can testify to the fact that 25 per cent of the total supplies coming to that army had not been delivered. The blame for such non-delivery could be laid wholly upon the inadequate transport capacity of the railways. To find a way out of that chronic shortage it became necessary to set up numerous mills and workshops in the immediate rear. The following may illustrate the great and varied "individual" production organized by the Seventh Army. In the summer of 1916 it had in operation a tannery, two soap works, three tarring plants, four saw-mills, a foundry, a rifle and machine-gun repair shop, and two workshops for making carts. In the autumn of 1916 even a kerosene refinery was opened at Nadvornaya in the Carpathians. Two thousand soldiers from the front and eight thousand prisoners of Slavonic stock were employed in these works. It goes without saying that this situation was far from a normal one. It rendered the rear of the army very unwieldy; besides, in case of a retreat all the workshops and factories were bound to fall into the hands of the enemy. But no other way of solving the problem could be found. Thanks to the measures described above, the troops did not suffer from those shortages which at times non-deliveries made unavoidable.

Movement of Troops.

The increase in the transportation of supplies coincided with increased strategical movements of troops. Under the circumstances the railways were constantly overwhelmed with work. As was said above, by September, 1915, the northwestern and southwestern fronts were stabilized on the line Dvinsk-Luninets-Kivertsy-Radzi-vilov-Novoselitsy; the former was divided into two fronts: the north-

ern front, to which fell the protection of the roads leading to Petrograd, and the western front, which had to cover those leading to Moscow. This decision made necessary a regrouping of troops, which, in its turn, called for strategic troop movements toward the Dvinsk-Riga section.

In the summer of 1916 the center of military operations shifted to the southwestern front. To it heavy forces, amounting to many army corps, were sent. As this task was carried out, the insufficient number of lines running north and south was above all felt. With the loss of such railway junctions as Vilna, Lida, and Baranovichy the Russian army was—to repeat—deprived of the only direct line of communication along the front from Vilno to Rovno. And, during a certain period, detour lines (Dvinsk-Polotsk-Molodechno-Gomel and, to go further, either Luninets-Rovno, or Bakhmach-Kiev-Kazatin) had to be used to move troops in a southerly direction. Such poor connections were, of course, far from adequate. Therefore, despite the unfavorable season, the following work was undertaken and carried on under all pressure: the building of a branch line (Sinyavka-Budy) encircling Baranovichy, the completion of the northern section of the Podolsk line (Kalinkovichy-Korosten), and the construction of a wooden bridge across the Pripet. When this had been done the situation improved somewhat. Although, in 1916, several thousand military trains were moved to the southwestern front, the number of transported troops was smaller than that called for by the strategic conditions. One of the reasons why the Russian victory in Galicia in 1916 did not bring such strategic results as might have been expected lay in the fact that the railways were not in a position to carry all the troops needed.

Rumania Joins the Allies.

By the autumn of 1916, after two years of strenuous work, new transport difficulties began to arise. The percentage of engines out of commission grew larger. The exchange of cars between the lines in the theater of war and those in the interior was functioning poorly. The railways needed a rest, to enable them to procure the supplies they needed and regulate the exchange of rolling stock. However, no sooner were the heavy movements of troops to the southwestern front at an end, than the transport service was called

upon to do work arising from new strategic conditions and demanding the utmost effort: in September, 1916, Rumania entered the War on the side of the Allies.

In accordance with an agreement to conduct military operations jointly, the Russian High Command was to transport a Russian army corps to the Dobruja, as also to ship to Rumania munitions which, sent from overseas to a Russian port, had been intended for the Rumanian army. But, in the very beginning the operations of Rumania's army ended in decisive defeat; and, a few weeks after it had entered the War, it was forced to evacuate Wallachia and the Dobruja. The rolling stock of the Rumanian railways in the provinces occupied by the enemy was removed into Moldavia. As a result, the Rumanian lines were so congested that traffic almost ceased. Communication along the Danube was also impracticable, the right side of the river being in the hands of the enemy. The situation of the Rumanian army, which had now retreated to Moldavia, was very serious. Despite the small capacity of the lines in Bessarabia—the Russian province bordering on Rumania—and the difficulties experienced by the whole system of Russian railways, the Russian army had to give its assistance to Rumania, assistance, too, which was vastly greater than what had been agreed upon.

Russian troops from the southwestern front were got to Rumania partly by marching, partly by rail; troops from the western and northern fronts were also sent. The transportation of the latter was fraught with especial difficulties both for the troops and the railways. Owing to the congestion of the lines in the theater of war, most of the trains carrying troops from the north had to be sent circuitously to Rumania (*via* Bakhmach-Cherkasy-Odessa and, further, through Razdelnaya-Bendery), a distance of more than 1,000 miles. Due to the persistent demands of Russian General Headquarters, the moving of these trains was being done in the quickest possible way: the trains made the briefest halts, which had its effect upon the regularity of the feeding of the troops. The number of cars per train was increased to fifty. The number of men assigned to a car was—though it was winter—in accordance with summer regulations. All these measures did not bring the expected results. But the continued and extraordinary strain imposed upon the railways produced its effect. Congestion at junction points became frequent.

Sometimes traffic was so seriously affected that the troops that had been moved by rail had to leave the trains and start marching, regardless of the fact that the roads in that season of the year were in very bad condition. In proportion as the number of Russian troops in Rumania grew, greater numbers of supply trains had to follow them, and the difficulties of strategic transportation increased. In winter, so many troops were moved to the Rumanian front that the lines in Bessarabia, though extraordinary efforts were made, could not deliver the daily stock of necessary supplies.

At the end of 1915 working conditions on the railways were somewhat relieved by the fact that evacuation of whole territories was no longer necessary. The partial evacuation of the Riga region was carried out systematically and under conditions relatively normal.

The evacuation of the wounded and sick continued as before. From the beginning of the War up to October 10, 1917, 1,425,000 sick and 2,875,000 wounded had been moved.³

Other Aspects of the Problem.

Besides the transport work described above—that of handling supplies and reënforcements, and also strategic movements and evacuation—the railways were engaged in numerous tasks of secondary importance. Among them the carrying of men granted leave and those sent on missions must be mentioned. Due to the long duration of the War the number of those given leave was growing large. The number sent on missions was also considerable, owing to the somewhat primitive system of supplies. Clothing was often delivered from stores located far in the interior of the country. Army units, fearing that all the supplies needed would not be delivered, made a practice of sending their men to the rear to make the necessary purchases. And in the end, men had to be assigned to accompany every shipment from the rear. As a result, thousands of soldiers daily traveled by rail.

Rolling stock was also used for purposes other than transportation. For example, trains and single cars were used as armored trains and armored cars; trains were equipped and used as bath-

³ *Trudi (Proceedings)* of the Commission for the Investigation of the Effects upon Public Health of the War of 1914–1920, p. 159.

houses, as laundries, shops, pharmacies, etc. The conditions peculiar to the Russian theater of war made it necessary to assign a considerable number of railway cars for such purposes.

But, along with the productive use of cars, cases of the misuse of the rolling stock could be seen. Such cases were due to the desire of almost every more important headquarters to have permanently at its disposal special trains for housing its personnel, offices, stores, etc. In 1916, when the forces were divided into four fronts and thirteen armies, the number of cars, mostly passenger coaches, so used was considerable. Although General Headquarters took measures with a view to regulate this abuse, General Ronzhin writes:⁴

the commanding personnel [of the armies and fronts] did not give such support as they should have to the legitimate requests of the Chief of Communications. An insufficient acquaintance with the nature of railways, on the part of certain military leaders, and the desire to be comfortably lodged in private cars, in the case of others, were equally bad for the railways . . .

Discipline and the instinct to give careful handling to technical equipment, so indispensable when the latter is in general use, could not have been deeply rooted in Russia. A soldier who takes no care of his rifle and throws away cartridges in order to carry a lighter load, and a general unnecessarily holding back rolling stock, are phenomena of the same kind. There is no doubt that such phenomena were a heavy burden on a country that was poorly provided with technical resources.

Lack of Coördination.

Even at General Headquarters any clear comprehension of the conditions on which the most productive utilization of modern mechanical equipment depends, was lacking. The division of the whole net of railways into two sharply defined parts, which was prescribed by the "Regulations for the Administration of the Army in the Field"—general rules drawn up in haste, but to which General Headquarters strictly adhered—may serve as a proof.

According to these regulations, all railroads in the area declared to be a theater of military operations were placed under the abso-

⁴ Ronzhin, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

lute control of the military authorities. That area included vast stretches of territory to the west of the line Petrograd-Smolensk and of the Dnieper. As soon as war was declared, the management of the railways in the theater of war was taken from the Minister of Transport, and they were subordinated to the Chief of Communications of the Army, whose office was attached to General Headquarters. Moreover, with a view to safeguarding the uninterrupted functioning of the railways in the theater of war and to provide the necessary rolling stock in cases calling for heavy movements of troops, a considerable percentage of locomotives, cars, and flat-cars were taken out of the hands of the Minister of Transport.

It turned out that such a simplified plan worked against the interests of the State as a whole. The reduced number of locomotives and cars at the disposal of the Ministry created conditions very difficult for the successful operation of the railways in the interior. Furthermore, there were many instances where the military authorities retained rolling stock, which had been moved to the theater of war from the interior. In the first part of the War, when all rolling stock was in good condition, and shipments of supplies from the interior were made on a comparatively small scale, the evil effects of the division of the railway system were not strongly felt. But, as the percentage of locomotives and cars in need of repair increased and traffic grew heavier, the condition of the railways under the control of the Minister of Transport went from bad to worse. In the latter part of 1916, when the railways were overburdened with work, the traffic in the interior was completely upset. Due to this fact, general discontent was growing. The following, written by M. Rodzianko,⁵ in which he describes the state of things in the country about three months before the Revolution, is of especial significance:

The supply organization was becoming worse and worse. The towns were short of food, the peasants could not buy boots; yet all felt that there was plenty of everything in Russia, and that the shortage was due to the chaos prevailing throughout the country. While Moscow and Petrograd had no meat, the papers wrote of great consignments of frozen meat which had accumulated at the railway stations in Siberia. Such supplies of food—and they amounted to more than 500,000 puds, were bound to be ruined as soon as the mild weather returned. All ef-

⁵ Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, pp. 157 *sqq.*

forts on the part both of the zemstvo organizations and of private individuals were wrecked by the criminal indifference or incompetence of the authorities. Each minister or senior official laid the blame on someone else, and those actually guilty could never be discovered. For the improvement of the food supply in the large centers the Government could think of nothing more effective than a temporary suspension of passenger traffic. This, too, proved a scandalous failure. After one of these stoppages the locomotives were found to be out of order: the water had not been run off, there had been a freeze-up, and the pipes had burst; instead of improving, the transport problem became still worse. The zemstvos and trade organizations attempted to convene special food-supply conferences, but these were prohibited by the Government. The local supply officials, who vainly sought to obtain instructions from the various ministries, used to come in despair to consult the President of the Duma, who, in the absence of the Duma itself, embodied the principle of national representation.

In the end of 1916 an effort was made to put all railways, those in the theater of war as well as those in the interior, under the control of one man. With that object in view the post of an Assistant Minister of Transport was created; his office was to be established at General Headquarters and he was to receive the necessary instruction from the Chief of the Communications of the Army. Although this measure contributed to the elimination of friction between the Ministry of Transport and the military authorities, it could not at once improve the transport organization: the available rolling stock, which, by the beginning of 1917 had become still less, was entirely insufficient for the needs of the army, the strength of which had largely increased.

The Effects of the Revolution.

When, following the outbreak of the Revolution in the spring of 1917, general collapse set in, the transport service fell into such disorder that its restoration to normal conditions was out of the question. Anarchy, absence of labor discipline, and chaos prevailed. As early as July, 1917, the Government itself considered the situation of the railways as catastrophic. It can best be illustrated by the following quotation from a report of the Chief of the Transport Service of the General Staff of July 17, 1917:

The situation of the railways is desperate, and is daily growing

worse. Just as in the army, discipline is rapidly breaking down. Labor productivity has fallen. One of the causes of the failure to repair the locomotives lay in the fact that half the boiler-makers stopped work to busy themselves on the committees, while the total number of railway employees on committees amounts to 6,000. The number of locomotives under repair, which normally was 15 per cent of the total, and during 1916 and January-March, 1917, was 18 per cent, began to increase rapidly after the outbreak of the Revolution, and in July, 1917, it was 24 per cent. Many locomotives, still in use, are not in a condition to continue operating; if measures to increase the productivity of work are not taken, the situation will, before winter sets in, end in calamity. The development of railway junctions and the construction of second tracks, undertaken and carried out for the purpose of increasing the traffic, proved of no value inasmuch as the capacity to move rolling stock was falling off.

A comparison of the figures for this year and those for 1916 shows that . . . during the six months of this year 700,000,000 puds of freight were not shipped. The average number of cars loaded daily, which in 1916 was about 37,200, is now about 31,800, that is, it had decreased by 5,400. In 1916 the number of cars detained daily, ran from 3,000 to 4,000. Now the average is between 5,000 and 7,000. There have been cases where, owing to the lack of engines, the rolling stock has been abandoned while the train was on its way. In this respect the condition of the Tomsk Railroad is so bad that freight shipped from Vladivostok had had to be reduced from 150 cars to 50 cars a day; this was the only way to clear that line of stalled cars belonging to the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Baikal Railroads. The shortage of engines everywhere affects the shipment of supplies in general and of fuel and provisions in particular. In the first half of this year, due to conditions on the railways, 100,000,000 puds of coal could not be shipped, and the huge amounts, unshipped, accumulated in May and June . . .

Coal production is decreasing, apparently, despite the fact that the average number of miners in the Donets coal field in 1916 was 220,000, whereas it is now 270,000, and, at times it has been 285,000. This decreased production must be attributed to the smaller number of working days, now reduced to fourteen a month; as a result, the average output of a worker has fallen from 550 puds a month, in 1916, to 350 puds.

The general picture of the collapse of transport will be incomplete if the chaos caused by unruly soldiers who had deserted and

were returning home, be left out of consideration. The following telegram is one of thousands received in the summer of 1917 by railway officials. It was sent on May 30, 1917, to the station master of Samodurovka, on the southwestern railroad, by one of his subordinates:

Train No. 28, made up of fifteen ears filled with soldiers granted leave, arrived at the crossing and was waiting for train No. 3. The soldiers, standing about me and threatening my life, demanded that I despatch their train immediately, and stop train No. 3 approaching the crossing. When train No. 3 arrived they wanted me to uncouple its engine and couple it, as a second engine, to train No. 28. When I argued that No. 3 was a mail train and could not be left without an engine, they threatened that they would bring me to reason. I succeeded in convincing them only when I told them that the second engine would have to be coupled backwards and would merely lower the speed. Next, they took me along to the engine of train No. 28 and threatened to throw the engine-driver into the fire-box if he did not make the train go faster. Most of the soldiers were drunk. Under such circumstances service becomes impossible; life is in danger. I request you to protect me from violence in the future, and to send trains, on which soldiers on leave are riding, under strong escort. Signed: Dorokhov.⁶

Soldiers "on leave" during the revolutionary period were for the most part deserters, and constituted a real scourge for the railways. General Knox found it necessary to point to that evil in one of his dispatches to his Government.

Guehkov's concession of leave to 5 per cent of the soldiers up to 40 years of age, and to 15 per cent of those over that age [he reported]⁷ means that the trains are constantly stormed by crowds of undisciplined soldiery. The crowd [sits] on the roofs, and their special delight is to ease themselves through the ventilators if there are "bourgeois" in the compartment below. They make short work of any railway official who ventures to interfere.

In the same dispatch, which was evidently based on the data of the General Staff, General Knox says, further:

The madness of electing chiefs has, of course, penetrated to the rail-

⁶ *Razlozhenie Armii v 1917 Godu*, pp. 22-23.

⁷ Dispatch D. 3, August 10, 1917; in the Archives of the War Office, London.

way department. Many of the directors have been dismissed by the men. A conference of railway employees now sitting at Moscow has decided to abolish the Ministry of Ways and to rule the railways by committees elected by the men.

But, of special interest are the concluding sentences in the dispatch, which proved prophetic in the full meaning of this word: "Of course," he wrote, "the first requirement is the reëstablishment of discipline. If this is not done no power on earth will save Russia from catastrophe. The only doubt is whether the crash will come in the autumn or in the winter."

Railway Construction.

From all that has been said above, it follows that in the demesne of transport, as in those of organization and supply, Russia was not equal to the demands of modern warfare. However, it would be a mistake to draw the conclusion that in this lay the main cause of the breakdown of transport at the beginning of the Revolution. The main cause lay in the fact that the task confronting the railways proved to be beyond their strength. From Table 21 it may clearly be seen how great was the effort made during the War to increase transportation facilities.

TABLE 21

*Railway Construction during the War up to September 15, 1917.**

<i>Lines</i>	<i>New construction</i>	<i>Double tracked</i>	<i>Gauges changed (in versts)</i>	<i>Total</i>
In operation	3,290	1,195	273	4,758
Under construction	2,843	726	81	3,650
Construction halted	389	586	..	975
In territory occupied by the enemy	384	384
Total	6,522	2,507	738	9,767

* *Rossya v Mirovoi Voine*, p. 60.

To these figures the construction of field railways of a lighter type should be added. On September 1, 1917, 2,252 versts of such railways were built, 608 versts were under construction, while 1,917 versts were operated.

Trade Routes.

This survey would be incomplete if we did not deal with the conditions under which supplies shipped from overseas during the War were delivered in Russia. Communication with the outside world could be maintained only through Vladivostok and Archangel. The ice-free Murmansk had no rail connection in the beginning of the War. Even had this line then been completed, much time would have been needed for the construction of a port.

Vladivostok, though inadequately equipped for the unloading and storing of large consignments of heavy freight, was nevertheless a first-class port. But only freight shipped from Japan and America could be sent to Vladivostok. For a long time, shipments from America were limited, inasmuch as almost her whole tonnage was concentrated in the Atlantic. During 1915 and 1916, therefore, Archangel was the main port to which oversea shipments for Russia were sent.

The equipment of the port of Archangel was also unequal to the task laid upon it by the War. For several months it was ice-bound and inaccessible, and the section from Archangel to Vologda was of narrow gauge and most limited cargo-carrying capacity. The fact that regular communications with Archangel could not be maintained all the year round, and oversea goods must arrive before navigation closed, meant that goods, ready for shipment, accumulated and were stored at home. When finally shipments were made, it was sometimes found that supplies other than those urgently needed at the front had been sent first. Under these difficult conditions the ignorance in high places of how things should be done to meet modern requirements was especially felt.

M. Rodzianko gives the following example.⁸

Scandalous abuses were uncovered by the Special Council for National Defense in the port of Archangel. As far back as the beginning of the War the Duma had been informed that the transport of supplies from Archangel over the narrow-gauge railway was very difficult, and that the port was crammed with stores. Supplies from America, England and France were piled mountain high and could not be moved to the interior. At the very outset of the War Litvinov-Falinsky had warned the Government of the appalling state the port was in. A heavy

⁸ Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, pp. 100 *sqq.*

consignment of British coal was expected for the Petrograd factories, but there was no place even to store it. In spite of the fact that Archangel was the only military port which linked us with the Allies, no particular thought had been given to its proper equipment. The subject was raised at one of the very first meetings of the Special Council, and the question of what was to be done was put to the Government. The Government, in the persons of Ministers Sukhomlinov, Rukhlov and Shakhovskoy, either wrote non-committal answers, or made verbal promises which came to nothing. Towards the end, the accumulation of goods was such that packing cases lying on the ground were literally sinking into the soil owing to the sheer weight of the stores piled on top of them.

Although the gauge of the Archangel line was changed to the standard width, traffic could not be increased to the degree that was necessary. The situation after Rumania entered the War became even worse, inasmuch as a percentage of the very limited number of trains of the Archangel railway had to be assigned for the transport of oversea shipments to the Rumanian army. The only way to clear the port was to send most of America's shipments to Vladivostok. This was done at the end of 1916. But the Trans-Siberian Railway was unable to carry the burden, and in 1917 Vladivostok in its turn was piled with freight. Here again the conditions of modern war proved too much for the Government.

An Allied mission [says Rodzianko]⁹ arrived in Petrograd towards the end of January for the purpose of coördinating operations during the approaching spring campaign. Joint conferences were held with the Allied delegates, at which the absolute ignorance of Belaev, the Minister of War, was fully revealed. He and also some of our other ministers found themselves in an extremely awkward situation so far as our Allies were concerned; they had failed on many points to reach a preliminary understanding among themselves, and lacked present knowledge even of their own departments. This was particularly noticeable in the case of orders placed abroad. After listening for a long time in silence to our Ministers' arguments, Lord Milner finally asked: "What is the amount of the orders you intend to place?" He was told. "And what tonnage do you require to transport it?" On receiving the answer he remarked: "Then let me tell you that you are asking for just one-fifth of the tonnage you require."

⁹ Rodzianko, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

CHAPTER X

THE SPIRIT OF THE ARMY BEFORE THE REVOLUTION

(Campaigns of 1914, 1915, and 1916.)

Response to the Mobilization.

COLONEL ENGELHARDT was quoted above¹ as saying that he "did not think that a certain access of patriotism, which at the moment of the declaration of war developed among the people of the capital, was any measure of the actual attitude of the nation." On grounds of his personal observations he reached the conclusion that "from the beginning . . . the Russian peasant served unwillingly."

Very different were the impressions which Rodzianko set down in his reminiscences.

On my return to Petrograd, just before the declaration of war [we read],² the change in the mood of the population of the capital struck me. "Who are those people," I asked myself with amazement, "walking the streets in crowds, carrying national flags, singing the national anthem and making demonstrations in front of the Serbian Legation?" I took a walk in the street, mingled with the crowd, spoke with some people, and learned, to my surprise, that they were workmen, the very same factory workers who a few days ago were damaging telegraph poles, overturning street cars and building barricades. To my question how such a change had come about, they replied: "What took place a short time ago was a family dispute. We thought that reforms that affected us came too slowly through the Duma, and we decided that we would see to it that they were passed. But now all Russia is involved. We want to rally to our Tsar as to our emblem, and we shall follow him, to make certain of victory over the Germans." Agrarian and other unrest at once abated, and the figures below bear eloquent testimony to the patriotic enthusiasm which prevailed in those anxious days. Ninety-six per cent of those called out reported for duty; they did not hold

¹ See above, p. 122.

² M. V. Rodzianko, *Gosudarstvennaya Duma i Fevral'skaya 1917 Goda Revolyutsiya* (*The Duma and the Revolution of February 1917*) in *Arkhiv Russkoi Revolyutsii*, VI, 17.

back, and later they fought bravely. At the session of the Duma of July 26, 1914, all party differences were forgotten, all members of the Duma were at one as to the necessity of carrying the war to a victorious end, and were resolved to uphold the Government unconditionally. All, without distinction of nationality, realized that the War was a war of the whole nation, that it must be so to the last, and that the defeat of the intolerable German militarism was an absolute necessity.

It goes without saying that in the evaluation of such a complex phenomenon as the mood of a nation strict impartiality can hardly be expected. The personal feelings of one participant in events inevitably color his account of them. But the above quotation is important because it contains a tangible fact: 96 per cent of those subject to military service reported for duty. Inasmuch as the exact registration of reservists was difficult, one could safely say that the difference between the estimated and the actual number might be as much as 12 to 15 per cent. Consequently, cases of evasion of the draft during mobilization were, probably, almost none.

It would seem that Rodzianko came nearer the truth than Engelhardt. The latter, when writing his monograph, could not get away from the pessimism left in him by the Revolution he had just been through; nor was he able to draw the line between phenomena that were local and transient, and those that were fundamental. General Danilov writes:³

The Russian people proved they were unprepared for the War, psychologically. Most of the people—the peasants—hardly understood what they were going to war for. Its aims were not clear to them. The peasants answered the call because they were wont to do everything the Government ordered them to do; they bore their cross patiently and passively till the final ordeal came. Because of insufficient training the feelings of the majority of our young and untaught people could not remain steadfast. Their feelings, like the quickly changing moods of a child who often smiles when the tears are still upon his face, were subject to frequent fluctuations. Nor could the mass of the people have developed a sense of national unity under the existing conditions. Because of the many races, the vast size of the country, the sparsity of the population and the poor communications, the implanting of such a sense was an extremely difficult task. Even the portion of the popula-

³ Danilov, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–112.

tion that was pure Russian had no sense of unity. "We are of Vyatka, or of Tula, or of Perm. The Germans won't come so far as our province!"—such were the words in which the attitude of the peasant towards a general threat to the State often, and with a good enough reason, expressed itself.

The intelligentsia likewise had no adequate conception of duty. This is best proven by the great number of them who sought for the opportunity or the possibility either of evading military service altogether, or of at least escaping service at the front, by finding themselves work in the rear. Our Mobilization Division was flooded with requests and petitions to grant exemptions from service or at any rate deferments. Still worse was the fact that not only were such evasions not swept aside by the Government, but they were not even branded, morally, as they should have been. On the contrary, the attitude of society was one of criminal complaisance. It often happened that those who had dug themselves in, in the rear, were given protection, were taken care of, and even efforts were made to have their indefensible position approved and made a permanency.

Moreover, the dark sides of mobilization have also been dealt with by General Dobrorolsky, former head of the Mobilization Division. He writes⁴ that during mobilization local disorders occurred among the mobilized men of the provinces of Tomsk, Perm, Orel, and Mogilev. He puts special emphasis on the great number

of petitions and requests, written as well as verbal, for exemptions and deferments, which were submitted through the Mobilization Division to the Minister of War. These requests were made not by the common people, but by individuals belonging to society and to the bourgeoisie. . . . The evil was combated, but, it must be admitted, largely with little effect. Favoritism was one of the deep cankers of Russian life; it could be fought with success only by the united efforts of the whole population. . . . To make it an issue during the strenuous days of mobilization was out of the question.

That this outstanding evil existed even in Russian intellectual circles we already know from preceding chapters. But we have here quoted the testimony of both Danilov and Dobrorolsky for the purpose of comparing their statements on this anomaly with their gloomy characterizations of the attitude of the Russian masses.

⁴ Dobrorolsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 114–115.

The disorders among the mobilized men which occurred in four different provinces are no good reason for making generalizations that include the whole of Russia. The very fact that those disorders, according to the statement of General Dobrorolsky himself, consisted in "the men storming locked wine-shops and government wine-cellars, and stripping them of their liquor"⁵ testifies not to their unwillingness to go to war, but to the crude simplicity of the mass of the Russian people. That in the beginning of the War there were no instances of evading military service among them—though such was not true of the educated—no more convincing proof can be given than the figures quoted above: "96 per cent of those called out reported for military duty."

Here is a fact cited by A. I. Kuprin, one of the foremost of contemporary Russian writers. During mobilization, as a reserve officer, he was made a member of the examining board in one of the districts of Petrograd province; and he states that there were many cases of reservists, who, when they appeared before the board, refused to be examined, declared they were physically fit, and did not want the members of the board to waste time examining them.

An Explanation of the Popular Attitude.

Whoever remembered Russia's war with Japan was struck with the enormous difference between the attitude of the people in 1904 and that in 1914. The vital stimulus, in 1914, which incited all classes to take up arms, was the conviction that Germany was the aggressor. The peaceful feelings of the Russian Government, so far as Germany was concerned, were well known. No suspicions, then, like those which existed during the Russo-Japanese War, could arise. The instinct of social self-protection had been aroused by the German menace. Another thing, and one easy for the common people to understand, was this: The War had its beginning in Serbia's having to defend her right of existence; and Serbia was linked to Russia by ties of blood and religion. This had nothing in common with the Panslavism which was frequently spoken of by Kaiser Wilhelm with a view to encouraging the Austrians to make an end of independent Serbia; it was sympathy for the "little brother" made the victim of injustice. This feeling was centuries old, having been instilled in the

⁵ Dobrorolsky, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

Russian people by a long succession of wars with Turkey for the liberation of the Slavonic nations. Tales of those who had participated in the various campaigns of that lasting struggle had been passed on from generation to generation, and they made beloved subject matter for village talk. They were responsible for the sort of national chivalry that was peculiarly Russian. It found its expression in the name "little brother," which the Russian soldier, holding himself to be the protector of oppressed Slavonic nations, had given to the Bulgarian and the Serbian during their wars of liberation, a name which had become a part of the speech of the Russian people. Now, instead of the Turks, it was the Germans who threatened to crush the Serbians, and it was also the Germans who had attacked Russia. The connection was one absolutely clear to the common sense of the Russian masses.

Under the influence of the events of 1917, which were a nightmare, many Russian intellectuals were ready to deny, as did Danilov and Dobrorolsky, that patriotism existed in the people. The phrase mentioned by Danilov, "We are of Vyatka, or Tula, or Perm. The Germans won't come to our province," was one in the mouths of soldiers who did not want to fight, and one heard in the meetings of 1917. It must not be forgotten that such words were not heard until after three years of bloody endeavors to win the War, and not before the Revolution had overthrown the Government, and there had set in a general disintegration of the State. Is it possible that any reader who remembers our chapter on the losses of the Russian army, can doubt the patriotism, the readiness to lay down their lives, that was shown by the bulk of the soldiers? The blood of the millions who were killed or wounded for their country cries out against such charges. What of the 260,000 Russian prisoners who tried to escape from the camps in Germany? Although the present author felt as he does now, even before he began to write this book, frankly, that picture of Russian prisoners bent on getting away from the enemy's country, went beyond anything he had ever looked for. The same chapter testifies to the gallantry of the Russian officers, though the latter represented the educated.

But, even as in the case of the educated, there were those among the masses who were incapable of giving up their lives. Of course, the percentage they represented is all-important, and there is no

way of learning what it was. But the various analyses we have made in preceding chapters justify us in claiming that that percentage could not have differed much from what it was in the Allied armies. There was a difference, but it was of another kind. The western allies of Russia, due to the better education of their lower classes, had a more conscious understanding of what patriotism meant. In this respect Danilov is right when he likens the feelings of the Russian people to those of a child. In the first years of the War the political ideals of the millions of Russian soldiers found their full expression in the formula: "For faith, and Tsar and country"; and many writers now seek to prove that the loyalty to the throne of Russia's common people had been exaggerated. We shall not argue: the swiftness with which the monarchy fell in March, 1917, seems confirmation enough. But it is equally true that the Revolution, as it further developed, did not lead to the establishment of a democratic *régime*; the latter lasted only eight months, and fell as quickly as did that of Tsardom, to be succeeded by another despotism. This shows that the national ideals of the masses were at least not what they were supposed to be by the country's educated classes, who were thinking in terms of western Europe.

The "Ritual" Aspect of Russian Patriotism.

The formula: "For faith, and Tsar and country," was, for the bulk of the common people in 1914, the voicing of a kind of national ritual. To understand the importance of ritual in our popular psychology, it suffices to recall the dominant significance of the "rite" in the field of religious feeling. This could be confirmed by everyday observation, and it had also been made plain by the history of religious movements in Russia. In the case of such movements the masses joined them only when questions of "rites" were involved. This enormous importance attached to ritual unquestionably grew out of the bond that bound the Russian people to the Orient. It was a case of mysticism as manifested in a backward people, for it should be borne in mind that the soul of the mystic is prone to see in rites something more than their external form; it is something that has a deeper meaning, one that cannot be conceived of by human reason; and the people have faith in it. It is only when that faith has been shattered that such ritual ceases to be effective and bursts like a

soap bubble. Then the popular soul, swayed by mysticism, goes through a crisis—and again goes looking for a new ritual that it can believe in. In this lay the secret of the abrupt change which occurred in 1917, and in this was the essence of the Revolution.

We would stress the fact that the inner, the psychological nature of Russian patriotism differed from that of any western European nation. Russian patriotism was of a much more primitive sort. It was—if such an expression may be used—raw material, out of which those more complex varieties found in France, Great Britain, and America might have grown. When patriotism is primitive, its social importance is not well understood; as a result, no social control can be exercised; and the absence of such control could be seen not only among those who had little education, but among the educated as well. General Dobrorolsky has been quoted above as saying that the tendency among the educated classes to evade military service was combated, “but, it must be admitted, with little effect. . . . It could be fought with success only by the united efforts of the whole population.” This was not done in Russia. Thus, what we say of the primitive nature of Russian patriotism is not limited to the lower classes; it holds good with the upper as well.

But, in 1914, Russia was called upon to enter a stupendous struggle, and it was to take its course under the extremely complex conditions of modern life. Such a test was for the Russian people and this primitive patriotism a test incomparably harder than it was for those nations of western Europe who were better aware of what was taking place.

Respective Strength of Armed Forces.

We shall now attempt to estimate the respective strengths of the armed forces which faced each other in the beginning of the campaign of 1914 in Russia's western theater of war. The fighting strength of its army constitutes the fundamental basis on which the military power of a State depends. In our modern era of fire tactics and the predominant importance of artillery, the strength of an army is determined by the number of its infantry divisions. Every infantry division represents a combination of artillery, machine-gun, and infantry fire which should be considered the foundation of fighting strength.

At the outbreak of the War there were in Russia 70 infantry divisions and 19 brigades. On the call for mobilization the formation of 35 infantry divisions of the second line began. Thus, according to the calculations of the Ministry of War, the fighting strength of the army was equal to 114½ infantry divisions. But this would convey a correct idea of the actual fighting strength of Russia only if each infantry division represented the most effective combination of artillery, machine-gun, and infantry fire. This may be roughly illustrated in this way: An infantry division which is made up of many men, but has no guns, is of little value as a fighting unit. Similarly a division consisting only of artillery could not be considered an independent fighting unit.

At the beginning of the War a certain combination of guns and men was considered more effective than any other. In the Russian army there were sixteen battalions in a division, in the German, twelve. However, with the first campaign it became clear that an excessive amount of infantry tended to render the division unwieldy, and was the cause of heavier losses. Therefore, in the middle of the War the Russian division was reduced to twelve battalions, and this reduction did not affect its fighting strength. Again, when the War began, Russian batteries were eight guns strong, whereas there were only six in a German battery. But the first battles showed that the firing strength of a battery of quick-firing guns remained almost the same whether it consisted of four guns or a greater number. In the course of the War the Russian battery accordingly became one of six guns, and again the firing strength of a Russian division was not diminished.

From war experience it became obvious that the Germans had found the most effective combination of men and firing equipment for the infantry division of the first line. Therefore, and the better to estimate the real strength of the Russian army, we shall take the fighting strength of the German infantry division of the first line as our unit ("yardstick").

In Chapter III we pointed out that for every German infantry division, of the first line, there were 14 batteries of divisional and corps artillery. The number of batteries in the German infantry divisions of the second line—the reserve divisions—was smaller, being 8. In the *Landwehr* units the number was still less, being 6, or even 4, bat-

teries to a division. But if we take into consideration the fact that the German heavy field artillery was, at the beginning of the War, 381 batteries strong, we get an average of 14 batteries to every German infantry division. As to the number of batteries to every Russian division, including those of the second line, it was only seven, counting both the corps artillery and the 60 batteries of heavy field artillery.

Thus, a Russian infantry division of the first line, so far as its artillery fire was concerned, possessed just one-half the strength of a German infantry division of the first line. Furthermore, there exists a certain limit, as was pointed out above, beyond which the numerical strength of infantry in a division must not be increased. Further increase has almost no effect on the fighting strength of the division. In 1914, 12 battalions would have been considered such a limit. This was the number of battalions in a German infantry division.⁶ Therefore, we feel justified in asserting that the actual strength of a Russian infantry division was equal not to a whole but only to a half "unit of fighting strength," as established above. This, in its turn, leads to the conclusion that in 1914 the fighting strength of the Russian army, estimated at 114½ divisions, in point of fact amounted only to 60 units. This, too, also tallies exactly with an authoritative statement of General Manikovsky to the effect that the War called for artillery twice as strong as what had been scheduled for the army.

Of that 114½ Russian infantry divisions 94½ were concentrated against Germany and Austria-Hungary. The remainder were left in the Caucasus inasmuch as the participation of Turkey in the War was expected, and also for the protection of other frontiers. But the concentration of these 94½ divisions had to be carried out gradually. By the fifteenth day of mobilization, concentration was complete in the case of 27; by the twenty-third day 52 had concentrated; by the sixtieth, 90½; and by the eighty-fifth day, 94½, or the equivalent of 47 fighting units.

In the meantime it had been possible to deploy the German and Austro-Hungarian forces as early as the fifteenth day of mobilization. In reality the concentration of the Austro-Hungarian army

⁶ A division of the line, according to the latest terminology.

was completed somewhat later because the Hapsburg Empire had launched an attack on Siberia. But the delay was one of only a few days. As to Germany, the bulk of her forces, as is known, were, in the beginning of the War, directed against France. To meet Russia there were left something more than 20 infantry divisions.⁷ The forces of Austria-Hungary consisted of 37½ infantry divisions, two *Landsturm* divisions and thirteen *Landsturm* brigades, a total of 46 infantry divisions.⁸

The actual strength of an Austro-Hungarian infantry division may be considered to have equaled that of a Russian infantry division, that is, of a half unit. The combined fighting strength of both the German and Austro-Hungarian forces was: Germany, twenty infantry divisions with a unit strength of fifteen;⁹ and Austria, forty-six divisions, with a unit strength of twenty-three, or thirty-eight units in all.

As we compare these figures with those immediately above them, we see that Russia, doing her utmost and in spite of the fact that the main forces of Germany were directed against France, was unable to concentrate forces equal to the combined strength of the Central Powers in the course of the second month. Yet that Russia was a colossus that could easily crush the enemy force facing her was a belief that was widespread not only in the general public but in governing circles as well. That such a belief had even taken root in offi-

⁷ According to an official German source these forces consisted of seventeen infantry divisions (*Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg, 1914-1918* [Berlin, 1925], Vol. II, annex I). To these, however, we must add the *Landwehr* and *Ersatz* units remaining in the fortresses of Posen, Thorn, Kulm, Graudenz, Marienburg, and Königsberg. The formation of these units was begun in the first days of the War.

According to General E. Buat (*L'armée allemande pendant la guerre de 1914-1918*) (Paris, 1920) the forces sent by the Germans against Russia amounted to 26 infantry divisions. Inasmuch as the formation of some of these units was completed within a month, the present author estimates that the total German force on her eastern front at the beginning of the War amounted to at least 20 divisions.

⁸ *Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918*, II, 336.

⁹ Inasmuch as among the German infantry divisions, operating against Russia there were also reserve divisions and *Landwehr* brigades, in which the artillery was somewhat weaker, the actual strength of the German forces has been taken as equal not to 20 but to 15 units.

cial circles in France is sufficiently proved by the following telegram sent on September 4, 1914, by M. Izvolsky, the Russian Ambassador in Paris, to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs:¹⁰

The respective roles to be played by allied armies of France and Russia in the case of Germany, are defined at the present moment as follows: The French are advancing, though confronted by five-sixths of the German forces, while we are held back by one-sixth of them. This, of course, is explained by the fact that we must fight two enemies, one of whom, Austria, brought against us all the strength she had. The complete rout of Austria here causes the greatest joy, but both public and military circles are convinced that Russia is powerful enough to master her sixth of the German forces, irrespective of her operations against Austria. . . . I do not feel that I have the right to withhold that criticism and not to warn you of a possible misunderstanding, not to speak of a complete divergence of opinion between us and the French, who are convinced that, at the present moment, France must, almost alone, face the onslaught of the German colossus. . . .

The very war plan worked out in Russia was based on an overestimate of her forces. Instead of concentrating all her efforts against one of her enemies in order to be able, after the defeat of that one, to throw the full strength of the army against the other, Sukhomlinov and his collaborators set themselves the task of dealing decisive blows both against the Austro-Hungarians, concentrating in Galicia, and against the Germans in East Prussia, that is, to conduct operations along two divergent lines. Such an overestimate of forces by the General Staff naturally had the result that the French immediately began to make demands which were beyond Russia's strength. No better proof of this can be given than the telegrams sent by the Russian Military Attaché in Paris, Count Ignatiev, during the first months of the War, and the statements made by the French Ambassador in Petrograd on behalf of his Government.

On August 1 (new style), that is, on the day Germany declared war on Russia, Count Ignatiev telegraphed that the French Minister of War "was very seriously suggesting that Russia invade Germany and advance on Berlin from the direction of Warsaw." This

¹⁰ J. K. Tsikhovich, *Strategichesky Ocherk Voiny 1914-1918 gg.* (*Outline of the History of the War of 1914-1918*) (Moscow, 1922), Part I, pp. 62-64.

suggestion from the French Government, when translated into strategical language, meant just this: to the two lines of operations decided upon—one in the direction of Galicia and another in the direction of East Prussia—there was to be added a third: Warsaw-Berlin. Considering the respective strength of the forces that would meet, such a request was equivalent to asking Russia to commit suicide, in the full sense of the word; and repeated several times by the French Government it was a request that put the Russian High Command in a very difficult position. The following evaluation of the situation is made by a French professor of the *École Supérieure de Guerre*.¹¹

Thus the Russian High Command, already engaged in pursuance of its plan, in two divergent directions, commits itself to a third in order promptly to meet the only half-considered suggestions of its French Ally: a chivalrous gesture, no doubt, but it eventually led to a strategic dispersion of Russia's forces, which was fraught with danger.

This dispersion of forces, as a matter of fact, resulted in the catastrophe in East Prussia, and it affected the strategic results of the Russian victory in Galicia.

Advance in East Prussia.

With the strongly patriotic feelings of the mass of the Russian people at the beginning of the War, there went enthusiasm for her Allies, especially France, who, in accordance with the treaty of alliance, took the side of Russia without hesitation. When, therefore, alarming news began to come from France, a general desire to assist that faithful Ally in her difficult position made itself immediately apparent. From the memoirs of the French Ambassador, M. Paléologue, it is easy to see how France insisted on being helped, and with how much sympathy her requests were being met. As early as August 5 (new style), the day after Germany's declaration of war on France, the following statement was made by the French Ambassador to the Emperor:¹² "The French army will have to face the formidable onslaught of twenty-five German army corps. I therefore

¹¹ Colonel Dufour, *La Guerre de 1914-1918* (Paris, 1923), I, 202.

¹² M. Paléologue, *La Russie des Tsars* (Paris, 1922), I, 55.

implore Your Majesty to order your troops to take the offensive immediately. If they do not, there is danger that the French army may be crushed.”¹³

Under the date of August 21 (new style) M. Paléologue wrote: “On the Belgian front our operations are taking a bad turn. I have received an order to make representations to the Imperial Government to hasten the projected offensive of the Russian army as much as possible.” The political leaders of France, frightened by the vision of approaching catastrophe, sought to bring strong pressure on the Emperor and the Russian Government. The question, as they saw it, was not one of merely assisting, but of saving France. And the result was that politics not only kept the Russian High Command from correcting the faults of its war plan, but caused those faults to become even more serious. Under the influence of politics the army was put in motion and began an offensive before it had completed its concentration and was ready to advance.

The French Ambassador testifies that the Russian military leaders were fully aware of the danger with which such haste in commencing military operations was fraught. Under the date of August 26 (new style) M. Paléologue writes that he had a talk with M. Sazonov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. In reply to Paléologue’s words: “Think, how grave this hour is for France,” the Russian Minister said that the Chief of Staff and the Commander of the northwestern front realized that the hasty offensive in East Prussia must meet with inevitable failure “since our troops were still too scattered, and their transportation would encounter many obstacles.” “But,” Sazonov added, “we have no right to leave our Ally in danger, and it is our duty to attack at once, notwithstanding the indubitable risk of the operation as planned. The Grand Duke has just given an order to that effect.”

The Russian High Command was at all times under the pressure of the obsession that it was necessary to save France, threatened with destruction. Hastening the invasion of East Prussia by the armies of General Rennenkampf and General Samsonov, in its orders General Headquarters deemed it important to say specifically that such action was being taken to assist France.

¹³ The words “I implore” were italicized by M. Paléologue.

The first operations in East Prussia, which had begun with Rennenkampf's victory at Gumbinnen, ended with catastrophe for the army of General Samsonov, for two army corps from his center were surrounded by the Germans, and with the defeat of General Rennenkampf at the Mazurian Lakes. But, nevertheless, France was saved.

General Dupont, one of those closest to Marshal Joffre, writes:¹⁴

Two army corps were taken from the French front: the Guard reserve corps, which was a duplicate of the Guard, was taken from the army of von Buelow, and the Eleventh Corps from the army of von Hausen. A cavalry division, the Eighth, went with them. . . . This measure was, perhaps, our salvation. Conceive of the Guard reserve corps as being, on September 7, in its place between von Buelow and von Kluck, and the Eleventh, together with the Saxon cavalry division, with von Hausen at Feré-Champenoise on September 9. What consequences that would have had! Such a mistake made by the Chief of the German General Staff in 1914 must have made the other Moltke, his uncle, turn in his grave.

On the Russian front the strategic consequences of the reverses suffered by Rennenkampf and Samsonov were compensated for by the rout of the four Austro-Hungarian armies in Galicia. Hundreds of thousands of prisoners were taken on the southwestern front; the whole of Galicia was evacuated by the enemy, while the remainder of their defeated armies hastily retreated toward Cracow and beyond the Carpathian Mountains. Although this victory was won almost simultaneously with the defeats in East Prussia, it could not blot out the painful moral effect produced by those defeats. A lack of confidence in the strength of Russia to cope with Germany grew out of them. Especially strong was the impression in the rear in view of the susceptibility to pessimism of the elements in opposition to the Government. M. Guchkov in his testimony given in 1917 before the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry of the Provisional Government stated that as early as August, 1914, he "had reached the firm belief that the War was lost," and that he had been made to feel so by his "first impressions at the front," that is, by the defeat at Soldau in which "one of Samsonov's wings was surrendered . . ." Such was the effect upon some of the most vigorous of statesmen. What must have been the effect on the general public!

¹⁴ Dupont, *Le Haut Commandement Allemand en 1914* (Paris, 1922), p. 2.

The Autumn of 1914.

The successful repulse of the Germans from the Vistula in October, 1914, filled the Russian army with confidence in its strength to deal with Germany, too. The bright hopes of the High Command found expression in the report of October 25, 1914.

In the course of the last thirteen days [it read] we have developed our success along the whole front—one of 500 versts—and we broke the resistance of the enemy, who are in full retreat everywhere. . . . The victory we have won enables our troops to take up new tasks, and opens a new period in the campaign.

However, the operation in the Lodz region, in November, although it ended successfully, contained that portion of bitterness which spoils much sweetness. In its course two German army corps were surrounded and got into a position like that of the two corps of Samsonov's army in the last days of August. What the situation was may be found in General von Ludendorff's memoirs,¹⁵ where he says:

From the enemy's wireless messages we learned in Posen, far from the battle field, how hopefully the Russians regarded things, how they planned the various battles, how they already exulted in the thought of capturing German corps. They were preparing trains for the transport of the prisoners. I cannot describe what I then felt. What was at stake? Not only a victory for the enemy and the capture of so many brave men, but nothing less than a lost campaign. After this defeat, the Ninth Army would have had to be withdrawn. What would have been the position of things at the end of 1914 then?

The reason why the Germans succeeded, though with enormous losses, in escaping the complete encirclement with which they had been threatened, lay in the grave blunders made by General Ruzsky, commanding the northwestern fronts, and his staff. But this was known neither to the troops, nor to the public. Besides, General Ruzsky was very popular both among members of the Duma and in the country at large. The feeling that the Russian army was not strong enough to meet the Germans began to grow. German propaganda also contributed, and very cleverly, in that direction. Exaggerating the importance of their successes in East Prussia they

¹⁵ Ludendorff, *Meine Kriegserinnerungen* (Berlin, 1919), pp. 83-84.

sought, on the one hand, to undermine the confidence of the Allies in Russia's army, and, on the other, to diminish the belief of the latter in its own strength. At the same time, too, they were supplying elements hostile to the Government with a new weapon. This coincided exactly with the first signs of the approaching catastrophe in the matter of supplies. In this connection an entry made by General Kuropatkin in his diary, under the date of December 27, 1914, tells much.

Guchkov [he writes] has come back from the front. He is in a very gloomy mood. I have seen him today. He told me many things. The army has not enough food. The men are hungry. Many have not got boots. Their feet are wrapped up in rags. Yet many cars carrying boots are unloaded at the railway stations owing to congestion. The leaders are far away, behind their telephones. They are not in personal contact with the troops. Losses in the infantry, among the officers, are enormous. There are regiments in which only a few remain. Especially alarming is the state of the ammunition supply. He read me the order of a corps commander saying that only from three to five shells a gun should be fired per day. No assistance is given by the artillery to our infantry, which is subjected to showers of enemy shells. Reinforcements are not sent in time. One infantry brigade was without reinforcements for three months. When fighting was going on and the Germans were being encircled¹⁶ reinforcements numbering 14,000 were sent to the right flank, but the men were without rifles. This column almost reached the firing line, and gave great trouble to the troops. One of the army corps was without reinforcements for a month and a half. . . .

No doubt there is much truth in this; but there is no doubt also that the colors in the picture are too dark. The statement that the sending of reënforcements without rifles played a decisive part in the escape of the Germans is an example. The important fact is that the comments quoted above clearly show the feeling and attitude of mind which were spread through the country by those who had visited the front. They become even more characteristic if one takes into consideration the fact that they were written by one of the former ministers of war and the Commander-in-Chief in the war with Japan, that is to say, by a man who understood warfare. Thus, in the end of 1914 gloomy rumors were finding their way from the

¹⁶ The end of the operations in the Lodz region.

army into the country, and tales of disorganization, together with forecasts of an approaching catastrophe, reached even places the most remote.

The Campaign of 1914.

The operations in the region of Lodz put an end to the effort of the High Command to assist the Allies in the French theater by invading Germany. But, at the same time, with regard to the general strategic situation, the results of the above-mentioned operation were very important; to meet it, the Germans had to transport seven more infantry divisions and a cavalry division to the eastern front. This unquestionably was of great help to the Allies, who were then engaged in battles on the Yser and at Ypres.

Similarly, at the end of 1914, Russia's army was guided by the desire to help its Allies, an aim that was carried into action with the greatest energy. With a chivalry characteristic of him, the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich solved the strategic tasks which fell to the Russian front not from the narrow standpoint of national expediency, but from the broader viewpoints of the Allies as a whole. This self-sacrifice cost Russia dearly. The army lost in killed and wounded about 1,000,000 men, and the fact that nearly all these losses were suffered by the permanent effectives made them especially heavy. Moreover, the strenuous tempo of military operations necessitated a heavy expenditure of ammunition, the shortage of which was already pointed out above.

As regards the territory lost and occupied in the campaign of 1914, the picture was much more favorable in the Russian theater of war than in the French. Although a small part of Russian Poland, on the left bank of the Vistula, was lost, its evacuation had been foreseen by campaign plans, while, on the other hand, the Russian army was occupying Galicia, and in East Prussia it had again advanced to the line of the Mazurian Lakes. To sum up, the line of the Russian front was more favorable than in the beginning of the campaign of 1914 because the "Polish salient" had become shorter.

However, the losses suffered by the army and the disorganization in the rear had its effect on the feeling of the country. Owing to that, every new setback was deeply felt, and the general strategic result of the campaign was completely obscured. Yet that result was posi-

tive and it was important. For success in the War Germany counted on a successive defeat, within a short time, first of France and then of Russia; but she proved unable to achieve either. The German General Staff could no longer act according to the assumptions on which its military thought had been based for many years; in consequence, the main idea of its war plan being no longer valid, it began to hesitate as to whether a decision should be sought in the west or in the east. In this lay the characteristic feature of the subsequent period of the War, during which, instead of one main German front facing France, there were two German fronts—one against France and another against Russia; this most important result, from the strategical standpoint, was traceable to the above military operations on the Russian front.

Unfortunately, the Allies did not repay Russia in coin of equal value. Her needs were not taken into consideration as they should have been. The first proof of this attitude may be seen in the fact that the Allied fleet did not keep the two powerful German warships, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, from entering the Sea of Marmora. This had as its direct result Turkey's joining of the Central Powers in November. Due to the declaration of war by Turkey some of Russia's troops had to be moved to the Caucasus. This, however, was of small importance compared with something else: Owing to the action of Turkey access to the Black Sea was closed, which, as pointed out above, was equivalent to a blockade; and here lay the Achilles' heel of the Russian colossus. The troubles suffered by Russia through the blockade were especially great in the early part of the campaign of 1915, inasmuch as the army, when making its sacrifice to the common cause, had spent the larger part of its ammunition.

The Campaign of 1915.

In the first four months of 1915 Hindenburg and Ludendorff, whose forces had been increased by four army corps in addition to the four army corps moved to the eastern front before the operation in the region of Lodz, were planning to deal Russia a crushing blow and put her out of action for good. The plan consisted in a turning operation, projected on a broad scale, the aim of which was to pinch out and cut off the Russian armies in the center, those in Russian Poland and western Galicia. The carrying out of that "pincer" pro-

gram was to begin with the defeat of the Russian Tenth Army in East Prussia, at the Mazurian Lakes, and with the decisive Austro-Hungarian offensive from the Carpathians to the direction Lemberg-Tarnopol. Both of these attacks, launched against the flanks, were preceded by an energetic onslaught on the Russian positions on the left bank of the Vistula in the region traversed by the shortest roads leading to Warsaw.

This frontal attack of the Germans led to most stubborn fighting, which was especially bloody in the region of Borzhimov. However, the German attack was stopped, and did not keep the Russian Commander-in-Chief from starting offensive operations which had been planned by him, in his turn, the decisive offensive that was to pass the Carpathians on the Gorlitsa-Vyshkov front and invade the plain of Hungary, and the subsidiary offensive from Russian Poland toward East Prussia, along the Ortelsburg-Soldau front. As a result, heavy fighting ensued both in the Carpathians and in East Prussia—the second battle of the Mazurian Lakes and that of Prasnysk. The plans of the Germans were completely upset. And this Ludendorff himself admitted.

The surrender of the fortress of Przemyśl, with its garrison of 135,000 men, and the brilliant victory at Sarykamysk, in the Caucasus theater, served as a complete moral compensation to the Russians for their tactical reverses in East Prussia. However, in the above battles the last supplies of ammunition were exhausted, and a catastrophe became imminent.

The fact that the plan of Hindenburg and Ludendorff to put the Russian army out of action with a single stroke had failed, did not cause the German High Command to give up the plan. On the contrary, the German General Headquarters decided definitely to move the center of gravity of its efforts in the summer of 1915 from the French theater to the Russian, and to that end heavy forces were transported to the east. That the Germans were aware of the ammunition crisis which threatened Russia there can be no slightest doubt. Moreover, inasmuch as the action undertaken by the Allies in the initial period of the campaign of 1915, with a view to assisting Russia, had had no practical results, the Germans were inclined to think that both the French and British High Commands would be less unselfish than was that of Russia, and that the Allies would make no

sacrifice like that of the Russian army in the campaign of 1914. They believed that the assistance of the Allies would be limited by the formula "so far as the circumstances would permit," and that under such conditions it would be possible for the Germans to throw all their forces, without running any risk, against Russia.

The following figures given by General Buat, former Chief of the French General Staff,¹⁷ whom it would be difficult to accuse of partiality for the Russians, clearly show how important was the redistribution of the German forces. According to his data, in the beginning of the War the Germans directed 79 per cent of their forces against France and 21 per cent against Russia, but in August, 1915, there remained only 60 per cent of the German infantry divisions against the combined forces of France and Great Britain, while 40 per cent were concentrated against Russia. The entrance of Italy into the War on the side of the Allies gave some assistance to the Russians. But, inasmuch as Italy's entrance had drawn only Austro-Hungarian troops to the Italian front and that Austria-Hungary had been prepared for it, that assistance proved of little value.

Such was the situation—a situation so difficult—that Russia found herself in during the summer campaign of 1915 (May-October). This campaign began with the breaking of the Russian front by Mackensen at Gorlitsa. The following may testify to the difference in the strength of the respective artillery during that attack. Against the front of one of the Russian corps of the Third Army, against which the main blow was directed, more than 200 heavy guns, not counting the field artillery, were concentrated by the enemy. At the time this whole Third Army, which consisted of seven corps, and which was holding a front of about 130 miles, had four heavy guns, two 4.2-inch, and two 6-inch howitzers. In addition, one of the two 4.2-inch guns was so worn that it burst in the beginning of the battle.¹⁸

The Germans knew well how to take advantage of their overwhelming superiority in artillery. The following is a rough picture of Mackensen's main attack. Creeping like some huge beast, the German army would move its advanced units close to the Russian

¹⁷ Buat, *L'armée allemande pendant la guerre de 1914-1918* (Paris, 1920).

¹⁸ Dobrorolsky, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

trenches, just near enough to hold the attention of its enemy and to be ready to occupy the trenches immediately after their evacuation. Next, that gigantic beast would draw its tail, the heavy artillery, toward the trenches. That heavy artillery would take up positions in places which were almost or entirely beyond the range of the Russian field artillery, and the heavy guns would start to shower their shells on the Russian trenches, doing it methodically, as was characteristic of the Germans. That hammering would go on until nothing of the trenches remained, and their defenders would be destroyed. Then the beast would cautiously stretch out its paws, the infantry units, which would seize the demolished trenches. In the meantime the Russian artillery and the Russian rear would be subjected to a fierce fire from the German heavy guns, while the German field artillery and machine guns would protect the advancing infantry from Russian counter attacks. During those counter attacks the Russians would suffer enormous losses, since the German infantry, halting its advance, would take cover in the shell holes which were everywhere, and open fire from close range. Having gained full possession of the Russian trenches the "beast" would draw up its tail again, and its heavy guns would start their methodical hammering of the next Russian line of defense.

No obstacle kept the Germans from repeating the kind of attack described above. Not only was the Russian artillery far too weak to oppose the enemy, but even the artillery available had to be silent because there were no shells. It must suffice to recall that to the shower of shells of the German drum-fire the Russians could answer only with five or ten rounds per field gun a day. Under those conditions any defensive by the Russians, in point of fact, became impracticable, and the "Mackensen steam roller" was able to force its way across Galicia to Przemyśl whence it turned toward the Lublin-Kholm front.

Simultaneously, a decisive German offensive in East Prussia began. This time the German "pincers," which threatened the Russian armies in the center, in the so-called "Polish salient," were actually doing their work. There was only one way out of the situation, the withdrawal of the army into the interior of the country, if it was to be saved from a debacle and continue the War after it had been supplied with munitions. However, three months elapsed before this de-

cision was taken by General Headquarters. It was only in the beginning of August that the great retreat of the armies of the north-western front, conducted by General Alexeev with much skill, got into motion. Through many tragic experiences had the High Command to live during that retreat: Two Russian fortresses surrendered (Novogeorgievsk, Kovno). Three fortresses (Ivangorod, Grodno, Brest-Litovsk) had to be evacuated. Panic was spreading in the rear. Several times the retreating army had narrow escapes from those German pincers which came near to closing. But finally, in October, the army having finally saved itself from encirclement, Russia's forces took up positions on a new line running from Riga through Dvinsk, Lake Naroch, and, further to the south, as far as Kamenets-Podolsk.

The Retreat of 1915.

We have already pointed out that if there is reason to blame General Headquarters that reason lies only in the fact that the decision to withdraw the army into the interior was taken too late. This meant many losses which could have been avoided; and we may easily learn this if we recall the figures of the casualties during that period. In the summer campaign of 1915 the loss in killed and wounded was 1,410,000, or an average of 235,000 a month. This is a record-breaking figure for the entire War, the average losses being about 140,000 men a month. The loss in prisoners during the same campaign was 976,000, or an average of 160,000 a month. If we take only four months, May-August, the average monthly loss in prisoners was 200,000. The average for the whole War was 62,000.¹⁹

To decide to withdraw the army was for the High Command very difficult, from the standpoint of morale. Every retreat tends to undermine the spirit of the troops. And so much the more was so gigantic a withdrawal as the evacuation of Russian Poland, Lithuania, White Russia, and a part of Volhynia. One has only to read the memoirs of those who were closely associated with General Alexeev, on whom fell the heavy responsibility of withdrawing the armies of the northwestern front, to understand how difficult was this decision to order a general retreat.

¹⁹ During the whole of 1915 the loss in killed and wounded was more than 2,000,000, and in prisoners about 1,300,000.

General Borisov,²⁰ the closest confidant of General Alexeev in matters relating to strategy, says:

When fighting was going on in the Polish salient, for the first time we had a serious difference of opinion. Pointing to the fate of the Belgian fortresses and being well acquainted with fortresses in general . . . I insisted that not only Ivangorod and Warsaw but Novogeorgievsk as well should be evacuated. But Alexeev said: "I cannot take upon myself the responsibility of abandoning a fortress for the equipment of which so much was done in time of peace." The consequences are known. Novogeorgievsk defended itself not a year, not six months, but just four days after it had been fired upon by the Germans and ten days after it had been invested. It had been invested on July 27, 1915, and it fell on August 6, 1915. This produced a very strong impression on Alexeev. We were at that time at Volkovysk. Alexeev came to my room, threw a telegram on the desk, and sat down with the words: "Novogeorgievsk has surrendered." For a while we looked at each other in silence, and then I said: "This is painful news, but it changes nothing in the theatre of war." Alexeev replied: "It will be very painful for the Emperor and the people."

It is impossible to disagree with General Borisov that, inasmuch as the retreat from the Polish salient in the summer of 1915 was a strategical necessity, the above evacuation followed as a logical consequence. There is, however, a great difference between thinking logically in the capacity of an irresponsible adviser, and taking the final decision as the responsible leader. In this connection the words of Jomini that war is, above all, "a frightful and impassioned drama" involuntarily come to the mind.

We find a more detailed description of what General Alexeev felt in the summer of 1915 in the reminiscences of General Palitsin, who was also with Alexeev at that time.²¹

The general situation [Palitsin writes, on May 26, 1915]²² confronts us with the simple question: Either Russia or Poland. And the interests of the former are represented by the army. . . . General Alexeev is not in a position to answer this question. It lies outside his competency. It

²⁰ V. Borisov, *General M. V. Alexeev (General M. V. Alexeev)* in *Russki Voenni Sbornik*, No. 2, pp. 13-14.

²¹ General Palitsin was Chief of the General Staff in 1905-1908, and was on terms of close friendship with General Alexeev, his former assistant.

²² Palitsin in *Russki Voenni Sbornik*, No. 3, pp. 178, 179.

is for the Commander-in-Chief and the General Staff both to answer it and to give an order. But our minds too are laboring on the solution. General Alexeev sees what we must do to get ourselves out of the position we are in. In the evenings, as we walk in the fields, we often broach the subject, but soon we give it up again. We are afraid, as it were, of our thoughts, for all the difficulties with which such a solution is fraught are clear to us. Free from any responsibility, I am bolder in my decisions; with me they are of a theoretical nature, but I can understand the torments and anxiety through which General Alexeev is living every hour. . . .

On June 24, 1915, General Palitsin again touches upon the question of the necessity of withdrawing the army into the interior. He writes:²³

He (General Alexeev) knows it very well. . . . The question is not one of Warsaw and the Vistula, not even of Poland, but of the army. The enemy knows that we have neither cartridges nor shells, and we should know that we shall not get ammunition soon; therefore, to save the army for Russia, we shall withdraw it. . . .

If General Alexeev, as Commander of the northwestern front, was experiencing such spiritual struggles, how much more difficult must have been the position of Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich, the responsible leader. The Grand Duke, as well as his staff, must have been fully conscious of the appalling consequences which such a retreat would involve.

Rumors of treason were also spreading among the many millions under arms. They grew more and more persistent, and even found their way into educated circles. And they gained strength because the ammunition catastrophe seemed to bear out the gloomy forecasts which had widely circulated in the end of 1914.

The Morale of the Army.

General Knox, a careful observer of the state of the Russian army, wrote as follows in August:²⁴

The morale of the army had come through a severe trial, and one that would have been fatal to most armies. It was impossible to avoid being struck by the respect with which the more intelligent commanders

²³ Palitsin in *Russki Voenni Sbornik*, No. 4, p. 278.

²⁴ Knox, *op. cit.*, I, 349-350.

regarded the determination of the Germans and their skill in manoeuvre as well as their superiority in technique. There was a belief that the Germans "could do anything." This was natural, but unhealthy. Among the rank and file there had been very many desertions to the enemy as well as to the rear, and the steps taken to capture the latter and their punishment, when captured, were alike inadequate.

. . . The number of men who reported "sick" was enormous. Any excuse was good enough to get away from the front. They said there was no good in their fighting, as they were always beaten.

General Knox speaks also of a letter, one of those which in great numbers were sent to the Commander-in-Chief from the ranks of the army, containing criticisms of its leaders. It seems very probable that many of those letters were dictated by patriotic feeling and that some of them had good reason to be written, but the very fact of their being written was evidence not only of a loss of confidence in the leaders but also a decline of discipline.

Pessimism at the front was communicated to the rear by those thousands of cords which unite a modern army of many millions with the people at home. The letters to relatives, the complaints of the wounded, the tales of indignant social workers were only, as it were, so many drops. But together they became streams of gloom which finally became an ocean of general discontent and confusion.

In his interesting volume, based on his observations in the French theater of war, General Serrigny, of the French army, writes as follows:²⁵

The crisis of discontent always starts among those who do not fight. Marmont in his "Spirit of Military Institutions" says that flight always originated with the soldiers in the rear ranks of the phalanx. The same was true of the battle fields of the World War: military clerks and kindred functionaries were usually the first to abandon their posts. Indeed, it would have been surprising if the opposite had occurred, inasmuch as there were good reasons why they usually lost spirit long before their brothers of the fighting line. For they lacked their experience of war; they were less accustomed to discipline, and less engulfed in the struggle.

The further away the battle field, the greater the proportions to which the crisis of distrust can attain. A certain optical delusion mag-

²⁵ General Serrigny, *Réflexions sur l'art de la guerre* (Paris, 1921), pp. 42-46.

nifies all events, successes as well as reverses. In the rear, opinion is based not on what actually happens, but on the tales of wounded men and refugees, who, under the influence of their affected psychic condition, distort the facts. Exaggeration becomes a rule. It may, therefore, be taken for granted that the situation is never so good or so bad as it seems, at first glance, to those who are in the rear.

From all that has been said above, it is clear that the supreme commander's will to carry on may be undermined long before his troops lose their spirit. This may be illustrated by many things which occurred during the World War, in the case of our Allies and of our enemies also. . . .

The further away from the battle field the more the facts are altered. Bad news, as it passes from mouth to mouth, grows greater, and fear is increased by the very words it uses. Imagination, playing its usual role, fills the mind with chimeras. The very fact that the danger is far away makes it look even more frightful. Pessimism, as it was in the times of Xenophon, develops in the most remote ranks of the front. To sum up, the crisis of distrust starts in the rear and, under the modern scale of war, at home and in the families of the combatants. . . .

Like mental phenomena developed in Russia during the summer campaign of 1915. To show how depression grew deeper the further the leaders of the army were from the firing line, we shall quote four contemporary documents. They are, a letter from one of the commanders of an infantry regiment, a letter from one of the commanders of an army corps, a letter from the Chief of Staff of the army, and reports submitted by the Minister of War, General Polivanov, at secret meetings of the Council of Ministers. The letters were addressed to General Polivanov, and he quotes them in his memoirs.²⁶ Consequently, as we read these letters and also his reports made to the Council, we are in a position to trace the difference of spirit found on the various steps of the ladder of the military hierarchy.

The letter from General Rylsky, Commander of the Grenadier Guards, in which he describes the conduct of the regiment in the battle of June 6-11, 1915, at the village of Krupe where the regiment lost 35 officers and about 2,500 men, ends with the following lines:

The army, as far as we can judge, expects something to happen that will turn the War in our favor. One rumor, and a rumor most authentic,

²⁶ Polivanov, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-186.

as it were, is followed by another. According to the latest, the Japanese army is joining us, and the War will be finished at a single stroke. Many have already seen the Japanese in the rear. A mass hallucination.

The letter of General Rylsky will reflect the spirit of the troops. Faith in its own strength was undermined but the army still hoped for final victory. The troops, as they were falling back, shed torrents of blood, but nowhere did they "flee."

The Commander of the Twenty-ninth Corps, General Zuev, wrote to General Polivanov of the unsatisfactory reënforcements situation, of the enormous losses among the officers, and of the colossal superiority of the enemy in guns.

The Germans plough up the battle fields with a hail of metal and level our trenches and fortifications, the fire often burying the defenders of the trenches in them. The Germans expend metal, we expend life. They go forward and, encouraged by their success, take risks, whereas we only beat them off by paying with heavy losses and our blood, and are retreating. This has a very unfavorable influence on the spirit of all.

The letter is far from hopeless. The situation is painted in gloomy colors, but the hope to find a way out has not been lost. Such was the attitude of the front toward the catastrophe of 1915. The impressions of the present author were exactly the same as those set forth in the two letters quoted.

But here is a letter from the rear. It was written, as said above, by the Chief of Staff of the army and addressed to General Polivanov.

Information is reaching us to the effect that in the villages, due to the activities of members of the Left, the following advice is being given the recruits called out on May 15: "Do not fight and let yourself be wounded. Surrender and save your lives." If there is to be only two or three weeks training for recruits and such advice is given them we shall not be in a position to do anything with the troops. Two measures have already been approved by His Majesty: families of those who surrender of their own accord will not receive allowances, and such prisoners will after the War be sent to Siberia as settlers. It would be very desirable if the population could be made to understand that such measures will infallibly be carried out and that land owned by such prisoners will be turned over to poor peasants who had done their duty. The consideration of material loss in the shape of their land will work more strongly than any other. As regards condemnation for voluntary surrender, and

the need of the offender's being made to suffer for it, we have the support of the Duma, no authority being higher. Inasmuch as the Grand Duke does not wish to apply to Rodzianko without the knowledge of the Government, he asked me to request you to use your influence with the members of the Duma for the purpose of reaching a decision to the effect that Rodzianko—or some leader of the center—may, in one of his speeches, state, if only in passing, that the soldiers who surrender of their own accord must not expect the same treatment from the Government as those who had done their duty . . . and that their being made to pay a penalty . . . is merely just. . . . I am firmly convinced that this will make the strongest impression. The Government, through the Ministry of the Interior, might also, by making use of the provincial governors, get this knowledge into circulation before the calling out of recruits. Then, instead of an element ready to surrender, men of duty would be coming to the front. . . . I wish to apologize for importuning you; but, like a drowning man catching at a straw, I am taking any measures that may offer us a way of salvation from such conditions as now exist.

Such a letter could have been written only by a man who had not the slightest faith in the troops under his command and who had completely lost his head.

Now let us see how all such information worked and found voice in General Polivanov. Its effect was to bring him to a state of out-and-out panic. It is Yakhontov²⁷ who tells the story, and he quotes Polivanov.

"I consider it my duty, as a citizen and a member of the Government, to declare to the Council of Ministers that the country is in danger." With these words the Minister of War, General Polivanov, began his report on the situation at the front, at the meeting of the Council of Ministers on July 16, 1915. His voice sounded somewhat shriller than usual. . . . A long silence followed. It seemed insufferable, endless. . . . When after a few minutes the strain of nerves felt by everyone somewhat weakened, Goremykin, the President of the Council, asked General Polivanov to explain on what it was he based his gloomy conclusions. The Minister of War gave a general outline of the situation at the front: Our retreat is becoming more and more rapid, taking in many instances the character of disorderly flight.²⁸ At any rate it is clear to

²⁷ Yakhontov, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

²⁸ This has no foundation in fact. (The Author.)

every man with even the slightest knowledge of military affairs that the coming hours will be decisive for the whole War. Taking advantage of their overwhelming superiority in guns, the Germans are forcing us to retreat by artillery fire. While they are firing almost at individuals, our batteries have to keep silent even during serious engagements. The enemy, not having to use their infantry, suffer almost no losses, whereas our men perish in thousands. Naturally, our resistance daily grows weaker, while the onset of the enemy is increasing. When our retreat will come to an end only God knows. The advance of the enemy is evidently taking three directions, toward St. Petersburg, Moscow and Kiev. . . . Under the circumstances it is impossible to foresee how and with what means we shall be able to halt the development of that advance.²⁹ The troops are exhausted by endless defeats and retreats. Their faith in eventual success and in the leaders has been shaken. Menacing symptoms of approaching demoralization become more conspicuous. Cases of desertion and voluntary surrender occur more frequently. Indeed, it would be difficult to expect enthusiasm and self-sacrifice from men who are sent to the trenches without weapons and with orders to pick up the rifles of their dead comrades.

Equally gloomy was the picture drawn by General Polivanov at the meeting of July 30:³⁰

There is no ray of light in the situation in the theatre of war. The retreat continues. General Polivanov says that he is not in a position to present a picture of the front which would correspond even approximately to reality. The whole army is continually falling back and the line is changing almost from hour to hour. Demoralization, surrender and desertion are assuming huge proportions. General Headquarters seems to be completely at a loss, and its orders are taking on a hysterical character. Lamentations at Headquarters over wickedness at the rear do not cease; on the contrary they grow stronger and increase the current that turns the mill of revolutionary agitation.

Attitude of the Council of Ministers.

The pessimism of General Polivanov was in keeping with the general mood of the Council of Ministers. They were much distressed by the decision of the Commander-in-Chief to withdraw the army into the interior, which decision was strategically right. It was, as stated

²⁹ This statement is greatly exaggerated. (The Author.)

³⁰ Yakhontov, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

above, the only way to save the army and to maintain any possibility of continuing the struggle in the future; the only reproach which can be laid to General Headquarters is that the heroic decision was taken too late, after much blood had been shed unnecessarily. This, however, the Council of Ministers would not understand, being solely impressed by the gravity of the immediate effects of the retreat. One of its effects was the refugee problem. And the ministers, seeing only that masses of refugees were moving into the interior together with the troops, blamed General Headquarters.

To give an example we quote below the *résumé* of the opinions of the ministers as expressed at the meeting of July 31, and taken down by Yakhontov:³¹

My records contain only the general content of the speeches made, for I made no note of what was said by individual members. But General Headquarters has lost its head entirely. They do not realize what they are doing, for what an abyss Russia is heading. For what was done in 1812 cannot be used as a precedent, and the territory which must be evacuated cannot be turned into a desert. In our days the conditions, the circumstances, the very scale of events have nothing in common with those of former times. In 1812 separate armies were manoeuvring, and the zone of their operations was limited to comparatively small areas. Now there is a continuous front from the Baltic to the Black Sea, which covers vast stretches of hundreds of versts. To lay waste a score of provinces and to drive their inhabitants into the interior is equivalent to dooming Russia to frightful calamity. But logic and the interests of the State are not highly regarded by General Headquarters. Civilian arguments must be wordless in the face of "military necessity," no matter what horrors are hidden beneath these words. At long last, to the debacle on Russia's fighting line there must be added another debacle in the interior. . . .

Now let us quote the statement made by Krivoshein, one of the most influential ministers:³²

From all the grave consequences of the War, this (the refugees) is the most unexpected, the most threatening and the most irreparable. And what is even more awful, it has not been caused either by actual necessity or by national impulse, but has been invented by wise strategists for the purpose of intimidating the enemy. What a clever way of

³¹ Yakhontov, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 37.

waging war. Curses, diseases, grief and poverty are spreading all over Russia. Hungry and destitute people are bringing panic everywhere, and all that remains of the enthusiasm of the first months of the War is wiped out. Refugees move in a solid mass, they tread down the fields, destroy the meadows and woods. They leave almost a desert behind them, as if a swarm of locusts or the hordes of Tamerlane had swept the country. The railway lines are congested; even movements of military trains and shipments of food will soon become impossible. I do not know what is going on in the areas that fall into the hands of the enemy, but I do know that not only the immediate rear of our army but the remote rear as well are devastated, ruined, stripped of the last stocks of supplies. I think that the Germans are not displeased to see a repetition of what took place in 1812. Even if they do not find certain supplies in the occupied localities, they are not compelled to care for the population of those abandoned regions, and enjoy complete freedom of action. But these details are not in my province. Evidently they were given early consideration by General Headquarters in due time and were then deemed unimportant. But it is in my province to declare, as a member of the Council of Ministers, that the great migration of peoples, staged by General Headquarters, will bring Russia to the abyss, to revolution and to ruin.

The Removal of the Grand Duke.

The study of the minutes of the secret meetings of the Council of Ministers is of great interest not only because it reveals the loss of spirit and the confusion brought about in the rear by the retreat of the army; such a study also discloses a steadily growing animus against General Headquarters. It goes without saying that many mistakes had been made by it. Many mistakes were also made during the retreat in 1915. But the scale of the events was of such magnitude that mistakes were quite natural; and such ruthless criticism by the central organ of the Government in the full tide of a most difficult strategic operation was inadmissible. It is strange that the members of the Government were speaking of the "scale of events" and yet they would not realize that the conduct of war under the conditions described above called for "sacrifices that were commensurate."

The statements of the ministers are very significant from social and psychological standpoints. They did not take into account that by attacking General Headquarters they were preparing the ground

for the removal of the Commander-in-Chief. This possibility, however, was realized by Goremykin, and he gave his colleagues the following warning:³³

I do not object to that decision [a decision was taken by the Council to request the Emperor to call a meeting under his chairmanship in order that they might "tell the Emperor the truth"] but I consider it my duty to repeat to the Members of the Council my emphatic advice to be extremely careful in what they are going to say to the Emperor about those things and those questions that relate to General Headquarters and the Grand Duke. Irritation against the Grand Duke at Tsarskoe Selo has become of a character which threatens serious consequences. I fear that your representations may serve as a pretext to bring about grave complications.

Although a study of the minutes reveals that the ministers themselves were preparing the crisis in the case of the High Command, there can be no doubt that they did not realize what they were doing, inasmuch as they, like all Russia, held the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich in great esteem.

At the meeting of August 6 General Polivanov, after he had drawn a most gloomy picture of the condition of the army made the following statement:³⁴

Appalling as is the situation at the front, Russia is menaced by something even more ominous. I am going deliberately to disclose an official secret, and to break my promise to keep it for the time being. I feel in duty bound to inform the Government that this morning, when I was received in audience, His Majesty told me of his decision to replace the Grand Duke and to take personal command of the army.

This communication of the Minister of War [Yakhontov writes] provoked the greatest excitement among the members of the Council. All began to speak at the same time, and due to this it was impossible to make out what was said by individual members. It could be clearly seen what a tremendous impression the news had produced on most of those present; in the midst of the military reverses and internal complications, this news came as a final and a stunning blow.

The exchange of opinion which followed showed how general was the feeling of confidence inspired by the Grand Duke.

³³ Yakhontov, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

The question of the impending replacement of the Commander-in-Chief was the subject of uneasy discussion during a number of subsequent meetings of the Council of Ministers. The Council even feared that a national upheaval might begin.

On August 21 all the ministers, with the exception of the President of the Council and the Minister of Justice (Khvostov), addressed a joint letter to the Emperor, in which they asked him not to remove the Grand Duke. The letter read, in part: "Your Majesty, we are again taking the liberty of expressing our opinion that, as it appears to us, for you to make such a decision (to remove the Grand Duke) will menace Russia, yourself, and your dynasty with grave consequences."

Thus spoke and acted the same men who only a short time ago literally vilified General Headquarters, and subjected to their criticism not only the carrying out of its strategic decision, but the very principle behind it. The withdrawal of the Russian army into the interior was a decision of principle, and it could have been taken only by the Commander-in-Chief. Consequently, the criticism of the ministers was directed, in point of fact, against him.

We have already spoken of the anomaly to be observed not only on the Russian front but on other fronts as well: the further away from the firing line, the greater the pessimism. The general retreat of the army started a panic in the rear, which included the Council of Ministers. The panicky attitude of General Polivanov may be seen in this amazing fact: Speaking at the meeting of the Council of Ministers, on August 12, of his trip to General Headquarters to hand the Grand Duke the letter in which the Emperor informed him of his removal, General Polivanov said:³⁵

I must confess that when I was going to General Headquarters I was in a very uneasy frame of mind, inasmuch as I was by no means sure that my mission would be successful. Fortunately, my apprehensions were not justified. The Grand Duke, as I could see from certain remarks, had been informed of the coming change, but he did not know what form it would take and apparently he anticipated something worse. After he had read the letter he was pleased and he received me as one bringing him a quite unusual favor. Any possibility of resistance or disobedience is out of the question.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

That there was no reason whatever to entertain any fears of a possible *coup d'état* everyone who at that time was at the front knows very well. Moreover, the chivalry and loyalty of the Grand Duke were such that fears of that kind were little likely to arise. Yet from the words of General Polivanov it is clear that he feared that the Grand Duke might disobey the order of the Emperor. Such a fear could originate only in a panicky imagination.

We come now to the effect of the retreat on the public. As a guide to public opinion, a certain document found in the personal archives of the Emperor Nicholas II, is of great value. It is a report submitted to the Emperor by the members of the Military and Naval Commission of the Duma in August, 1915.³⁶ It reflects the feelings of the leading circles of the public at the precise time when the removal of the Grand Duke was about to take place. From this report it is obvious that such circles reacted to the retreat of the army into the interior with more composure than did the Government. A stronger impression was made on them by the causes of the retreat, than by the fact itself. Among those causes the crisis in ammunition supplies was considered paramount. The main features of the report, therefore, running through it like a crimson thread, are blame of the Government and a tendency to take control over the work in the rear into their own hands. The latter thought, though not expressed in so many words, forms the *Leitmotiv* of the report. It should be borne in mind that the report was submitted at the time when the mobilization of industry, advocated by the public, had just begun.

Unquestionably, the removal of the Grand Duke may also be explained by the influences exercised on the Emperor by his immediate *entourage*. That this is a fact the letters of the Empress Alexandra Feodorovna leave no doubt. However, the present author maintains that, due to the revolutionary frame of mind of the public, the rôle played by personal influences in that removal has been exaggerated. It is very probable that in the above question the Emperor acted rather under the influence of general causes than of his personal motives, and there is no reason whatever to doubt the sincerity of the words of the Emperor, in which he explained his assumption of the supreme command by his wish to place himself at the head of the

³⁶ *Monarkhiya Pered Krusheniem, 1914-1917* (*The Monarchy before Its Fall, 1914-1917*) (Moscow, 1927), pp. 270-275.

army at a moment when the country was threatened with catastrophe.

The Emperor at the Head of the Troops.

The removal of the Grand Duke took place on August 23. The command of the army was assumed by the Emperor, and General Alexeev became his Chief of Staff. In point of fact General Alexeev was now the Commander-in-Chief. This was understood by the whole army, and it was thanks to this fact that the public, to a certain degree, reconciled itself to the change in high command, the more so since the nearest assistants of the Grand Duke at General Headquarters were very unpopular.

What was the impression produced in the army by the change?

The change, important in itself [General Denikin writes],³⁷ did not make a great impression. Our generals and officers were fully aware that the part which the Emperor would take in commanding the army would be only nominal; therefore, they were more interested in the question, who would be the Chief of Staff? The fact that General Alexeev was appointed was reassuring. As regards the soldiers they were not much concerned with the technique of army administration; even previously they had looked upon the Emperor as the supreme leader of the army; and there was only one circumstance which troubled them: long ago the conviction had taken root in the people that the Emperor was unlucky.

In those lines, written by one of the most prominent leaders of the White movement, there is disclosed the same lack of understanding of the mass of the people which was subsequently responsible for his final failure. It is true that at the time of the change in the High Command everything remained externally quiet. But this took nothing from the profound regret which the removal of the Grand Duke had caused, and above all among the mass of the common soldiers. In their minds, too, the Grand Duke represented the noble champion of truth and the ruthless enemy of falsehood—one who was severe and just to all.

"Three or four months of war," a Bolshevik author writes,³⁸

³⁷ Denikin, *op. cit.*, I, 34.

³⁸ M. Lemke, *250 Dnei v Tsarskoi Stavke (Two Hundred and Fifty Days in the Imperial Headquarters)* (Petrograd, 1920), p. 82.

"and Nicholas Nikolaevich had become a popular figure. Men in the army never failed to speak of him with admiration, and they even spoke of him with awe."

Nicholai Nikolaevich [writes General Knox]³⁹ was, before everything, a patriot with a strong sense of duty. Though destined by birth to great wealth and high position, he devoted himself to the scientific study of his chosen profession of arms. His active career showed that he possessed the qualities of a real leader of men. Of commanding stature and extraordinarily handsome, he was gifted with boundless energy, a strong will and a power of rapid decision. Every form of intrigue was absolutely foreign to his nature. . . . He possessed to an extraordinary degree the power of inspiring love and trust. His sense of justice made him trust general and soldier exactly alike, and many stories of his doings told by the peasant soldiers of the Russian army showed that he was regarded as a sort of legendary champion of Holy Russia in the struggle against Germanism and court corruption. They felt that, though he was a strict disciplinarian and very exacting in his demands on their strength, he would ask from the private soldier no greater effort than he did from his general and imposed upon himself.

The popularity of Alexeev was of another kind. In the army it was largely limited to the officers' corps. The personnel of the High Command saw in him the most competent of all Russia's generals. Officers of lower rank saw in him their equal who had won his way to the highest positions solely by his own merits. The soldiers knew him little; he did not possess those external features which, in the eyes of the little educated, a hero should have. The same was true in the case of the country as a whole. All educated men knew Alexeev, respected him, and trusted him; the mass of the people did not know him at all. For that reason both the army and the public were of the opinion, as may be seen from many memoirs, that the maintenance of the Grand Duke as Commander-in-Chief and the appointment of General Alexeev as his Chief of Staff would have been the best solution of the question.

By removing the Grand Duke the Emperor was depriving himself of the influence of an extremely important moral value. He thought that for the moral value which had been evolved by the Grand Duke's popularity a substitute could be offered in the shape of the

³⁹ *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 13th ed., Vol. II, p. 1074.

monarchical tradition. The fault of such a point of view lay in its disregard of the necessity of uniting all the factors that could help to bring the War to a victorious end, and in its substitution of one for another. It is obvious that here again we have an expression of that primitive attitude toward the complex questions of modern life which had been displayed in other fields.

The Spirit of the Army.

After the High Command had halted the retreat, the troops had taken up new lines of defense, and General Alexeev was quietly getting everything in order, the spirit of the army began to improve. The capacity of the Russian soldier for rapid recovery after grave defeat had been noticed by the Germans, and they made a point of it in their characterizations of the Russian army. As far back as 1913 the Chief of the German General Staff wrote as follows: "To outside impressions the Russians are comparatively little susceptible. Even after reverses the troops recover quickly, and are again capable of a stubborn defense."⁴⁰ It is interesting to compare this opinion of the Russian soldier, expressed before the War by careful observers, with a note which General Knox, who had also observed the Russian army closely, made in October, 1915. "The Russian soldier," he says, "when seen after a prolonged strain, often looked poor stuff, but he had an extraordinary power of rapid recuperation."⁴¹

To form a correct opinion of the spirit of soldiers in the mass, especially Russian soldiers, is a difficult thing. Almost the only genuine evidence would be found in the reports of the military censors on the letters sent by private soldiers. Unfortunately, the present author is not in a position to examine whatever is left of this vast material. They might enable one to form some general idea of the changes of feeling experienced by the army. But certain interesting indications may be found in the following lines written by General Knox.⁴²

During a visit to the northern front in February, 1916, I was struck by the enthusiasm with which officers spoke of the spirit of the rank and

⁴⁰ Kuhl, von, *Der deutsche Generalstab, und Durchführung des Weltkrieges* (Berlin, 1920), p. 68.

⁴¹ Knox, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 389.

file. The censors in the Twelfth Army (on the extreme right) read all letters and classified them according to their general spirit, as (a) "Good," (b) "Discontented or depressed," (c) "Complaining of officers," (d) "Complaining of food," etc. In all units, 80 per cent of the letters were said to show a good spirit, and in some units 100 per cent.

The above is amply confirmed from another source. In the volume by M. Lemke mention is made of a report of the military censor at Headquarters on the western front, dated February, 1916. According to it the letters mailed were classified as follows:⁴³ 2.15 per cent "Depressed," 30.25 per cent "Good," 67.60 per cent "Expressing faith in the final success."

The interest of such data is enhanced by the fact that they relate to two fronts which had been through the longest retreat in the summer campaign of 1915.

The last months of 1915 were marked by comparative quiet on the Russian front. Certain local operations took place, but they were insignificant, and, speaking generally, it may be stated that the army had a moral rest, and by the beginning of 1916 its spirit had improved. That spirit was no longer characterized by the enthusiasm shown in the beginning of the War; it was based on sober confidence. This was the result of the enormous work of organization performed by General Alexeev with a view to restoring Russia's armed forces after the catastrophe in the summer of 1915.

However, two alarming symptoms might have been observed: (1) General discontent with the "rear," a word which meant, above all, the activities of the Government. Under the influence of that discontent extremely favorable ground was being prepared for rumors about inefficiency, abuses, and even high treason in the highest places. Criticism was passed from mouth to mouth. Briefly, although the army had recuperated morally, in a military sense, it presented, from the political standpoint, a weakening body, and one very susceptible to any infection. More and more it was turning into a sounding board in which every revolutionary change of feeling at the rear found a rapid and reiterated response. (2) A loss of faith in the Allies, and it became apparent by the end of 1915. Indeed, as we have said, the action of the Russian army in 1914, full of self-sacrifice, forced the Germans in 1915 to shift the center of their

⁴³ Lemke, *op. cit.*, p. 545.

operations to the Russian front. But the Allies were unable to keep the Germans from doubling their forces against Russia and coming down upon her at a most critical juncture. The result was that the former readiness of the army to make sacrifices for the Allies gave way to a bitter feeling of disillusionment.

We shall again let General Knox bear testimony. Under the date of October 7, 1915, he set down the following talk which he had with General Lebedev, the Quartermaster General of the armies of the western front:⁴⁴

The conversation turned to a discussion of the share of the common burden borne by each of the Allies, and little Lebedev, who is a most ardent patriot, let himself go. He said that history would despise England and France for having "sat still like rabbits" month after month in the western theatre, leaving the whole burden of the War to be borne by Russia. Of course I disputed this, and pointed out that Russia would have been forced to conclude peace by the spring of 1915 if it had not been for England, for Arkhangel and even Vladivostok would have been blockaded. I reminded him that, though we had only a very small army before the War, we now had nearly as many bayonets in the firing line as Russia, who had a population of 180,000,000 to our 45,000,000. As regards France, I repeated Declassé's remark that if Russia were to make an effort equivalent to that of France, she would have to mobilize 17,000,000 men.

Lebedev replied that he did not wish to make comparisons between what the various armies had actually done, but he complained that England did not realize that the present war was one for her very existence. No doubt England was doing a good deal, but she was not doing all that she could. Russia was. She grudged nothing. Nothing could be of greater value to her than the lives of her sons, and those she was squandering freely. England gave money freely but grudged men. The number of men that Russia would willingly offer was only limited by her power of arming and equipping them, and that, as I knew, was restricted. England was waging the war as if it were an ordinary war, but it was not. Of all the Allies it would be easiest for Russia to make a separate peace. She might lose Poland, but Poland was nothing to her. She might have to pay an indemnity, but in twenty years she would be strong again. On the other hand, if Germany were allowed by England to win, she would in twenty years have a fleet three times as strong as

⁴⁴ Knox, *op. cit.*, pp. 352-353.

England's. He repeated: "We are playing the game. We are giving everything. Do you think it is easy for us to look on those long columns of fugitives flying before the German advance? We know that all the children crowded on those carts will die before the winter is out." What could I say to all of this—I who knew that much of what he said was only the truth? I said what I could. I only hope that I talked no more foolishly than some of our statesmen, for I had a more critical audience!

In the army and in the mass of the people the idea was taking root that the War had been forced on Russia by the Allies, who wanted to weaken Germany by using Russia. Beginning with the winter of 1915–1916 the present author often heard the following phrase used by the soldiers: "England and France have made up their minds to carry on the War until the Russian soldier has shed his last drop of blood." The idea that Russia had been lured into the War against the interests of her people was readily given credence by the backward masses which had completely lost confidence in their Government.

In the meantime, when the campaign of 1916 began, Russia was again asked by the Allies to give them assistance. In response to that request offensive operations on the northern and western fronts were started earlier than was intended. Disregarding the fact that the season barred the possibility of conducting any real offensive, the High Command none the less decided to carry out such a movement, with the idea of drawing off German forces engaged in the French theater. On March 15, attacks were launched in the region of Lake Naroeh, and on March 21, on the northern front in the region of Jakobstadt and Dvinsk. The enemy front was not broken. The capture of some 3,000 prisoners and a loss by the enemy of two or three miles, in certain places, were results which of course could not justify the enormous losses which Russia suffered. On March 30 an order was given to discontinue the operations. Nevertheless they had helped the French, for no German attacks on Verdun were made from March 22 to March 30. As to the morale of the Russian High Command, the unsuccessful offensive could not but produce its effect on it.

That effect could clearly be seen at a conference held at General Headquarters on April 14. A careful study of the minutes of that

conference leaves no doubt that the Commander on the northern front, General Kuropatkin, and the Commander on the western front, General Evert, had "lost heart"; they no longer believed in success, though they would not say so outright. Only General Brusilov, commanding the southwestern front, looked forward to the general offensive, planned for May, with hope. However, General Alexeev insisted that the main attack should be launched from the western front. The time for its commencement was postponed. And the depressed spirit of General Evert was responsible for that postponement.⁴⁵

The Campaign of 1916.

In the meantime a catastrophe occurred in the Italian theater of war. Russia was again asked to give immediate help. To comply with that request, the plan of a general offensive, worked out by General Alexeev for the campaign of 1916, was changed. Unquestionably, that change of plan must affect the whole course of the War in Galicia and prevent General Alexeev from taking full advantage of the tactical results achieved.

On May 22, 1916, four Russian armies of the southwestern front began their attacks, which developed into a four months' struggle in Galicia. Its tactical results were immense. The Russians took 416,924 prisoners, of whom 8,924 were officers and 408,000 men. They captured 581 guns, 1,795 machine guns, and 448 bomb-throwers and mine-throwers. A territory of 25,000 square kilometers was occupied. Such results were obtained in no offensive operation of Russia's Allies in 1915, 1916, or 1917. As regards the strategic results from the standpoint of the general situation of the Allies, they were most important. (1) The Italian army was saved, inasmuch as the Austro-Hungarians were forced to discontinue their offensive in Italy and to transport about fifteen divisions to the Russian front. (2) The situation of the French army was given great relief, for the Germans were forced to move eighteen divisions from the French theater to the Russian, and besides to transport to that front four divisions formed in the interior of Germany. (3) The pressure on the Allies on the Salonika front was also considerably relieved since

⁴⁵ Klembovsky, *Strategicheskii Oчерk Voyny 1914-1915 Goda* (*Strategical Outline of the War of 1914-1915*) (Moscow, 1920), Part V, p. 29.

three and a half German divisions and the two best Turkish divisions were moved from that front, and sent against Russia. (4) Another decisive defeat of Austria-Hungary forced Germany to lend stronger and more permanent support to her Ally, now nearing final collapse. (5) It caused Rumania to enter the War on the side of the Allies.

However, all the strategic advantages enumerated above fell to the Allies and not to Russia. Even the entry of Rumania into the War was less advantageous to Russia than her neutrality, for due to that entry, Russia had to cede to Rumania a certain part of her tonnage which already had been limited in the extreme.

The successes gained on the southwestern front had an excellent effect on the spirit of the troops. On the contrary, the failure of the attempts to break through the German positions on the western and northern fronts produced an unfavorable impression. On the western front in the middle of June an attack was launched in the direction of Baranovichy, the decision to attack having been taken by General Evert after long hesitation. The attack was repeated in the beginning of July, after some changes in the grouping of troops had been made. In each of these offensives the fire of the Russian artillery was far from what it should have been, to measure up to modern requirements. Having suffered enormous losses, the troops gained little ground, and their attacks had to be halted. Nevertheless, the offensive, although conducted under most unfavorable conditions, put the Germans in a very difficult position. That this was almost critical is admitted by Ludendorff himself.

Criticism of the High Command.

The unsuccessful attempts to break through the German lines on the northern and western fronts made a stronger impression on public opinion in Russia than the victories in Galicia and in the Caucasus (at Erzerum). Due to the growing pessimism, all the mistakes of the Russian High Command were exaggerated. But at the same time an important fact was left out of consideration altogether: the attacks of the Allies were bringing no better results than the Russian attacks against the Germans although the generals of the Allied Armies had at their disposal technical means beyond even the dreams of Russia's generals.

The excessive criticisms directed against the Russian High Command were fully reflected in a memorandum drafted by Rodzianko in the end of 1916.⁴⁶ Many statements in that memorandum are unjust and untrue; yet, as evidence of the feelings which prevailed in the public and which, no doubt, influenced the spirit of the troops, it is of great historical interest. Those feelings may be characterized as a complete loss of faith in final success and of confidence in the personnel of the High Command. Here are the conclusions reached by Rodzianko:

The Russian High Command either does not work out plans of operations, or, if it has such plans, it does not carry them out (see the Kovel operations). The High Command does not know how to organize, or it is unable to organize large operations on a new front, partly because it lacks adequate information, partly because the military authorities are utterly incompetent from the economic standpoint (see the operations in Rumania). The High Command has not worked out uniform methods of defense and attack, nor does it know how to prepare an offensive. There is no system in the making of appointments or changes in the command; and appointments to higher posts are often dependent on mere chance; therefore, those posts are entrusted to persons unfitted to occupy them. The High Command disregards losses in men, and it does not take enough care of the soldiers.

Those are the fundamental reasons that halted the further advance of General Brusilov, and caused our defeat in Rumania. . . . We must sweep away those reasons for failure, for the army realizes fully that if they are not eliminated we shall never win a victory, no matter what our sacrifices may be. This conviction had taken root, not only among our officers, but among the rank and file as well; and that should always be taken into consideration when the question of continuing the War comes up. The army no longer believes in its leaders, the army does not consider its leaders to be capable of giving correct and expedient orders. The army is in such condition that every evil rumor and slander is repeated and accepted as an additional proof of the utter incapacity of our commanders to overcome the obstacles which confront them and to lead the troops to victory. As a result, apathy, absence of initiative and paralysis of bravery and gallantry are seizing upon the army. If measures are not taken immediately, first, to improve the com-

⁴⁶ This memorandum is the report submitted to General Headquarters, of which Rodzianko speaks in his reminiscences. The memorandum was never published. One copy is preserved in the Hoover War Library.

mand, to adopt some definite plan, to change the attitude of the commanders toward the soldiers, and, next, to raise the spirit of the troops by meting out retribution to those who, through incompetent leadership, destroy the fruits of glorious exploits—the time to do it may be lost. Should the present situation not be changed before spring, when everybody expects either our or a German offensive to take place, no success in the summer of 1917 any more than in the summer of 1916 need be hoped for.

As one reads these lines it is difficult even to imagine that they were written after the greatest of victories, one which had not been equaled in three years by Russia's Allies. Yet that memorandum was written by one of the most ardent of Russian patriots. Such, too, was the view of things that was held by the overwhelming majority of the educated element throughout the army and the general public.

What was taking place in the backward masses of the soldiers and the people? The army and the country were both strongly impressed by the losses suffered in 1916, for they amounted to 2,060,000 killed and wounded and 344,000 prisoners.⁴⁷ This impression was aggravated by the belief that these losses were not necessary. This belief, in its turn, arose from the complete loss of confidence in the Government and in the Allies.

The conviction that sacrifices are necessary is one of the basic conditions that increase the capacity of the masses to make them. This is a social and psychological law, common to all nations. In this connection let us quote a conclusion arrived at by the French military writer, General Serrigny, on the strength of his observations of what had been taking place in France:⁴⁸

If you explain to the people that the interests of national defense make it necessary to use the whole merchant fleet for the transportation of the American army, and that, therefore, rations must be cut down to a minimum, the people will understand and will look upon such measure as fully justified. But if you give a drastic order to tighten belts, the country will revolt. During three years Germany showed remarkable firmness in enduring privations which were of a much more serious nature; this she could do because through speeches, newspaper articles

⁴⁷ During the summer campaign of 1916 alone, the losses amounted to 1,200,000 killed and wounded and 212,000 prisoners.

⁴⁸ General Serrigny, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

and public lectures her people were made to understand that sacrifices were necessary. . . .

In this respect the situation in Russia was extremely bad. Neither the Government nor the country at large was up to the modern complex forms of political life. The bureaucracy was used only to give orders, being of the opinion that all unnecessary discussions tend to undermine the prestige of the authorities; the people, due to their backwardness, were unable to rise above the interests of "their own parish" and to understand a national point of view. The situation was aggravated by the fact that by the end of 1916 all the educated classes in Russia found themselves in the camp of the opposition. As a result, the masses, instead of hearing from the leading groups explanations and words of encouragement, heard only criticism, blame, and prophecies of unavoidable catastrophe.

As a description of public feeling, the following extract from a letter written by Guchkov on August 15, 1916, to General Alexeev is of especial interest:⁴⁹

In the rear, disintegration is doing its full work, and the Government is decaying at its foundation. No matter how good the conditions now may be at the front, the rotting rear is once more threatening, just as it did a year ago, to drag your gallant front and your clever strategy, nay, the whole country, into that impassable swamp, from which some time ago we extricated ourselves after mortal peril. Indeed, one cannot expect that the railroads may be in good order when they are in charge of Trepov, nor that our industry may be productive when Prince Shakhovskoy takes care of it, nor that our farming may thrive and the problem of food be solved when they are in the hands of Count Bobrinsky. And, when you remember that the whole Government is headed by Sturmer, whose firmly established reputation (in the opinion of the army as also of the people) is that of a man who, if not a traitor, is ready to commit treason, that in the hands of that man are the foreign relations in the present and the issue of peace negotiations in the future, and, consequently, of all our future—you will understand the deadly fear for the fate of our country which fills the thoughts of the public and has taken hold of the people.

We in the rear, are powerless, or almost powerless, to struggle against that evil. Our methods of struggling are double-edged; and be-

⁴⁹ *Monarkhya Pered Krusheniem, 1914-1917*, p. 282.

cause of the excited state of the people, especially of the workers, they may strike the first spark and kindle a fire, the size of which no one can foresee and the limiting of which will be impossible. I am not going to speak about what is awaiting us after the War—a deluge is approaching—and a pitiful, wretched and flabby Government is preparing to face that cataclysm by taking measures only good enough to protect oneself from a shower. It puts on rubbers and opens an umbrella!

Can you do something? I don't know. But you may be sure that our disgusting policy (including our disgusting diplomacy) is now threatening to cut the cords of your good strategy, and completely to ruin its fruits in the future. History, in particular the history of our country, presents not a few ominous examples.

In nearly all the memoirs relating to that period one may find evidence of general discontent, a complete loss of prestige on the part of the Government, and a presentiment, even a certainty, that a formidable catastrophe was approaching. Rumors, each more gloomy than the one before, circulated in every class of society. The necessity of a dynastic revolution was spoken of almost publicly. The country was completely demoralized. No longer could it offer any source of encouragement to the army; it could only contaminate it with its spirit of dissolution.

CHAPTER XI

DISINTEGRATION OF 1917

Attitude of the Army toward the Downfall of the Empire.

THE events which took place in Petrograd in February and March, 1917, and led to the fall of the Imperial Government, astounded the army. General Denikin, who then commanded the Seventh Corps, writes:¹

To many people it seems amazing, incomprehensible, that the collapse of the centuries-old dynasty *régime* far from everywhere bringing the army to its defense, did not stir it even to sporadic movements of support. Why did not the monarchy find such a Vendée? . . . For I know of only three instances of active or proposed resistance: the movement of General Ivanov's detachment toward Tsarskoe Selo, which, organized by Headquarters during the first days of unrest at Petrograd, was carried out very unskilfully, and was soon called off; and of two telegrams to the Emperor, one sent by the commander of the Third Cavalry Corps, Count Keller, and a second by the commander of the Guard Cavalry Corps, General Khan Nakhichevanski. Both offered the Emperor their services and their troops to put down the "rioting." . . . It would be a mistake to think that the army was fully prepared to accept, even temporarily, a "democratic republic," or that there were neither loyal regiments nor loyal leaders ready to begin a struggle. Unquestionably there were such regiments and such leaders. But two things tended to restrain resistance: first, the apparent legality of the two acts of abdication,² the latter of which, by calling for submission to the Provisional Government, "vested with full power," struck every weapon out of monarchical hands; and, second, the fear that a civil war would open the front to the enemy. At that time the army obeyed its leaders. As regards the leaders, they, including General Alexeev and all the commanders of the fronts, had recognized the new Government. The Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich, who had again been appointed Commander-in-Chief, made the following statement in his first order: "A new Government has been established. For the good of our country, I,

¹ Denikin, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 61-62.

² The manifesto of the Emperor Nicholas II, and that of the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich.

as Commander-in-Chief, have recognized it and have set an example of military duty. It is my order that everyone serving in our gallant army and navy give his unhesitating obedience to this Government, whose commands will reach you through your immediate superiors. Then only will God give us victory."

This explains the attitude of the officers' corps, according to General Denikin. As for the soldiers, they were too unawakened, too stolid to understand at once what had taken place. As a result some sections of the army reacted in one way, others in ways that were wholly different. General Denikin states that on the reading of the manifesto announcing the Emperor's abdication, "here and there in the line of men, a rifle swayed, and tears poured from the eyes of the older soldiers. . . ." ³ On the other hand, there were regimental commanders who reported that their men refused to take the oath of allegiance to the Provisional Government before the regimental colors, and demanded that the initial of the Emperor, embroidered on them, be removed at once.

But regardless of the varying attitudes of the men in the ranks, one thing can be said to have been made overwhelmingly plain. Confidence in the Imperial Government had been completely undermined, and an end had been made of the linked unity expressed by the traditional formula, "for faith, and Tsar and country." "Tsar" and "country" became two conceptions having contrary meanings. Rumors that spoke of high treason on the part of the Empress, and of the unclean rôle of Rasputin, though without foundation, had an especially demoralizing effect. The very fact that Rasputin had been murdered by members of the Imperial family was interpreted by the soldiers as proof of the truth of such rumors. Disorders in the country, lack of supplies, disorganization of transport, malicious criticisms of the Government by the intelligentsia—in the case of our common soldiers, all this had gone deep, and had extirpated every feeling of confidence and respect for the former Government. The mystic prestige of the Imperial crown was destroyed. And there was therefore no reason to expect that in the first days of the Revolution any element of the rank and file would take up arms in the defense of that Government, now in its fall.

³ Denikin, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Part I, p. 60.

Your Majesty [telegraphed General Evert, Commander of the western front],⁴ it is impossible to rely upon the army, in its present condition, for the suppression of the disturbances. . . . I am taking all necessary measures to keep the news of the situation in the capital from spreading through my command, and to protect the latter from the unrest which would then certainly develop. There are no means at my disposal of putting down the revolutionary outbursts in the capital.

The Front and the Rear.

As one studies the attitude of the bulk of the troops in the first days of the Revolution, it becomes obvious that the degree of revolutionary feeling, and the tendency to yield to demoralizing influences increased proportionately with the distance from the front. This was observable throughout the entire year. The fact that every new wave of disintegration came from the rear was based on that; and the process of collapse in the army illustrated a kind of general psychological law. General Serrigny, already quoted in this connection, noticed the same thing in the French theater of war. He writes:⁵

This development made itself clear during the defeatist propaganda of 1917. Regiments which had been relieved from service at the front, and were resting in the rear, were the first to yield to such propaganda; and they were infected with the poison by reinforcement units and by men who had been on home leave. Germany experienced the same thing in October, 1918. She was in a state of complete disintegration. Her rear units and depot regiments were hoisting red flags and tearing the shoulder-straps from their officers, while troops in the firing line continued to fight gallantly. The latter, after the signing of the armistice, retreated across the Rhine in perfect order, and helped to restore it at home, for they had had no time to be infected. . . .

In Russia, the process of the spread of military disintegration from the rear to the front showed itself in another way. For in the northern front, behind which was the chief center of revolution, Petrograd, it developed more rapidly than elsewhere. Next came the western front, behind which lay the second focus of revolution, Moscow. The southwestern front, in the rear of which was Kiev, was in a more healthy state; and the waves of dissolution reached it only later

⁴ In *Arkhiv Russkoi Revolutsii*, III, 261.

⁵ Serrigny, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

on. . . . As for the armies on the Rumanian front, they made the best showing. They were on foreign soil, and that delayed the revolutionary process.

The Petrograd garrison, consisting of depot units, turned out to be the Revolution's driving force. Indeed it was its revolt that gave the Revolution its instant victory. The Baltic fleet and the fortress troops of Kronstadt, which were nearest to Petrograd, proved to be no less demoralized.

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies, made up of the revolutionary leaders, at once became the guiding agency of the Revolution; and it immediately changed its title. After "Workers'" the words "and Soldiers'" were inserted. And it made every effort to gain control over the rebellious troops. On March 1, in the name of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, its leaders issued to the Petrograd garrison the well-known Order No. 1. Its first paragraphs read as follows:

(1) All companies, battalions, regiments, artillery parks, batteries, cavalry squadrons, individual branches of military administration, and vessels of the navy will appoint committees of elected representatives from the rank and file. (2) All army units which have not yet chosen their representatives for the Soviet of Workers' Deputies will do so on the basis of one representative for each company; and such representatives will appear with their written credentials in the hall of the Duma, at 10 in the morning on March 2. (3) In all their political activities army units will be subject to the authority of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and to their own committees. (4) Orders of the Military Commission of the Duma are to be carried out only in cases where they do not run contrary to the orders and regulations of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. (5) Arms of every kind, including rifles, machine guns, armored cars, etc., must remain in the hands and under the control of company and battalion committees, and must under no circumstances be placed at the disposal of officers, even upon their demand.

The seizure of power in the capital by the Petrograd Soviet was made a reality as the direct result of Order No. 1. The Provisional

Government, in point of fact, was relegated to the background; and although it retained power for a certain time, its authority was only nominal. One of the first concessions which the Provisional Government was forced to make to the Soviet was the removal of the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich from the position of Commander-in-Chief.

"In the first ten days of the Revolution," writes M. Yakovlev, a Soviet author,⁶ "General Headquarters became the centre of a plot to keep Nicholas Nikolaevich in command. . . . The plan was upset by the soldiers and workers." This statement calls for correction. It was not the soldiers, but the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies who upset the plan.

The Petrograd Soviet made an effort to put Order No. 1 into effect in the whole army. But in that it did not succeed, and had to issue Order No. 2, which explained that Order No. 1 referred only to the troops of the Petrograd garrison.

Nevertheless, despite this initial failure, Order No. 1 played a very important rôle in the matter of the disintegration of the army. In the first place, it urged the masses of the rank and file to form "soldiers' soviets" on their own initiative. Secondly, it undermined the very foundations of established military discipline. Paragraph 5 of the Order, to omit everything else, declared that "arms . . . must under no circumstances be placed at the disposal of officers, even upon their demand." Thus insubordination was sanctioned, and officers were treated as the soldiers' dangerous enemies.

Many members of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies regarded Order No. 1 as an act precisely designed to break up the old army. Frank testimony to that effect was given by M. Goldenberg (editor of the daily *Novaya Zhizn*).⁷

Order No. 1 [he states] was the unanimous expression of the Soviet's will. On the first day of the Revolution we understood that, if we did not destroy the old army, the latter would crush the Revolution. We had to choose between the army and the Revolution. We did not hesitate. We took a decision in favor of the Revolution and we used, I declare it boldly, the proper means.

⁶ *Razlozhenie Armii v 1917 Godu*, p. 5.

⁷ Denikin, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Part I, p. 66.

Reports of the Members of the Duma.

At least some approximate idea of the attitude of the soldiers in the first month of the Revolution can be given by a report made by N. O. Yanushkevich, a member of the Duma,⁸ who, with other members visited various sections of the front. His report was read before the Provisional Committee of the Duma, which in the first month of the Revolution sought to maintain control over the Provisional Government headed by Prince Lvov.

This report by Yanushkevich is typical. It is almost identical with the reports of other members of the Duma, who, in March, 1917, had been sent by the Provisional Government to visit the army. Undoubtedly, their common mission accounted for the similarity of their reports; and the mission they had been given was that of strengthening the army's faith in the Provisional Government. In their desire to win the confidence of the rank and file they risked seeming to play the part of demagogues. In Yanushkevich's report this may be seen in his tendency to find an explanation for all rank and file disorders in the "tactlessness" of officers not in sympathy with the Revolution. The following detail is characteristic: the committees are called in the report "soldiers' and officers' committees," the word "soldiers'" being placed before the word "officers'." Similar details, written with intent to please the soldier in general, may be found in many other places. But, broadly speaking, one must admit that all such envoys of the Provisional Government were filled with a profound, patriotic, and sincere desire to help the army through the impending crisis.

The Yanushkevich report offers added evidence of the social and psychological law already spoken of, namely, that the disintegration of an army begins in its rear. Yanushkevich states that the spirit of the troops grew better as one neared the front, and that the attitude of the men in the firing line was "so cheerful, joyous and good that one felt reassured." "The soldiers," he said, "are waiting for something . . ." That "waiting attitude" of the bulk of the troops in the first days following the collapse of the old *régime* has been noted by all observers. It is very significant from the psychological stand-

⁸ N. O. Yanushkevich must not be confused with General Yanushkevich, Chief of Staff of the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich.

point. Up to then the great majority of people had been wont to look passively upon all high questions of national importance; there everything was decided by the Tsar and his Government: and such an attitude was the product of centuries of habit. Now, and suddenly, everything was overturned. The newspapers, in which the soldiers now were greatly interested, the speakers to whom they now listened for hours, exhorted freedom; and, they said, the people were henceforward to decide everything for themselves. Most soldiers were still bewildered and did not know what to do. From somewhere deep down in their inner consciousness selfish desires would often arise: to take away the land from the landlords, to rob the *bourgeois*, to abandon the front, and go home. . . . But the fact that a lawful Government, although its authority was shaken, was still in existence tended to restrain such anarchistic tendencies, and, for a while, they remained subconscientious. Under such conditions, the sounder elements at the front were inclined to rely upon the Duma and the Provisional Government. The ovations to the member of the Duma which Yanushkevich describes in his report were sincere. Few knew as yet that the Provisional Government had already been outtrumped by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. However, the extreme revolutionary elements in the army already suspected it. This may be seen from this sentence in the Yanushkevich report: "We were also requested to let them send their representatives to Petrograd to learn what was going on there." Later on, such representatives were sent by every army. In this way those who advocated making the Revolution more radical were able to establish contact with the Petrograd Soviet, which aspired at the leadership of the whole revolutionary movement.

This, however, Yanushkevich failed to see. Strongly impressed by the outward side of his reception, he forgot completely that all crowd manifestations are always highly emotional and subject to change, and that mere appearances could not serve as a guaranty that the same crowd, within the shortest time, would not acclaim with equal enthusiasm something entirely different. Nor did he realize that the underlying causes of the split between the officers and their men were of a more serious nature than the alleged "tactlessness" of the former. That split marked the beginning of the hostility which eventually led to civil war. He likewise failed to understand that

what was said about leaves of absence and the requests of the older soldiers to be sent home were ways of showing their unwillingness to go on fighting. That "refusal to wage war" was still confined to the subconscious in the case of most of the men; though they did not dare as yet to express it openly, it existed as a potential factor.

To show that our analysis is correct we shall cite the report of two members of the Duma, M. Maslennikov and M. Shmakov who visited the southwestern front one month later in April. Therefore, what had been taking place in the army at the time of Yanushkevich's visit appeared only in symptoms that were sporadic and barely perceptible, but everything had now become very plain. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the disintegration of the southwestern front, visited by Maslennikov, proceeded at a slower pace than the northern, with Petrograd in its immediate rear.

As we consider the report of Maslennikov and Shmakov, the following fact must not be left out of sight: during the first month of the Revolution, the soldiers' soviets were being formed in every section of the front. The commanding officers, anxious to get control over that elemental movement in the rank and file, decided to create committees of men and to place representatives of the officers on those committees. They hoped that in that way the soldier's confidence in his officers might be restored, and the gap between them bridged anew. Instructions to take such action were given by General Alexeev, who, as we have said, had replaced the Grand Duke as Commander-in-Chief.

By the time Maslennikov and Shmakov arrived at the front, committees in every regiment, division, and army corps had already been formed. Therefore, the task of the two members of the Duma, in so far as their being able to arrive at the attitude of the soldiers was concerned, was easier than that of Yanushkevich, who had visited the front when the committees were in process of formation and soldiers' meetings differed but little from casual gatherings apt to be carried away by the appeal of an eloquent speaker.

During their first visit to two regiments, described by Maslennikov and Shmakov as quite capable of fighting, they heard the formula "peace without annexations and contributions," which was the first slogan used by the defeatist propaganda of the Bolsheviks. The peculiar way in which the soldiers interpreted it may be judged

from the many cases where they refused to dig new trenches, even at short distances in advance of their lines, and when trenches were needed to strengthen the positions they were holding.

A frank explanation of the meaning of "without annexations and contributions," as understood by the soldiers, was given to the members of the Duma by the chairman of a conference of the committees of the Second Army, a war-time lieutenant, whose manner of speech "was clearly Bolshevik." After he had described the Duma as representing the interests of the *bourgeois* classes and the capitalists, "he declared that the army would fight to the end only on the condition that the actual intentions of the Allies were made known, and Russia given a guaranty that the War was not being waged for their capitalistic aims. Taken as a whole, the speech gave the impression of being made to undermine the prestige of the Duma and the Provisional Government, as well as confidence in the Allies. It was with this situation that the Duma's representatives were, for the first time, confronted. The speech of the chairman had an enormous success. . . ." Further confirmation came when they visited the engineers of the Guard.

The political views of the presiding body of the committee [says the report] proved to be very radical, and Bolshevik in their nature. At this meeting the question of peace was taken up for the first time in our tour of the front. A member of the presiding body, the editor of a Lettish paper, suggested a peace conference as the quickest way to liquidate the War. Other speakers demanded that our agreements with the Allies be published, to show that we were not fighting for their imperialistic and capitalistic aims. A lack of confidence in our Allies was clearly felt. Not a single word was said that was hostile to Germany. Nevertheless, the meeting ended with cheers.

But, later on, Maslennikov and Shmakov encountered frank displays of defeatism:

Soldiers of infantry regiments have often cut the telephone wires from artillery "observers" to the batteries. They have threatened to lift the artillery men on their bayonets if the latter opened fire on the enemy. The same threat to use the bayonet prevents all machine-gun fire. Fraternizing is in progress, though not to the same extent as at Easter when it took a monstrous form. . . . We were told that in our

trenches, some thirty yards from those of the Germans, the machine-guns were kept in their covers. . . .

From what has been said above, Maslennikov and Shmakov came to this conclusion as to the army's readiness to fight:

As we compare the present spirit of the army with what it was when we paid a visit to the northern front in the first days of the Revolution, we must regretfully state that the propaganda carried on by Germany through her voluntary and involuntary agents and spies in the rear, as also her propaganda at the front, under the pretence of armistices and fraternizing, have done their pernicious work. The soldiers are no longer eager to fight, nor to prove their willingness to sacrifice themselves for the sake of free Russia. They speak only of defense, and they are even afraid that when they do that they are acting in the interests of mythical French and English capitalists. The rear is already strongly infected with such propaganda. Our gallant artillery and the Cossacks are, so far, untouched. What the spirit of the cavalry is we do not know. And if some infantry regiments have already succumbed, to one thing only is due the fact that the same work of propaganda has not become general. That is the influence of the heroic elements among our soldiers, and the unsparing efforts of our brave officers, who place duty to country above undeserved offenses, slanders and insults. Propaganda has been successful among the infantry because it has found the weakest spot in our defense. Everyone is weary of *fighting*, and the Bolsheviks insist on the immediate ending of active military operations. [They had insisted on a war of defense, and a peace conference.] Their chief aims are to undermine the belief of the army in the Government, the Allies and the Duma, and to sow dissension and discord in the rank and file. Though the latter are tired of fighting, they are trying to find some compromise between their instincts of self-preservation and the need of continuing the War. From their country they hear that they must defend the new freedom. That is why a wrong interpretation of the formula "peace without annexations,"—that it means the cessation of all offensive operations—has taken root so deeply. Hence the soldiers' distrust of the Government and the Allies, and their hostile attitude to officers. Moreover, an overwhelming majority are pleased to believe that the Germans will comply with every demand put forth by the Russian democracy. The Germans, fully aware of this attitude, do their best to maintain and add to such a belief. They no longer fire upon our lines, and they preach their peaceful intentions through an organized system of fraternizing. . . . The firm determination of the Allies to

continue the War, and the words of the Provisional Government—that everyone must do his duty—mean the postponement of peace. And that propaganda which teaches distrust of England meets with proportionate favor.

The officers, a great majority of whom are for war until we win, find no sympathy, and agitation against them works in fertile soil. It is significant that in most cases those officers who had above all distinguished themselves by their bravery, are regarded with most suspicion. That comes from the fear that good officers may be able to compel their soldiers to advance.

In all this the connection between the defeatist feelings of the troops, and their attitude toward the Provisional Government can clearly be seen.

In the Fifth Army Corps, which as a whole produced a favorable impression on the two visitors from the Duma,

the political views [of the men] are identical with those of the Right Wing of the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies. Their attitude toward the Duma and the Provisional Government is benevolent, and sometimes emphasis is laid on the necessity of coöperation between the latter and the Soviet. We were received with enthusiasm. We were asked—the usual question—to what parties we belonged. And everywhere the same things were discussed, the future form of the Government, the Constituent Assembly, the question of the land, the relations between the Provisional Government and the Soviet. . . .

In one place, and toward the end of this visit to the front, a different note came out. It was at a meeting of the First and Second Infantry Divisions of the Guards. And there such words as these were heard: "The bayonet for the Germans, and the butt-end for the enemy within. . . . If the Provisional Government does not work hand in hand with the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, it will be abolished . . ."

The Rôle of Kerensky.

The great majority of the soldiers, as we have said, had been bewildered, in the first days of the Revolution, by the rapidity and ease of the overthrow of the Imperial *régime*. Correspondingly and with bursts of excitement then, they acclaimed the new authority represented by the Provisional Government. But very soon news began to

reach them that the actual power was not with that Government, but in the hands of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. While the soldiers did not wish to break with the Provisional Government, carried to the top by the first wave of the Revolution, their sympathies were with the Soviet organization. Highly significant is that part of the report which says that the views of the committees of those army units whose readiness to fight had been least impaired, were identical with the political views of the right wing of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. That was true everywhere. M. Yakovlev proves it when he states⁹ that "in the first days of the Revolution these [military] committees were headed by Social-Revolutionist and Menshevist elements¹⁰ which tried to stretch the Revolution on the Procrustean bed of bourgeois half-reforms." Such forces were responsible for that tremendous popularity which Kerensky enjoyed among the soldiers at the front, from the beginning of the Revolution. Due to that popularity, in July he was made head of the Government, despite the fact that he no longer satisfied the revolutionary aims of the Petrograd Soviet. In this lay the tragedy in the rôle played by Kerensky. All his power depended on the support of soldiers at the front. And, while their attitude was being changed more slowly than was the mood of the Petrograd Soviet, that chief center of the Revolution, every further intensification of it tended to undermine Kerensky's strength and increase that of the Soviet. Under such circumstances the army, at the front, became an arena for the struggle between two tendencies. One aimed to keep the Revolution to politics alone, the other sought to change it, most speedily, into a social revolution. There is no doubt, however, that the representatives of the former, including Kerensky, were involuntarily pushing it on to transformation to the social phase. At the soldiers' meetings, Kerensky used to cry out, "Comrades, let us intensify the Revolution." Yet in that, as in similar cases, his words were dictated purely by demagoguery; and by means of it, he and his political sympathizers were seeking to gain power over the masses. The same foolish demagoguery also accounts for the orders given by Kerensky which led to the decline of the

⁹ *Razlozhenie Armii v 1917 Godu*, p. 5.

¹⁰ It was precisely these elements that formed the right wing of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

prestige of army leaders,¹¹ to the destruction of discipline, and to further disintegration of the army. Kerensky did not understand what had been at work in the army from the beginning of the Revolution. There was another important factor in the situation. Though suffering from a psychosis, the troops had to go on fighting. It is only natural that the burden of the War,—so little understood by them—which had weighed upon them for three years, had stirred in them a spirit of ever growing discontent and unwillingness. Consequently, from the beginning of the Revolution a desire to end the War, along with the political, economic, and social stimuli at work in every revolution, spread rapidly in both the army and the people.

Deserters.

The vast increase in the number of cases of desertion and evasion of military service, which followed upon the outbreak of the Revolution, bears testimony to the urgent desire of the bulk of our soldiers to end the War. Let us go back to a few figures given in earlier chapters. The average monthly total of the sick increased 120 per cent, although the army suffered from no epidemic diseases and the sanitary conditions were no worse than before. The monthly record of deserters increased 400 per cent. Furthermore, beginning with March, 1917, there was a great "leakage" of soldiers from the front; and, in the rear, it became increasingly frequent for men to refuse, under varying pretexts, to join their regiments.

In the memoirs of General Polovtsev, who commanded the troops of the Petrograd military district, we find a description of one of the methods of desertion, and one practiced under the very nose of the Provisional Government.¹²

A rumor [he says] to the effect that all soldiers over forty were to be discharged had got abroad, and an agitation began to make this rumor a reality. As a result, soldiers of forty commenced to desert, and to arrive in the capital with requests for legal discharges. They camped on the Semenovskiy drill grounds, formed companies, founded their own republic, and sent deputations everywhere. Having no success, they commenced to parade the city, sometimes more than fifty companies at

¹¹ In May, he removed Guehkov from his position at the head of the War and Navy Ministries.

¹² Polovtsev, *Dni Zatmenya (The Eclipse)* (Paris, 1928), p. 81.

once. Chernov¹³ had encouraged them. Kerensky became enraged and had them driven out. I decided to starve them, and ordered their rations to be stopped. But it turned out that their republic could subsist independently, that they could live on what they made from the sale of cigarettes, from carrying baggage at the railroad stations, and the like.

As we pointed out in Chapter VI, more than 2,000,000 men left the army in 1917 wilfully, and under various pretexts, since the Revolution began. It was a stupendous flow of men to the rear, that could only be called a spontaneous mobilization.

The above figures fully justify the statement that "the refusal to wage war" became, soon after the Revolution had begun, a part of its fundamental character. The political leaders, placed at the helm by the first changes, leaders who for the most part belonged to the progressive *bourgeoisie*, failed to understand it. Nor was it understood by Kerensky, who in July had succeeded Prince Lvov, and, assisted by the Social-Revolutionists of the Right, had become the master of Russia's destiny. They all continued to exhort the people to go on with the War until final victory was won.

Only one small group, the Bolsheviks headed by Lenin, staked their success by going to the army and calling for the immediate ending of the War.

Opinion of Army Leaders.

Let us turn now to the opinions held by military leaders of the spirit of their troops. On the strength of reports, submitted to Headquarters on the western front—which we believe to be representative of the army as a whole—by the commanders of army units in the middle of April, 1917, the following memorandum was drawn up:

Most of the commanders agree that discipline has slackened; the confidence of the soldiers in their officers has been shaken, and the morale and the fighting capacity of the troops have decreased. At the present time they are fit only for defensive warfare; offensive operations will be possible in a month or two, after the excitement caused by

¹³ A member of the Social-Revolutionary Party, and one of the ministers in Kerensky's Government.

the Revolution has subsided. However, success may be counted upon only if most careful preparations are made.

Nearly every commander points out that the great volume of publications, especially the *Isvestia*, with which the army has been flooded and the proclamations and orders of the Soviets are doing immense harm. For they tend to take the troops from their duties and demoralize them. Much of such literature is little understood by the soldiers. Much is given undue credence, and only what suits them at the time is remembered. Joint committees of officers and soldiers, which are in process of formation, are clearly playing a quieting rôle.

Many commanders state that, following the Revolution, the will of the troops to win the War remains, and in some units it has even grown stronger. The spirit of the new regiments is somewhat poorer than that of the older ones. Most of the former can now be used only for defensive operations. Certain regiments, which for a long time have been occupying the same positions, are complaining of weariness, and above all, they need a long rest.

Most commanders look to the future with confidence, and they hope that in a month or two, the fitness of the troops for combat will be restored.

The feeling of Headquarters as to the general situation is made plain by the minutes of a conference held on March 18. At it the following conclusion was arrived at:

The army is sick. To establish normal relations between officers and men will probably require not less than two or three months. The spirit of the officers is now low, the troops are restless, and cases of desertion are numerous. The fighting capacity of the army has diminished, and one could hardly count on it for an advance. To sum up: (1) The possibility of carrying out, at the present time, the active operations planned for the spring, is out of the question. (2) The organization of the defense of Finland and that of the approaches to Petrograd call for an increase in strength on the northern front, inasmuch as the co-operation of the Baltic fleet can not be counted upon. (3) Armies on all fronts must remain on the defensive until order is restored in the rear and the necessary supplies are available. (4) Most energetic measures must be taken to reduce the number of men drawing army rations at the front. (5) All the foregoing must, definitely and clearly be communicated to the Allies by our Government, and we must point out that we are not now in a position to fulfil the obligations which we assumed at the conferences of Chantilly and Petrograd.

Reasons for Official Optimism.

As one reads the reports of the military leaders in the first months of the Revolution, an important contradiction appears. On the one hand, many commanders stated that, after the Revolution, the will to win the War remained, and in some units it even increased, while the great majority of commanders declared that for the time being the troops were incapable of advancing. A strange increase in "the will to win the War"!

Two things, however, may account for the contradiction. First, many commanders mistook the excitement aroused in their soldiers on the outbreak of the Revolution—excitement due to the granting of liberties—for true patriotic enthusiasm. Second, when the Revolution began, all commanders whose attitude was pessimistic were suspected as counter-revolutionists. Such officers were forthwith removed by Guchkov, Minister of War in the Provisional Government, and by Kerensky, his successor; for both—and especially the latter—had a great desire to win favor with the army.¹⁴ Thus, the commanders who remained were men who either played up to the Revolution, or at least were afraid to tell the whole truth.

This should be borne in mind when the contemporary reports of the commanders are studied, and it should be taken as a rule that they make the situation brighter than it really was. That, no doubt, made itself felt in the memoranda of the headquarters and in reports of commanding officers. Nor did it remain without influence on General Headquarters and General Alexeev himself. In his letter of March 12 to the Minister of War he says:

As regards the morale of the army no sufficiently clear idea can yet be formed, inasmuch as what both officers and men have been experiencing is still to be fully assimilated; and propaganda, by having so made its way into the army, has overturned the centuries-old order of military things. With God's help the army will come through the acuteness of the crisis fairly well; but the possibility of a decline in its fighting capacity, if only temporary, must be kept in mind. In the general course of events this will be the most dangerous moment for Russia. Our enemy, who is well informed, will, of course, take advantage, and try to

¹⁴ In the course of a few weeks Guchkov dismissed about 150 officers, holding high positions, among them 70 commanders of infantry and cavalry divisions.

deal us a decisive blow in our time of weakness. No one knows whom the general opinion of the army will then blame for the defeat.

Although in the above letter General Alexeev condemned propaganda, he did not say definitely that the Revolution was causing disintegration in the army and was likely to destroy it. He spoke only of the "possibility" of a temporary decline in the fighting capacity of the army and of that acute crisis which the army, with God's help, would come through.

Here, too, it is interesting to compare the lack of understanding of the disintegrating power of revolution, shown by Russian political and military leaders, with the view taken by their German colleagues.

The Government [writes General von Ludendorff]¹⁵ was afraid that an attack on our part might check the break up of Russia. At the beginning of April, when fraternizing at the front was at its height, von Linsingen's group of armies carried out a local attack on a bridge-head on the Stokhod, northeast of Kovel, which had remained in the hands of the enemy after the fighting of 1916. This was not in itself an important undertaking, but the number of prisoners we took was so large that even I was astonished. The Chancellor requested me to make as little as possible of that success; and I did as he asked, though unwillingly. The troops who had carried out the attack did not deserve to be passed over in silence. The incomplete accounts of the battle that we furnished to the press seemed strange to many people. I knew beforehand that such would be the impression, but considered it my duty to accede to the Chancellor's request lest anything should mar our hopes for peace. For that reason General Headquarters forbade any further operation of a similar kind.

Now let us compare the lines just quoted with what General Alexeev said of the enemy's certainty to take advantage of the chance offered by the Revolution, and deal a decisive blow. The Germans realized the formidable force of destruction inherent in revolution, while the Russian command saw in the situation only a temporary crisis. The simplicity of the Russian attitude toward revolution led to their believing that the army might be cured of it by engaging in an offensive. But, inasmuch as most of the commanders

¹⁵ Ludendorff, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

had reported that from one to three months would be needed to get the troops over the crisis, the offensive was postponed until June.

General Denikin, who at that time was Chief of Staff, justifies the projected offensive.¹⁶

There could be no doubt whatever [he says] that had the army remained passive, its loss of the fighting instinct would have ended in its going completely to pieces. On the other hand, an offensive followed by success might have restored its morale. The magic of victory might have accomplished such a change, though an outburst of patriotism could hardly have been expected. A sense of victory could, possibly, have swept away all the international dogmas sown by the enemy in the fertile soil of the defeatism being preached by the Socialists. For victory promised external peace and the possibility, if a limited one, of internal peace, as well. In case of defeat the State faced an abyss. Risk was necessary, and it was justified by the end, the salvation of the country. The Commander-in-Chief, the Quartermaster General and I were at one as to the necessity of an offensive. Our view was shared in principle by the other higher officers. There was difference of opinion, though the difference was important enough, only as to the readiness and fighting capacity of the troops.

That is, all hopes of saving the army were based on some final victory which would bring peace. But in 1917 the War was still in that stage when the only strategy possible lay in attrition, and not in any smashing Napoleonic blows. And, because of its inferior armament not only could the Russian army not count upon a decisive victory, but even an important success was unlikely. "Risk was necessary . . ." General Denikin writes. But risk may be either reasonable or absurd; and here it would have been the latter.

Coöperation with the Allies.

Another motive advanced was that an offensive was necessary for the Allies. Under the circumstances, however, that was no good reason. An offensive might have been useful to the Allies if made in April or May. This is pointed out by General Ludendorff in his reminiscences. But in June, it was merely an isolated attack. By sending the necessary reinforcements the Germans beat it off without difficulty. Consequently, the June offensive was absolutely use-

¹⁶ Denikin, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Part I, p. 178.

less to the Allies, and for Russia it was a most dangerous adventure.

As regards General Denikin's statement that the Commander-in-Chief, General Alexeev, was as much in favor of it as he, the Chief of Staff, was himself, that is open to doubt. In his letter of March 12, General Alexeev writes to Guchkov:

It is too late to speak now of the coördinated operations planned by the Allies and myself. We had decided on them in Chantilly in November, 1916, and in Petrograd, in February, 1917. And in those conferences Russia had assumed certain obligations. But, the present situation is such that, despite our efforts to preserve our standing in the eyes of the Allies, we must either postpone the fulfillment of those obligations or wholly abandon them.

The above obligations were these: The Russian army guaranteed to launch a decisive attack on the enemy not later than three weeks after the beginning of the offensive of the Allies. We have already given notice that, owing to disorganization, bad conditions of transport, and lack of supplies, we are not in a position to begin action before the early part of May. But, according to your letter, we can not fulfil even that modified obligation. To engage in any serious operation without reinforcements is out of the question. The Allies must be informed that we cannot be counted upon for any action before June; and our reasons for that must be made clear. Thus, by force of circumstances we are coming to the conclusion that during the next four months¹⁷ our army must remain quiet and avoid extended and decisive operations.

By insisting on an offensive the Russian High Command acted in keeping with the wishes of the new political leaders of the country. Revolutionary demagoguery of a certain kind helped those in favor of an offensive to advance themselves to higher posts. Here General Brusilov, who in June succeeded General Alexeev as Commander-in-Chief, must first of all be named.

"Shock" Units.

Belief in the possibility of saving the army from disintegration by ordering an offensive gave rise to the idea of forming shock units of volunteers. General Brusilov was one of the ardent advocates of such formations. In his order of May 22, 1917, he wrote:

To arouse in the army the offensive spirit of the Revolution we must

¹⁷ In April, May, June, and July.

form special shock battalions of the Revolution, made up of volunteers recruited in the interior; this will do its part to fill the army with the faith that, backed by all Russia, it is fighting for an early peace and the brotherhood of nations; these revolutionary battalions, placed in the most outstanding sections of the front, will, in the assault, set an example by their onslaught to those who may be hesitating.

General Alexeev was not in sympathy with that proposal. In a telegram to Brusilov of May 18 he made the following comments:

The assembling of unknown and untrained elements in the rear, instead of having good results, may work mischief. Only by selecting reliable men from among the regular troops can you obtain good material for the new units. This is my opinion, and by it, in spite of your arguments, I abide.

General Alexeev was right. Very few reliable reënforcements could be recruited in the rear. Those who expected that crowds of enthusiastic volunteers would start for the front from the interior, as had been the case in the French Revolution, were making a fundamental mistake: the hidden but at the same time the chief driving power behind the Russian Revolution lay in the unwillingness of the mass of the people to continue the War. The volunteer battalions were formed as General Alexeev had advised. They were made up of the better elements from the dissolving infantry regiments. In those regiments the position of such officers, non-commissioned officers, and men with a sense of duty, was becoming literally intolerable. They were absolutely without power or influence over the unruly soldiery. Not only that, but they put their very lives in danger by remaining with their units, for in the eyes of an army gone mad, they were an obstacle to fraternizing, desertion, debauchery, and the immediate ending of the War. Enlistment in the shock battalions not only enabled those better elements to continue to perform their duty, but it also removed them from the constant menace of violence.

It would seem that such a situation should have suggested to the army's leaders some method of utilizing those chosen units, different from that planned by General Brusilov and his supporters. Such units, being dependable, might have been used to stop the Revolution and restore order in both army and country. There the shock battalions might have given invaluable support to the Cossacks, and the

cavalry and artillery regiments, among whom the process of disintegration had been much slower than in the infantry; for the latter had lost almost all its regular officers. An incident which occurred on the Rumanian front, when the present author was Chief of Staff on that front, may show what might have been done. In the beginning of June a riot broke out in the Hundred and Sixty-third Infantry Division. Second Lieutenant Filippov, a Bolshevik and the leader in the trouble, went so far as to proclaim an independent socialist republic in the town of Kagul, where the division headquarters was located. The author immediately ordered¹⁸ the regiments of the Third Cavalry Division, two shock battalions, and several batteries to surround the mutinous division. After the firing of a few shots, it surrendered, the ringleaders were arrested, and the mutinous troops were disbanded. In a few days a similar use of shock battalions was made in the Seventh Army on the southwestern front when a mutiny in the Seventh Siberian Army Corps was suppressed. There were several identical cases in other armies.

The quickness with which all these mutinies were put down showed clearly that the shock units should have been regarded as the only practical means of stopping the collapse of the army. The preservation of those units was of primary importance. To insist on an offensive as most of the commanders did, was like passing a death sentence on them, for they were doomed, as assault troops, to suffer the heaviest losses. They even risked extermination if not supported.

Anti-War Propaganda.

The army's attitude may be judged from the thousands of proclamations put in circulation. We may quote here a typical example.¹⁹

Brothers, we beg you not to obey an order that is meant to destroy us. An offensive is planned. Take no part in it. Our old leaders have no authority now. The papers have said there should nowhere be an offensive. Our officers want to make an end of us. They are the traitors. They are the internal enemy. They would like everything to be as before. You know well that all our generals have been put on reduced pay,

¹⁸ General Shcherbachev, Commander on that front, was on leave of absence.

¹⁹ *Razlozhenie Armii v 1917 Godu*, pp. 35-36.

and they want this revenge. We shall be thrown back when we reach the enemy's wire. We can not break through. I have reconnoitred in the enemy lines, and I know well that there are ten rows of it, with machine guns every fifteen yards. It is useless to advance. If we do, we shall be dead men, with nobody left to hold our front. Pass this on, brothers, and promptly write other letters of the same sort.

Views of the Commanding Officers.

On May 2 the Commander-in-Chief, with the commanders of the various fronts, went to Petrograd to give frank notice, at a conference of the Provisional Government and the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, that the army was collapsing. The minutes of that conference are of great historical interest because they present a record of the opinions of the responsible commanding officers. We quote them at length:²⁰

Faith in our Allies [said General Alexeev] is disappearing. You take this into consideration in your diplomacy, and I must do the same thing in handling the army. Though it might seem that the Revolution would mean better morale, greater energy, and therefore victory, unfortunately, we have so far been mistaken. Not only is there no new energy in evidence, but the lowest instincts, such as love of life, and self-preservation have come to the surface. The interests of the country and its future are forgotten, probably because of the spreading abroad of theories quite misunderstood by the masses. The slogan "peace without annexations and contributions" has been interpreted as meaning that no longer is there any reason why a man should sacrifice his life. The army is on the very brink of ruin. One step more, and it will go into the abyss dragging with it Russia and her liberties, and nothing can save us. . . .

A thirst for peace [asserted General Dragomirov] that is all-dominant in the army. Anyone preaching peace without annexations, peace with the right of self-determination becomes a popular man. The ignorant, giving their own meaning to "without annexations" and unable to conceive of conditions in other countries, ask, why do not the common people among our Allies join us in such declarations? The desire to make peace is so strong that reinforcements, on arriving at the front, refuse to take their rifles. "What for?" they say, "We are not going to

²⁰ The full text of these minutes is printed in Denikin, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 48-78.

fight!" No work is being done. It is even necessary to take special measures to prevent the tearing down of trench timbering, and to repair the roads. On a section of the front held by one of the best of our regiments, a red flag was found carrying the device: "Peace at any price." An officer who tore it to pieces, had to flee for his life. He was hidden by Headquarters—it was in Dvinsk—and, all through the night groups of soldiers were looking for him. The dreadful words "supporters of the old *régime*" has meant the dismissal of our best officers. We all looked for the Revolution; yet many officers—the pride of the army—have been put on the reserve list because they have tried to keep their troops from going to pieces, or because they have not known how to adapt themselves. . . .

It is difficult to persuade the troops to do anything for the country. Under various pretexts, such as the bad weather or the fact that some of them haven't yet had their baths, they refuse to relieve the front-line units. There has even been a case of a regiment refusing to relieve another because two years before, just before Easter, it had occupied the same position. Therefore it would not do so again. It has become necessary to make bargains with the committees of the regiments concerned. All pride in belonging to a great nation has been lost. This is especially true of the people of the Volga provinces. "We don't want German land," they say, "The Germans won't come here, nor will the Japanese." And while one can profitably argue with individuals, it is very hard to alter the general attitude. . . .

Nowhere has it been possible fully to put in practice the election of officers. In some instances those the soldiers did not like, have simply been driven out as supporters of the old *régime*; or men who have shown themselves absolutely unfit, and have been slated for dismissal, have been asked to remain. There has been no way of persuading the soldiers to cease demanding the retention of such undesirables. As for excesses, men have made attempts to shoot their officers. . . . In the instinct for self-preservation even elementary shame has been forgotten, and panic has been made easy. The Germans well understand this, and they have taken full advantage of this desire for peace. They began the fraternizing, and began it on our time of disorder and collapse, to give all encouragement to our yearning for peace. Later, they began sending us peace envoys, which was frankly provocative.

The army [said General Gurko] is on the eve of collapse. The country is in danger and nearing destruction. You must help us. To destroy is easier than to build. You knew how to destroy. You should know how to restore.

In the cavalry, artillery and engineers [General Brusilov estimated] fifty per cent of their *cadres* still remain. The situation in the infantry, which forms the bulk of the army, is very different. Heavy losses in killed, wounded and prisoners, and many desertions have meant that the effectives of some regiments have been renewed as many as nine or ten times, while there are companies with not more than three of their original men. As to new reinforcements, their training is inadequate, and their discipline is worse than anything before. There remain only from two to four of the original officers per regiment, and many such officers have been wounded. Those we have now are young men who have been promoted after short periods of training, who lack experience, and who have no authority. Now, such *cadres* have been given the task of restoring the army, and on a new basis. This has so far been beyond their powers. Although the need of a revolution has been felt, and it even broke out too late, the soil for it had not been prepared. It was regarded by our backward soldiers as an emancipation "from oppression by officers." As to the officers, it unfairly took from them the right to exercise influence over their subordinates. Misunderstandings have occurred. Some of the older commanders, I admit, have not been without guilt. But, when the Revolution became a fact, everyone did his best to reconcile himself to it. The difficulties that arose were due to outside influences. Order No. 1 worked confusion in the army. Order No. 2 cancelled it so far as the front was concerned. But in the minds of the soldiers the idea had taken root that their commanders were concealing something, that some were granting certain rights and others even taking them away.

The officers welcomed the Revolution. Had we not given the Revolution so friendly a reception, it might not have been brought about so easily. But it turned out that liberty meant liberty only for the private soldier. The officer had to be content to be a pariah of liberty. The granting of liberty has stupefied the masses who have little understood what has really taken place. Everyone knows that important rights have been granted, but not what those rights are, nor are the masses interested in doing their duty. The officers are in a difficult position. About 15 or 20 per cent of them, those who are in sympathy with the new order of things, have quickly adapted themselves; the soldiers trusted them before and trust them now. Some have begun to flatter the soldiers, to indulge them, and to incite them against others. But the majority, about 75 per cent, have been unable to change and have become moody; they have shut themselves up in their shells, and don't know how to act. We are taking measures to get them out of their shells, and bring them and

their men together, for we have no officers now. Many officers have no political experience, and many more do not know how to talk to their men. All this keeps them from reaching a mutual understanding. It is necessary to explain things and to show the common soldier that liberty has been granted to all. I have known him for forty-five years, I like him and will try to bring him closer to our officers. But the Provisional Government, the Duma, and especially the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies, should spare no effort to assist us. They must do it without delay, for the sake of the country.

That assistance is also necessary because a peculiar interpretation has been put on the slogan "without annexations and contributions." One regiment declared that not only would it not advance, but it would leave the front and return home. The committees opposed this, but they were told that they would be replaced by others. I tried persuasion on the mutineers, and for a long time. But when I asked them whether they agreed with me, they asked leave to give me a written answer, and in a few minutes they put before my eyes a poster reading, "Peace at any price, down with the War!" When we began to talk again, one of them declared: "Since 'without annexations and contributions' is to be the word, what value for us has that hill over there?" I replied: "That hill is worth nothing to me either. But we have got to fight the enemy who is holding it." Finally, they gave me their word that they would not withdraw. But they refused to advance. "Our enemies are good fellows," they said, "They told us they would not advance if we did not. We want to go home, to enjoy our liberty and use our land. Why should we get ourselves crippled?"

Fraternization, the newspaper *Pravda*, widely circulated, the proclamations of the enemy, written in good Russian,—all alike result in depriving the officers of all influence, although they themselves are willing to fight.

Upon my recent appointment as Commander on the Rumanian front [testified General Shcherbachev], I made a tour of inspection of the armies under my control, and the impression I received of the morale of the troops and their fitness to fight were identical with those which have just been put before you in detail. . . . Without piling up examples, I will simply cite the case of one of the best divisions in the army, one which in earlier days won the name of the iron division, and which in the present war brilliantly maintained its reputation. That division, on a section of the front where an offensive had been planned, refused to do the needed preliminary trench work, and as a reason gave its unwillingness to advance. A similar case occurred recently in an-

other very fine division. Work begun by it was discontinued. The elected committees made an inspection and decided to stop it, because it was the preparatory step for an advance.

Changes in the Command.

On May 1 Guehkov resigned. He explained that "democratization" of the army which he had been trying to bring about in this way: "We wanted to mould the awakened spirit of independence, initiative and liberty which filled everyone, and to direct it into proper channels. But there is a certain limit, at which the disintegration of that powerful living organism, the army, must begin."

There is no doubt that that limit had been passed before May 1. That is, Guehkov himself had gone beyond it. However, we should remember that except at the very beginning, as Minister of War in the Provisional Government of Prince Lvov, Guehkov had no power at all. He could only follow the course set by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and try to block what clearly was leading to the ruin of the army. In his letter to General Kornilov of June, 1917, shortly after he resigned, he explained his course. "My task was," he said, "to seek to prevent that complete destruction with which the army was menaced by the Socialists, and especially by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and to afford the healthy elements a chance to regain strength by giving the disease time to reach its end."

Guehkov was followed by Kerensky, whose first steps were marked by many measures that made the demagogue's appeal, for instance his promulgation of the "Soldier's Declaration of Rights." And on May 22, on his demand, the Provisional Government removed General Alexeev and made General Brusilov Commander-in-Chief.

The Offensive of June, 1917.

The main attack in the summer campaign of 1917 was to be launched by the southwestern front in the direction of Lemberg. The attacks on the northern, western, and Rumanian fronts were to be only of a subsidiary nature. On June 18, the Eleventh and the Seventh Armies began the offensive. An excellent plan had been worked out. Artillery and technical equipment in quantities previously unknown to Russia's forces were concentrated to prepare the

infantry assault. All enemy works were literally leveled with the ground. Then and only then did the infantry advance in the zone of the enemy's fire; for the most part the picked shock units headed the advance. But the rest of the infantry followed with reluctance. Some regiments, having reached the enemy's lines, turned back on the pretext that the trenches had been so completely destroyed that it would be impossible to occupy them overnight. Nevertheless, thanks to the excellent artillery preparation and the heroic action of the picked units, the enemy positions were taken in the first two days. After that the Eleventh and Seventh Armies only marked time, inasmuch as the infantry was unwilling to advance further.

I feel in duty bound to report [wrote the commander of the Eleventh Army] that, despite the victory won on June 18 and 19 which should have strengthened the spirit and increased the zeal of the troops, no such effect could be seen in most regiments, while in some the conviction prevails that they have done their work and must go no further.

In the meantime, on June 23, the Eighth Army, on the left flank of the southwestern front, went into action. General Kornilov, commanding, had concentrated all his best units for a break through. But the same thing happened. The attack was successful, and even more so than in the center; for the Austro-Hungarian divisions facing the Eighth Army were of inferior quality. On the first day 7,000 prisoners and 48 guns were taken, and the Russian troops penetrated far into the enemy zone. But, as the advance progressed, the picked units, having suffered heavy losses, melted away, while the remaining infantry in their rear became so disorganized that a slight center attack from the enemy caused the entire army to fall back in the greatest confusion.

By July 2 this offensive on the southwestern front was at an end. The losses in the three armies amounted to 1,222 officers and 37,500 men. Such figures, compared with the losses before the Revolution, were small. But they were suffered solely by the picked units and the few regiments not yet in disintegration. Thus they were heavy indeed, for they meant the loss of all elements imbued with a sense of duty, and available for preserving some sort of order among the troops. As they no longer existed, the three armies became nothing but tumultuous crowds, which any first pressure by the enemy could put to flight. Such pressure was brought to bear on the left flank of

the Eleventh Army where at that time there had been concentrated 7 army corps²¹ or 20 divisions—a total of 240 battalions, 40 squadrons, 100 heavy and 475 field guns and howitzers. The opposing enemy had only 9 divisions, or some 83 battalions, with about 60 heavy and 400 field guns and howitzers. Despite such enormous numerical superiority, the detachments of the Eleventh Army began to retreat of their own accord. Soon the whole army was following in a panic. And the rest of the story may show how completely unfit it was to fight. On July 9 it reached the line of the Seret. An attack by three German companies put to flight the One Hundred and Twenty-sixth and the Second Finnish Divisions. Resistance to the advancing enemy was offered only by cavalry and infantry officers and non-commissioned officers supported by single soldiers. The rest of the infantry was fleeing, while crowds of deserters blocked every road. To tell how many there were it is enough to say that 12,000 were arrested in the neighborhood of Volochisk by a single battalion of picked men, who had been posted in the rear. And these fleeing mobs committed every act of violence. They murdered officers, robbed the people, and assaulted women and children.

On July 9 the committees and commissars of the Eleventh Army sent the Provisional Government the following telegram:

The German offensive, which began on our front on July 6, is turning into an immense catastrophe which perhaps threatens revolutionary Russia with ruin. A sudden and disastrous change occurred in the attitude of the troops, who had recently advanced under the heroic leadership of a few units. Their zeal soon spent itself. The majority are in a state of growing disintegration. Authority and obedience exist no longer. Persuasion and admonition produce no effect. Threats and sometimes shots are the answer. . . . For hundreds of miles one can see lines of deserters, armed and unarmed, in good health and in high spirits, certain they will not be punished. The situation calls for strong measures. . . . An order to fire upon them was issued today by the Commander-in-Chief, with the approval of the commissars and committees. And all Russia should be told the truth. . . . Though she shudder at it, it will give her the necessary determination to deal with those who by their cowardice are ruining and betraying both their country and the Revolution.

²¹ Five corps on the front and two corps in reserve.

Attempts at an offensive on the northern front ended as soon as they began. They were made on July 8-10.

Only two divisions out of six [Headquarters reported] could take part. The Thirty-sixth, after seizing two lines of enemy trenches and advancing against the third, turned back because shouts from behind called it to a halt. The Hundred and Eighty-second, compelled to by force of arms, took its position. But, when the enemy opened fire upon it it began firing crazily at our own troops. In the Hundred and Twentieth only one battalion advanced to attack. The Neishlotsky regiment of infantry not only refused to attack, but kept others from advancing by seizing the field kitchens of the front line units.

The same thing happened on the western front. General Denikin was then in command. At the Headquarters conference of July 16 he thus described the unsuccessful attempt of his front to attack:

The troops went forward, passed two or three lines of enemy trenches as if on parade, and . . . then went back to their own trenches. On a section of nineteen versts I had concentrated 184 battalions and 900 guns; the enemy had 17 battalions in the first line and 12 battalions in reserve, with 300 guns. For the attack 138 battalions were moved against 17, and 900 guns were used against 300.

The offensive on the Rumanian front began on July 10. It differed from the offensives undertaken on the other fronts in that not only Russian but also Rumanian troops took part. The example of the latter unquestionably produced a sobering effect. Headquarters, taking advantage of this, organized the attacks so that Russian and Rumanian troops might carry them out jointly. Besides, the shock units were not used as they were on the other fronts; they were regarded as infantry assigned the work of suppressing mutinies in corrupted army units. The offensive made good progress. The German line was broken, prisoners and more than 100 guns being taken. But on July 13 a telegram was received from Kerensky, which, in the name of the Provisional Government, ordered the advance to be stopped. The telegram was sent in accordance with the request of General Kornilov who, following the defeat of the armies of the southwestern front in Galicia, had replaced General Brusilov as Commander-in-Chief.

General Kornilov.

The appointment of General Kornilov meant that measures to restore discipline would be taken at once. Before consenting to act he placed before the Provisional Government very definite demands for its restoration; he categorically refused to serve unless those demands were granted. They included the reëstablishment of courts-martial, abolished at the beginning of the Revolution, and capital punishment.

On July 12 the Provisional Government issued a decree beginning:

The shameful conduct, both in the rear and at the front, of certain regiments which had forgotten their duty to Russia, has brought her, and brought the Revolution, to the very verge of ruin, and forces the Provisional Government to take extraordinary measures for the purpose of restoring order and discipline in the army. Fully conscious of the heavy responsibility for the future of the country that weighs upon it, the Provisional Government has found it necessary: (1) to restore capital punishment for the duration of the War, in the case of certain very grave crimes if committed by men in uniform, and (2) to establish courts-martial of the Revolution, to be made up of men and officers, for the immediate trial of those guilty of such crimes.

But it should be borne in mind that defeat was not the sole reason of the change of attitude of the Provisional Government, no longer headed by Prince Lvov, but by Kerensky. Between July 3 and July 5, the Bolsheviks made an attempt to seize power in Petrograd. This first attempt failed because the majority of the number of the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies were opposed to it. It was soon ended by a cadet battalion and Cossack regiments, after a few shots had been fired from a two-gun battery of horse artillery.²²

The defeats at the front had a sobering effect on those elements that still retained a sense of duty. The right wing delegates in the military committees began to realize that for the army further to play with revolution must surely bring the country to ruin. But the great mass of the troops were as reluctant to fight as before.

General Kornilov was doing his utmost to bring his forces back to what they should be. But his heroic efforts were meeting immense

²² Polovtsev, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-130.

difficulties. The elements that had remained faithful had been destroyed in the abortive offensives. Such elements had to be created anew, and to do that it was necessary to take advantage of the change for the better taking place in the loyal sections of the army and people. But, without the fullest coöperation of the Government, no lasting results could be obtained. Instead of assistance, General Kornilov was soon meeting with opposition from Kerensky. Such an attitude on the part of the head of the Government was bound to precipitate a crisis, inasmuch as there could no longer be any doubt that the vast majority of the troops and the people did not want the War to go on. Kerensky did not have the courage to tell the Allies this frankly, and at the same time he was anxious not to break with the Left. How afraid he was of such a break can easily be shown. After the Bolshevik uprising in July, General Polovtsev, commanding the troops of the Petrograd district, succeeded in getting the Government to give him a warrant for the arrest of the principal Bolshevik leaders.

It was not without pleasure [General Polovtsev writes]²³ that I received from Kerensky a list comprising the names of more than twenty Bolsheviks, headed by the names of Lenin and Trotsky, who had been set down for arrest. . . . But, no sooner had the cars been sent upon the mission, than Kerensky came back to my office and told me that the arrest of Trotsky and Steklov must be cancelled, for they were members of the Soviet. . . . Kerensky hurriedly left my office and rushed off somewhere in a car. The next day Balabin²⁴ reported to me that the officer who had come to Trotsky's apartment to arrest him, found Kerensky ahead of him, and he then cancelled the order. Such was the practical application of his fiery speeches on the necessity of a strong Government . . .

The Officers' Corps.

In fact, his hesitation resulted in his playing a double rôle. It was inevitable that such an attitude should lead to that crisis in the army known as "the Kornilov affair." And to understand its psychological side, what had been developing in the officers' corps must first be known.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

²⁴ Chief of Staff of the Petrograd military district.

Even before the War it was a corps that was not really a distinct caste. Men of humble origin were to be found even among the generals occupying high positions. General Kornilov himself was the son of a Cossack farmer. The conditions of service, the sense of honor uniting the officers as a class, the existence of the Guard, all that gave it the outward features of a caste; and they were misunderstood and misinterpreted by those who did not know the army. The corps was fundamentally very democratic. Traditions which had taken root in the army were often at variance with the Regulations which had been drawn up under strong German influences. Not only were the latter modified by the power of tradition, but even in spirit the Army Regulations became Russian as time went on. That the democratic spirit was inherent in the whole structure of Cossack life is well known, but even in the regular army also the elective principle in certain questions had been given legal sanction. In the case of the rank and file, that principle had developed in "artel" arrangements, whether of companies, squadrons, or batteries. And among the officers it showed itself in the "courts of honor," established to investigate and pass on cases in which the conduct of an officer was involved.

By the end of 1915 a large proportion of the permanent officers had been killed, and their places had been taken by officers of a new or war-time type. The latter came from the common people. During the winter of 1915-1916, when, following the catastrophe of the summer campaign, the military authorities were at work reestablishing the fighting strength of the army, special attention was paid to the question of filling vacancies in the command. In view of the fact that the war-time junior officers arriving from the interior, were inadequately trained, the following measure was put in force by the present author, as Chief of Staff of the Seventh Army. All such junior officers had to take a six-weeks course in tactics, for which purpose a special school was established in the immediate rear. According to reports made by it, 70 per cent of the men trained there belonged to the peasant class and only 4 per cent to the nobility.

It was with the help of these war-time junior officers that the Galician victories in the summer campaign of 1916 were won. With their blood, shed in torrents, did the new officers cement their union with the remnants of the officers of the regular army. For the strength of

that union there were social and psychological reasons. At the beginning of 1916 the following situation existed: the war-time officers then drawn in came from the educated youth of the country. The enthusiasm which marked the initial stage of the War had faded away. In the future one could only look for hardships. Those with a sense of patriotism little developed were seeking safe positions and settling themselves in the rear. As has been said, for the educated in Russia to avoid military service was easy. But all those who were patriotic and courageous had gone to the front, and were serving there. From the social standpoint a certain selection was taking place, and it was for the good of the army. This accounts for the fact that the newly promoted juniors and the older officers of experience were soon undergoing a kind of spiritual welding.

Such was the officers' corps at the outbreak of the Revolution. Systematic persecutions, to which the personnel of the command had been subjected by Guchkov, and especially by Kerensky, had been driving the officers into the ranks of those opposing the Provisional Government. For the time the officers had been suppressing their feelings of protest; but they were growing and certain to burst forth sooner or later, the more so since it would not be a protest from regular officers, in defense of some professional or class interest, but a protest from those who were patriots. This, in their party short-sightedness, neither Kerensky nor his close associates were able to understand. Instead of taking advantage of what was theirs to use, they turned it against themselves. For such a course they had only recently been blaming the Government of the Tsar. Now, having come into power themselves, they repeated the self-same error.

The Kornilov Affair.

The circumstances of the Kornilov incident, in which that protest found its first expression, are well known. In Petrograd a Bolshevik uprising was expected. To preserve order loyal troops, under an agreement between Kerensky and Kornilov, were to be sent to Petrograd. Simultaneously it was intended to put an end to the control over the Government exercised by the Petrograd garrison which, under the pretext of "defending the Revolution," had refused to go to the front and, in fact had made the position of Kerensky and his Government virtually that of prisoners. At the last moment Keren-

sky took fright and, referring to a conversation between his representative, M. Lvov,²⁵ and Kornilov regarding the need of strengthening the Government, he sent a telegram to Kornilov removing him. Kornilov refused to obey, and appealed to the army to rise against the Provisional Government. Kerensky, on his part, sent telegrams to all military committees denouncing Kornilov as a rebel.

Kornilov was backed by a small group of officers at General Headquarters, who were ardent patriots but had no real strength; all other officers in sympathy with Kornilov were scattered among the troops and were completely in their power. As for the mass of the rank and file, it was clearly against Kornilov. On the Rumanian front Kornilov's appeal to rise against the Provisional Government was received about midnight; an hour later there arrived the telegram from Kerensky which proclaimed Kornilov a traitor. The following day, about noon, all the committees in every army on the front wired to the Provisional Government begging it to court-martial Kornilov. In the evening of the same day General Denikin, commanding the southwestern front, his Chief of Staff, as also the generals commanding the armies on that front, were put under arrest by their troops. And they began to massacre the best officers, under the pretext that they were "Kornilov's supporters."

Kornilov's appeal was worse than premature. It was the doom of the flower of the army and the intelligentsia. To save the situation General Alexeev was forced to oppose Kornilov. By taking such an attitude, he showed that he placed the salvation of Russia above his political and personal sympathies. Having the mind of a statesman, he saw that Kornilov must submit to Kerensky, hard though it was. Alexeev persuaded Kornilov to abandon further resistance. Alexeev, that man of sterling honesty, had to hear Kornilov answer in his excitement; "You are following the course which marks the division between the gentleman and the man without honor . . ."

The Final Breakdown.

After Kornilov surrendered Kerensky himself became Commander-in-Chief. The break-up of the army was proceeding at full speed. The existing military committees were considered by the sol-

²⁵ V. N. Lvov, not to be confused with Prince George E. Lvov, head of the first Provisional Government.

diers to be too reactionary. Everywhere self-styled "revolutionary tribunals" sprang up, which soon changed that name to "military revolutionary committees"; their personnel was made up chiefly of men of the Extreme Left and, even to a greater extent, of adventurers anxious to fish in troubled waters, and bent on using the Revolution for their personal advantage.

As a result of the Kornilov incident a complete and final break between officers and private soldiers took place. The bulk of the men now looked upon the officers not only as "counter-revolutionists," but as on the chief obstacle to an immediate ending of the War. The Bolsheviks and the Germans were making full use of the situation. "The attitude of the troops," Zhdanov, Commissar of the western front reported, "is growing worse under the influence of the defeatist propaganda which the papers *Burevestnik*, and *Tovarishch*, and the German paper *Russkii Vestnik*, are spreading . . ."

What the attitude of the army was on the eve of the Bolshevik *coup d'état* one may judge from the following report of General Headquarters, based on information received between October 15 and 30, 1917.

The general feeling of the army continues to be, as in the first half of the month, one of highly nervous expectancy. Now as before, an irresistible thirst for peace, a universal desire to leave the front, and end the present situation somehow in the quickest possible manner constitute the main motives on which the attitude of most of our troops is based. . . . The army is simply a huge, weary, shabby, and ill-fed mob of angry men united by their common thirst for peace and by common disappointment. The above holds true, more or less, for the entire front . . .

On October 25, in Petrograd, the Bolsheviks, supported by the garrison of the capital, overthrew the Provisional Government. A bloody struggle ensued, in which Kerensky had to look for support to those forces which had been undermined by him during his conflict with Kornilov. Anyhow the Bolshevik victory was certain, inasmuch as they had won the masses over to their side by the promise of an immediate cessation of the War.

The Soviet of People's Commissars proclaimed in their wireless message:

Soldiers, peace, the great peace is in your hands, you will not let the counter-revolutionist generals make peace a failure. . . . Let the regiments, holding the line, immediately select delegates for formal negotiations with the enemy looking to an armistice. The Soviet of People's Commissars authorizes you so to do. . . . Soldiers, peace is in your hands . . .

This marked the end of Russia's participation in the World War. But the people of Russia did not obtain the promised peace. Simultaneously with the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks civil war began, and one of the cruelest civil wars in history.

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